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A b s t r a c t 
Chinese l i terary tradition has no voice in contemporary 
cr i t ical discourse, and this has made it easy for the dominant 
Western system of interpretation to take over the enunciation of the 
Chinese literary tradition. So this thesis tries to outline a reading 
position in a Chinese-Western comparative discourse, which aims at 
an art iculat ion of the Chinese literary tradition in contemporary 
critical discourse with minimal distortions. Such a reading position, 
in this line of argument, represents a kind of interpretation with no 
necessary relation to Western theories. In this thesis, however, 
inf luence f rom the dominant system of interpretation is conceived to 
be inevitable. This reading position is thus devised as a means to call 
into question both sides of the juxtaposition. Between the Chinese 
and Western systems of interpretation there is a gap that is not easy 
to be fused. This thesis tries to read towards an "other" Chinese 
cr i t ical d iscourse which grounds itself on the rear t iculat ion of 
contemporary theories of reading in a (post-)colonial context, and it 
can thus be seen as a radical quest ioning of given dominant 
discursive categories. 
The introduction first discusses the politics of an "other" 
critical discourse which brings forth the problems that such a reading 
posit ion may have to face. The second chapter goes into the 
problem of textuality to see how the paradox generated in a text may 
be appropriated by the hegemonic interpretation to legitimate the 
production of meaning as a means of suppressing the voice of the 
cri t ical Other . The third chapter examines the "hermeneutical 
f ramework" of this "other" reading position as laid down in the 
previous chapters. The problem faced by the critical Other in a 
comparat ive discourse is underscored in Chapter Four with relation 
to feminist discourse, the discourse of yet another critical Other. The 
f i f th chapter deals with three different positions (James Liu, Stephen 
Owen and Wai- l im Yip) in reading traditional Chinese poetry and 
poetics. By going into the textual/political space opened by these 
reading positions, this chapter tries to propose a reading stance for 
an "other" interpret ive subject in a Chinese-Western comparat ive 
discourse. The last chapter then examines different (post-)colonial 
discourses in order to see how the reading of this "other" subject can 
be oppositional and transformative in a post-colonial cultural context. 
Throughout this thesis, the reading posit ion of Chinese critical 
discourse is conceived as a radical critique of contemporary theories 
of reading and interpretat ion, which aims at a t ransformation of 
Chinese critical discourse as a real "difference" that truly exists and 
functions in a polyphonic context. 
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Chapter One: 
Introduction: The Politics of an "Other" Critical Discourse 
"We speak for those who do not have a voice." So the slogan 
of an advertisement placed by a rehabilitation centre for the mute 
goes. I cite this slogan at the very beginning because I find that 
such a tendency of speaking for the silent other has been pervading 
the field of comparative literature. The monologic articulation of such 
a slogan, of course, is in favour of the handicapped. However, in an 
age of neocolonialism1 such as ours, we cannot afford to overlook the 
i d e o l o g i c a l , soc io -po l i t i ca l and even economica l suppress ion 
immanent in such a seemingly benevolent tendency when we talk 
about comparat ive literature. 
Chinese-Western comparatists with a Chinese background, 
including myself , have been rehearsing the agony of having no 
discourse of our own. I am not simply talking about the languages 
that we are using. Although JanMohamed and Lloyd are not wrong 
in saying that "every time we speak or write in English, French, 
German or another dominant European languages, we pay homage to 
Western intel lectual and political hegemony,"2 cultural hegemony 
* P lease refer lo Oxford Literary Review (1991) , a special issue on 
"Neocolonia l i sm", ' for lhe different implications of this term. Among others, Robert 
Young, the editor of this issue, writes in the introduction, "Neocolonial Times," that 
"much of the attraction of the study of colonialism lies in the safety of its politics of 
the past . Neocolonial ism, on the other hand, is concerned with the more awkward 
ef fec ts of colonial ism in the present..." p.2. 
2 A b d u l J anMohamed and David Lloyd, "Toward a Theory of Minor i ty 
Discourse , " in JanMohamed and Lloyd eds., The Nature and Context of Minority 
Discourse (New York & London: Oxford University Press, 1990), p.2. 
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should not be merely seen on the level of which language one is 
using. "The task facing us It not the advocacy of a return to pure 
ethnic origins," so Rey Chow adds to JanMohamed and Lloyd, "rather, 
it is to articulate the special ways in which ethnicity, as the site both 
of an inevitable cultural predicament and of possible formations of 
c o l l e c t i v e i d e n t i t i e s - i n - r e s i s t a n c e , func t ions . "3 Indeed, such an 
ethnicity is essential, but the more urgent need seems to be finding a 
d iscourse to express such an ethnicity in a dominant Western 
language which is the most widely-used, if not compulsory, medium 
of contemporary discourse; otherwise, any ethnicity is doomed to be 
articulated by those who care to speak for those who do not have a 
voice of their own. We have to see why a particular language 
becomes the "off ic ia l" medium and the ideological impl icat ion 
systematically hidden behind the textuality of that language. As 
Antony Tatlow rightly indicates, "Comparative Literature has now 
turned, where it is most adventurous, to an anthropological or 
ethnographic investigation of texts, of 'textuality' or writing, of the 
whole cul tura l text ."4 So I decide not to choose texts f rom "two 
traditions, analyze and then compare them. I would rather situate 
the issue in the context of dominant vs. marginal discourse. In this 
sense, a comparative discourse is not inscribed on an Archimedean 
point outside the two systems being compared. It is situated in-
be tween , and the " in-between-ness" is the condi t ion of the 
articulation of a comparative discourse. 
3 R e y Chow, Woman and Chinese Modernity: The Politics of Reading between 
West and East (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990), p.xi. 
4 Antony Tatlow, "The Context of Comparative Literature," in Chinese/Foreign 
Comparative Literature Bulletin 1 (1990), p.4. 
Chu 3 
While contemporary critical discourse is becoming more and 
more sensitive to the colonized alien Other, the situation faced by a 
Chinese-Western comparatist becomes all the more embarrassing. In 
a sense we are no different from the colonized Other, such as woman, 
the Black and the Third World who are struggling for a discourse of 
their own against the hegemonic cultures in the contemporary scene. 
On the other hand, the "vestige," be it a burden or not, of the Chinese 
tradition is situating us (as Chinese-Western comparatists with a 
Chinese origin) in an academic dilemma - to keep or to abandon the 
t r ad i t i on . 5 Worse still, when the West is haunted by the excess of its 
own history in the post-structuralist context, the postmodern Chinese 
critic has to face the danger of becoming a means to drain such an 
excess. For instance, Fredric Jameson has been saying that China will 
be an antidote to the spiritual crisis in the West, but it seems that he 
is simply treating China as a car in the junkyard, good only for spare 
parts for the Western automobile/ ' In this sense, our tradition may 
5 In fact., ever since the May-Fourth Movement , Chinese intellectuals have 
been vigorously debating whether the Chinese tradition should be abandoned for the 
sake of complete westernization. This question has been the main concern of every 
Chinese facing a cultural predicament caused by the domination of Western culture. 
In this respect,* I am more sympathet ic with the view, such as that of the 
"contemporary Neo-Confucians", that the tradition does take a very important role in 
the transformation of Chinese culture. As I am going to demonstrate in the rest of 
this thesis, my aim is to figure out an other way of transforming Chinese culture in 
the Western hegemonic discursive context. 
6 S e e for instance, Fredric Jameson, "Modernism and Imperialism," in Seamus 
Deane ed.fc Nationalism, Colonialism, Literature (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1991), p.51. Jameson claims that in Western discourse, "pieces of puzzle are 
missing; it can never be fully reconstructed. . , " The Third World culture, in 
Jameson's view, is a means to recover that loss. See also his lectures delivered at 
Beijing University during September to December in 1985 for his "hope" upon China. 
The Chinese translation of the lectures is published in book form: Iiou xiandai zhuyi 
yu wenhua lilun {Postmodernism and Cultural Theories), trans. Tang Xiaobing (Sanxi: 
Sanxi Normal University Press, 1987). 
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only be good for the manipulat ion of Western hegemonic 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 
At this point I think it would be necessary to adduce two 
different kinds of "interlocutors." When Edward Said expounds the 
term "interlocutor," he claims that this notion "is ' so unstable as to 
sp l i t qu i t e d ramat ica l ly into two fundamen ta l l y d i sc repan t 
meanings." The first one is that "it reverberates against a whole 
background of colonial conflict, in which the colonizers search for an 
interlocutor vcilable" and the other is a good deal less political that 
"der ives f r o m an a lmost ent irely academic or theore t ica l 
envi ronment , and suggests the calm as well as the antiseptic, 
controlled quality of a thought-experiment."7 This thesis assumes 
interlocutor vcilable of colonial conflict and is to be an analysis of the 
cross-cultural conditions with such an interlocution - political, not 
neutral. Being a critical Other which struggles to speak in its own 
voice in a comparative discourse, Chinese discourse is a somewhat 
different enunciation from that of the minorities.8 Chinese critical 
discourse is not. identical to feminist hermeneutics or black aesthetics 
in the sense that the traditional Chinese culture once had a tradition 
of its own (although in the past there were not as many cross-
cultural communications as nowadays). However, the problem of 
having that tradition articulated in contemporary discourse remains. 
"Chinese hermeneutics" can be seen as a prerequisite for a Chinese 
7 See Sa id , "Represen t ing (he Colonized: Anthropology ' s In te r locu tors , " 
Critical Inquiry 15 (Autumn 1989), p.210. 
8 One may even say that Chinese discourse is the "majori ty" discourse on 
earth, in terms of population. However, what I am trying to stress here is the lack of 
a voice of one's own. In this respect, Chinese discourse has to be conceived as a 
minor i ty d i scourse . 
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discourse to express its own set of interpretation standards to the 
West, and such a hermeneutics, obviously, should not in the least be 
a kind of raw material for. the West to tailor-make the missing pieces 
of their puzzles, which can never be reproduced in Western culture. 
Unfortunately, a concept like "Chinese hermeneutics" will inevitably 
bring forth many theoretical problems for us. 
The term "Chinese hermeneutics" conveniently gives the 
impression that the term should be handcuffed in quotation marks 
lest causing confusion, or else it must mean dealing with Wenxin 
diaolong, Wenfu and the like in a "hermeneutical" (Western) way.9 
The term "Chinese hermeneutics" that I employ may give the illusion 
that it aims at borrowing Western hermeneutical theory - in this 
case, hermeneutics is conceived as theory - to systematically clear up 
a hermeneutical framework in Chinese classics. If it is .so, I would 
tender my apologies for my "Chinese hermeneutics." Although I 
believe that Western concepts may not be totally applicable to 
Chinese materials, 1 am afraid it is inevitable for one to have Chinese 
« 
discourse articulated in the Master's language. Without conforming 
to the rules of the game laid down by the dominant discourse, 
Chinese culture will at best be seen as mysterious, and at worst alien. 
If one cannot go "inside" the mainstream hermeneutic thought and 
methodology in order to establish a sound "Chinese hermeneutics," 
one will definitely be excluded from the mainstream culture. 
9 Tl i e re is indeed nothing wrong with such a treatment. However, as I have 
shown above , I would rather see this dissertat ion as situated in a post-colonial 
cultural context , and so the resistance towards hegemonic culture will be seen as the 
first , prerequis i te in the transformation of the Chinese tradition. 
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It is useful to distinguish several different approaches to a 
"Chinese hermeneutics ." " To use the development of Western 
hermeneutics and its contribution to the problem of interpretation 
and understanding to shed light on a systematic treatment of the 
Chinese tradition of interpretation in Chinese classics is the first 
approach. But as I have mentioned above, since this thesis is 
grounded upon the "political" aspect of interlocution, this approach is 
not advocated. Second, one may emphasize the "Chineseness" of a 
Chinese way of interpretation which cannot be "understood" by the 
West . This approach, I would say, does not meet our aim of 
establishing a comparative discourse. It may also be possible for one 
to j ux t apose Chinese and Western tradit ions, but, as I will 
demonstrate later in the thesis, such a juxtaposition may allow the 
dominant tradition to distort the other discourse. There is an illusion 
that when Chinese and Western discourses are juxtaposed, the 
juxtaposition must bear some kinds of "meaning." However, I would 
later demonstrate that such a belief is only a kind of rehearsal of the 
"meaning" authorized by the dominant system of interpretation. 
Consequently, I do not intend to adopt these approaches in this 
thesis; but rather, I will approach the issue from an other direction. 
< The "Chinese hermeneut ics" I envisage is a "mutual 
defamiliarization" which "constantly cail(s) into question our methods 
of constructing," borrowing Tallow's idea when he talks about the 
juxtapos i t ion of two literary systems. 1 0 So I would rather treat 
"Chinese hermeneutics" as a device to question the given dominant 
discursive categories, such as "interpretation" and "meaning." By 
l^Tal low, "The Context of Comparative Literature," p.2. 
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problematizing the given discursive categories, it may be possible to 
establish new discursive spaces for the articulation of marginal 
discourse. It is in this light that I believe a method of interpretation 
may question "interpretation" as a given discursive category by 
examining the legitimation of its meaning. The reason I use the term 
"hermeneutics" is basically due to my conviction that interpretation 
is the most important factor in such a "defamiliarization." I believe 
that our questioning of the given dominant categories must be 
grounded on the problem of interpretation since we have to inquire 
into the ways "meaning" and dominant ideologies reproduce 
themselves in a comparative discourse. Therefore, to use the term 
"hermeneutics" can on the one hand foreground the problem of 
i n t e rp re t a t i on , and on the other e f fec t ive ly cha l l enge the 
(re)production of meaning and dominant ideology. 
At this point, it would be helpful to clarify the name "Hermes" 
f rom which "hermeneutics" is derived. As a messenger of the gods, 
Hermes definitely embodies the transmission of their message, but at 
the same time his own never transparent being must also (re)present 
the interpretation of the gods' message. One just has to take a look at 
the fact that the Greeks and Romans heartily considered Hermes both 
as the god of eloquence and lies to perceive the immanent paradox. 
Here I find myself sympathetic with the point that Tatlow puts 
forward when he explicates Western hermeneutics as the science of 
biblical interpretation. Tatlow writes, 
What is significant is Jiow the institution 
arranges the production of meaning, adjusting 
advances in unders tand ing to what is 
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perceived as a theologically or/and socially 
necessary ideo logy or canon ic i t y . 1 1 (my 
e m p h a s i s ) 
So far my argument conveniently gives the impression that we have 
to talk about the politics of "Chinese hermeneutics" in a comparative 
discourse . In saying that we have to deal with the politics* of 
"Chinese hermeneutics," however , I will not treat "politics" and 
" h e r m e n e u t i c s " as two separa te conceptua l en t i t ies in this 
dissertation. In other words, I do think it is possible to clear up a so-
called "Chinese hermeneutics" from the Chinese literary tradition, 
and then talk about the politics of that tradition. I would rather 
treat the issue from the viewpoint that "Chinese hermeneut ics" 
cannot be established without a keen sense of the politics of reading 
in contemporary critical discourse. As Robert Young asserts, 
The "yoking of politics" to theory assumes 
that politics is already known, that it is self-
evident what it involves, that it is positioned 
outs ide theory, so that theory can have 
nothing to say about it, whereas oh the 
contrary politics can have a lot to say about 
theory: that it can judge it, identify it, 
a c c o r d i n g to p ro toco l s that have , by 
implication, been thought through elsewhere, 
outside theory.12 (my emphasis) 
1 * Tal low, "The Context of Comparative Literature," p. 3. 
^ R o b e r t Young, "The Polities of T h e Polities of Literary Theory'," Oxfo 
Literary Review 10 (1988), p. 131. 
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One of the basic doctrines that underlines this dissertation is 
that there exists no Archimedean point outside the critical discourse 
in which both politics and theory are inscribed. Chinese-Western 
comparat ive discourse is certainly no exception. It is a common 
prac t ice in Chinese-Western comparat ive literature to adopt the 
Western pivot to examine Chinese aspects, but such a pivot is 
obviously possible only when one neglects a higher level of discourse 
that controls and legitimates the "use" of the pivot, Therefore, I 
would not discuss the politics of "Chinese hermeneutics" with politics 
outside the comparative discourse. " It must be in the interpretation 
too. As Young has rightly indicated, 
What the different meanings of "the politics of 
theory" do all share, however , is that 
possessive "of" - meaning that literary theory 
whatever it is, has or possesses a politics, a 
politics that can be ascribed to it and for 
which it can be called to account. This 
assumes that literary theory can somehow be 
isolated, that its politics are intrinsic to it and 
not the product of any situation that it might 
find i tself , in or with which it might be 
confronted. On the other hand as we have 
seen the phrase "the politics of" implies that 
politics as such are somehow outside theory: 
the phrase itself could therefore be said to be 
s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y , s u g g e s t i n g both that 
polit ics are essential to theory, and thus 
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exclusively interior, and at the same time that 
polit ics const i tutes a realm outside theory 
which is exclusively exterior to i t . 1 3 
I cite this extensively since it serves to highlight the fact that we 
should not treat the "politics" of "Chinese hermeneutics" outside the 
discourse of "Chinese hermeneutics" itself. If we are to adopt this 
approach we may merely arrive at a so-called "self-contradictory" 
discourse , and in the last analysis it will even become a self-
subversive one. 
In this post-structuralist context, "Chinese hermeneutics" 
should not be regarded as a position, but rather as "a state of 
d i f f i c u l t y , " as Young ment ions when he talks about Mpost-
s t r u c t u r a l i s m . " 1 4 I have no intention of placing my so-called 
"Chinese hermeneutics" simultaneously inside and outside my own 
discourse. That is to say, I will not regard my discourse as higher 
than that of the "Chinese hermeneutics" that I am discussing. I 
cannot be both ..inside and outside at the same time. In this respect 
Spivak has something similar to say: 
The line between the politics of explanation 
and the specific politics that my text explains 
is ever wavering. If I now call this a 
he te rogeneous p red icamen t const i tuted by 
discontinuities, I hope I will be understood as 
using vocabulary rather than jargon. This is 
1 3 Young , "The Politics of 'The Politics of Theory'," p. 133. 
1 4 Y o u n g , "The Politics of T h e Politics of Theory'," p. 146. Young writes, "Post-
structural ism is not itself a position hut a state of difficulty, a name for a conflict in 
wh ich t he re is a dynamic but no necessary cance l l ing , p r e se rv ing or f inal 
reso lu t ion be tween terms," 
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the predicament as well as the condition of 
possibility of all practice.1-^ 
Meanwhile, I will not try to claim a kind of "Chineseness" as 
the sole characteristic in my so-called "Chinese hermeneutics" since I 
do not want to give the impression that a "Chinese" talking about 
hermeneut ics would automatically become "Chinese hermeneutics." 
Nor do I want to claim that using Western hermeneutical rules to 
read Chinese materials will spontaneously generate a "Chinese 
hermeneut ics ." The f lashy tag of "Chineseness" would merely 
become self-flattery, .or even self-deception, without a keen sense of 
reading (as) the Other in contemporary discourse. It would merely 
be an undesirably essentialistic attitude which sees, "Chineseness" as 
something impossible to be comprehended by the West. I will come 
back to this issue later in this dissertation. 
Although I claim that one should not borrow Western theories 
to analyze Chinese materials without any awareness of the problems 
that they bring, I do not feel that an approach the other way round -
emphasizing Chineseness and speaking against Western theories - is 
possible. The term "Chinese hermeneutics" I employ so far thus 
seems to bear an immanent limitation: on the one hand it shows 
re l iance on Western hermeneutics and on the other it tries to 
advocate Chineseness. Unfortunately, as I have mentioned above, I 
do not feel that these ways are adequate in proposing a real "Chinese 
hermeneutics," Nor is it possible , to talk about the politics of it, as 
m e n t i o n e d above, to see how it func t ions , This "Chinese 
l ^Gaya l r i Chakravorly Spivak, "Explanation and Culture: Marginalia ," in her 
In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics (London & New York: Roulledge, 1987), 
p .110 . 
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h e r m e n e u t i c s / ' however , is much-needed in a Chinese-Western 
comparative discourse. Facing this double-bind, I think it would not 
be wise to handcuff oneself by the term "Chinese hermeneutics" and 
thus imprison one's discourse in the double bind. Instead, I will try 
to approach the issue f rom an "other" direction to examine the 
reading position of a critical Other in a comparative discourse, and 
this reading position can let us have a clearer view of the Chinese 
interpretive subject in a Chinese-Western discourse. Hopefully, the 
examination of this reading position - this position sees the problems 
raised by the issue of "Chinese hermeneutics" as its central concern -
will pave the way for the discourse of a critical Other, 
A convenient way to voice a seemingly "radical" treatment of 
i ssues as such is a kind of "reversal." Indeed, a Derr idean 
deconst ruct ion provides this approach with a very good starting 
point , but we ,can never forget that it is the spirit of Derrida 's 
writ ings to offer a deconstructive reading which I conceive as the 
most important thing in a radical critique. To view a non-totalizing 
pract ice as a totalizing closure will obviously miss the spirit of 
deconstruct ion, Although this dissertation is not a deconstructive 
practice, there is a superficial intimacy with deconstruction. Lest I be 
mi sunde r s tood here, it is necessary to say something about 
deconstruction before we move on. 
John Ellis writes his Against Deconstruction with the belief 
that "any sense of a continuing dialogue and interchange between the 
two sides [deconstruction and anti-deconstruction] is completely 
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lacking. ." 16 He claims that the purpose of writing his book "is not 
only to contribute to a debate on deconstruction but to help to create 
the conditions under which that debate will be possible." He goes 
on to note that "what should be surprising, and upsetting, is that so 
very little exists on the other side."i* ( m y emphasis) In terms of an 
"opposi t ional" discourse with emphasis on the other side, this 
dissertation does share a similar aim with El l is ' in voicing the other 
side. However, Ellis's opposition against deconstruction is on a 
different level of discourse, but not actually emphasizing the other 
side. He simply misses the spirit of a deconstructive practice and 
treats it as a closed and totalizing project. If deconstruction is really 
such a project , Ellis 's remark is beautiful ly jus t i f ied . Yet 
deconstruction, like all poisons, can be therapeutic if it i$ used 
properly. Ellis's li mi led insight has driven him to the wrong use of 
such a poison. In the line of argument of this dissertation, I am more 
sympathetic with Zavarzadeh and Morton whose criticism on Ellis is 
as follows, 
Although Ellis claims to be inaugurating a 
"dialogue" with deconstruction (p.vii), he in 
fac t s y s t e m a t i c a l l y f a i l s to e n g a g e 
deconstruction's most significant premises: by 
by-passing the particular question of the role 
of critique in deconstruction, Ellis evades the 
issue of critique-al inquiry which, we believe, 
1 6 J o h n Ellis, Against Deconsiruclion (New Jersey: Pr inceton Universi ty 
Press, 1989), p.ix. 
l^EIl is , Againstt Deconslruclian, p.ix. 
l^EI l i s , Against Dcconsiruction, p .x . 
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is c ruc ia l to (pos t )modern oppos i t iona l 
practices.11-' (my emphasis) 
F rom the viewpoint of a comparative discourse, Ellis's notion of 
"deconstruction" needs serious radicalization. I cite Ellis's example 
with an eye to showing that d e c o n s t r u c t s practice has to be a 
r ead ing stance in our d i scourse si tuated in a (pos t )modern / 
(post)colonial context. We cannot rely only upon deconstruction to 
reverse the violent hierarchy of West over East,20 o r d s e 0 u r reading 
will easily be subject to the critique that Ellis makes: "its emphasis is 
on debunking the old" and thus it is "inherently uninteresting."*i 
Our practice, clearly enough, cannot depend on debunking the old to. 
establish a discourse of our own. It definitely needs transformation. 
Bearing in mind the role of deconstruction in our practice, we 
shall move on to see how we should position a deconstruct ive 
reading in our Chinese-Western discourse. Donald Wesl ing is 
f W a . s h i n P i m ^ n r . M & Donald Morion, Theory, (Pon)Modernity, Opposition 
S u e T f " p m ; t M a , s o n « u v e - P r e s*>, p. 13. For fur ther details about their 
wnr h V ? ' P ' e a S C r U , e r 1 0 PP- 1 1 " 1 4 - Among others, the following point is most 
wor thwhi le noting ,„ our context : "Yet while pretending lo open up a 'dialogue' with 
decons t ruc .on, Ellis comple te ly fails to realize that when the p r e s u p p o s i t i o n ' s b e h i n d 
d i f f e r e n t discourses are radical ly differenl , the discourses do not 'meet' and there is 
no dialogue. II one wants to change that situation, one cannot s imply rehearse as 
his book does, the established and familiar terms of the impasse, but must produce a 
? , d ' scou rsc at a d i f fe ren t level, that is lo say, theorize these d i f fe rences . 
In te l l ec tua l ly serums texts do not ' rehearse, ' but to open up space beyond, the 
lami l ia r . Venous theoretical invest igat ions constantly enlarge the reader 's f rames of 
unders tand ing , while .Ellis's book shows little, if any, familiari ty with the broader 
intel lectual movements of the (post)modern moment, of which deconstruction is only 
one, if an important, part." p. 14. 
2 0 T ' 
T h e "violent h i e r a r c h y " re fe r s to a h ie ra rchy "v io l en t l y " imposed 
accord ing lo a certain set of s tandards determined by a dominant sys tem. For 
i n s t ance , Der r ida once cr i t iqued (he hierarchy of phi losophy over l i te ra ture by 
d ' a i m i n g that ph i losophy seems to be more directly dealing with "Truth" than 
l i terature under the undesirable logocentrism in Western metaphysics. In the rest of 
this thesis , I will try to "deconstruct" the "violent hierarchy" of Western "Theory" 
over Chinese "text." 
2 1 Ellis, Against DecanslrucUvn, p.80. 
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definitely right in his essay on the applicability of deconstruction to 
Chinese-Western comparat ive literature when he says that "The 
opposition East-West is the most pervasive of all those readings to be 
undone by understanding, but the undoing will not be accomplished 
merely by bringing French fashion to the Far East ."2 2 However, 
despite being a brilliant analysis of Derrida's philosophy, one can 
hardly see any points dealing with the opposition which he promises 
us in the title of the essay. Except for a very brief remark that 
Der r ida ' s philosophy is a so-called "incomplete Taoism" where 
Wesl ing pays homage to the Chinese c o u n t e r p a r t , w h a t he tries to 
do all the time is merely to "deconstruct" Derrida's philosophy. His 
suggestion in the conclusion is as follows: 
Further correct ion of specif ics in Derrida 
would involve a demonstration (1) that the 
Chinese wri t ten charac te r has a s t rong 
phonetic component which is forgotten or de-
emphasized by Fenollosa, Pound, and Derrida 
(2) that the Chinese philosophical and literary 
tradition, for instance, in such works >as Lu 
Chi's [Lu Ji] Essay on Literature [Wenfu] and 
Liu Hsieh's [Liu Xie] Literary Mind and the 
Carving of Dragons [Wenxin diaolong], is to the 
2 2 D onald Wesl ing, "Methodological Implications of the Philosophy of Jacques 
Derrida for Comparative Literature: The Opposit ion East-West and Several Other 
Oppositions," in John J. Deeney ed. Chinese-Western Comparative Literature: Theory 
and Strategy (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1980), p.81. 
2 ^ W e s l i n g , "Methodological Implications," p,7Q, 
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same extent as the Western tradition subject 
to the myths of origin and presence.2 4 
Here Wes l ing is merely trying to use Chinese mater ia l s to 
"deconstruct" the deconstruction of , Derrida. Although he does cite 
Edward Said at the beginning and the end of the essay,25 w e cannot 
see any analysis to show how the "positional super ior i ty"^ 0 f the 
West systematically silences the East. Quite contrary to what the 
tit le of his essay suggests , not only does Wesling neglect the 
opposition between East and West, he also uses China from a superior 
posi t ion to deconstruct decoast ruct ion, which exactly contradicts 
what the title of his essay promises: coping with the East-West 
oppos i t i on . 
From this we may sense the danger of blindly believing in the 
power of deconstruction. Ellis is right when he says, "deconstructive 
strategy seems focused but is really random."2? However, I hesitate 
to call my project a kind of deconstruction. It is neither a 
deconstruction of Western theories nor a deconstruction of Chinese-
Western comparative literature. Far more than that, it aims at 
providing a transformative discourse - a radical questioning of the 
production of meaning in dominant discourses in order to establish 
new d iscurs ive spaces for a t ransformat ion of the Chinese 
2 4 W e s l i n g , "Methodological Implications," pp. 110-111. 
2 ^The two limes thai he cites Said are on pages 80 and 110. See also notes 3 & 
57 in Wesl ing, "Methodological Implication." 
2 ^For a description of this please refer to Edward Said, Orientalism (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1979), p.7. Said writes, "Orientalism depends for its strategy on 
this f l ex ib le position s ignif icantly, which puts the westerners in a whole series of 
poss ib l e relationship with the Orient without, ever losing him the relative upper 
h a n d . " 
2 ^EIl is , Against Deconstruction, p.81. 
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hermeneut ic tradition in contemporary critical discourse - through 
which the Chinese tradition can have a voice of its own in the 
contemporary orchestra of. literary criticism. If it is in any sense 
similar to a deconstructive reading, it may be due to the "violent 
hierarchy" imposed on a Chinese-Western discourse that we - of 
course excluding the Orientalists - all love to deconstruct . The 
"violent hierarchy" I invoke here certainly owes something to the wit 
of Derrida, but it has more to do with my feeling that the hierarchical 
order of Western "Theory" over Chinese "text" has to be 
d e c o n s t r u c t e d . 
In face of this "violent hierarchy," however, a s imple 
reversing is never enough. One has to deal with it from within. The 
spirit^ of the reading strategy of deconstruclion may be helpful, but 
we cannot rely upon it to establish a reading position of a critical 
Other since in that case deconstruction will simply turn into a 
totalizing practice that has always already ruined the essence of a 
deconstructive practice. Likewise, when I talk about "politics," I am 
not inclined to separate it from theoretical discourse. To do so will 
make the "politics" totalizing and it will thus become no different 
f rom a metaphysical centre which is inside and outside at the same 
t ime . 
Furthermore, any talk about politics must be penetratingly 
ideological . When R. Radhakrishnan talks about the notions of 
ideology, knowledge as ideology, and the critique of knowledge as 
ideology, he indicates that when we distinguish between "good" and 
"bad" ideology, we have these choices: 
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• * . 1), Having assumed our perspectivity in 
the form of a suitable ideology, we proceed to 
unpack and elaborate a certain kind of critical 
praxis, which is to say that once we have 
assumed our macropolitical stance we will not 
submit, that stance to a recursive analysis. 
This option results in the universalization or 
naturalization of one's own perspectivity. 2). 
The critical theorist takes up responsibility 
for a determinate ideological position but with 
an awareness that no one ideologica l 
perspective is privileged or putat ive, and 
therefore, remains open to contestations by 
opposing political and theoretical positions. 3). 
The critic assumes responsibi l i ty for her 
choice but at the same time does not abdicate 
the second-order responsibility of submitting 
the "cor rec tness" of her posi t ion to a 
deconstruct ive crit ique whose legitimacy is 
no t n e c e s s a r i l y c o m p l i c i t o u s with the 
macrology or the telos of the critic's primary 
c o m m i t m e n t . 2 8 
In my concept of the reading position of a critical Other, I am 
trying to take the third choice which is "'always-ready' called into 
M r . Radhukr i shna i i . "PosNs l ruc lu ra l i s t Pol i t ics : Towards a Theo ry of 
Coal i t ion ," in Douglas Kellner ed., Post modernism/ Jameson/Critique ( W a s h i n g t o n 
D.C.: Maisonneuve Press, 1989), pp.309-310. 
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question by its own inadequacy or potential errancy."29 A s stated 
above, I am against borrowing Western hermeneutics to review 
Chinese mater ia ls . Howeve r , I should say I have borrowed 
extensively from the West since I would not deny the fact that my 
own discourse is enmeshed in the dominant Western discursive 
context. Among the things that I borrow from Western hermeneutics, 
I would say the first and foremost thing is to put Gadamer's notion of 
'"participation" into practice. Gadamer says, "by sharing, by our 
participating in the -things in which we are participating, we enrich 
them; they do not become smaller, but larger."-™ The discourse of a 
critical Other, in this sense, has to be an active participation in the 
con tempora ry critical d iscourse , which is essential before any 
transformation is possible. I may have to pay the price of giving the 
impression that my discourse is drifting along the critical current and 
riding on the whitecaps of the critical wave without focus. But the 
prize is too great to be jettisoned by such a risk. In a sense' I am 
very eclectic, but 1 do not mind being so. Why does one have to 
mind being eclectic if one may point towards a discourse for the 
Chinese tradition to articulate itself in the world scene? 
There fore , this dissertat ion takes shape with an eye on 
f ind ing a way to have Chinese discourse art iculated in the 
contemporary literary and critical discourse. How the proposed 
reading position is radical and how it is Chinese are the two 
questions that I am trying to raise in much of what follows, and I 
believe that to answer these questions one must first, take part in 
2 9 Radhakr i shnan , "Poslsfruct uralisl Politics," p. 310. 
^ H a n s - G e b r g Gadamer, "Hermeneutics of Suspicion,* in Man and World 1 7 
(1984), p. 323. 
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quotidian critical discourse. Consequently, I find it necessary to 
situate my analysis in the postmodern context. In this respect, I see 
the ph i losoph ica l he rmeneu t i c s represented by He idegger and 
Gadamer as the f i rs t pos tmodern challenge of given modernis t 
discursive categories. At the same time, philosophical hermeneutics 
also represents the German vein of theories of interpretation, and its 
debate with French deconstruction can be said to have opened up 
new postmodernist discursive space for a 'postmodern questioning of 
established values. Therefore , I will start my discussion with the 
issue of "hermeneutics." In the second chapter I set off by tackling 
the problem of textuality, and conclude that the paradox of textuality 
and interpretat ion would easily be appropriated by the dominant 
critical tradition in a comparative discourse. Then I proceed in the 
third chapter to examine the Chinese tradition of interpretation to 
see how its juxtaposi t ion with the Western hermeneutic tradition 
may let the dominant voice appropriate the silent critical Other. 
It seems that we are back to the start after these two 
chapters, but these two chapters do pave the way - that is to say, to 
prepare a reading position - for the fourth chapter in which I go into 
the discourse of the colonized Other which is a signal development in 
con tempora ry Western theories . These two chapters serve the 
purpose of "calling into question our method of c o n s t r u c t i n g , 1 and 
thus achieve a kind of "defamil iar iza t ion" of the hegemonic 
in terpre ta t ion . In Chapter Four, the approach of contemporary 
Chinese critics is juxtaposed with feminist discourse - discourse of 
3*Tatk>w, "The Conlexl of Comparative Literature," p,2. 
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another critical Other, and I will try to show how Chinese critical 
discourse may critique as well as use it. 
Then comes the fifth chapter in which I try to contextualize 
the read ing posit ion of the crit ical Other by a reading of 
contemporary Chinese cri t ics of Chinese poetics with a reading 
posit ion oriented by the crit ique laid down in the four previous 
chapters. The reason I choose James Liu, Stephen Owen and Wai-lim 
Yip as the representat ives of the reading of traditional Chinese 
poetics is a manifold one. (I will explain them in the relevant 
chapter .) Among other reasons, the most immediate one is that I 
have to deal with the common - not necessarily commonplace - belief 
that one has to cleat with the traditional classics to formulate a kind 
of traditional Chinese poetics. Such an interpretation of traditional 
Chinese poetics and literary theory "seems" to make it possible to 
clear up the Chinese hermeneutie tradition by conduct ing a meta-
reading of the reading of these critics. I use the word "seems" 
because I bel ieve that wi thout focusing on the problem of 
representing the Other, the rules of reading presented in a meta-
reading have already been denied a discourse of their own. By 
ques t ion ing the production of meaning and the textual/poli t ical 
spaces opened by these texts, we can come to see how the dominant 
ideo logy reproduces i tself . Through an examinat ion of the 
interpret ive differentials in these texts, it is possible for us to 
revalue the "values" which are legitimated by the hegemonic culture. 
A radical challenge of the given dominant discursive categories, such 
as "hermeneutics ," may provide us with new ground on which 
Chinese articulation can be made. 
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Moreover, my reading of the Chinese critics' readings will be 
very sensitive towards the problem of (re)presenting the Other. I 
choose not to use primary texts of Chinese literature as the main 
subjec t of discussion since traditional Chinese poetics is a self-
representat ion as well as the represented. Its (re)presentation has 
collapsed the simple distinction between primary text and secondary 
commentary. (In fact, this distinction has to be collapsed in all radical 
critique.) We cannot avoid intertextual and cross-cultural questions 
that Henry Louis Gates is able to evade when he uses contemporary 
critical theories on black primary texts.32 (However, I would rather 
see this approach as a kind of suppression in a homogeneous context 
of America.) In the Chinese-Western comparative context, such a 
reading of the so-called primary texts will only result in a cultural 
r e la t iv i s t i c conclus ion which displaces the original target of 
part icipation in the dominant discourse with a double gesture of 
conformi ty and resistance.33 The analysis of original Chinese texts 
with relation to contemporary critical discourse cannot foreground a 
reading (as) the Other as effective as a reading of the Chinese critics' 
readings, since the central issue of this dissertation, which I consider 
See for instance Henry Louis Gales, "Criticism in the Jungle," in Black 
Literature and Literary Theory, ed. Henry Louis Gates (New York & London: Methuen, 
1984). 
i i 
->: )Here I find it necessary to clarify my point about "dominant" discourse. I 
u n d e r s t a n d it may he a s w e e p i n g s y n c h r o n i z a t i o n and h o m o g e n i z a t i o n of 
con temporary discourses to put them under the large and indiscr iminate "dominant" 
umbre l l a . There are def in i te ly Western discourses , especially in the last twenty 
years, that may be anti-totalizing, and thus "anti-dominant." However, what I wish to 
fo reg round in this thesis is the hegemonic posit ion of Western d i scourse in a 
compara t ive discourse, be they totalizing or anti-totalizing, I am not unaware of the 
risk of over -s impl i fy ing the paradigm shifts in contemporary critical d iscourse , but 
as I will demonstrate later, the problem is that anti-colonial theories do not carry any 
promise of decolonization: they still have to conform to the signification process of 
the grand narrative. So it is the production of meaning by the grand colonizing 
narrat ive that I wish to foreground. 
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to be the most important factor in a comparative discourse, is the 
problem of reading. 
The concluding chapter is dedicated to an oppositional reading 
situated in a colonial context, which aims at a decolonization of 
interpretation. Problems of colonial and anti-colonial discourses will 
be examined to show the difficulty of reaching a genuinely post-
colonial era. Chinese-Western comparative literature is in a good 
position to utilize its non-position to "unlearn" the dominant system 
of methods and the Chinese tradition. Hopefully such a reading 
"between" reading the Other and reading as the Othe r^ can negotiate 
between dif ferent levels of representation (the simple distinction 
be tween the r ep resen t ing and the represented) in order to 
f o r e g r o u n d a Ch inese cr i t ica l d iscourse l iberated f r o m the 
manipulation of the politics of hegemonic interpretation. In sum, the 
itinerary of the development of my idea in this dissertation may 
broadly be plotted as a progression from text, hermeneutics, culture 
to (post)colonial theories. 
Last but not least, this introduction, as is usually the case, is 
written after the body, and the conclusion, of the dissertation. This is 
a so-called Derridean "supplementary origin." I am stating this in 
order to stress the necessity of reading and the importance of 
reading one's own reading position. I also have to point out that this 
dissertation is founded on a leading of the readings of contemporary 
theories, which aims at establishing a Chinese critical discourse that 
3 ^ T h e "between" used here is somewhat, misleading. cf Derrida's "hymen" 
which s imultaneously means a membrane and the penetration of that membrane. 
See his Dissemination t trans. Baibara Johnson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1982) , p.212. "Hymen," according to Derrida, "is an operation that both sows 
confus ion between opposites and stands between (he opposites at once." 
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really exists and functions as a real "difference." It may thus give 
the impression that primary texts do not. receive due at tention. 
However, in my reading of readings, which aims at accounting for the 
colonizing dominant narrative of contemporary criticism, I am more 
interested in the interpretive differentials in these readings than the 
primary texts since I find these differentials a niche to establish a 
discourse of the critical Other - oppositional, radical and hopefully 
f ree f rom the domination of the powerful discourse. In fact, this 
d isser ta t ion grounds itself on a postmodern cri t ique of meta-
narrat ive which asserts that there exists no Archimedean point 
outside the intertextual system from which it can be judged , the 
impression of the "secondariness" of critical discourse is thus not 
a d v o c a t e d . 
This is the end of the introduction. I do not anticipate this 
supplementary origin to take an innocent position to introduce to you 
a topic that we do not know yet. If this introduction should be found 
e f fec t ive in getting rid of misunderstandings about the reading 
posit ion of a critical Other that I mean, it should naturally be 
gratifying. However, if this introduction seems problematic by itself 
and thus raises problems about the issue, it should also have 
performed its useful service. 
Chapter Two: 
Interpretation, Textuality, Paradox-
Towards an "Other" Reading Position 
Prologue 
Comparative literature calls for an immediate interpretation 
of interpretations. The comparison of any two systems must be 
based upon interpretations, be that of texts or theories. As a critic 
working across cultures, a comparatist should be able to deal 
extensively with the problem of interpretation. Gadamer has already 
noted that there is a methodological advantage "in making (the) 
inner relation of interpretation and text clear". 1 In this chapter I will 
examine the issue from a different angle, focusing on the role of the 
critic. Between the hermeneutics and textuality of two literary and 
cultural systems there is a gap that can hardly be bridged by a 
simple "fusion of horizons".2 This gap, however, is both negative and 
H a n s - G e o r g G a d a m e r , "Text and In t e rp r e t a t i on , " in Br i ce R 
W a c h t e r h a u s e r ed. Hermeneutics and Modern Philosophy ( A l b a n y Sta te 
University of New York Press, 1986). Gadamer believes that the methodological 
advantage is that "'text' must be understood as a hermeneutical concept. This 
implies that the text is not regarded from the perspect ive of g rammar and 
linguistics, and as divorced from any content, that it might have; that is, that it 
is not to be viewed as an end product, the production of which is the object of 
an analysis whose intent is to explain the mechanism that allows language as 
such to function at all." p.389. ° " 
I " Gadamcr 's view, "the horizon of the present cannot be formed 
without the past. There are no more an isolated horizon of the present than 
there are historical horizons. Understanding, rather, is always the fusion of 
these horizons which we imagine to exist by themselves." Gadamer, Truth and 
Method (New York; Seahury Press, 1975), p.273. See also Joel C. Weinsheimer, 
Gadamer's Hermeneutics: A Reading of Truth and Method (New Haven: Yale 
Univers i ty Press, 1982). Weinsheimer writes, "all knowledge of the truth is 
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posi t ive, and it is exactly the place to begin, or else a sound 
comparative literature can never be established. In so saying I do 
not intend to deny the possibility of comparative literature. The 
point that I want to stress here is that we have to pay adequate 
attention to the role of the critic in the act of interpretation before 
any inadvertent comparison. By focusing on the role of the critic, I 
think it is possible to go into the gap to examine the problem of 
interpretation from inside. Therefore, the gap, is "negative" in the 
sense that it denies an easy fusion of two cultural systems to reach a 
so-called "common poetics," but it is also "positive" in the sense that 
it is where we can inquire how meaning is produced and 
disseminated in interpretations. 
Interpretat ion, be it of texts or theories, operates by no 
means at a single level of discourse. We need to dissect the complex 
relat ionship among critical theories, the interpretation of theories, 
theoretical criticism and meta-criticism, in order to have a close look 
at the puissance and limitation of interpretation. In the following 
pages, I will begin by interpreting the two positions of modern 
hermeneutics, those of Hirsch and Heidegger, and note the inevitable 
l imi ta t ions of both (due to their concepts of " intent ion" and 
"s i tuatedness" respect ively) . By so doing I aim to show the 
inevitable paradox in any hermeneutical approach caused by the 
never transparent textuality of a critical commentary. From this I 
proceed to delineate the paradox of interpretation - on the one hand 
one bel ieves that interpretation is not capable of assuring the 
shared knowledge, and all knowledge of Ihe truth of history is shared truth. . . 
And the truth always means what is true from the historian's own viewpoint , 
within his own horizon, as well as within (he other's." p.183. 
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certainty of meaning in a text, and yet on the other one continues to 
rely on interpretat ion to express oneself and expect others to 
interpret "correctly" the meaning of that interpretation - and show 
that this paradox would conveniently highlight the problem of 
textual i ty .3 This problem of textuality, I suppose, can reflect on "how 
the production of meaning is authorized"* in comparative discourse. 
By examining the role of Edward Said as a critic in his comment on 
the two exemplary positions in facing the problem of textuality as 
represented by Derrida and Foucault respectively, I wish to be able 
to shed light on the latent problem in Chinese-Western comparative 
literature. Reading the Other cannot avoid the suppression by the 
hegemonic interpretation of the dominant culture if the problem and 
paradox of interpretation and textuality are ignored. 
When one reads across culture, there will inevitably be 
problems about the representation of the Other in one's discourse. 
When we are comparing two systems at a certain level of discourse, 
the textuality of our own text as well as the textuality of the two 
systems being compared will create lots of paradoxes since the 
discourse of representing the Other is not transparent at all. If we 
ignore the problem of textuality and believe that we can represent 
the Other accurately, we will definitely face a kind of suppression 
f rom the dominant system - the hegemonic system of interpretation 
will appropriate the paradoxes at a "higher" level of discourse since it 
has an entire intertextual web of meaning to back itself up. 
-^The "problem of textuality" I invoke here is derived from Edward 
Said's article, "The Problem of Textuality: Two Exemplary Positions," Critical 
Inquiry 4 (Summer 1978), pp.673-714. 
4 A n t o n y T a t l o w , "The Contex t of C o m p a r a t i v e L i t e r a t u r e , " 
Chinese/Foreign Comparative Literature Bulletin (1990), p.2. 
Chu 28 
(Compara t ive ly speak ing , the weaker discourse lacks such a 
s y s t e m . ) 5 Let me use the reading of a poem by Li Bai ^ , one of 
the most widely-known Chinese poet, as an example to highlight the 
the lack of a Chinese l i terary and critical d iscourse in the 
contemporary critical scene. 
I intend to use the analysis of one of Li Bai's "Ancient A i r s "£ /^ l 
by James J.Y. Liu, the late leading critic of Chinese literature in the 
English-speaking world, in his essay "Time, Space, and Self in Chinese 
Poetry" as an example. Indeed, I am not trying to say that it is not 
right to use concepts like "time" and "space" to analyze Chinese 
poetry, and traditional Chinese poets do have similar concepts in 
their minds. The point that I find significant in the essay is that Liu's 
treatment is rather problematic when he puts the poem under the 
category of "Transcendence of Time and Space." First of all, let me 
the quote the poem in full for the sake of my analysis: 
* The term "dominan t" I use here may need c la r i f i ca t ion . It Is 
apparent here that I a ssume there is always a dominant system which is 
a lways the Western sys tem. I do not deny when compared to Ch inese 
l i terature, some European l i teratures and American l i terature are young. In 
terms of age, numbers of poets and readers, Chinese li terature is in fact the 
majority culture. However, the "dominant" I use here, I would like to repeat, is 
referr ing to the lack of a cultural discourse in the modern context. The pre-
modern China (perhaps we may use the Opium War as a watershed although 
the generalization may be - a bit sweeping) may have something of its own, but 
with the ^ dawn ing of a nude cross-cul tura l contac t with the Wes t , the 
d e g e n e r a t i n g C h i n e s e c i v i l i z a t i o n has been r e h e a r s i n g the a g o n y of 
ques t ion ing its own cul ture, and its people keep on quest ioning their own 
cultural identi ty. In other words, such a "legitimate" , cross-cul tural contac t 
forced Chinese people to rethink their own cultural identity. It is well known 
that the May-Fourth Movement is a radical questioning of traditional Chinese 
culture, calling for westernizat ion, either in part or in whole, Unfor tunate ly , 
the s i tuat ion has not changed since then, and Chinese discourse has a lmost 
a lways been enthralled by Western culture. Consequently, Chinese discourse 
is s ignif icant ly limited by Western discursive categories. So by "dominant" I 
mean in our con t e m p o r a r y Context , Ch inese d i scour se canno t but be 
articulated through its Western counterpart , and it is in this line of argument 
that I find "dominant" applicable to the Western system. 
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The Yellow River runs to the eastern ocean, 
The white sun sets over the western sea. 
The vanishing river and the streaming light 
Both are gone suddenly, awaiting no one. 
My spring looks have deserted me and gone, 
My autumn hair is already fading away. 
Human life is not a wintry pine: 
How could years and visage remain for long? 
I would ride a dragon among the clouds 
To inhale celestial lights and stay my bright countenance. 
- Li Bai, "Ancient Airs," N o . l l 6 
Liu analyzes the poem as "a conscious attempt to transcend 
time and space,"7 and "to transcend time and space the poet wishes 
to rise vertically, as it were, above the river and the sun's course, so 
as to remain young forever."8 I quote this statement of Liu's with no 
intention of saying that he wrongly interprets the poem. However, if 
we juxtapose this poem with another one in the same series of 
"Ancient Airs," we should realize that although there is a "conscious 
a t tempt of rising," the so-called "transcendence" is not "other-
wor ld ly" : 
^Translation quoted from James Liu, "Time, Space, and Self in Chinese 
Poet ry ," Chinese Literature; Essays, Articles, Reviews 1 (1979), p. 156. This 
essay is later reprinted in James Liu, The Interlingual Critic ( B l o o m i n g t o n : 
Indiana University Press, 1982) in the chapter "A Critical Exercise." 
7Liu, "Time, Space, and Self," p. 155. 
8 Liu, "Time, Space, and Self," p. 156. 
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West ascending Lotus Flower Mountain, 
far far away I saw the Bright Star maid; 
with pale hands she plucked lotus blossoms, 
with airy steps she walked the great clear void; 
her rainbow skirts, their broad belt trailing, 
dipped and fluttered as she strode up the sky. 
She called me to climb with her to Cloud Terrace, 
to lift hands in salutation to Wei Shu-ch'ing. 
Dazed and enraptured, I went with her;, 
mounting a stork, we rode the purple gloom. 
I looked down and saw the Lo-yeung River, 
barbarian troops marching in endless files; 
streams of blood that stained the meadow grasses, 
wildcats and wolves wearing the hats of men! 
- Li Bai, "Ancient Airs," No.199 
w - h i t ^ , S X ^ K , 
A $ ^ m • * f r o 
^ i t s t ^ . 
It is apparent from the last four lines of the translation that Li Bai's 
rising can be seen as related to this world, His concern for the 
present world makes his use of metaphor point back to this world, 
and the images in the poem rise with him. In other words, Li Bai 
does not transcend the images, and the metaphors in the poem do 
not point towards an "other-worldly" realm. As Pauline Yu mentions 
in an article extensively discussing "metaphor,". 
It [Chinese poetry] does not head toward 
a n o t h e r , t r a n s c e n d e n t r ea lm tha t is 
autonomous and different in kind from the 
^Translation quoted from Burton Watson ed., The Columbia Book of 
Chinese Poetry (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), pp.214-215. 
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sensory world of the poet and his readers, 
simply because such a realm was not held to 
ex is t . 1 0 
Yu further holds that the Chinese world-view is different f rom its 
Western counterpart in that "the transcendent was not beyond, but 
immanent in all things."1 1 I do agree with Yu in this respect, and I 
find Liu X i e ^ J - ^ j . a good example to further Yu's argument. Liu Xie, 
one of the most influential critics in the Chinese literary tradition, 
writes in the chapter of "Shen Si" (Spiritual Thought or 
Imagination) of his monumental Wenxin h e 
Literary Mind and the Carving of Dragons), 
Through the mystic subtlety of imagination, 
the spirit and the things in the outside world 
are .one in their excursion.1 2 
tk&n. % o 
The kind of imagination that Chinese poets advocate seems to 
be a union of "spirit" and "thing," rather than a "transcendence" of 
things. This is well reflected in "Ancient Airs, No. 1 1 " in which the 
poet is "riding a dragon among the clouds to inhale celestial lights." 
Anyhow, when one discusses Li Bai's poem, it seems impossible for 
one to avoid using the term "transcendence." In many commentaries 
written in Chinese, Li Bai is even claimed to be a "Romantic" poet -
Pauline Yu, "Metaphor and Chinese Poetry," Chinese Literature: 
Essays, Articles, Reviews 3 (1981), p.220. 
"Metaphor and Chinese Poetry," p.221. 
1 2 L i u Xie, Wenxin diaolorig; translation quoted from Vincent Y, Shih 
trans. The Literary Mind and the Carving of Dragons, a bi l ingual edi t ion 
(Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1982), p.298. 
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probably due to his tendency of "rising" in his poems. The adjective 
"Romant ic" will inevi tably bring forth the whole tradit ion of 
Romantic imagination in which "transcendence" is a predominant 
concept. Interestingly enough, when we talk about a tradition which 
places emphasis on "immanence," we have to use "transcendence" as 
the centre of discussion. On the one hand it seems that concepts like 
"imagination" are neutral and able to clarify Chinese poetry, but on 
the other they will influence the analysis. For instance, when termed 
a transcendence of time and space, Li Bai's poems, albeit inherited in 
the Chinese tradition which stresses "immanence," seem to exhibit a 
"Romantic transcendence." ' The point that I want to raise here is 
definitely not to claim that Yu's analysis is superior to Liu's. The 
most important factor that I find in their analyses is that even in 
Yu's account which tries to highlight "Chinese metaphor" as 
"immanent," she has to use "transcendence" as the centre of her 
d iscuss ion . Moreover , in Liu's account, " t ranscendence" even 
becomes one of the characteristics of Chinese poets' treatment of 
time, space, and self. I do hot want to dwell upon a further 
discussion of these concepts. 1 aim only at using this as an example 
to show how the dominant Western tradition may appropriate the 
voice of a critical Other. In fact, "transcendence and immanence," 
like other opposites such as "concrete and abstract," are a way of 
thinking in Western metaphysics , 1 3 and they are not inherent in the 
Chinese tradition. In addition, Pauline Yu states on another occasion 
tha t , 
^ S e e for instance Jacques Derrick, "White Mythology; Metaphor in 
the Text of Philosophy," trans. F.C.T. Moore, New Litemry History 6 (Autumn 
1974), pp.25-30. 
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Terms like lyric, metaphor, and allegory will 
no doubt continue to be applied to Chinese 
p o e t r y , wi th ail the m u r k i n e s s and 
cont rad ic t ions in their def ini t ions fur ther 
exacerbated by the transfer. . . But at the 
least, one would hope that an awareness of 
l i terary t r ad i t ions other than those of 
Western Europe might alert one to problems 
of taking bas ic terms and concepts for 
g r a n t e d , w i thou t cons ide ra t i on for the 
contexts in which they have arisen and to 
which they are being applied.14 
Along this line of argument Yu seems to suggest that it is possible to 
separately depict a "Chinese tradition" other than those of Western 
Europe. However, as shown above, the centre of her discussion is 
still Western concepts. Her treatment is indeed a way of treating 
Chinese literature in English, but it is only a way to note the problem 
in Chinese-Western comparat ive literature. It is not a way to 
squarely face the problem. 
In the meant ime , I shall d i f ferent ia te several d i f f e r en t 
approaches to interpret the Chinese literary tradition. First, we may 
focus on "hermeneutics" and use Western methodology (and treat 
them as "impersonal") to "systematize" Chinese hermeneutical issues 
(predominantly classical ones), such as the example of James Liu 
I 4 P a u I i n e Yu, "Alienat ion Effects : Comparat ive Li terature and the 
Chinese Tradition," in Clayton Koelb and Susan Noakes eds., The Comparative 
Perspective on Literature: Approaches to Theory and Practice (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 1988), p. 175. 
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mentioned above. Second, we may focus on "Chinese" and emphasize 
a Chinese way of interpretation without acknowledging Western 
discourse, or with an awareness that Western discourse may bring 
distortion, such as the example of Pauline Yu. However, as I have 
shown, these two approaches cannot but be subsumed under 
Western discursive categories, and thus they are not applicable to 
our aim of finding a voice of our own,1-^ 
In both of the two cases mentioned above, any discussion of 
Chinese literature in a comparative discourse has to bring in the 
Western hegemonic system which is always the one to determine the 
d i scurs ive ca tegor ies J 6 Therefore, without a self-reflexiveness of 
the textuality of one's own discourse, a "seeming" comparison will 
merely become another discipline of the hegemonic system of 
interpretation which is self-generating. I believe that the problem of 
reading the Other must be brought down to the level of the problem 
of textuality and the. paradox of interpretation, or else a sound 
comparative discourse can never be achieved. Let me move on to a 
discussion of the problem of interpretation with relation 'to textuality 
to see how a critical Other may find a voice of its own. 
1 5 Here I have k> stress (hat analyses like Liu's and Yu's are definitely 
use fu l . They may clar i fy Chinese poems to Westerners, but inevitably will 
there be a shift of emphasis, if not distortion. They are also useful to us who 
aim at a hermeneutics of our own in the sense that they provide a good chance 
for us to examine how dominant ideologies reproduce themselves, and I would 
leave the analysis of this respect to Chapter Five in which I closely examine 
James Liu's theory. 
1 6 B y this 1 mean the melalingual nature of one system may supersede 
the less melal ingual counterpart . For instance, Chinese texts are very of ten 
b e i n g exposed to • Wes t e rn theo r i e s s ince there lacks a s o p h i s t i c a t e d 
melalingual structure in the Chinese tradition which seems to have come to an 
eternal standstill . I will discuss this "eternal standstill in further detail in the 
fourth and the fifth chapters . 
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The Problem of Interpretation 
When Harold Bloom proclaims that "all interpretations are 
misinterpretations" - what Paul de Man would call "tropological 
d i s p l a c e m e n t " 17 - it seems that he is admitting simultaneously the 
necessity of both interpretation and misinterpretation. By displacing 
the problem of interpretation with its negation, Bloom affirms the 
paradoxical role of interpretation. With a similar rhetoric, a critic can 
let his terms generate their meanings infinitely and these terms will 
acquire a kind of "semantic autonomy,"18 to borrow E.D. Hirsch's 
term. The jargons of (post)modern discourse will thus conveniently 
be "foregrounded." In other words, a critic may let the "autonomy" 
of his terms generate their own "surplus of meaning," and thus their 
dissemination power will be pushed to the apogee.1 9 
Indeed, the Post-structuralists, such as the Yale critics, would 
believe that there are both correct and incorrect misreadings; those 
readings that help liberate the possibility of various misreadings 
without suppressing other readings should be considered correct 
m i s r e a d i n g s . 2 0 However, what is the role of this so-called "correct 
misreading" in a Chinese-Western comparative discourse? Can the 
^ S e e Paul tie Man, "Anthropomorphism and Trope in the Lyric," in 
The Rhetoric of Romanticism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), pp, 
2 3 9 - 2 6 2 . 
Refer to E.D. Mirsch, Validily in Interpretation (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1963), p . l . 
1 9 T h e "dissemination '* I invoke here is Derrida 's notion of textual i ty 
that a text is not a closed system, and once ybu enter a text, you will wander 
f rom one text to another text, and this kind of free iiUerlextual s ignif icat ion is 
end less . Refe r to Jacques Derr ida, Dissemination, trans. Barbara Johnson 
(Chicago: Universi ty of Chicago Press, 1981). See in part icular the translators ' 
i n t r o d u c t i o n , p p . x x i x - x x x i i . 
^^The most < obvious example of a discussion of "misreading" is Harold 
Bloom, A Map of Misreading (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 
1975 ) 
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weake r s y s t e r n a l claim to have a "correct misreading"? In fact, 
"correct misreading" is already a contradictory combination, but why 
is it legitimate - at least in the seventies and eighties when the 
theories of the Yale critics prevailed? Is it simply due to the fact it is 
in compl ic i ty with the hegemonic system? If so, how is it 
legitimatized? I will attempt to answer these questions in the course 
of this chapter with relation to modern hermeneutics and post-
structuralist theories. In this respect I choose Hirsch and Heidegger 
to start my discussion since they represent the two opposi te 
attitudes of modern hermeneutics; that is, the insistence upon the 
"sameness" and "different-ness" of meaning. Moreover, as I have 
ment ioned in the previous chapter, modern hermeneutics can be 
seen as the first pos tmodern quest ioning of given modern is t 
discursive categories. I thus find it helpful to start my inquiry of the 
read ing posit ion in the postmoclen context with a focus on 
' h e r m e n e u t i c s . " 
Dating back to the fountainhead of modern hermeneutics, there 
have been two schools of theorists voicing opposite opinions. The 
school originating from Schliemacher and Dilthey, whose theoretical 
positions Hirsch inherits, insists on a definite meaning inherent in a 
certain text. On the other hand, the school headed by Heidegger and 
Gadamer believe in meanings that are always changeable, and hence 
deeply rooted in the situatedness of the interpreter. David Couzens 
Hoy even sets it aga ins t ep i s t emology by asser t ing that 
21 The so-called "weaker" system (vs. the hegemonic system) needs to 
be discussed in terms of the politics of academy or even the ethnography of 
academy. I am afraid the latter has gone beyond the scope of this thesis which 
focuses 011 in terpre ta t ion , but I will discuss the former in relat ion to 
hermeneut ics in the third chapter. 
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" h e r m e n e u t i c s th inks o f unders tanding as s o m e t h i n g w i t h o u t a 
s p e c i f i c unconstrained stance."22 jn H o y - s w o r c ] S ) 
H e r m e n e u t i c s is essent ia l ly the ph i losophica l 
concern with the theory of understanding and 
interpretation. For phi losophers the primary 
interest in hermeneut ics depends on whether 
it can g e n e r a t e a s u c c e s s f u l cr i t ique of 
t r a d i t i o n a l e p i s t e m o l o g y . S i n c e K a n t 
e p i s t e m o l o g y has been c o n c e i v e d as a 
foundat iona l i s t enterprise one that attempts 
to separate k n o w l e d g e from other forms of 
be l i e f , with the intention of ascertaining what 
is o b j e c t i v e l y certa in . H e r m e n e u t i c s , in 
contrast , rejects the idea that the primary 
task of p h i l o s o p h y is to supply foundat ions 
and guarantee c e r t a i n t y . 2 3 
The paradox of interpretation is at issue here as it is sugges ted the 
very c la im that hermeneut ics , which is supposed to be the theory of 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g and in terpre ta t ion , d o e s not guarantee cer ta in ty . 
H o w e v e r uncertain the meaning of a text, one still has to express 
one's be l ie f in a text and hope others will correctly interpret the 
m e a n i n g of that text. Given this paradox, to c la im that a "correct 
22David Couxens Hoy, The Critical Circle (Berkeley; Univers i ty of 
Ca l i fo rn ia Press, 1982); p re face to the Chinese translat ion, (Liaoning; People 
Publ isher , 1987) p.8. Translat ion mine. This is the preface in the Chinese 
t ranslat ion of The Critical Circle, and it. seems to me that it only appears in 
Chinese version translated by the translator of the book. 
23 David C o u x e n s Hoy, "Must We Say What W e M e a n ? T h e 
Grammato log ica l Cr i t ique of Hermeneut ics ," in Bricc R, Wachte rhauser ed., 
Hermeneutics and Modern Philosophy (Albany; State University of New York 
Press, 1986), p.398. 
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misreading" is desirable is merely to employ a kind of " topological 
displacement" in attempting to avoid the paradox of interpretation. 
In fact, as the Chinese critic Xie Zhen claims in his Siming 
Shihua i B l f ^ l f f f , 
In poetry there ' s that which can be - f ^ ^ j f o l 
interpreted or understood, that which cannot 
be interpreted or understood, and that which T 
need not be interpreted or understood.24 
To employ a single set of hermeneutical standards to interpret a 
certain text will inevitably give rise to lots of paradoxes. To blindly 
believe in the fact that we do not have a pre-determined meaning 
when we interpret a text is an easy way out However, when the 
Yale Critics try to deconstruct Romantic poetry by proving that the 
Romantics bury the Romantic ideal in the process of searching the 
ideal, they still exhibit , designedly or undesignedly, their full 
conviction in interpretation. As long as we do not have prior 
in te rpre ta t ions , we can never have an object to deconstruct . 
Paradoxical ly enough, we have to admit the legitimacy of our 
in te rp re ta t ions in order to perform deconstruct ion of pr ior 
interpretat ions. Indeed, one may say that a self-deconstructive 
approach should be included in the discourse of deconstruction. But 
if we, again, question the paradox of interpretation ~ we have to use 
interpretation to voice the limitation of interpretation, we should 
realize that the paradox itself is also in complicity with the rhetoric 
of contemporary criticism. 
2 4 D i n g F u b a o T f f e i ^ ; , Xu iidai sliihua . Translation 
quoted f rom James Liu, Language, Paradox, Poetics (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1988), p. 100. 
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Amongst various disciplines in the Humanities, literature may 
well be considered a unique and paradoxical subject. Viewed from 
the angle of interpretation, the field of literature includes not only 
literary texts, but also literary histories, literary theories, literary 
criticisms, and all forms of meta-criticis'm on these histories, theories 
and cri t icisms. It is evident that interpretation is by no means 
l imi ted to a s ingle level of d iscourse . By d issec t ing the 
interpretat ions of theoretical criticism, critical theories and meta-
criticism, we may have a bird-eye's view of the limitation as well as 
puissance of interpretation, which can examine the production of 
meaning in hegemonic interpretation that dominates a comparative 
discourse. At this point we will move on to Hirsch to examine the 
role of "meaning" in hermeneutics, and in turn we shall try to 
underscore the boundary of interpretation and note the significance 
of the paradox of interpretation in Chinese-Western comparat ive 
d i scour se . 
Hirsch's Hermeneutics of Innocence Reconsidered 
The most important point in Hirsch 's theory is the 
discrimination between meaning and significance. Speaking of that 
which is "represented by a text," Hirsch suggests in his Validity in 
Interpretation, that meaning "is what the author meant by his use of 
a particular sign sequence; it is what, the signs represent." On the 
other hand, "s igni f icance names the relat ionship between that 
meaning and a person, or a conception, or a situation, or indeed 
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any th ing i m a g i n a b l e . " ^ Hirsch further points out in The Aims of 
Interpretation t ha t , 
At every point , the stable determinacy of 
meaning is being de fended , even when 
significance is under discussion, for without 
the stable determinacy of meaning there can 
be no knowledge in interpretation, nor any 
knowledge in the many humanistic disciplines 
based upon textual interpretation.2 6 
Hirsch redefines meaning as that which pertains to "the whole verbal 
meaning of a text," and significance as the "textual meaning in 
relat ion to a larger context . "27 Hirsch's standpoint about the 
determined meaning in a text has remained unchanged although he 
modifies his view in a more recent article "Meaning and Significance 
Reinterpreted" as follows, 
In my earlier account, I argued that meaning, 
while not restricted to what was going on in 
the author's mind, was restricted to what the 
author could have entertained at the time of 
composit ion. I held that meaning was an 
affair of consciousness and that it could 
contain nothing that was not implicitly part of 
the author's intentional object . . . 
Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation. p.B 
2 6 E . D . Hirsch, The Ainu of Interpretation (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1976), p. I. 
27 Hirsch, The Aims of Interpretation. , p-2. 
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My current views are more capacious than 
b e f o r e , b o t h b e c a u s e I see n e w 
exempl i f i ca t ions as part of a self- identical 
meaning and because I also consider minor 
conceptua l ad jus tments to be part of the 
se l fsame meaning . 2 8 
Obviously Hirsch has extended the scope of "meaning," yet he has not 
quite eschewed the limitation warned of by Frank Lentricchia, thus: 
Much of the strength and weakness (and 
ambigui ty) of Hirsch's hermeneut ics rests , 
then, on his employment, of Husserl's austere 
intentional theory of human consciousness. . . 
The power of Hirsch's argument for validity in 
interpretation depends, as we have seen, on 
the cogency of his d ismissa l of those 
p s y c h o l o g i s t ic and r a d i c a l l y h i s t o r i c i s t 
theories that would ask us to believe that 
intentional objects - like texts - can never be 
stripped of the subjective accretions laid on 
them by the time-ridden interpreter .2 9 
Hirsch's obstinate reliance on the theory of "intention" limits his 
notion of "meaning." However much he extends his scope, he cannot 
break away f rom the chains of his narrow definition. Hirsch cites an 
example about going to an office. He believes that one may go to 
2 8 E 
.D. Hi r sch , "Mean ing and S ign i f i cance Re in t e rp re t ed , " Critical 
Inquiry 11 (Autumn 1984) pp.223-24. Hirsch still believes that the meaning in 
a text will not change, and new exemplifications still belongs to that meaning. 
2 9 Frank Lentr icchia , After the New Criticism (Chicago: The Universi ty 
of Chicago Press, 1980), p.27C." 
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one's off ice by different routes, but without amending the original 
intention of going to the office. One may not choose Route 29 but 
something else. Similarly, a hammer may be used to pound in and 
pull out nails, but whether the nails are iron or brass, threepenny or 
tenpenny, headed or headless, the intention will be fulfi l led. Hirsch 
then concludes that "there was a domain of fixity and a domain of 
va r i ab i l i t y . " 3 0 
Hirsch compares the "logical notion of the extension of a 
concept" to the case in which several joutes are so heavily jammed 
that one at last chooses to go to the library rather than the office.31 
By this he means that all the individual instances of interpretation -
past , present and fu ture - are subsumed under the concept of 
"meaning." He simply treats different interpretations as an extension 
of "meaning." This gives the impression that Hirsch is simply 
blurring the boundary between meaning and significance. Worse 
st i l l , he seems to let "meaning" encroach on the domain of 
"significance," arrogating to itself a function superior to "significance." 
He has not diverged from his argument in Validity in Interpretation; 
the new statement being a mere "extension" of the old one, to borrow 
his term. 
Hoy has such a succinct criticism on Hirsch's theory of 
intention that I need not repeat it he re 3 Hirsch's obstinacy on 
3 0 Hirsch. "Meaning and Signi f icance Reinterpreted/* p .206. 
3 1 Hirsch, " Meaning and Signif icance Reinterpreted,11 p .207. 
3 2 Please refer to Hoy, The Critical Circle, Chapter One, "Validi ty and 
Author 's Intention: A Critique of E.D. Hirsch's Hermeneutics," pp.11-40. Hoy is 
q u e s t i o n i n g Hi r sch ' s theory at three points : "Meaning and S i g n i f i c a n c e , " 
"Author ' s Intent ion," and "Meaning and Consciousness ." With respect to the 
f i r s t po in t , Hoy be l ieves that. Hi rsch ' s d is t inc t ion be tween m e a n i n g and 
s ign i f i cance to avoid a circular theory of interpretation has led him "too far 
toward dogma t i sm" and "to combat relativism with a theoretical ob jec t iv i sm 
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intention imprisons him in the scope of definite meaning, and thus it 
seems impossible for him to believe that the intention of driving to 
the off ice may itself be indeterminable. This leads conveniently to a 
blind spot in Hirsch 's hermeneutics: a writer has to face the 
l imitat ion of language and thus he/she is not able to adequately 
express himself/herself. In other words, t we should ask if language is 
an adequate means to express one's intention. In terms of Hirsch's 
analogy, then, the problem should be whether a hammer is able to 
pound in or pull but a nail or not, but Hirsch tends to simply focus on 
the nature of the nails. Hoy has already noted that, 
Several considera t ions are involved in the 
inference beyond the text to an intending 
consc iousness . The tradit ional not ion of 
i n t en t i on invo lves a view whereby the 
meaning of what is to be said exists before 
the actual saying, Thus the utterer attempts 
to "express" a meaning or thought, which in 
turn is what the saying intends to say 
(although (he actual utterance can fail and say 
something different) On this view language is 
almost always inadequate, 
tha t ins i s t s on (he p r inc ip l e of unchanging meaning and o n e p rope r 
unders tand ing is ph i losophica l overkil l" since an "unchanging meaning can 
only be dogmat i ca l ly asser ted and never captured." (p.24) Second , Hoy 
chal lenges that "Hirsch's idea that the author's intention is the only basis for 
d e f i n i n g correct in te rpre ta t ion is a phi losophical rather than a prac t ica l 
po in t . " (p .33) Las t ly , Hoy holds that "the notion of c o n s c i o u s n e s s is 
ext raneous ," and so "Hirsch's attempt to connect meaning with consciousness 
is not particularly useful ," (p.36) Hoy would rather suggest that "contrary to 
what Hirsch believes, it does make sense to speak of the intention of text 
rather than of a person." (p.39) 
Hoy, The Critical Circle, p.36. 
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With respect to the "inadequacy" of language, I would say traditional 
Chinese thoughts also share something similar, In my line of 
argument, however, I would say the use of language to express the 
"inadequacy" of language, rather than the question if language is an 
adequate means, is the point that matters. 
First of all, one can never leave out-Lao Tzu's famous dictum 
in consider ing the l imitat ion of language in tradit ional Chinese 
t h o u g h t s , 
The tcio that can be taoecl is not the constant 
Tao, 
The name that can be named is not the 
constant name , 3 4 
The Taoist. suspicion of language may not be strange, yet the 
Confucians also share the same belief, by no means coincidently, in 
the s ta tement that "Wri t ings cannot ful ly embody language and 
language cannot ful ly embody the meaning" . 3 5 It is apparent that 
the aporia arises f rom the paradox that they all experience in using 
language to convey their beliefs, as derided by Bai Juyi , 
"One who speaks does not know; one who knows is silence", 
This remark I have heard from the Old Master. 
If you say the Old master was one who knew, 
Wherefore did he himself write his "5000 words"? 3 6 
3 4 G a o Hung j , Lao Zi ZltengguJ%L^r(Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 
1956). Translation quoted from Liu, Language, Paradox, Poetics, p.5. 
3 5 My translation of shit bit jin yan, yan bit jin y t — g r , aTn J S l f ^ - , 
in Sun Xingyan J ^ j L t ^ J > Zhou yi jijie i f ] ^ . cf. James Liu's translation, 
"Wri t ing does not exhaust words, words do not exhaust meaning", in Liu, 
Language, Paradox, Poetics, p.25. 
3 6 Bai Juyi ^ , "On Reading the Laozi" - J - , translation quoted 
from Liu, Language, Paradox, Poetics, p.l 
The Western, tradition, albeit famous for t ranscendence, also 
discredits the ability of language at many points. Stephane Mallarme 
once wrote to his friend, 
But we are all failures, Mauclair! How can one 
be o t h e r w i s e , when we m e a s u r e our 
f ini teness against infinity.37 
In modern theor ies , language begins to "speak by i tself ." For 
instance, Heidegger makes an ontological claim about language, 
Language speaks. Its speaking bids the dif-
ference to come which expropriates world and 
th ings into the s imple onefold of thei r 
in t imacy .3 8 
He fur ther claims that "language is the house of B e i n g . " 3 9 Here we 
can realize that language may transgress the speaker's control, and 
the surplus of meaning greatly complicates the interpretation of a 
text to an extent hardly imaginable in Hirsch's sense. Let me cite 
Hirsch's example to illustrate my point. I would say on our way back 
to the office, we are not able to choose the route as we wish. The 
destination, be it the off ice or the library, seems no longer in the 
driver's control, Likewise, we do not know whether we can express 
what we want to express. We may thus say that the intention may 
not be achieved since it is interrelated with the action in a complex 
^ 7 Guy Mid l and , M a l i a r m e , trims'. Marie Collins and Bertha Humez 
(New York, 1965), p. 164. 
3 8 M 
arl in H e i d e g g e r , Poetry, La n gu age, Thought, t rans. Alber t 
Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p.2IO. 3 9 Refer (o Martin Heidegger, On the Way to Language, trans. Peter D. 
Hertz (New York: Harper & Row, 1971). 
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process. To claim that a certain intention will create a certain result 
would be far from apposite, if not totally misleading, with respect to 
the production of meaning. 
Accord ing to Hirsch 's dist inction between mean ing and 
significance, in a text the meaning must precede its significance. We 
may, however, question such a claim in reading many poems : and 
cri t icism. In classical Chinese poetry, the meaning is often the 
significance in Hirsch's sense. The late professor James Liu raises an 
in teres t ing example of Li Bat's "Question and Answer in the 
M o u n t a i n s " ^ ^ ( l ^ J§ -
You ask me why 1 nestle among the green mountains 
I smile without answering, my mind, by itself, at ease. 
Peach blossoms on flowing water are going far away, 
There's another cosmos, not the human world.4 0 
-MiTx. & ^ > ] ^ ^ A i y j . 
This kind of "non-sequitur" does not directly answer the question, 
and it can thus free itself from the limitation of the question. Here 
the "meaning" of the answer seems to depend upon the "significance" 
of the question. Wai-lim Yip writes on this point with reference to 
the Taoist epistemology of yan wu. yan ^ iSsTS , In Zen Zhong's 
gong-cin, 
"How to get the essence of Buddha's way?" 
Wind-gate replies,"When Spring comes, grass 
spontaneously grosses." 
^Trans lat ion quoted from Liu, Language, Paradox, Poetics, pp. 60-61. 
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Yip claims that although the answer does not answer the question, 
"When Spring comes, grass spontaneously grasses" is already the 
order of Nature, the Buddha's Way.4l A t t h i s point we can realize 
that Yip is insisting on the "Order of Nature" as an answer as he takes 
great pains in re-creating the primal world prior to language and 
reason. Anyhow, in these poems and gong-an, the "meaning" is 
obviously not limited to those represented by the signs, as Hirsch 
b e l i e v e s . 
One say may that in these instances, the poets are creating 
"spots of i nde t e rminacy , " to borrow Roman Ingarden ' s te rm. 
Ingarden different iates two different "spots of indeterminacy" in his 
theory, the first being "concealed by, aspects held in readiness which 
are predetermined by the wits of meaning and are actualized by the 
reader as he reads" and in the other, 
The reader usually goes beyond what is simply presented 
by the text and in various aspects comple tes the 
represented object ives , so that at least some spots of 
indeterminacy are removed and are frequently replaced 
by determinateness. . . that are not in agreement with the 
posit ively determined object ive . 4 2 
The first "spot of indeterminacy" represents the "meaning behind 
l anguage , " which is purely rhetorical , but the lat ter tends to 
V _ / ^ I 
represent what Yen Yu calls yan you jin er yi wu qiung £^ JSJ^pjg^ 
(language is exhausted, but the significance is infinite). T,S. Eliot's 
concept of "objective correlative" is at most the first kind of "spots of 
4 1 Yip, Bijiat) Shi.me t b ^ t f ^ f (Taipei; Dongda, 1983), p. l54. 
4 2 R o m a n Ingarden , Literary Work, of Art (Evans ton : N o r t h w e s t e r n 
Universi ty Press, 1973), p.252. 
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indeterminacy," using an object to represent the meaning. There is 
no contradiction with Hirsch's theory. However, in U Bai's poem or 
the gong-an mentioned above, the meaning is not merely implied by 
"language." The signification is pointing outward to a different level 
of discourse, creating the second kind of "spots of indeterminacy," a 
kind of significance beyond language. 
Meanwhi l e , W o l f g a n g Iser has pointed out two m a j o r 
drawbacks in Ingarden's theory, 
First, he is unable to accept the possibility 
that a work may be concretized in different , 
equally valid ways; and second, because of 
this blind spot he overlooks the fact that the 
reception of many works of art would be 
simply blocked of f , they , could only be 
concretized according to the norms of classical 
aes the t i c s . 4 3 
In the classical Chinese tradition, poets would accept the fact that "a 
work may be concretized in different , equally valid ways." For 
instance, Liu Xie points out in the chapter o f - Tong Bien]h^&m 
Wenxin diaolong that norms are always changing, 
If it changes, it will endure, if it adapts itself 
to the changing trade, it will lack nothing. 
Success will be- his who follows the changing 
4 3 W o l f g a n g Iser, The Act of Reading (Balt imore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1980), p, 178. 
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times, and he will have no need of fear if he 
can take advantages of his opportunities.4 4 
^fcl'J X: > iU'J ZF » 
Meanwhile, Su Shi also writes, 
If, in writing poetry, you insist it must be this 
p o e m , 
Then c e r t a i n l y you ' re not one who 
unders tands poe t ry . 4 5 
M> i i # i t b i f , ^ ^ t f A . 
The meaning of the author, even if it be possible to extend it in 
Hirsch's sense, will undergo a metamorphosis, so to speak, in the text 
to break away from the chains of the signs. 
I begin with Hirsch in my discussion of hermeneutics mainly 
because of his posit ion against the common skeptical at t i tude 
towards interpretation in the contemporary scene. On the one hand I 
aim at highlighting the drawback of the meaning-significance theory, 
and on the other at delineating the limitation of interpretation. I 
believe that "innocence," if I am to borrow Lentricchia's term in 
descr ibing Hirsch, may be a determining factor in any type of 
interpretat ion. "As a theorist who speaks unapologet ical ly for 
rational values, E.D. Hirsch stands pretty much by himself in the 
4 4 L i u Xie, Wenxin diaolottg;. t ranslat ion quoted f rom. Vincent Yu-
chung Shih trans., The Literary Mind and the Carving of Dragons (Hong K o n g : 
Chinese University Press, 1983), p.325. 
4 5 Su Shi, Dong po ji > j u a n 16,10b, in Sibil beiyao 
.Translat ion quoted from Liu, Language\ Paradox, Poetics, p.81. See also Burton 
Watson , Su Tung-p'o: Selections from a Sung Dynasty Poet (New York: Columbia 
Univers i ty Press, 1965), p. 109, 
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landscape of contemporary critical theory."46 Hirsch ts complaint in 
The Aims of Interpretation does hit the nail on the head and sounds 
the alarm of the paradox of the radical s ide of the c o n t e m p o r a r y 
scene . Thus: 
Scholars are right to feel indignant toward those 
learned wr i te rs who de l ibera te ly exp lo i t the 
inst i tut ions of scholarship - even down to its 
p u n c t i l i o u s c o n v e n t i o n s l ike f o o t n o t e s and 
quotat ions - to deny the whole point of the 
institution of scholarship, to deny, that is, the 
possibility of knowledge. I f is ethically inconsistent 
to batten on institutions whose very foundat ions 
one attacks. It is logically inconsistent to write 
scholarly books which argue that there's no point in 
writing scholarly books.4 7 
The Paradox in Heidegger's Hermeneutics 
Here let me direct the issue back to the postmodern c h a l l e n g e 
in i t ia ted by p h i l o s o p h i c a l hermeneut ics : modernist "determinacy" vs . 
p o s t m o d e r n "indeterminacy." In ana lyz ing Gadamer's h e r m e n e u t i c s , 
Hirsch points out the d i f f erence between Gadamer and h i m s e l f , 
The c h i e f d i v e r g e n c e is that Gadamer argues 
for the n e c e s s i t y of d i f ferentness of meaning , 
and I for the p o s s i b i l i t y of s a m e n e s s o f 
meaning , in different applications of a t ex t . 4 8 
4 6 Len(r icch ia , After the New Criticism, p. 257. 
4 7 H i r s c h , The Aims of Interpretation, p.2. 
4 8 H i rsch, "Meaning and Signif icance Reinterpreted," p.214. 
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Ever since Heidegger's effort in exorcising the metaphysical spirit in 
Western philosophy, the role of the traditional view of understanding 
- to seek truth - has begun to topple. Heidegger openly admits the 
"thrownness" of human being, and so human understanding must be 
deeply rooted in one's "situaledness." In his monumental Being and 
Time, Heidegger lays down the three decisive factors of interpretation 
: Vorhabe ( fore-having), Vor.ucht (foresight) and Vorgriff (fore-
c o n c e p t i o n ) .49 Understanding no longer originates f rom the subject, 
but rather from the "pre-understanding" which is made up with the 
"fore-structure." ' Gadamer further extends his point to Voruteile 
(pre judice) , insisting on the fact that only prejudice can make 
interpretat ion p o s s i b l e ™ This "pre-understandmg" must be rooted in 
the "si tuatedness" of the interpreter, the "situatedness" being pre-
determined by culture, history, language and other factors. Thus in 
the view of phenomenological hermenenticists like Heidegger and 
Gadamer, different situations will lead to different interpretations - it 
is hardly possible, even if necessary, to seize the original meaning. 
Heidegger also holds that "all interpretations are based on 
understanding," and interpretation is "the understanding expressed 
through the medium of language."51 Meanwhile, Hoy has been 
perspicacious in noting that Heidegger's inquiry into the modern 
phi losophical tradition and technological society merely aims at 
in Mciclcggcr, Being and Time, trans* J, Macquaric and Robinson 
(London: SCM Press, 1962); Heidegger writes, "Whenever someth ing is 
interpreted as something, the interpretation will be founded essent ia l ly upon 
fore -hav ing , foresight and fore-concept ion. An interpretation is never a 
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n l e s s apprehending of s o m e t h i n g presented to us." S e e 
particularly the part on "Understanding and Interpretation," pp. 188-195. 
I-Ians-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: Seabury, 1975), 
pp.245-274. Sec pp.261-269 in particular. 
ec Heidegger, Being and Time, pp. 188-195. 
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"expounding that, a better tradition in the good old days has been 
concealed and then d isappeared ."^ In fact, Heidegger's emphasis on 
"Being" in his interpretation is deeply rooted in the "situatedness" of 
himself. The "thrownness" of the interpreter situates the interpreter 
in the historicity of the structure of Western metaphysics. One can 
hardly gainsay the fact that when we interpret Heidegger, it is 
inevitable to go back to Kant, and Heidegger's study on Kant is 
completely different from the work of Neo-Kantians such as Cassirer. 
Let alone the question of whether Kant's theory is essential ly 
"existential epis temology" as Heidegger would claim, Heidegger 's 
Existentialism is deeply rooted in his own interpretation of Kant. The 
interpretat ion derived from the interpretation of Kant is in turn 
deeply rooted in Heidegger's own interpretation of Dasein (Being-
there). This interpretation will inevitably influence his interpretation 
of Being, which will in turn profoundly influence our interpretation 
of Heidegger. 
If we are to look at Heidegger's followers, we shall realize that 
in their interpretations the philosopher "Heidegger" advocates the 
des t ruct ion of the Western thinking which does not put due 
emphasis on "Being," and "Heidegger" aims at the return to the Being 
itself. The influence of this advocation of Heidegger can be seen in 
many critical theories after him. Obviously enough, Paul Bove 
utilizes the theory of Heidegger in his Destructive Poetics. The point 
that matters here lies in the fact that Heidegger's advocation of a 
return to "Being" strangely exhibits a significance which influences 
5 2 Hoy, Pre face lo The Critical Circle, C h i n e s e ve r s ion , p. 15. 
T rans l a t ion mine. 
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B o v e S theory. It m apparent that Heidegger's theory has been 
utilized. In other words, "situatedness" becomes a mere access to 
ano the r theory. Heidegger may not be responsible for this. 
However, in Heidegger's view, the interpretation of the "situatedness" 
should be rooted in its own "situatedness." Such a paradox would 
c o n v e n i e n t l y fo l low: i„ fac ing one's own " th rownness , " . the 
" s i t ua t edness" of the Dasein is inevi tably thrown into the 
in terpre ta t ion of the predecessor and the interpretat ion of the 
successo r . 
Heidegger believes that the characteristic Being in a certain 
situation is determined by the future: 
Only in so far as Dasein is as an "I-am-having~ 
been," can Dasein c o m e towards i tself 
futurally in such a way that it comes back. As 
authentically futural , Dasein is authentically 
as "having-been" . Ant ic ipat ion of one's 
uttermost and ownmost possibility is coming 
back u n d e r s t a n d i n g ^ to one 's ownmos t 
"been", Only so far as it is futural can Dasein 
be a u t h e n t i c a l l y as having been. the 
characterist ic of "having-been" arises, in a 
certain way, from the future . 4 0 
Ironical ly, the interpretation of this concept is articulated in the 
interpretation of Heidegger's followers on Heidegger. In other words, 
the "Being" of Heidegger('s theory) is also determined by the future. 
Therefore , the Vorhabe, Vorsicht and Vorgriff in his sense are also 
- ^ S e e Heidegger, Being and Time, p.373. 
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r o o t e d in t h e " f u t u r e " o f h i s t h e o r y , t h a t is t o s a y , t h e " n o t - y e t -
i n t e r p r e t e d - n e s s " o f t h e f u t u r e i n t e r p r e t e r . 
P r e - u n d e r s t a n d i n g m a y o r i g i n a t e f r o m " B e i n g , " b u t in t h e 
p r o c e s s o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g , a s p l i t e m e r g e s to m a k e t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
e n d l e s s l y s e p a r a t e f r o m t h e B e i n g a n d t h u s i t i s t r a p p e d in a n 
e n d l e s s a n d h i s t o r i c a l l y i n t e r t e x t u a l s i t u a t i o n . T h i s " p r e -
u n d e r s t a n d i n g , " i r o n i c a l l y e n o u g h , b e c o m e s a n o t h e r o b j e c t o f 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of a n o t h e r B e i n g , and th i s c a n n o l o n g e r r e t u r n b a c k to 
t h e B e i n g i t s e l f , s i n c e " p r e - u n d e r s t a n d i n g " h a s b e c o m e an o b j e c t o f 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g . " P r e - u n d e r s t a n d i n g " a l s o d e p e n d s o n "post-
understanding" in t h i s s e n s e . W h e n t h e " p r e - u n d e r s t a n d i n g " c a n n o t 
r e t u r n t o t h e " B e i n g , " it w o u l d b e c o m e a k i n d o f "post-
understanding," t h a t is t o s a y , r e t u r n i n g f r o m t h e f u t u r e t o t h e 
" h a v i n g - b e e n , " a n d t h u s , to a c e r t a i n e x t e n t t h e " u n d e r s t a n d i n g " is 
f r e e d f r o m i t s o w n " s i t u a t e d n e s s . " 
H e i d e g g e r o n c e c r i t i c i z e d N i e t s c h z e ' s b l i n d n e s s t o t h e 
p r o x i m i t y of N i e t s c h z e ' s o w n m e t a p h y s i c s to A n a x i m a n d e r ' s . 5 4 H o y 
h a s a l r e a d y n o t e d tha t t he A n a x i m a n d e r f r a g m e n t is "now p a r t o f an 
i n t r i c a t e w e b o f r e a d i n g s o r o f w h a t h a s r e c e n t l y b e e n c a l l e d 
' i n t e r t e x t u a l i t y ' . " " ( m y e m p h a s i s ) H e i d e g g e r ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is 
l i m i t e d b y h i s o w n " s i t u a t e d n e s s " - t h e a i m at d e s t r o y i n g W e s t e r n 
m e t a p h y s i c s , a n d t h u s b e c o m e s p r e j u d i c e d a g a i n s t N i e t s c h z e ' s 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a n d c a l l s it m e t a p h y s i c a l . I n H e i d e g g e r ' s 
h e r m e n e u t i c s , p r e j u d i c e is g r a n t e d a l i c e n s e , but t h e p o i n t is t h a t t h i s 
l i c e n s e s i m p l y b a n s a l l m e t a p h y s i c s . If l i m i t e d to H e i d e g g e r ' s o w n 
5 4 H o y , "Musi. We' Say What We Mean?" p.397. 
5 5 H o y , "Musi We Say What We Mean?" p.397. 
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interpretat ion, this "situatedness" is indeed valid. However, in 
Hoy ' s in terpre ta t ion Heidegger ' s des t ruct ion of me taphys ic s has 
f o r m e d a kind of " in te r t ex tua l i ty" with Nie t schze ' s so-ca l led 
"metaphysics." In this intertextual hermeneutic situation, it confirms 
the validity and accuracy of the interpretation of the Anaximander 's 
f r a g m e n t at that time. In view of that particular interpretation at 
that par t icu la r t ime, once again the interpretat ion fa l ls back to 
Hi rsch ' s "hermeneut ics of innocence,'"56 confirming the validity of 
that interpretation in that situation. 
Hoy has s u c c e s s f u l l y u n d e r s c o r e d the l i m i t a t i o n of 
h e r m e n e u t i c s after Heidegger (the following remark is made on 
G a d a m e r ) , 
• • . when hermeneut ics insists that the 
tradition ( W i r k u n g s g e s c h i c h t e ) inevi tab ly 
i n f l u e n c e s t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d 
in te rpre ta t ion of art works , it does not 
q u e s t i o n s u f f i c i e n t l y . the t r a d i t i o n a l 
metaphysical assumptions built into the very 
concept of art work and tradition.5 7 
Derr ida also argues against Heidegger by contending that "insofar as 
Heidegger asks about the essence of truth or the meaning of Being, 
he still speaks the language of metaphysics which looks upon 
m e a n i n g as something pre-exist ing that is to be d i scovered ." 5 8 
5 ^ R e f e r to Len t r i eeh ia , After the New Criticism, p p . 2 5 7 - 2 8 0 . 
L e i i l r i c e h i a c r i t i c i s e s Hi rsch ' s h e r m e n e u t i c s as innocen t in the chap te r 
bea r ing the , t i t le "Hermeneut ics of Innocence". 
5 7 H o y , "Must We Say What We Mean?" p.400, 
5 8 S e e for instance Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Text and Interpretat ion," in 
Hermeneutics and Modem Philosophy, p.381. 
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M e a n w h i l e , Gadamer a lso points out that the later He idegger 
"developed his special quasipoetical language in order to eseape the 
language of metaphysics ." ;" Such a "quasipoetical" language calls for 
"understanding" which leads to a very complicated issue: a theory of 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 6 0 which teaches others how to interpret, deliberately 
employs a language which needs to be interpreted. These questions 
will then follow: How to interpret? By following the ways outlined in 
the theory? Is it possible for the readers to grasp the "meaning" of 
the theory? If so, does that "valid" meaning transgress the rules laid' 
down by the theory i tself? Or if the meaning is valid without 
cont rad ic t ion with the theory i tself , does Hirsch's hermeneut ics 
s imultaneously stand? In other words, are we doing Hirsch's so-
called "Hermeneutics of Innocence" justice? Heidegger's definition of 
interpretat ion as "as-structure" that takes something as something 
must also rely upon the "valid" meaning of the something that the 
in te rpre te r takes. 
- " G a d urn or, "Text unci Interpretation," p.381, 
„ t 6 C r i ( i c s ° r Heidegger , and Gadamer may deny that Heidegger and 
Gadamer would consider (heir works as theories. Indeed, interpretat ion, in 
Heidegger s sense, is the bas ic structure of being. Thus it should not be 
regarded as an isolated "theory" that teaches people to interpret . However 
when Gadamer talks about the "quasi-poetical" language of the later works of 
Heidegger , he has to admit that "the extent to which one can succeed in 
f inding the language that fulf i l ls (his task is problematic; however, the task is 
set, it is the task of understanding." (Gadamer, "Text and Interpretat ion," p. 
38 0 On another occasion when Gadamer discusses "the hermeneut ics of 
suspic ion," he claims that "The question is, how thoroughly can the role of 
h e r m e n e u t i c s p lays in ph i losophy be seen or discussed in l ight of this 
oppos i t ion [either s imply interpret ing s ta tements fol lowing the intent ions of 
the author or as revealing the mcaningfulness of statements in a completely 
unexpec ted sense and against the meaning of the author]?" (Gadamer , "The 
Hermeneutics of Suspicion," in Man and World 17 (1984), p.317; my emphasis) 
In other words, when we try to understand Heidegger, the question is still 
"how" ^ to unders tand his "role" in phi losophy, and this is apparen t ly a 
theoret ica l quest ion deal ing with our interpretation of Heidegger . In this 
s e n s e we cannot but treat He idegge r ' s h e r m e n e u t i c s as " theo ry of 
unders tand ing" in our discourse. 
Chu 57 
I begin with I-Iirsch and then move onto Heidegger. Although 
there is hardly any similarity between their hermeneutics, it seems 
that they agree on one thing: the necessity of interpretation. I aim 
not at pointing out the paradox in each of their hermeneutics, but at 
bringing out the necessity of paradox in hermeneutics. Here I would 
agree with Derrida when he quotes from Montaigne, "It's more 
important to interpret interpretations than to interpret things."61 As 
I have mentioned at the very outset of this chapter, I believe that 
c o m p a r a t i v e l i te ra ture involves an immedia te compar i son of 
interpretations. Whether we are interested in critical theory or not, 
crit ical theory does encroach onto the > realm ' of the literary t e x t 
Therefore, before we actually compare the interpretations, it must be 
u s e f u l to in te rpre t how in te rp re ta t ions work . But once 
interpretations (or' theories) are interpreted by others, will there be 
similar ambiguities in the meta-commentaries, or to borrow Geoffrey 
Hartman's term, "enchantment" in a text? 
The problem that we confront here should be the problem of 
textual i ty, for both primary text and secondary commentary, and 
even me ta -commenta ry exhibi t enchantment . Here I aim to 
highlight the role of a critic in the interpretation of interpretations 
f rom a comparative point of view. By examining the role that a critic 
takes in the production of meaning in his/her interpretation, we may 
^ J a c q u e s Dcrrkla, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: 
The Universi ty of Chicago Press, 1978), p.278. 
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take a closer look at the mechanism of ' the dissemination of meaning 
of one system onto another system in a comparat ive discourse. 
When we talk about a comparative point of view, it is at once 
apparent that it has to do with two or more kinds of discourse. So 
there must be a problem of the representation of one system in the 
discourse of another system. 
Reading the Other and the Problem of Textuality 
In his "Reading the Other Reading," Liao Ping-hui states that 
Zhang Longxi and Ut Liebman Schaub share a similar point that, 
"Oriental thought provides an occasion for the Occidental critic to see 
things in a different light," but the opinions of the two critics collide 
at the point where Zhang "insists on a unique Chinese cultural 
integrity that makes it inaccessible to the Occident" and Schaub "is 
more willing to see Foucault as a sympathetic reader, who actually 
learns from Oriental systems of thought."6 2 The very problematic 
point lies in the chance for the Occidental to see things in a different 
light. To borrow Edward Said's argument in his Orientalism, we 
would see that the Orient is something that the critic creates; that is 
to say, to see something one wishes to see according to the "will to 
power" in the Nietszchean tradition. Liao has also sounded the alarm 
not to "confuse the Orient Foucault refers to with the Orient Schaub 
shows as significant to Foucault."6 3 By using Lyotard's theory, Liao 
also notes that "The Oriental systems of thought that Schaub finds 
6 2 L i a o Ping-hui , "Reading llie Oilier Reading", a paper presented in 
the Third Col loqu ium, Commi t t e e of (lie International Compara t ive Li te ra ture 
Associat ion, on Concepts of Literary Theory East and West, 1990. p.3. 
6 3 L i a o , " R e a d i n g the O t h e r R e a d i n g / ' p. 15. 
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important to our understanding of Foucault can be an 'absence' that 
Schaub wants to make significant as a •presence'.1"64 From this we 
can detect a trace of paradox. Through his interpretation, Liao tries 
to say that the Orient that Schaub shows as significant to Foucault 
may be different from the Orient that Foucault refers to. However, if 
we push the issue into another level of discourse, we may not be 
surprised to see that the Orient,? (Schaub's and Foucault 's) in Liao's 
text (or meta-commentary) may also be different from the Orients in 
Schaub's and Foucault's own texts. In other words, Liao may have 
represented a different Orient in his own text in order to put forward 
his argument. So the Other in a certain discourse is doomed to be a 
( re - )p resen ta t ion by the cr i t ic , and thus this Other must be 
enmeshed in the rhetoric of the critical text. 
Liao should be well aware of this and he quotes Foucault 
again to unravel the puzzle, or to ease the embarrassment, 
The philosopher must be sufficiently perverse 
to play the game of truth and error badly; this 
pe rve r s i ty , which opera tes in pa radoxes , 
allows him to escape the grasp of categories.6 5 
Liao fur ther states that "one should not forget that Foucaul t is 
deploying a modernist rhetorical strategy to persist, in perversity and 
to make a d i f fe rence ." 6 6 Post-structuralist criticisms, in particular 
6 4 Li ao, "Read ing the Other Reading ," p. 14. The "presence" and 
"absence" here should be understood with relation to the representat ion of the 
Other . As Johannes Fabian indicates, "the Other 's e thnographic presence goes 
toge the r with its theoret ical absence," See Johannes Fabian, "Presence and 
R e p r e s e n t a t i o n : T h e Other ' s An th ropo log ica l , Wr i t ing , " Critical Inquiry 1 6 
(Summer 1990), p.771. 
Michel Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory Practice, p. 190. Quoted 
by Liao, p. 15. 
6 6 L i a o , "Reading the Other Reading," p. 15. 
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d e c o n s t r u c t s ones, give birth to another piece of writing, a criticism 
of work and a criticism of itself, putting criticism on a par with 
creation, or as Hartman would say, 
I think the intellectual effort is always against 
enchan tmen t , but that doesn ' t mean that 
every enchantment must be rigidly resisted, 
as a matter of Superman-like honor. Then the 
cure is worse than the disease.6 7 
Hartman's insistence on enchantment in the text leads his theory to a 
"hermeneut ics of indeterminacy" that "proposes a type of analysis 
that has renounced the ambition to master or demystify its subject 
( t ex t , p s y c h e ) by t e c h n o c r a t i c , p r e d i c t i v e or a u t h o r i t a r i a n 
f o r m u l a s . " 6 8 W h e n m i t M n m i s p u t o n a p a r w l l h c r e a t i o n , the 
problem of textuality will be heightened, and in that sense a critical 
commentary is inevitably a piece of "double-writing," as in Foucault 's 
case. Said has a lucid account of this kind of "double-writing": 
The text [critical commentary] intended first 
to describe (by represent ing) the texts he 
[Foucaul t ] s tud ies , as d iscourse , a rch ive , 
statements, and the rest, then later to present 
a new text, his own, doing and saying what 
those other ' invisible ' texts have repressed, 
6 7 Quoted from Jmre Salusiiiszky, Crilicism . in Society (New York and 
London: Mcthuen, 1988), p.75. This is cited, as an epigraph of an interview 
with Ha r tman . 
6 8 G e o f f r e y Har tman , Criticism in the Wilderness: The Study of 
Literature Today (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), p.299. 
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doing and saying what no one will say and 
d o . e y 
Every text, then, is not limited to one level of discourse. The 
text simply systematically wraps up the levels of the double-writing 
and pretends to be a harmonious whole. The "invisible" interstices 
between the double-wri t ing is the place where textuality generates 
its paradox. The rhetoric of critical discourse may well disguise the 
d i f fe rence of the Orients mentioned earlier in Liao P i n g - h u i ' s essay, 
but amidst the rhetoric there inevitably lie some interstices which 
will become particularly important when we juxtapose two cultural 
systems to be compared. 1 will then try to focus on the interstices by 
using a commentary as "text" to make a meta-commentary, If w e 
look at the case in a different light by cutting the linear adding up of 
m e t a - m e t a - c o m m e n t a r i e s , we may see tha t th is k ind of 
" s u p p l e m e n t " 7 0 may not mean anything, if we do not question how it 
gathers status and history to secure its authority, as Said claims. A 
meta -commenta ry does not necessarily demyst i fy a text; at times 
even contrary to the common belief among theorists it mystif ies a 
text. If we adopt a reflexive way of pointing the hermeneutic action 
back to the meta-text i tself , we may be able to detect the 
enchantment that a commentary brings, and then examine how this 
enchantment secures the role of a commentary and disguises the 
in te r s t i ces between the two levels of double-wr i t ing , in turn 
germinating the power of the dominating culture over the culture it 
is being "compared" to. 
6 " E d w a r d Said, "The Problem of Texlual i ly : Two Exemplary Posi t ions ," 
p . 6 7 6 . ' 
70 , 
mm deliberately using (his (enu with a Derridean overtone. 
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Now let us move onto an analysis of a critic's work and a 
meta-cri t ic 's work to see how the surplus of meaning is on the one 
hand suppressed, and on the other liberated, ' and f rom the inter-
re la t ion of the two to see how the "metaphorici ty," to borrow 
Ricoeur 's term, functions to consolidate both the critic's critique and 
the critique on the critic, in turn seemingly fusing the two levels of 
doub l e -wr i t i ng together to form a seemingly "organic" whole . 
Gadamer has noted that there is a methodological advantage to make 
the inner relation of interpretation and text clear,? l but I would 
ra ther think the critic is the one situated between the text and 
interpretation. So it would be necessary to consider the role of the 
critic in this sense. 
The essay selected is Said's "The Problem of Textuality: Two 
Exemplary Positions" which is later revised and collected in his prize-
w i n n i n g The World, The Text, and The Critic, as the chapter 
"Cri t ic ism Between Culture and System." By detecting the role 
played by Said, a critic, 1 hope to shed light on the paradox of. 
textual i ty (the paradox between the two levels of double-wri t ing) 
and see how the paradox is successful ly si lenced. I wish to 
emphas ize that I am not trying to "deconstruct" the text in a 
Derr idean way. My purpose here is rather to examine how the 
hegemonic system of interpretation appropriates the indeterminacy 
in a text.. I take for granted at this stage that a text may inevitably 
transgress the rules that it lays down for itself, but to point out the 
se l f -deconstruct ive nature of a text, there will not but be another 
7 1 Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Tex! and tnierpreiaiion", in Hermeneutics 
and Modern Philosophy, p . 3 8 9 . 
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kind of " me taphys ic s" denounced by Derr ida. As Said has 
commented on Derrida, "Although Derrida may not be responsible, 
the dissemination power of his text forms a new "metaphysics."7 2 
The interesting point here lies in the fact that Said is saying that "of 
course Derrida is not responsible." Obviously enough, if Derrida is 
r e spons ib le for creat ing another kind of "metaphysics" that . he 
denounces, it is not the clisseminative power of the text that is to be 
blamed. Paradoxically enough, without Said the critic commenting on 
Derr ida , Derrida's dissemination would not have been able to be 
d isseminated in this aspect : to gather status and fo rm a new 
"metaphys ics . "73 The textuality of Said's comment on Derrida silently 
gives the impression that Derrida is responsible, although Said tries 
to claim that Derrida is not. When Said explains Derrida, he himself 
states that "when reading a given text traditionally a critic will 
respect its supposed stability and securely reproduce that stability in 
a critical commentary ." 7 4 Here Said is apparently not a "traditional" 
critic. He is trying to make, something more than the reproduction of 
the stabil i ty, in Derr ida 's text. He encroaches onto Derr ida ' s 
textuality. On the one hand, Derrida keeps on trying to show that 
"far from criticism being able to account for everything by a doubling 
or dup l i ca t ing represen ta t ion , there is a lways someth ing that 
7 2 S a i d , "The Problem of Textuality," p.682. 
^ T h e point (hat Said raises here is that "To (he extent tha t Derr ida ' s 
d i s c i p l e s h a v e ava i l ed t h e m s e l v e s of his s t r a t egy [ d e c o n s t r u c t i v e s t r a t e g y 
based on a theory of undec idabi l i ty and desemanl ic iza t ion] and its ' concept , ' a 
kind of new o r thodoxy .has come into ex i s tence , no less held in by cer ta in 
doc t r ines and ideas than in 'Western metaphys ics ' . " Please refer to Sa id , "The 
P r o b l e m of Tex tua l i t y , " p .682. The e n o r m o u s number of books and ar t ic les 
e m p l o y i n g , or at. least, d i s cus s ing , D e r n d e a n decons t ruc t ion is a very good 
e x a m p l e . 
7 4 S a i d , "The Problem of Textuali ty," p.682. 
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escapes," on the other Said's commentary on Derrida tends to grasp 
those elements which try to escape f rom Derrida's text. No wonder 
S - d says, "the text commands and indeed permits, invents all the 
mis in terpre ta t ions and misreadings which are funct ions of i tself ."?* 
Said the critic here acts like the middle man who keeps the two 
levels of wri t ing toge ther , not let t ing ei ther one fall apar t or 
domina te the other. 
Said fu r ther secures his own role when he ment ions that 
Derr ida chooses Levi-Strauss and Foucault with "what seems to be a 
fair ly straightforward polemical goal in mind." It's rather ironic that 
through this "pr inciple of select ion," to borrow Jakobson ' s term, 
Derrida is selecting something in favour of his own polemical goal. So 
"there is no explanation why what Derrida calls the age of Rousseau 
should not also be known as the age of CondiIlac."76 The mechanism 
of this kind of selection is similar to that of Robert Burns' calling his 
love a red, red rose instead of anything else. The selection with an 
eye to a po lemica l goal implic i t ly restates Said 's idea that he 
ment ions e lsewhere: knowledge is contentious. Here Said is again 
adopt ing the method of Derrida: selecting Derrida's selection for the 
sake of his own polemical goal. Perhaps different f rom the poetic 
funct ion in Jakobson 's sense, the critical function projects f rom the 
axis of selection to another person's axis of selection. Said, living in a 
glass-house, still throws stones. But Said's act of throwing stones is 
def ini te ly an art. 
7 5 S a k ) , "The Problem of Texlualily," p.688. 
7 6 S a i d , "The Problem of Texlualily," p.697. 
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In his analysis of Derrida, Said continues to insist that 
"Derrida's work has had and continues perforce to have a cumulative 
effect on h i m . " ^ (original emphasis) This view of Said grants a 
l icense to the extratextual power. to Derrida's work by adding a 
cumulative effect outside the text, and this extratextual power will 
in f luence , if not dominate , the intratextuai concern of Derr ida. 
Although Derrida tries to place the emphasis on the textuality itself, 
his text will inevitably be changed by the "cumulative effect* on him. 
That is why Said claims that more and more Derridean terms, such as 
"supplement," gather status and history. But Said seems to have 
overlooked, perhaps deliberately, that the name "Derrida," and even 
"Said," gathers status and history through their criticisms as well. 
Said's effort, in noting the extratextual significance of Derrida's 
works leads conveniently to his inclination to Foucault 's theory, 
which Said himself believes to be moving the readers "in and out of 
the text." Said clearly states Foucault's "perspicacity" over Derrida: 
Foucault is not only able to show very 
polemically that on one crucial point Derrida 
has a p p a r e n t l y mis read D e s c a r t e s by 
employing a French translation that adds 
words not present in Descarte's Latin original, 
he is also able apparently to "prove" that 
Derrida's whole argument about Descartes is 
wrong, even capricious. Why? Because, true 
to his method and not to the text's semantic 
sedimentat ion, Derrida insists on trying to 
7 7 S a i d , ' " T h e P r o b l e m pf T e x t u a l i t y , " p .699 . 
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prove that Foucault 's thesis about Descartes, 
in which Descar tes separated folly f rom 
dreaming, was really not that at all but an 
argument about how dreams were more 
extravagant even than* folly, folly being but a 
weak instance of dreaming.78 (My emphases) 
The issue is getting more complicated. The textuality undergoes a 
couple of levels of discourse. From Descartes to Derrida, to Foucault, 
to Said, and eventually to here. Applying Liao Ping-hui 's and 
Lyotard 's points that we have discussed earlier, Foucault is saying 
that the Descartes that Derrida depicts is not the real Descartes. The 
Der r ida Foucaul t ment ions in his own discourse may also be 
di f ferent , however, from the Derrida Said mentions. So Said here 
seems to commit the same error as Schaub, "collapsing the distinction 
between levels of d i s c o u r s e ; S a i d no longer observes the fact that 
"a t e x t c o m m a n d s and indeed p e r m i t s , i nven t s all the 
mis in terpre ta t ions and mi s r ead ings which are funct ions of i tself ." 
Quite the contrary, he insists on the real Descartes at this point. 
Here let me contrast the "wrong" or even "capr ic ious" 
argument of Derrida on Descartes with Confucius's misinterpretation 
of the line si wu xie ^ fejtf . James Liu argues that Confucius is 
us ing "the same words to mean something di f ferent" and Liu's 
c a r e f r e e a t t i tude that "one need ne i ther be embar rassed nor 
s h o c k e d " 8 0 d e m o n s t r a t e s a typica l d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n a 
characteristic Chinese critic and a Western trained one. Liu believes 
7 8 S a i d , "The Problem of Textuality," p.701. 
7 9 L i a o , "Reading the Other Reading," p. 14. 
8 0 J a m e s Liu, Language, Paradox. Poetics, pp.95-96. 
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that "Confucius was in.eres.ed not in interpreting the Book of Poetry 
but in borrowing words from it , 0 suit his own purposes," whereas 
Said insists on the "wrong"' way of Derrida in being true to his 
method and not to the text's semantic sedimentation, although he 
still believes that knowledge is contentious. 
Said's commentary thus exhibits ' in itself the power of 
discourse that Foucault points out elsewhere; to borrow Said's own 
words here, this is a discourse that "hid the systematic rules of its 
formulation and its concrete affiliations with power."8l W h e n S a i d 
postulates that "between the power of the dominant culture, on the 
one hand, and the impersonal system of disciplines and methods 
(savoirs), on the other, stands the critic,"82 Said must have taken for 
granted a kind of ability by which he himself being a critic can 
negate his own identity. Said is perfectly right in saying that "each 
d iscourse , eaclr language - of psychiatry, psychology, cr i t icism, 
history - is to some degree a jargon, but it is also a language of 
control and a set of inst i tut ions within the cul ture which it 
consti tutes as its special d o m a i n , " " but he must have been putting 
too little, if any, emphasis on the role of the critic here. This leads to 
a confusion: on the one hand Said stresses the importance of the 
"worldliness" of a text and on the other he situates the critic between 
the dominant culture and impersonal methods. In such a model it 
would seem easy to have impersonal methods freed from any power 
of the dominant culture as long as the critic is cautious and aware of 
the problem. Said does not mention anything about the interstices 
8 ' S a i d , "The Problem of Textuality," p.706,. 
8 2 S a i d , "The Problem of Textuality,11 p.701. 
^ S a i c l , "The Problem of Textuality," p.708. 
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between the two levels of double-writing. The significance of the 
textual i ty of a commentary or a meta-commentary is generated 
between the two levels of discourse and the critic is the one who 
l iberates the power of textuality. Due to the different levels of 
discourse, there will inevitably be paradox. A critic is not an arbiter, 
however; he simply uses "the language of control," such as names, 
j a r g o n s and quota t ions to d i sgu i se or displace the pa radox . 
Whenever there is paradox of textuality, the dominant system will 
appropr ia t e that paradox by metaphor ica l ly displacing it in a 
h o m o g e n e o u s inter textual web of dominant /Western he rmeneu t i c 
system. In a comparative discourse, therefore, paradox will become 
the power of the dominant 's textuality. The dominant voice will 
easily appropriate the weaker voice whenever there is a kind of 
paradox existing in a comparative discourse. Both of the two systems 
have to suffer from (he paradox of textuality and interpretation, but 
the dominant one is able to appropriate the paradox since it is 
supported by a self-generating "intercritical web" behind. A Chinese 
critical discourse, in this sense, is almost impossible to be free from 
hegemonic interpretation since Western theories are supported by 
the whole Western critical tradition which is developing, but the 
Chinese side is merely situated in a closure of eternal standstill. 
Here I have to go back to the Chinese critic, James Liu, for a 
fur ther discussion. Liu concludes after his discussion of the paradox 
of interpretat ion that "interpretation is ultimately bound to move 
For inslancc, refer la Zhang t .ongxi, "The Myth or the Other: China 
in the Eyes of Ihe Wesl." in Critical. Inquiry 15 (Auluinn 1988), pp. 108-131. See 
in part icular p. 116. See also ihe prel'aee of Rey Ciiow, Woman and Chinese 
Modernity: The Politics of Reading between West and East ( M i n n e a p o l i s : 
Univers i ty of Minnesota Press, 1990). 
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perpetual ly between the impossibility of perfect understanding and 
the necessity for imperfect explication, just as poetry is bound to 
move perpetually between, the voice of silence and the silence of the 
v o i d . " 8 5 Here Liu is bound by the discrimination of criticism and 
creation. In reading Foucault 's and Derrida's works, for instance, Said 
would wonder why criticism of the sort is not a branch of belle-
l e t t r e s . 8 6 When the boundary between cri t icism and poetry 
diminishes, however, the paradox of interpretation also demonstrates 
another paradox: the paradox of textuality. In fact, to use Liu's 
c o n c e p t , the paradox of interpreta t ion does not in te rcep t the 
necessity of explication, even if it is imperfect. Of course, no one can 
hope to have "perfect" explication, but the significant point is that 
imper fec t explications . will also be imperfectly explicated again by 
a n o t h e r cr i t ic . However , imperfec t expl icat ions of impe r f ec t 
explicat ions may not be farther away the perfect explication of the 
original text. When perfect understanding is a metaphysical "full-
presence," we should go back to the production of meaning in the 
p r o c e s s of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i tself to examine how " p e r f e c t 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g " b e c o m e s an excuse which is s y s t e m a t i c a l l y 
l eg i t ima t i zed in in t e rp re t a t ions . Us ing a mere t ropo log ica l 
displacement to move interpretation between whatever poles simply 
evades the most important point. The importance of textuali ty 
should incorporate both poetry and interpretation in Liu's sense. 
85L Au, Language, Paradox, Poetics, p. 119. 
(his line- of argument, tile art of quotations is no less creative 
than a metaph or operated according to the principle of selection. Very often, 
the art of quotations works by using the "melaphoricity" of the quotations to 
d e f a m i l i a r i z e our understanding, making us forget the paradox generated 
among different leve ls of discourse mentioned above. 
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The reason I am quoting Liu is that he tends to believe that 
"the fusion of cultural horizons is both possible and necessary" 
although he also notes that " p a r a d o x i c a l l y , by becoming aware of the 
unspoken presuppositions as well as consciously held beliefs of one 
culture, a person may hope to transcend them and understand those 
of another culture."*" ( m y emphasis) In Gadamer's case, the "fusion 
of horizons" refers to the overcoming of the "foreign" elements in a 
text by the interpreter.** In a comparative discourse, however, 
tension between the horizons of the text and the reader may not be 
dissolved, unless the foreign elements are appropriated by the critic 
who is inevitably overwhelmed by the dominant culture. Strangely 
enough, Liu's view bears a curious resemblance to Said's vjew in a 
more recent essay "Orientalism Reconsidered," 
A need for greater crossing of boundaries, for 
g rea te r i n t e rven ing in c ros s -d i sc ip l i na ry 
activity, a concentra ted awareness of the 
s i tuat ion. 
Anyhow, unless we can deal sufficiently with "the politics of 
t e x t u a l i t y , " 9 " Liu's "hope" and Said's "need" will merely become 
another powerful 'discourse which suppresses the "other" culture by 
8 7 Liu , Language, Paradox, HoeMc.%, p.l 19. 
inner, "Texl and Interpretat ion/ ' p.396. 
8 9 E d w a r d Said, "Orientalism Reconsidered," in Literature, Politics and 
Theory, Francis Barker e( al. eds. (New York: Metheun, 1986), p.229. 
9 0 S e e Gayatri CJiakravorly Spivak, "The Politics of Interpretat ion," in 
her In Oilier Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics (London & New York: 
Routledge, 1987), p.121. When Spivak talks about "the politics of textuality", 
she wr i t e s , " the ne twork of po l i t i c s -h i s to ry - soc ie ty - sexua l i ly and the l ike 
de f ines itself in ideology by acknowledging a textual or webl ike structure." 
Conversely speaking, we have to analyze the textuality of a critical text to see 
how the hegemonic ideology works, and this is the so-called "poli t ics of 
textual i ty" I invoke here. 
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the power, generated by the rhetoric of textuaiity of the hegemonic 
cr i t ica l t radi t ion. As Said rightly indicates , "the problem of 
Orienta l ism" - in our co.ntext, this implies the domination of the 
hegemonic interpretation over the suppressed culture - "is in reality 
a fact basic to any theory of interpretation, or hermeneutics.'"91 
. 555 * * 
I began this chapter by showing the two positions of modem 
hermeneut ics , and noted the paradoxes . in both of them. Then I 
moved on to the two positions of reading the Other (Zhang Longxi's 
and Schaub's), and Liao Ping-Inn's paradoxical reading of them. Then 
I went into the two positions of textuaiity, Foucault and Derrida, 
through the eyes of Said and the paradox between Foucaul t and 
Derrida and the paradox of Said in commenting on them. After all, I 
aim at delineating the problem of textuaiity and the application of 
this problem in Chinese-Western comparat ive li terature. I have 
always been confident that Chinese critical discourse is essential. Yet 
I also believe that the suppression from the dominant discourse will 
never let the suppressed speak in its own voice for itself. This is 
exactly the double bind faced by Chinese discourse. To transcend 
this double bind one has to note one's reading position with a keen 
awareness of being a critical Other. Said's most contributive remark 
in his "Orientalism Reconsidered" is perhaps that "a much sharpened 
•^Saitl , "Orientalism Reconsidered," 'pp .211-212 . 
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sense of the intellectual's role both in the defining of a context and in 
changing it is essential."9 2 (my emphasis) 
A so-called "re-oriented" look at the tradition is simply a 
duplication of Orientalism; "If the knowledge of Orientalism has any 
meaning, it is in being a reminder of the seductive degeneration of 
knowledge, of any knowledge, anywhere, at any t ime."9 3 The most 
ironical point seems to be seen in the phrase "a re-oriented look." 
The Orient is no longer the Orient, but an Orient present only in a re-
oriented look by the Occident. Lyotard would say "to name the 
r e fe ren t is not the same as to show its p re sence . " 9 4 In the 
comparat ive sense, to use the voice of the dominant discourse to 
name the Orient does not necessarily mean the showing of the Orient, 
but it clearly dictates, regrettably, the alien Other's fate of being the 
s u p p r e s s e d . 
To pursue a Ch inese -Wes t e rn compara t ive poe t ics by 
adopt ing Wai-l im Yip's so-called "trans-cultural" common poetics 
would seem ideal. But 1 cannot hope to achieve such a goal after my 
analysis of the paradox of textuality and its appropriation by the 
dominant discourse. Unless we elevate the comparative level of 
discourse to include the problem of textuality that both the Orient 
and Occident face, a trans-cultural application, be that rapport or 
influence studies, would be another kind of Orientalism. However, I 
am not trying to "argue" against dominant views on the status of 
textual i ty . As -Mas'ud Zavarzadeh and Donald Morton r ightly 
9 2 S a i d , "Orientalism Reconsidered," p.229. 
9 3 S a i d , "The Problem or Textual i ty ," p.328. 
9 4 J e a n - F r a n c o i s Lyotard , The Differend: Phrases in Dispute, trans. 
George Van den Abbeelc (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 
p.42, 
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indicate, that does not make sense; I a m m o r e i n c I i n e d t Q t h f t y i e w Q f 
Zavarzadeh and Morton that "it [will be] more important to indicate 
why such a position on .textuality is attractive ("truthful") and to 
indicate, when a reader nods in agreement with that position, what 
ideological series lies behind that n o d . " " 
In brief, let me restate three different reading strategies for 
the interpretive subject of a Chinese discourse. First, we may focus 
on "hermeneulics" and use Western methodology (and treat them as 
" i m p e r s o n a l " ) , 0 " s y s t e m a t i z e " C h i n e s e h e r m e n e u t i c i s sues 
(predominantly classical ones). Second, we may focus on "Chinese" 
and e m p h a s i z e a C h i n e s e way of i n t e rp r e t a t i on w i t h o u t 
acknowledging Western discourse. Finally, we may let Chinese 
critical discourse follow the reading strategy of a radical cri t ique 
which "begins with an in ter ior read ing , but moves towards 
displaying in the contradiclions and aporias of the text surfaced by 
an internal inquiry, the crisis of ideology [the will to power which is 
systematically., disguised in a comparative discourse].1-96 
Af te r the reading of (he complic i ty of the paradox of 
textual i ty with hegemonic interpretation, I believe that the third 
way is a fesible reading position of a critical Other. Only with this 
reading strategy can a Chinese critical discourse exist and function as 
a real "difference" in the dominant discourse. With this "difference," 
an "other" Chinese critical discourse may transformatively reread the 
he rmeneu t i ca ! typica l i t ies of the Chinese l i terary t radi t ion in 
_ 9 5 S e e Mas'ucI Zavarzadeh ami Donald Morion, Theory, (Post)Modernitv 
Opposition (Washington IXC.: Maisonncuvc l'ress, 1991), p.47. 
^"Zavarzadeh and Morion, Theory, (Po.u)Madernily. Opposition, p.203. 
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i 
con t empora ry d i scourse and thus l iberate it f rom an e ternal 
s t ands t i l l . 
Let me conclude by a story about a man selling weapons. He 
claims that the spear that he is selling can pierce everything whereas 
the shield can foil any weapon. In Chinese the term paradox arises 
f rom such a story where spear is mao and shield dun, together 
making mao-dun i f f% . (paradox). However paradoxical the story 
sounds, the man possesses both the spear and the shield. Others may 
be able to challenge the paradox, or to find out the weakness of each, 
yet the spear and the shield was still possessed by the man. Any 
effort to imitate the spear or the shield is futile as only those in the 
man's hand can possess that superior quality. The two, both in the 
man's hand, never have to be opposed to each other. Perhaps to win 
the ownership, that is to say, the power of textuality, would be a way 
out. But do not ask if it is paradoxical to say so. Paradox may be an 
a r t . 
In facing the rampant critical theories, the Chinese critic 
would be forced to stand between the power of the dominant culture 
and the "impersonal" system of disciplines and methods which is 
actually predetermined by the hegemonic system of interpretat ion. 
Unless one can juxtapose the (wo cultures at the same level of 
d i scourse , one can hardly speak in one's own voice. If the 
marginalization of the Other by the dominant is neglected, Bakhtin's 
"heteroglossia" would only be a difference of terms of monologism in 
a critical . text, as the rules laid down by the dominant would 
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systematically silence the voice of the o p p r e s s e d . " T h e d i s c o u r s e o f 
a critical Other, thus, has to take shape at the level of discourse 
where dominant theories face their own disparity and opposed Other, 
that is to say, a paradoxical Other. , 
9 7 W h c n Edward Said expounds the term "inter locutors ," he c la ims that 
this not ion "is so uns table as to split qui te dramat ica l ly into two fundamen ta l l y 
d i s c r e p a n t meanings . " T h e f irst one is that. "it reverberates agains t a who le 
b a c k g r o u n d of c o l o n i a l c o n f l i c t , in wh ich the " c o l o n i z e r s s e a r c h fo r an 
interlocutor valahle" and the o ther is a good deal less political that "der ives 
f r o m an a l m o s t en t i r e ly a c a d e m i c or theore t ica l e n v i r o n m e n t , and s u g g e s t s 
the ca lm as well as the ant i sept ic , control led qual i ty of a thought -exper iment . " 
A B a k t i n i a n d i a log i sm and he tc rog loss i a is the second kind of in t e r locu to r . 
S e e S a i d , " R e p r e s e n t i n g the C o l o n i z e d : A n t h r o p o l o g y ' s I n t e r l o c u t o r s , " in 
Critical Inquiry 15 (Autumn 1989), p.210, Without a sense of the first kind of 
in te r locu to r , one may easily be fascinated by a seeming "hetcrogloss ia ." 
Chapter Three 
De/Formalion of the Hermeneutical Framework 
in a Comparative Discourse 
As I have shown in (he previous chapter, the problem of 
t ex tua l i ty may be appropr i a t ed by the dominan t sys tem of 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which may then repress he rmeneu t i ca l i s sues 
per t inent to the critical Other. It is interesting to note that 
hermeneut ics , which implies the interpretation of a text, is not 
allowed to perform its job since the dominant critical tradition will 
be able to appropriate the power of the paradox of interpretation. 
How would this kind of hermeneutical suppression in f luence a 
Chinese-Western comparat ive discourse? Is it possible to juxtapose 
Chinese and Western literatures/criticisms for a fair comparison? In 
this chapter I wish to see the problem of such a juxtaposi t ion in 
order to examine how to de/form a hermeneutical f ramework for a 
Chinese-Western comparat ive discourse.1 
Juxtaposing the Chinese, and Western Hermenentic Traditions 
I- luivc lo s i ress that I wish solely i.o e x a m i n e the so -ca l l ed 
h e r m e n e u l i e t r a d i t i o n s " wi th r e f e r e n c e ' to my a r g u m e n t c o n c e r n i n g 
language, meaning and interpretat ion developed in Chapter Two, and so it may 
not be seen by some cr i t ics as Ihe "hermeneul ie proper" in the respec t ive 
tradit ions. For Ihe sweeping general izat ion which I may be susceptible, I beg 
the readers ' indulgence. I will demonstra te in the second half of this chapter 
that what I wish to achieve is an "oilier" hermeneutical f ramework on which 
our fu r ther analys is of an "oilier" Chinese critical d iscourse in a Chinese-
Western discourse in Ihe fol lowing chaplers may be based. 
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First of ail, lei me have a brief account of traditional Chinese 
views towards interpretation. One's theory of interpretation has 
close relation with one's view towards language, and it is apparent 
that traditional Chinese poetics is basically built upon a disbelief in 
language. The famous dictum of Lao Zi is a clear manifesto of such a 
d i sbe l i e f , 
The tao thai can be taozil is not the constant tao, 
The name that can be named is not the constant name.2 
In this respect, Zhuang Zi also shares a similar view, 
What the world values as speech are books. 
Books are nothing more than words; words 
have something that it valued; What is 
valued in words is meaning; meaning is 
derived from something. That from which 
meaning is derived cannot be transmitted in 
language. Yet ' the world, because it values 
language, t ransmits books. Although the 
world values them, 1 shall still think they are 
not worth valuing, because what the world 
values is not valuable.3 
g ^ j ' L ( W T z " c : / u '"X-k l i ^ ^ i r f (Bei j ing: Zhonghua , 
1956), p . l . Translation quoted from James Liu, Language, Paradox, Poetics ( N e w 
Jersey: Princeton Universi ty Press, 1988), p. 5. Among other t rans la t ions I 
think Liu's is the best. 
3 F r o m Zhuang Zi yin-te 4|£ 4 in Ilarvard-Yencliing Institute 
Sinological Index Series. Translat ion quoted from Liu, Language, Paradox, 
Poetics, p.9. 
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^ r r y ^ t I f - - C I , . ^ H i l i t . 
Tao i s t ph i losophy p laces the concept of Tao which canno t be 
expressed by human words at the centre, and so there is no wonder 
they do not value language. However, Confucianism, albeit famous 
for its concern with the human world and its "positivistic" outlook, 
also devalues the abil i ty of language, as reflected in C o n f u c i u s ' . 
saying that ",/,„ hu jin yan, yan In, jin ^ . ( W r i t i n g s 
cannot fully embody the language and language cannot ful ly embody 
the m e a n i n g . ) 4 It is n o coincidence that the Great Masters in 
t radi t ional Chinese cu l tu re all discredit (he abili ty of l anguage . 
Language is conceived as an inadequate means to convey one 's 
in tent ion in tradit ional Chinese thought. But wi thout l anguage 
l i terature will not be able to exist and we also have to note the 
paradox that the Masters have to use language to t ransmit their 
disbelief in language. 
Along this line of argument, we have to bear in mind what 
t radi t ional Chinese c r i t i c s s tress is the way to t ranscend the 
limitation of language. In his Wenfu , Lu Ji writes, 
Tax non-being to demand being, 
Knock on silence to seek sound.5 
4Sun S h i n g - y a n ^ . I f ; ] Zhou yi jiejich . Translation mine. cf. 
James Liu s translation, "Writing docs not exhaust words! words do not exhaust 
meaning." 111 Language, Paradox, Poetics, p.25. 
•Translat ion quoted from James Liu, Language, Paradox, Poetics, p.8 
c f . Wong Siu-kil's translation in his parly Chinese Criticism, (Hong Kong- Joint ' 
Publishing Co., 19X3) p.42: "I'or, in it, being is created out of non-being/ And 
out ot silence is music made." 1 am not inclined to (he term "music" that Wong 
uses. In addition, Liu's translation can preserve the form of couplet of the 
o r i g i n a l . 
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In other words, writing becomes n process from "non-being" to 
"being." In fact, in traditional Chinese culture, " y o u " ^ (presence) 
must rely upon (nothing). Accepting the limitation, the 
Chinese poetic tradition then seeks to acquire a "being" by pointing 
the. meaning beyond language , so as to reach the state of 
"limitlessness." In this respect, Zhong R o n g ' s M < ' f > e „ jin er yi 
you }>"" (The text ends but the significance does not)6 
•can be considered as an account of reaching l imit lessness in * 
limitations. Yen Y u ' s ^ "wen you jin er yi wu 
(The text is limited, but the significance is infinite) is a more 
elaborate account of this idea, but, as Wong Wai-leung points out, it 
does not have significant development.7 
Developed within the context of "wen you jin er yi wu qiung," 
the Chinese he rmeneu tical t radi t ion tends to p r e s e r v e the 
limitlessness of significance. The hermeneutic direction as implied in 
Sikong Tu's Erhxishi Shipin—'Y&i^-** (Twenty-four Modes of Poetry) 
is thus quite the opposite to that implied by Western hermeneutics 
(from wordless to word, from Hermes to hermois). Sikong writes, 
Without attaching a single word 
Fully capture the "wind-flow."8 
- ^ , H . r f * » 
^Translation mine. I translate llie term " y i " _ j i s "significance" since, as 
Hsu Fu-kuan points out. it means "yi i r e / " ^ ^ (significance) rather 
H18" (meaning). See flsu Fu-kuan, Zliotigguo wenxue lunii 
( T a i p e i : X u c s h e n , 1 9 7 6 ) . p. 1 1 4 . 
// j^ v k ?Scli Wong . Zhonggua sliixue zhongheiig 
Hnngfang, 1975), p. 133. 
"Translation quoted from Liu, Language, Paradox, Poetics, p.66. 
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Sikong's effort may be treated as naming the unnamable, as language 
is not able to capture the nature which cannot be sought f rom traces 
- the meaning of the tern, feng tiu J ^ u [wind-flow] in C/ Hal - and 
Sikong uses the term fmg Uu to name this unnamable. However, I 
would claim, in addition to treating the term feng Uu as a kind of 
differance, that the metaphoricity 0 f Chinese poetics is a way to 
resist the temptation to name the unnamable. In other words, since 
Tao cannot be expressed in words, Chinese poetics would rather get 
rid of the extravagant wish of "naming" that unnamable in order to 
let the unnamable reveal itself beyond words. By the way, the use of 
the term "feng Uu" has brought about many interpretations: "wit" by 
H.A. Giles, "beauty" by Yang Hsien-yi and Gladys Yang, "flowing 
grace" by Wai-lim Yip, "elegant style" by Pauline Yu, "charisma" by 
Zhang Longxi and "dynamic force" or "life rhythm" by James Liu.9 
Moreover, the problem in defining the word zhuo/zhujg also brings 
about different interpretations such as "put down," "allocate," "write" 
and so on.10 W e have well seen the powerful plurisignation that 
Sikong creates, and, we should not forget the fact that Sikong is 
writing a criticism on poetry! This kind of "meta-poetry" may be 
"impressionistic," but the essence of Chinese poetry is self-evident in 
such a c r i t i ca l d i s c o u r s e which uni tes p r e sen t a t i on and 
representa t ion . Through Sikong's representat ion, therefore , the 
poetic worlds can present themselves and Sikong's discourse thus 
JQm>lo(l from .lames I,in, Lanuiuiuc, Paradox, Poelics n .67 
1 0 • * * I am Incl ined to Wong Wai - l eung ' s op in ion among o the r 
interpretations of this line: "Without a word indicating feng Hit, it has already 
captured feng Uu(Translation mine) Wong Wai-leung, Zhongguo sliixue 
zhongheng lu/i, p. 144. * " 
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successfully preserves ihe unity of different discursive levels in his 
poetic criticism. 
Poetry itself exhibits a paradox of language in face of the 
limitation of language as outlined by the Great Masters ' disbelief 
above, and thus any criticism on poetry has the risk of becoming a 
meta-paradox. Facing this "meta-paradox," the Chinese critic tries to 
preserve the essence of poetry as they well understand that the text 
is no longer like the original after criticism. Beside Sikong who uses 
"me ta -poe t ry" to co l l apse the dis t inct ion between poe t ry and 
criticism, there are criticisms which quote lines of poetry f rom poems 
to let the original poetic world present itself in cri t icism. For 
instance, Zhong Rong writes in the preface of his Shipirt~?$ ^ 
"My thoughts for you run like the stream," is 
no more than a record of what appeals to the 
eye. "Many are the winds of sorrow on the 
high terrace" is merely what the poet sees. 
"In the freshness of morning I climb the low 
mountains" does not contain any literary echo, 
and "The bright moon shines on the heaped 
snow" is in no way derived from either the 
classics or the histories."11 
5 J Z h o n g Rong, Shipin. Translation quoted from Wong Siu-kit, Early 
Chinese Literary Criticism (Hung Kong: Joint Publishing Co., 1983), p.96. 
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At first glance, this may not be strange since it is quite a common 
pract ice in different cul tures . However, in the Chinese tradition, 
there is a typical unity of presentation and representat ion in a 
crit ical commentary , as mentioned- in the example of Sikong Tu 
above. This unity of presentation and representation also works in 
the case of Zhong Rong. The so-called "record of what appeals to the 
eye" seems to imply d i rec tness , but Zhong Rong's not ion of 
"directness", for instance, entirely lies in the metaphoricity created 
by the poem juxtaposed with it. In fact, the line "My thoughts for 
you run like the stream" bears its own ambiguity in the apparent 
lack of a specific relation between thought and flowing water. This 
recurr ing pattern of wri t ing poetry, or using poetry to wr i t e on 
poetry may let the original text present itself in the cr i t ics ' 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . 1 2 
As pointed out by Wong Kin-yuen, "s ignif icance beyond 
l anguage" and "an unde r s t and ing cri t ic" are the two m a j o r 
hermeneut ic t radi t ions in traditional Chinese poet ics , whi le the 
former shows inclination to the Taoist tradition, and the latter to the 
C o n f u c i a n o n e . 1 3 These two major hermeneutical approaches, I 
1 2 Indeed, (his so-ca l led "hernieiieiilic" tradit ion is by no means 
complete. I have • no intention (o be comprehensive (in the sense of covering 
all C h i n e s e h e r m e n e u t i c issue's). Instead, I aim at f o r eg round ing the 
s i g n i f i c a n t i n t e rp re t ive d i f f e r e n t i a l s in the Ch inese t rad i t ion . For more 
examples of this kind of quoting lines of poetry to comment on poetry, please 
refer to Wai-Ieung Wong, "Selection of Lines in Chinese Poetry-Talk Crit icism: 
With a Compar i son between the Selected Couplets and Mat thew Arnold ' s 
'Touchstones ' ," in William Tay el al. cds. China and the West: Comparative 
Literature Studies (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1980), pp. 33-44. 
1 3 S e e Wong Kin-yuen i ^ j j l , Xianxiang quanshixue. yu zhongxi 
xiongyun S ^ ^ f f i M j ^ t ^ ^ ^ ^ m t f l y S ^ S j (Taipei: Dongda, 1988)", pp. 211-226. 
In accept ing Wong's point, I fully understand that it may be a somewha t 
sweep ing gen erali nation of the so-cal led "Chinese he rmeneu t ic t rad i t ion ." 
However , what I wish to stress here is the relation between language and 
meaning / s ign i f i cance , and (he typical treatment of it by tradit ional Chinese 
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realize, can be seen as bearing similar attitudes in the dealing of the 
re la t ionship between yan (language) and yi ( m e a n i n g / s i g n i f i c a n c e ) . 
Not only do the Confucians and the Taoists share a similar disbelief in 
language as an adequate means of, expressing one's idea, but also 
even in critics talking about "an understanding critic," such as Liu 
the treatment of the process of understanding shows, a 
strikingly similar attitude to the ones mentioned above. I will use 
the chapter of "Zhi Yin" (An Understanding Critic) in Liu Xie's 
monumental Wenxin c l i a o l o n a s an example. 
In the chapter of "Zhi Yin," Liu Xie laments at the very 
beginning that "it is d i f f icul t to find an understanding critic of 
personal t h o u g h t s . " - 1 4 Why is it difficult to find "an 
understanding critic"? Liu goes on to describe several factors for 
this: 
There are men of high intelligence and keen 
pene t r a t ion who value the ancient and 
despise the modern, like the two rulers [the 
first Emperor of Ch'in and Emperor Wu of 
Han] mentioned above. There are others, men 
cri t ics . I bel ieve it should be more important , at least in our case, to focus on 
the i s sue of in terpre ta t ion than to direct ly deal with the "he rmeneu l i e p roper" 
of the Ch inese t rad i t ion . C o n s e q u e n t l y , 1 try to foreground only the po in t s 
w h i c h carry impor tant i m p l i c a t i o n s to my unders tand ing of the typ ica l i ty of 
the -Chinese tradition when compared with the West, and these points should be 
seen as related to n problemaff / .a l ion of the juxtapos i t ion of the two t radi t ions . 
For a "hermeneut ics proper ," one may refer to Steven Van Zoeren , "Poetry and 
Per sona l i ty ; A Study of the Hermeneut ics of the 'Classic of Odes '" (PhD diss. , 
H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y , 1986) , M i c h i g a n : U n i v e r s i t y M i c r o f i l m I n t e r n a t i o n a l . 
Van Zoeren has a t ho rough account of (he "hermeneut ics" f rom Shi Jing to 
Zhu Xi. However , as I see it, there are some problems in his t rea tment , and I 
will d iscuss them in Chapter Five. 
' mJii Xie, Wen.xin diaoiong. Trans la t ion quoted f rom Vincen t Yu~ 
c h u n g Shih , The Literary Mind and the Carving of Dragons ( H o n g K o n g : 
C h i n e s e Universi ty Press , 1983), p .503. 
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of talent, who have a tendency to esteem 
themselves and look clown upon others, like 
Pan Ku and Ts'ao Chih. There are still others 
who, although they are men of letters, lack 
scho la r sh ip , and are blind to truth and 
credulous of fa lsehood, like Lou Hu. [Liu 
Hsieh's] (Liu Xie 's) expressed apprehension 
that [work of p rofundi ty] may be fated to 
cover pickle ja rs cannot be dismissed as a 
case of oversensit ivi ty. i^ 
^ ^ ft 1% ; 
I 
These factors can be seen as related to the reader's subjectivity, and 
have little to deal with the process of understanding itself. Liu then 
states the fo l lowing remark which is directly deal ing with the 
diff icul ty of understanding a text: 
If these [physical objects that are mistaken by 
people], which are physically tangible things, 
and easi ly d i s t i ngu i shab l e , have been so 
mis takenly perce ived , how much harder it 
must be to judge accurately when we come to 
^ T r a n s l a t i o n q u o t e d f r o m Sl i ih , p . 5 0 5 . 
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deal wilh li terature, the nature of which is so 
d i f f icul t to unders tand! 1 6 
^ t r i ^ j S $ „ 
Liu does not g 0 i n t 0 ( h e d i f f i c u l f i e s Q f ^ ^ ^ ^ 
•dea, his words may not be adequate to express what he intends to 
say - even if he clear.y knows what he .wants to say. So there m a y 
be a d i sc repancy between the meaning intended and the meaning 
expressed . Moreover, there may be surplus of meaning in language 
genera t ing meanings more than that intended by the author. Worse 
st i l l , the d i f fe ren t educa t iona l , cul tural , historical backgrounds and 
p re jud ice of different readers (such as the factors Liu points out in 
the quota t ion above) will cause fur ther d iscrepancies be tween the 
or iginal yan and the expressed yi. What does Liu suggest to solve 
these problems? Curiously enough, he does not go into the process of 
unde r s t and ing in a chapter talking about an "unders tanding" cri t ic , 
but ra ther he advocates a kind of intuitive apprehension of l i terary 
w o r k : 
But one can be considered a good musician 
only after one has played a thousand tunes, 
and a col lector of arms can be considered a 
connoisseur only af ter he has seen thousand 
swords. So broad experience and learning are 
the sine qua nan of true wisdom. Only when 
^Translation quoted from Sliih, p.505. 
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exper i ences of large mounta ins and ocean 
waves , form the background for a man ' s 
description of small mounds and ditches, can 
lie be f r ee f r o m ind iv idua l p r econce ived 
evalua t ions and pre judices . And only thus 
freed is he able , like a balance, to j u d g e 
impartially, or like a mirror, to reflect without 
d i s to r t i on . 1 7 
R j ^ V t ^ TTp f i rfc f l ^ s ^ ; 
>4 iA , 1 f t ^ I L , Z ^ V ^ 
In other words, af ter reading extensively, one can acquire the ability 
of . in tui t ive judgment and thus one can transcend the d i sc repancy 
be tween yan and yi and become an "understanding" critic. There is 
no direct explanation of the -solution of the difficulties, and it gives 
the impression that in Liu's sense, the gap between ycin and yi can 
only be bridged by one's own intuit ion. Fur ther accounts of the 
d i s c r e p a n c y be tween van and yi may only give rise to fu r ther 
d i f f i c u l t i e s s ince "the na tu re of l i t e ra ture is so d i f f i c u l t to 
unders t and . " Here I find it necessary to adduce the f amous "six 
points observat ion" (lin guan ) suggested by Liu Xie to further 
my account of (he process of understanding. I do not deny that the 
"six points" are hermeneut ica l s tandards set by Liu Xie to analyze 
literary works. However, as I see it, this "systematic" treatment does 
not go into the process of unders tanding . This " sys temat ic" 
^Translation quoted from Sliih, p.505. 
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t rea tment acts only as a basis for intuitive judgment which can be 
acquired only through extens ive practice. In other words, Wenxin 
diaolong does have a systematic f ramework of analysis, but in terms 
of the process of unders tanding and interpretat ion, Liu Xie by and 
large sticks to the importance of intuitive judgment . This can be well 
ref lec ted in the fact that Liu does not go into a discussion of these 
points and hastens into the conclusion that, 
Indeed , an u n d e r s t a n d i n g cr i t ic a lone is 
c a p a b l e of s e e i n g wha t is [ i n w a r d l y ] 
w o n d e r f u l . 1 8 
When Liu invokes "unders tanding; ' he seems to have no intention of 
going into (he process of understanding since this can only deal with 
the "ou tward ly" w o n d e r f u l . He tends to surpass the p rocess of 
unders tand ing by advoca t ing intuitive judgment which can only be 
acqu i r ed through ex tens ive pract ice . The emphas i s on in tu i t ive 
percept ion to see the " inwardly" wonderful shows that Liu sees the 
process of understanding as an organic whole. The most interesting 
poin t of Liu's treatment of yan and yi then seems to be that his 
accoun t leaves gene rous room fo r f u r t h e r ' accounts of his own 
account of "understanding." In other words, with respect to the gap 
b e t w e e n yan and yi, Liu tends to hold that it cannot be bridged 
solely by a systematic account - intuitive perception is the thing that 
mat ters , Above all, in an account of "understanding," the process of 
" u n d e r s t a n d i n g " is l e f t " u n s a i d " for the p e r c e p t i o n of an 
unde r s t and ing cri t ic . 
^Translation quoted J'rom Sliih, p.507. 
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In sum, both " s ign i f i cance beyond language" and "an 
unders tand ing cr i t ic" tend to leave the process of unders tanding 
"unsaid," and it is only in the reader's intuitive perception that the 
gap between yan and yf can be bridged. The emphasis on intuitive 
p e r c e p t i o n t ends to g i v e t r ad i t i ona l C h i n e s e c r i t i c i s m an 
"impressionistic" outlook since the critics prefer to leave much of the 
process of understanding "unsaid" - to be perceived directly by the 
r eade r s . It may then seem (hat the " impress ionis t ic" Chinese 
hermeneutical f ramework can be built by having a "dialogue" with 
the "systematic" Western tradition. However, r am afraid it is not as 
easy as it seems. It is generally agreed that the Chinese poetic 
t radi t ion s tresses "concre teness" and percept ion. >» This tendency 
will naturally lead to a poetics which avoids formula and abstraction. 
Consequently, (he emphasis of such a tradition is not on the building 
up of a f ramework through which ' poetry can be "analyzed." The 
Western situation developed from Platonic logocentrism, on the other 
hand, holds "structure" in esteem, and thus it is often considered as 
"systematic ." The "systematic" development of an argument will 
make a critical tradition "speculative" and above all, "eloquent." How 
are we going to have a dialogue between these two traditions which 
are fundamental ly different? Cao Shunqing raises a similar question 
on the basis of the differences mentioned above, but his solution - a 
See for instance Wai-lim Yip, Mjiao Shixue b t ^ L i f ^ (Taipei : Dongda , 
1 9 8 3 ) and Wil l iam Tay, "The Subs tan t ive Level Revis i ted: Conc re t enes s and 
Nature Imagery in T'ang Poetry," in William Tay et al cds. China and the West: 
Comparative Literature. Studies (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1980), 
pp. 127-149. In' the former, Yip argues e lsewhere about the concre teness and 
examples are loo ample to need citation here. On the oilier hand , Tay has a 
s ta t is t ics of the "concrete" images in T'ang poetry in a lucid account of the 
"subs tan t ive" level in Chinese poclry. 
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neutral dialogue which le. the two traditions complement each other 
- is far more high-sounding than practical.20 T h e p o i n t t h a t j a m 
trying to question here is not the "differences" of these two systems, 
but rather the possibility of a depoliticized "dialogue." As I have 
mentioned at the . outset of this thesis, 1 am placing the emphasis on 
the kind of "interlocutor" who is not situated in a neutral dialogic 
situation. I would rather be inclined to Spivak's opinion, 
The desire for neutrality and dialogue, even 
as it should not be repressed, must always 
mark its own failure. To see how desire 
articulates itself, one must read the text in 
which that desire is expressed. The idea of 
neutral d ia logue is an idea which denies 
h i s t o r y , d e n i e s s t r u c t u r e , d e n i e s the 
possibility of subjects. I would try to look 
how, in fact, (he demand for a dialogue is 
a r t i cu l a t ed . 2 1 
Cat> Sliuiujing, "Dia logue between Chinese and Western Poet ics -
Their Theoretical System and Basic Realms," a paper presented in ICLA Tokyo 
Congress 1991, the first ICLA congress held in (he Hast. In the essay Cao has 
numerous examples of the d i f fe rences of (he two traditions, but it is rather 
e m b a r r a s s i n g to sec his so-ca l led "dia logue" swal lowing (he h is tory and 
inst i tu t ional structure of such a conference. Indeed, there may be an ideal 
s i tua t ion in which a kind of complementa t ion of the two s ides of the 
juxtaposi t ion is possible. For instance, Cao suggests that it is possible to avoid 
the "mechan ica l " nature of (he former and the "unsys temat ic" character of 
the latter. However, he seems to show no self-awareness that the desire for a 
d i a logue can only be- mediated in a monologic Western discurs ive si tuat ion. 
The Chinese version of this paper is collected in Yuc Daiyun cd. Yuwang yu 
liuanxiang J f e l j ^ J f r (Desire and Illusion), a collcclion of the 
pape r s presented by the compara t i s t s from Mainland China in the above 
c o n f e r e n c e , (J iangxi : Reninin ehubanshc , 1991). 
2 I O a y a t r i C. Spivak, The Post-Colonial Critic: Interviews, Strategies, 
Dialogues, Sarah Ilarnsym cd. (New York and London: Routledge, 1991), p.72. 
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If we are to satisfy ourselves with a neutral dialogue, I cannot see 
how we are going 'to avoid a "monologue" of the dominant system 
s ince the s i tuat ion is someth ing like this: an "e loquent" and 
"systematic" Western tradition being juxtaposed with a "tacit" and 
"impressionist ic" Chinese tradition. Such a treatment is def ini te ly 
over-optimist ic , if not naive, since in the intertextual condition, the 
dominant critical tradition would either exclude such an approach as 
there is no point of convergence or "explain" the ineffable, to name 
the unnamble in the Chinese poetics. In the latter ease the typical 
uni ty of represen ta t ion and presenta t ion of t radi t ional Chinese 
poetics would be ruined and it cannot but appear to be arbitrary. 
As Wong Wai leung points out in his account of the 
" s ign i f i c ance" beyond language in t radi t ional Chinese poe t ics , 
t radi t ional Chinese cr i t ics lend to talk about the "s igni f icance" 
wi thout examining it in details.22 Wong has a thorough account of 
"the significance beyond language" and I need not repeat it here. I 
would rather try to invoke the point that Wong raises in the 
conclusion: the investigation of the "significance" may evolve into a 
kind of study or symbol or archetype in the West, and amidst this 
process there is a problem about vocabularies. As Wong points out, 
Chinese critical vocabularies are often criticized as unsystematic and 
without clear definition. However, 011 the other hand, there are also 
no clear dist inct ions among Western critical vocabularies, such as 
"image," "symbol," "metaphor" and the like.2 3 I would say the reason 
these terms appear to be systematically "well-defined" is that they 
22Wong , Zim/iggim shixue zhongheng inn. Sec in parlicular pp. 170-177'. ' i i 
,. " W o n g , Zlioiiggiiu shixue zhongheiig luu, p.174. 
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are backed up by an inter-textual web of critical texts which can 
complemen t each other. Wong suggests that we may use simpler 
terms like > * " (significance / meaning) and "xiang" J ^ (image / 
symbol ) in Chinese poet ics to summarize the somewhat confus ing 
Wes t e rn vocabular ies .24 Unfortunately, in a comparative discourse, 
the Wes te rn cri t ical t radi t ion can exerc ise its power over the 
"unsys temat ic" tradition .o def ine its vocabularies, and in such a 
hermeneut ic situation, the commitment to "structure" in the Western 
cri t ical tradition will not tolerate anything "unexplicated" since, as 
Don Ihde remarks, when "more is meant than is intended in each 
e x p r e s s i o n , " " h e r m e n e u t i c process is needed to exp l i ca t e the 
u n s a i d . "25 o t h e r W O f d j l t t h e "hermeneut ic" process aims at 
"explicating" the unsaid, while the Chinese critical tradition tends to 
stress the" presence of the unsaid without systematically def ining it; 
that is to say, to preserve the unsaid as it is. In addit ion, the 
Western tradition places "interpretation" at the centre of its inquiry. 
Hirsch's "meaning and significance," Gadamer's "fusion of horizons" or 
Ricoeur ' s "surplus of meaning" are all placing the emphas i s on 
interpret ing the "unsaid" in a text. On the contrary, the Chinese 
tradition tries not to offer the reader a helpful guide to apprehend a 
text in a passive way , but rather trying to arouse them to an inspired 
enl ightenment in reading. In this sense, in a juxtaposition of Chinese 
and Wes t e rn h e r m e n e u t i c t r ad i t ions , the Western h e r m e n e u t i c 
process will inevitably "explicate" the "unsaid" of the Chinese poetic 
tradition. In other words, in the Chinese tradition, there is a space 
24 w ong, Zhonggno shi.xue zhoiigheng fun, p. 175 . 
T c 
z -M)on IluJe, "Interpret ing I I crmeneut i c s : Or ig ins , D e v e l o p m e n t s , 
Prospects," in Man and World 17 (1980), p.337. 
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d e l i b e r a t e l y left open for me taphor i c i ty to gene ra te . Th i s 
"metaphor ica l" process which unites presentation and representat ion 
will be terminated in a juxtaposi t ion with the Western tradition 
which sees > „ • as a kind of "absence" rather than as something 
complementary to "you," 
In fact, the Chinese poetic tradition sees juxtaposi t ion as a 
m e a n s to hold an i n d e t e r m i n a t e and unspec i f ied r e l a t i o n s h i p 
be tween the two sides of the j u x t a p o s i t i o n ^ However , in a 
juxtaposi t ion .of this tradition with the highly syllogistic Western one 
which holds "s t ructure" in es teem, the. Western t radi t ion will 
encroach onto the Chinese one and gives the hallucination that there 
must be a definite "meaning" in the juxtaposition. The "meaning" will 
in turn imply a real "dia logue" between the two sides of the 
juxtapos i t ion . Unfor tunate ly , without an adequate chal lenge of the 
production of meaning and the "fusion of horizons" between the two 
s y s t e m s , th i s u n e x a m i n e d " d i a l o g u e " m a y o n l y be a 
monologue/conquest "defined" as "dialogue" by the Western critical 
t r a d i t i o n . 2 7 Let me use Sikong's example once again to illustrate 
this. Indeed, Sikong's "without attaching a single word" does not 
mean that we can write poetry without a word. What he tries to 
present in his poetic-cri t icism are twenty-four poetic worlds which 
present themselves, and through these worlds we can transcend the 
2 6 S ee Tor instance Wai-lim Yip's Bijiao Shiuie. 
" S e c Jose Rabasa, "Dialogue as Conquest: Mapping Spaces for Counters-
Discourse," in JanMohamed and Lloyd cds., The Nature and Context of Minority 
Discourse (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 187-215. This essay 
argues "how dialogue was an invention of (he conquistadors," just, like "liberty 
is an invention of I ho ruling classes." p. 19. cf M i c h e l . Foucau l t , "Nie t szche , 
Genealogy, History," in his Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, t rans. Donald 
F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon (Ithaca; Cornell University Press, 1911), p.142. 
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limitation of words, achieving the status advocated by Zhuang Zi, V e 
yi wan yan" (getting the "significance" and forgetting the 
words) . This can only be. achieved by surpassing the limitations of 
words through the metaphoric i ty created between presentat ion and 
representa t ion (apparent in Shipin as the form of "meta-poetry" -
s imul taneously a poem by itself and a poem that examines what a 
poem is). However, in a so-called "dialogue," there is an inevitable 
" d e f i n i t i o n " of the a m b i g u i t y which is r e spons ib l e fo r the 
metaphor ic i ty between d i f fe ren t discursive levels in Shipin. This 
will inevi tably redirect the Chinese hermeneut ical process which 
points beyond words back to Ihe limitation within words. Therefore, 
in a "dialogue" which is established on a different discursive level, 
the metaphorical process that let the Chinese poetic tradition present 
itself is terminated, and thus what it says - actually, what it does not 
say - is completely appropriated by (he dominant critical tradition 
which translates the "unsaid" into "definitions." Indeed, there may 
well be terms like "spots of indeterminacy" which sounds similar in 
nature to what I have said about the Chinese tradition. However, it 
is important lo bear in mind that these terms - which do not aim at 
point ing beyond words - are inscribed at a different discursive level . 
in the Western tradition. Using these terms to expound the Chinese 
counterpar ts is simply an appropriation of the original voice of the 
Ch inese tradition to claim that it is a" "dialogue" rather than a 
"monologue" of the dominant tradition. 
This kind of appropriatrve definition will subsequently cast 
Chinese poetics into a silence as it is not speaking in the same voice 
as the Western tradition. In other words, Chinese criticism may be 
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able to avoid distorting the self-presentation of the poetic worlds in 
Chinese poetry, but it is doomed to be suppressed when it is placed 
in an inter textual he rmeneu t i c s i tuat ion since it p rov ides less 
protection for its poetry on the one hand, and on the other since it 
scarcely defines itself, i, i s vulnerable to be appropriated by the 
dominan t voice- through a so-called "interpretation" - expl icat ion, 
analysis, definition and the like. 
The typicality of Chinese poetics cannot be used to establish a 
sound Ch inese h e r m e n e u t i c a l f r a m e w o r k s ince it is h igh ly 
metaphor ica l and thus leaves generous room for the problem of 
textuality to generate its power in favour of the dominant, as shown 
in the previous chapter. Therefore, we cannot hope to establish a 
hermeneutical f ramework from Chinese poetics as there will be no 
fa i r intertext that can be formed. How about es tab l i sh ing a 
h e r m e n e u t i c a l f r a m e w o r k th rough an ana lys i s of d i f f e r e n t 
hermeneutic positions in the West in order to use it as a f rame of 
reference to systematize the study of Chinese poetics? 
In its contemporary sense, hermeneutics is no longer a simple 
messenger of the sacred for the nostalgia of the lost origin has been, 
spelled out by modern theorists. Hermeneutics has become a field in 
which "to say" and "to mean" wrestle with each other, and f rom 
Husse r l i an "sub jec t iv i ty , " I le idegger ian "Dasein" to Gadamer i an 
"fusion of horizons," this field has evolved into something that calls 
for interpretation i t s e l f 2 * It seems that the word "hermeneutics" has 
See tor instance, ( i ay le I.. Ormistun and Alan D, Schrifl. eds. , The 
Hermeneutic Tradition: From AsI to Ricoenr (Albany: State Universi ty of New 
York Press, 1990). The ediloi s declare in (he introduction that the purpose of 
the select ions is "to trace certain paths t raversed within selected d i scourse ( s ) 
and t radi t ion(s) of he rmeneu t i c s in the nineteenth and twent ie th cen tur ies , " 
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never meant what the word promises to mean. Hermes brings in the 
message of the gods and hennois, the priest, interprets the sayings of 
the Oracle at Delphi. Amidst this process - from "wordlessness" to 
"word," and then to "knowing what it means" - there lies a problem 
whe the r these hermeneut ical processes are similar, let alone the 
same. The modern emphasis of hermeneutics has shifted f rom a 
biblical or scriptural interpretation to find its philosophical root in 
Heidegger 's and Gadamer 's hermeneutics. But it is probably in full 
agreement that the principles of hermeneutics are to provide a basis 
for textual and historical interpretation. H then fol lows that, a 
hermeneut ical f ramework may possibly be built up by examining 
d i f f e r e n t posi t ions of hermeneut ics to see how "hermeneut ics" 
interprets. (This is already an ironic statement since hermeneutics 
should imply the rules of interpretation. But as 1 have shown, it does 
call for interpretation itself.) In the following sections I will try to 
see how hermeneutics forms a turbulent field by itself. In my 
reading of different hermeneutical positions, I intend to foreground 
the impossibi l i ty of sys temat ica l ly clearing up a hermeneut ica l 
f ramework as a point of reference in a Chinese-Western comparative 
d i s c o u r s e . 
Hermeneutics and the Problem of Interpretation 
First of all, I see the interpretive process of hermeneutics as 
bas ical ly divided into two major aspects, language and history. 
Gadamer's theory is one that tries to incorporate both. His "fusion of 
and "each of the s e l ec t i ons presented in lids vo lume can be seen as an 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of i n t e rp re t a t i ons . " p.2 (or iginal emphas i s ) 
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horizons," the focus of his monumental Truth and Method, is a very 
influential concept in bringing language and tradition together. In 
Gadamer 's view, 
Hence (he horizon of the present cannot be 
formed without the past. There is no more an 
isolated horizon of the present than there are 
historical horizons. Understanding, rather, is 
always the fusion of these horizons which we 
imagine to exist by themselves.2? 
There may be different horizons: the text's, the reader's, the author's 
and the tradition's, and understanding is a fusion of these horizons -
these horizons are constituted with one's preimderstanding - and it 
thus projects a unity of shared truth. Such a dialogic understanding 
sounds open and fair enough, but perhaps the more important issues 
are how that f u s ion o p e r a t e s and what d e t e r m i n e s the 
"preimderstanding" beside one's own "historicity." 
E.D. Hirsch has challenged Gadamer's position as inconsistent, 
s ince "unless he [the interpreter] has somehow appropriated the 
original perspective . . . unless the original sense of the text has been 
unders tood," the interpreter cannot fuse these two perspec t ives . 3 0 
At this point I would agree with Jan Edward Garrett that Gadamer 
actually means "we never have a pure access to the author's horizon, 
2 ^ H a n s - G e o r g Gadamer , Truth and Method (New York, Seabury Press, 
1975), p.273. See also Joel C. Weinsheimer, Gadamer's Hermeneutics: A Reading 
of Truth and Method (New Haven: Yale Universi ty Press, 1982), p .183. 
Weinshe imer writes, "all knowledge of (lie truth is shared knowledge, and all 
knowledge of the truth of history is shared truth." 
D. Hirsch, "Gadamer 's Theory of Interpretation," the Appendix II 
in his Validity in Interpretation (New Haven: Yale University Press , 1967), 
p .254. See also Hirsch, The Aims of Interpretation (Chicago: Univers i ty of 
Chicago Press, 1976), p.49. 
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for the working out of the text's horizon always already means going 
beyond the author 's horizon."3i (original emphasis) However, it is 
s t range that Hirsch - let us bear in mind that he always insists on 
authorial intention - seems to have misunderstood the intention of 
G a d a m e r , who s t resses "fusion of hor i zons / ' We canno t but 
compl ica te the issue here: in Garrett 's text, the one who advocates 
au thor ' s in tent ion, Hirsch, is likely to misunders tand Gadamer ' s 
meaning/intention. The real irony is that Gadamer's notion of "fusion 
of horizons", should be able to permit a fusion of Hirsch's and his own 
hor izons . I am not trying to say that these theories have to be 
d e c o n s t r u c t e d , but ra ther 1 am skept ica l about the so-ca l led 
"pre judgment" which predetermines our horizon in Gadamer 's sense, 
as it has been predominantly influenced by a power-relation in the 
"fusion of the horizons." Any fusion of horizons may be appropriated 
by a certain dominant horizon - often in an intertext - as a means of 
systemat ical ly conceal ing the gaps between the fusion of horizons. 
In this sense, in Hirsch's text the "fusion of horizons" is taken to be 
possible only with the understanding of the author's horizon, but in 
Garret t ' s reading of Gadamer 's text the text's horizon has already 
gone beyond the author's horizon. The "fusion" of Gadamer 's and 
Hirsch's horizons, even if it be a "fusion," should be seen as a fusion 
entwined with the problem of textuaiity and the power of paradox. 
Bearing in mind the problem of textuaiity, we should realize 
that a l though there may be a so-called "fusion," the repressed 
3 1 Jan Kdward Garrcd , "1 lans-Georg Gadamer on 'Fusion of Horizon' ," 
Man and World II (1978), p.399. I deliberately quale Garrett's interpretation 
of Gadamer in order lo parallel Hirsch's interpretation of Gadamer. What I am 
trying to show here is the different interpretations of Gadamer's intention by 
the two critics. 
Chu 98 
horizon may no, receive it* due "proportion" in such a seeming 
fus ion. Besides, if we take a comparative point of view, we would 
wonder if different cultural traditions can be fused that way. It may 
not be that difficult for the traditions in the West to fuse - though 
there must still be repression - as Western cultures can be seen as 
evolving homogeneously from Greco-Roman culture. To fuse Chinese 
and Wes te rn ho r i zons would de f in i t e ly present a fa r more 
complicated, if not insoluble, problem for u s . " 
To have a "fusion 0 r horizons" of East and West, even if it is 
possible, we have first to go into the respective "horizons." However, 
a comparatist is not completely disinterested as he/she also has to 
bring along his/her own horizon into the fusion of these horizons. To 
make things more complicated, as Hans Robert Jauss has noted, there 
are "two horizons within each horizon: that of individual experience 
and- that of methodical u n d e r s t a n d i n g . " " These two horizons can 
engage each other and they consti tute the criteria that the readers 
n„,l i f r • W ' S , r e S S . ' h a l " r u s i 0 n " m " h e Possible, but understanding 
and a l l o t l ion are nnl i m p o s s i b l e . Moreove r , the e m e r g e n c e of an 
in ternat ional human cul ture seems nol only possible, but perhaps inevi table 
S T C r - I h c | l n , h l c m <"' interpretat ion has not been examined 
before a so-called fus ion . ' the fusion must be problematic. Aldridge tries to 
approach the issue Iron, the point of a "universal literature" in his "East-West 
Relat ions: Universal Literature. Yes; Common Poetics. No," Tamkang Review 10 
(Autumn 1979). However, as I see it. bis arguments are somewhat problematic 
i-or instance, Aldridge claims at the end of bis essay that "Probably the most 
lnlluential writings of an ideological nature in both the East and the West are 
those associated with religion." (p .3 I ) Here he is referring Confuc ian ism and 
Uuddhism as religion." Let alone Buddhism which did not come into China 
a f te r Han Dynasty, I am reluctant to consider Confucian thoughts as religion 
in the Chinese civi l izat ion. . Among other factors, the Confuc ian concept of 
y ^ (conscience) can be seen a.s an internal, desire for the external li 
-"rS_ (ritual), and in the pursuit of zhong yona 4 (mediocre), the sole 
concern of Con luc ian thoughts tends to be placed ' in the human wor ld , 
showing no terminal concern a.s that in other religious thoughts. 
- Hans-Robert Jauss, Toward an Aesthetics of Reception ( M i n n e a p o l i s -
University of Minnesota Press. 19X2). See Paul de Man 's introduction, p. xii. 
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use to judge literary texts in any given period. In addit ion, the 
"horizon of expectation" will be different in reading each new text, 
[as] the new text evokes for tlie reader 
( l is tener) the horizon of expecta t ions and 
"rules of the game" famil iar to him f rom 
earl ier texts, which as such can then be 
v a r i e d , e x t e n d e d , c o r r e c t e d , but a l so 
t r a n s f o r m e d , c r o s s e d ou t , or s i m p l y 
r e p r o d u c e d . 3 4 
Jauss 's notion of "horizon of expectation" is used primarily to depict 
the reader 's experience in reading a literary text. But if we are to 
push the issue to the discursive level of meta-criticism, we shall note 
something different. We have to bear in mind that reading is by no 
means one-way. Take the example of reading a critique of a certain 
text . We have d i f fe ren t "horizons of expectat ion" towards the 
cr i t ic ism, the text and ourselves. Our text will in turn present a 
d i f fe ren t "horizon of expectat ion" for further meta-cri t icism, should 
there be one. So there should exist intertextual hor izons of 
expectat ion. These "horizons" cannot be simply fused in Gadamer's 
s ense , as they are d i f f e r en t in levels of d i scourse , and in 
"expectations," to borrow Jauss's term. There can only be a seeming 
fus ion of horizons in which we are to "expect" the "horizons of 
expectat ion" by ourselves. That is to say, a critic writes a certain 
crit icism by an o b j e c t i f i c a t i o f his own horizon of expectation into 
^ 4 Jauss , Toward an Aesthetics of Reception, p.88. 
- " T h e ohjee l i f iea t ion" I invoke here i.s derived from Foueaul t ' s notion 
of " o b j e c l i f i c a l i o n . " In F o u e a u l t ' s v iew, (here are t h r ee m o d e s of 
o b j e c l i f i c a l i o n which t r ans fo rm human beings inlo objects , "The f i rs t is the 
m o d e s of inquiry which try lo give themselves Ihe status of sc iences ; for 
f \ 
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other's horizons, and builds up a horizon of the text as well as the 
hermeneutical framework according to which the text is judged , and 
on which his own cri t icism is based. I would rather say that the 
problem of textuality has led hermeneutics to face an aporia: we are 
a l m o s t a lways unab le to read a certain in te rpre ta t ion theory 
according to (he same criteria that it reads a certain text. One may 
say that the example always transgresses the rules that the reading 
lays clown, and it is exactly here French deconstruction challenges 
philosophical hermeneutics . Due to the different levels of "horizons 
of expectation," we are doomed to have different kinds of "fusion(s) 
of horizons" at different levels of discourse. However, it seems not 
possible to have a fusion of these different "fusion of horizons." The 
apparent "fusion" can only be seen as being secured by the critic who 
appropr ia tes the " fus ion" through an object i f ica t ion of his own 
"horizon of expectation." This "objectification" then becomes the so-
called "horizon of (he expectation" of the readers. Jauss's "horizon of 
expec ta t ion" evoked by a new text is another way of indirect ly 
accounting for, if not displacing, this difficulty. 
One would easi ly cha l lenge that to judge an individual 
experience of the "horizon of expectation" has already been a kind of 
" fus ion of horizons" s ince d i f fe ren t readers will have d i f f e ren t 
"horizons of expectation" in different periods of time. However, we 
e x a m p l e , the objec l iv i / . ing of the speaking subject in grammaire generate 
phi lo logy , and l inguistics. . . In Hie second part of my work, I have studied the 
object iv izu ig oI the subject in what 1 shall call 'dividing practices.' The subject 
is either divided inside itself or divided from others. This process objec l iv izes 
him. . . Finally, I have sought lo study - it is my current work - the way a 
human being turns him- or herself into a subject . . . " Michel Foucault, "The 
Subject and Power," the "Afterword" in Hubert I,. Dreyfus and Paul Rainbow, 
Michel Fuucawtl: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Sussex : Harvester-
Press, 1982), p.20fi. 
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still have to rely upon a' set of hermeneut ical rules in our 
unders tanding. In dealing w i t h l h i s k i n t | o f p r o b l e m > S t a n ] e y ^ 
tries to use the concept of "interpretive c o m m u n i t y " " to account for 
the influence of the conventions of the community on interpretation. 
Fish does not aim at theorizing the variety as well as the stability of 
reader's response to a text, in his / , There a Text in This Class? Fish 
shows that text is not an object of interpretation, but a product of it, 
and this interpretation is produced by the "interpretive community." 
" In te rpre ta t ion is not the art of cons t ru ing , but the art of 
c o n s t r u c t i n g , " " w i l e s Fish, h, this sense, criticism is a kind of 
a r g u m e n t based upon the c o n v e n t i o n s of the " i n t e rp r e t i ve 
community" to establish a certain set of rules of the game. However, 
as Robert Scholes has rightly noted, (he size and the shape of this 
" in te rp re t ive communi ty" often changes to suit Fish 's need.3 8 
Indeed, such "rules" of (he "interpretive community" have to depend 
upon the power structure of that particular community. Therefore, 
one may claim that a "community" is often an objectification of the 
powerful , here Fish himself, and "standards" can be said to be a mere 
e u p h e m i s m . 
Fish's idea does not provide any hint of the chance of 
es tabl ishing a hermeneutical framework as he is rather hostile to 
theorizing on the level of reading texts. However, his "interpretive 
community" does offer some illuminating thoughts for our discussion. 
3 0 F o r further detai ls s e c Stanley Fish, "With Compl iments of the 
Author: Ref lect ion on Austin and Derridii," Critical Inquiry 8 (Summer 19821 
pp. 693-721 . " * 
• " S t a n l e y Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1983), p.327. 
" R o b e r t Scholes , Textual Tower: Literary Theory and the Teaching of 
English (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), p. 153. 
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If interpretation produces a text according to a set of rules, what is 
the role of the original text upon which a certain interpretation has 
to be based? When each community of interpretation deciphers texts 
in the manner demanded by its interpretive strategies, does it mean 
that the interpreter cannot have his o w n horizon? In a sense, the 
" interpret ive c o m m u n i t y has preset the rules of reading, and the 
text is produced by such a reading. But if we are to read that 
reading, are we obliged to follow the same rules as if we belong to 
the same " interpret ive communi ty"? If s o , do we consider the 
r ead ing that an " in te rp re t ive c o m m u n i t y " produces as another 
product of the meta-reading? If not, how are we going to determine 
which are the rules or the "interpretive community"? These are the 
quest ions we need to raise as a starting point, and I will try to 
answer (hem in (he following pages. 
While 1 seem to sympath ize with "decons t ruc t ing" these 
hermeneutical rules: . "fusion of horizons," "horizon of expectation" and 
"interpretive community," I believe that relying upon them and then 
deconst ruct ing them would only be at worst self-defeat ing, and at 
bes t a " s u p p l e m e n t " of that s t ruc ture . In such a sense , 
deconstruction is merely, al best, another discipline in the structure. 
In fact , French deconstruction represents a more radical challenge of 
the determinacy of meaning in the postmodern move . 3 9 A simple 
decons t ruc t ion of the hermeneut ica l f r amework is only another 
m e t a p h y s i c s for a c o m p a r a t i v e d i s c o u r s e , as a s o - c a l l e d 
• - 'Fur the deba te between Gadamer and Derrida, please refer lo Hans- • 
G e o r g G a d a m e r , "Text and I n t e r p r e t a t i o n , " in Br iee W a e l i t e r h a u s e r ed . , 
Hemeneuiics anil Modern Philosophy (Albany: University of New York Press 
1986), pp .337-396. 
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"intertextuali ty" does not equally cover the systems; that is to say, 
the " f u s i o n of hor i zons" is not evenly p ropor t iona l , as the 
p r e j u d g m e n t , the " knowledge prede te rmined by t radi t ion, is not 
evenly distr ibuted. Take the instance of the conversation between 
Harry Levin and Antony Tatlow as an e x a m p l e . ^ Putting aside what 
they are arguing about, I wish to bring attention to' K.C. Cheung's 
opinion about the conversation between them, 
. . . I am surprised at the offhand manner in 
which both of these professors of comparative 
literature indicate that Goethe cited a "Chinese 
novel" without dignifying their citations with 
either the title of the novel or its author, 
perhaps I am too sensitive on the point, but I 
cannot wonder how it would sound if two 
Ch inese scho la r s in a reverse s i tua t ions 
remarked that a "German work of criticism" 
under the influence of Hau Ch'iu Chuan{The 
For tunate Union) introduced the notion of 
world , l i terature.4 1 
I bring up this issue to show that such a "sensitivity," as noted by 
Cheung, is essential in reading across cultures. But, of course, it is a 
mundane truism to say that Chinese literature is not receiving its due 
a t ten t ion . I believe that a "reverse situation11 will probably be 
denounced as "impressionistic," and will simply be "excluded" f rom 
4 0 For c j c ( l l i i s ()j- u , c j r arguments , p lease refer to Chinese/Foreign 
Comparative Literature Bulletin. John J. Deeney e( al eels. The First and Second 
I s s u e s . 
' F r o m the r e s p o n s e of C h e u n g to L e v i n - T a t l o w d e b a t e , 
Chinese/Foreign Comparative Literature Bulletin, The Third Issue, p.66. 
Chu 104 
the dominant discourse . What I hope to shed light on is that 
in ter textual i ty does not guarantee something fairly " in ter-sys tem." 
One sys tem of textual i ty may be more powerfu l in an "inter-
s i tuat ion" and thus it can systematically appropriate the system of 
the other. Chinese-Western comparat ive literature is a conspicuous 
case as a convenient instance; in fact 1 consider the inter-textual 
condit ion within the West to be basically the same. "Intertextuality" 
gives an illusion that a certain set of hermeneutical rules, or the rule 
that it is impossible to have such rules, would only be possible by 
e l i m i n a t i n g or decons t ruc t i ng d i f f e ren t he rmeneut ica l p roces ses . 
Af te r this preliminary view on the problem of interpretation, I will 
now proceed to examine the validity of a juxtaposition of the Chinese 
and the Western hermeneutic traditions. 
Hermeneutics and Deconstruction 
One may then be inclined to think that a combinat ion of 
1 
deconstruct ion and hermeneutics may illuminate a way out, since a 
s imple deconstruct ion alone, as expounded above, cannot claim to 
have a hermeneut ical f ramework as it has to rely upon a "non-
s t ructure" that must depend upon a structure. The re la t ionship 
be tween hermeneut ics and deconst ruct ion is succinctly stated by 
Hugh J. Silver ma n n i n 111 e i ntrod notion o f H e r ni e n c u t i c s ci n d 
Deconstruct ion, 
A l t h o u g h these two . d i f f e r e n t ways of 
philosophy are, to a large extent, mutually 
e x c l u s i v e , n e v e r t h e l e s s they are o f t e n 
juxtaposed. They both constitute responses to 
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t h e r c « J f o $ S of the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l 
t r a d i t i o n s i n a u g u r a t e d by I l u s se r l and 
Heidegger . . . 42. 
S ince these two approaches are often juxtaposed , there might be 
some connections from which we may acquire some illuminations for 
our de / fo rmat ion of the hermeneut ical f ramework . Now let us 
e x a m i n e some of the theor ies of the d e c o n s t r u c t i o n i s t s , as 
represented by the Yale critics, to see how they may contribute to 
our analysis of the comparative hermeneutical f ramework. Following 
Derrida, the Yale critics place the utmost emphasis on textuaiity. But 
in my discussion of their theories, I will aim at relating them to the 
not ion of history as I believe that language and history are two 
important factors to be considered in hermeneutics.43 
Harold Bloom's "anxiety of influence" can be said to have a 
direct connection with the notion of history. Bloom believes that 
ever since the first truly subjective .poet, Milton, poets have been 
suffer ing from an anxiety of belatedness. In A Map of Misreading, 
he fu r the r states that strong poets cope with this - "anxiety" by a 
de l ibera te use of tropes, and a deliberate misreading of the strong 
precursor poet from whose influence they cannot f ree themselves . 4 4 
_ 4 2 Hugh J. S i lvcrmani i & Oon Hide cds. Hermeneutics and 
Decansiruchon (New York: Sialc University of New York Press, 1985), p. ix. 
„. ' T h e "history" I tun invoking here is similar lo Jameson's idea that 
History is not a text . . . hut [fell . . . ii is inaccessible lo us except in textual 
lorm. F r c d n c Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially 
Symbolic Act (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), p.35 
4 4 H a r o l d Bloom, /I Metp of Misreading (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1975), According to Bloom, there are six kinds of tropes that a poet 
employs lo cope wills ihe anxiety of influence: I. clinamen 2. tessera 3. kenosis 
4. daemonization 5. tiskesis 0. apaplirndes. I shall not dwell upon the meanings 
of each as I am not going lo locus on Ihe use of rhetoric in particular, but 
rather I, would examine the use of this "use of rhetoric." 
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In fact , such an anxiety is also present in criticism. Let me cite an 
e x a m p l e . When Said is asked in an interview whether he is 
inf luenced by Foucault , he replies, 
I didn't want Foucault 's method, or anybody's 
method, to override what I was trying to put 
forward. The notion of a kind of non-coercive 
knowledge which I come to the end of the 
book, was deliberately ant i -Foucaul t .45 ( m y 
e m p h a s i s) 
In an intertextual s i tuat ion, such kind of "anxiety of inf luence" is 
very common in cr i t icism. Said and Foucault are s imilar in their 
emphas i s on discourse and power, and there exists an "intra-school" 
anxiety. There may also be "inter-school" anxiety when, for instance, 
a Marxis t critic may have to deal with deconstruction when he/she 
talks about text. There may be an "anxiety of influence" in reading 
cr i t ic ism, so to speak. In addition, this "anxiety of inf luence" may 
also be pointing towards the future. In a sense, fu ture indicates 
one's own past, and thus (he poet/critic who has the anxiety of being 
surpassed will deliberately try to carve himself into a stereotype. As 
shown in the example of Said, he is del iberately an t i -Foucaul t , 
because he does not want anybody's method to override his own. 
This "anxiety of inf luence" will thus make critics create their own 
rhe tor ic to mark themselves as someone worthwhile r emember ing . 
So there should be no wonder why .Frank Lentr icchia cons iders 
Bloom to be a writer with "flamboyant habits" who "has permitted us 
to understand that what he desires most is not to engage history but 
——»——— —— i— • •'— 
• ^ Q u o t e d f r u n i a i i h i l srr igw with Edward Said; Saluszinsky, p.137. 
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to make his own history. . . [and] callfed] attention to himself as the 
br ight star of our critical heavens,"46 although Lent r icchia should 
have referred to many other "stars" of this kind as well. 
In this sense, Bloom's own "anxiety of influence," ironically 
enough, is a prerequisite of his reading of "anxiety of influence." So 
his reading of the tropes used by the strong poets to deal with their 
strong fathers has been a trope employed by Bloom himself to cope 
with the "anxiety of influence" of criticism, probably, starting f rom 
the last " t ru ly-subject ive" critic in the Western crit ical t radi t ion, 
Plato, I am not trying to say that Bloom's "anxiety of influence" is 
se l f -defea t ing , but we have to understand that it is trapped in the 
pa radox of textual i ty , and when his d iscourse appropr ia tes the 
dominan t role of manipulat ing the power of paradox, it can mean 
almost everything. In a sense, the "anxiety of influence" can even 
poin t towards the future when one wishes to be remembered. So 
Chris topher Norris will note that, 
Bloom should seem torn between a de fense of 
poetry which holds to the ethos of Romant i c 
individual ism, and a deconstruct ive poetics which 
tends to d i s so lve such themes into someth ing 
approach ing an absolu te sys tem of t ropes and 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s . 4 7 
4 "Frank Lentricchia, After the New Criticism (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1980). p.345. 
rislophcr Norris* Deconslruclion: Theory and Practice ( L o n d o n : 
Melhuen, 1988 rcprinled with a revised bibliography), p. 119, 
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Meanwhile , Bloom once stales that "Influence, as I conceive it, means 
that there are no texts, but only relationship between t e x t s . " ^ H e is 
del iberately placing the emphasis between texts, and so in his view, 
"the best a reader can achieve is a strong misreading - a reading that 
will in turn produce o t h e r s . " ^ H e i s t r a p p e d ir) h i s Q w n a n x i e t y Q f 
inf luence, making his hermeneutics not stand firmly, but rather point 
away from itself. 
To say that Bloom's "anxiety of inf luence" is a lready an 
anxie ty by itself is not saying that he is sel f -defeat ing or self-
evident. I would rather .see it as an echo to our earlier discussion of 
Foucaul t : the oppressions thai we see may already be oppression of 
opp re s s ions (anxiety is an anxiety of anxiety) . The rampant 
d isseminat ion of meaning in an intertextual hermeneutic si tuation 
makes things worse. However, I do not want to simply conclude that 
a reading can be reread infinitely; at the same time, I can see no 
reason such a rereading is simply tautological. The only thing is that 
t h r o u g h such "anxie ty of anx ie ty" we may unde r s t and the 
impor t ance of reading other 's reading in a more re f lex ive way. 
Wi thou t this re f lex iveness , there will be no fair compar ison in 
c o m p a r a t i v e d iscourse . It is exactly the Pos t -s t ruc tura l i s t s who 
advocate "reading" instead of interpretation. However, that does not 
mean that "reading" is able to- read "interpretation" from a superior 
p lace , but quite the opposite, reading again calls for interpretation. 
8 Bloom, A Map of Misreading, p.3. Obviously enough, there should be 
no re la t ions between texts if there are no texts. What Bloom suggests here 
seems lo be a deliberate overstating of the case in order to lead the readers to 
focus on the relationship beiwecn texis, but not on a single text. 
4 y . l o n a t h a n Cul ler , On De.consiruciioii (I thaca: Cornell Univers i ty 
Press, 1982), p.80. . 
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Here I am not blurring the boundary between the Post-structuralists ' 
"reading" and hermeneuticists ' "interpretation." That is to say, only 
by analyzing the intertext formed by them may .one have a clearer 
view of the dance of "meaning" - how "meaning" generates in the 
dominant critical tradition - and how this "meaning" is appropriated. 
So to read cri t icism one has to beware of the trope of 
cri t icism, in particular when the critic is talking about tropes. In 
saying this obviously I have Paul de Man in mind. In his Blindness 
and Insight, de Man states that "the criteria of literary specificity 
does not depend on the greater or less discursiveness of the mode, 
but on the degree of constituent "rhetoricity" of language."50 As an 
"uncanny" deconstructionist - a term coined by Geoffrey Hartman^l -
de Man is clearly aware of the rhetoric of criticism. In Blindness and 
Insight he connects the blindness of some critics, such as Georg 
Lukacs, Maurice Blanchot and Georges Poirlet, to their insights. In de 
Man's view, these critics gain their insights through the assumptions 
denounced by their insights , that is to say, their b l indness . 
Therefore, all these critics "seem curiously doomed to say something 
dif ferent from what they meant to say."-" This "critical insight" 
which is a result of critical blindness is a strange consequence of 
rhetoric. Criticism returns to "literature" - a critic can say more than 
he wants, and a critic of him would know him even better than he 
50 P 
aul de Man, Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of 
Contemporary Criticism. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971'), p. 137. 
** * See (he P re face in G e o f f r e y I ia r tman ed., Deconstruction and 
Criticism (London: Rout ledgc & Kegan Paul, 1979). Hartman divides the Yale 
r e v i s i o n i s t into "canny" and "uncanny" ones, and de Man is an "uncanny" 
o n e . 
ee in part icular de Man, Blindness and Insight, Chapter VII , "The 
Rhetor ic of Blindness: Jacques Derrida's Reading of Rousseau". . 
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knows himself. So when de Man comments on Locke, he would say 
t h a t , 
He [Locke] has to be read not in terms of the 
e x p l i c i t s t a t e m e n t s ( e s p e c i a l l y e x p l i c i t 
statements about statements), but in terms of 
the rhetorical notions of his own text, which 
cannot be simply reduced to intentions or the 
identifiable facts. . 
Here de Man is indeed perspicacious in noting the rhetoric of 
cr i t ic isms which analyze rhetoric, such as Locke's own eloquence in 
his denunciat ion of eloquence,** However, 1 would say, de Man is 
hereby limiting his discussion of rhetoric within the notion of "text", 
just, as most deconstructionists have clone. One may ask who is the 
one to decide what the blindness and insights are: The reader? The 
critic? Or the rhetoric of the critic? Or blindness disseminates into 
insights and/or vice-versa? I fully agree with de Man in his point 
about inevitable rhetorici ly of the language in every text and his 
belief that any critical reflection in literary texts has to depend upon 
a suppression of the implications of the rhetoric, as the rhetoric can 
l imit less ly disseminate its power. However, de Man does not 
squarely face the "suppression" and so it is exactly due to the 
l imit lessness of rhetoricity, such rhetoric may be twisted f rom time 
to t ime and the "bl indness" and the "insights" are not s table . 
Blindness in a certain text would disseminate insights when a certain 
Paul iyt Man, "The Kpislemology of Metaphor," in Critical Inquiry 5 
(1978), p.16. 
^ 4 R e f e r to Paul dc Man, Blindness and Insight, p. 15. 
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rhetoric is successfully appropriated by a c r i t i c , " Accordingly, more 
emphasis is perhaps necessary to be placed upon the critic's use of 
the "rhetoricity," or else the more eloquent the argument of such 
rhetorici ty of de Man, the more effective the suppression of the 
appropriation behind the rhetoric. 
De Man has noted e lsewhere that wi thout ex t ra tex tua l 
intention the ambiguity created by (he rhetoricity of language cannot 
be cleared.™ He seems to show his "blindness" in his "insights" here. 
Just as he claims, "rhetoric is a text in that it allows two incompatible 
mutual ly self-destruct ive points of v i e w , " " but I am afraid he has 
l imited everything within the text when he holds that "it is 
impossible to decide . . . which of these meanings prevails."-™ In fact, 
the extratextual intention may be appropriated by the interpreter 
and the "negative truth" - (hat no text can be correctly explicated -
has already, ironically enough, secured the necessity of reading. This 
reading, be it a double reading which can expose the otherness 
inherent in a text, does not denounce every chance of establishing a 
" have ft detailed example of (his in Chapter Five in which I analyze 
Wil l iam Touponcc 's reading of James I,iu's Chinese Theories of Literature. Sec 
Wil l iam Touponce, "Straw Dogs: A Deconslruclive Reading of the Problem of 
Mimes is in James I.iu's Chinese Theories of Literature," Tamkane Review 1 1 
(1980-81), pp.359-390. 
5 6 Such ns ('his example: "Asked by his wile whether he wants to have 
his bowling shoes laced over or laced under, Archie Bunker answers with a 
ques t ion : 'What 's (he d i f fe rence? ' Being a reader of subl ime simplici ty, his 
w i f e repl ies by patiently explaining Ihe d i f ference between lacing over and 
lacing under , whatever this may be, but. provokes only ire. 'What ' s the 
d i f ference ' did not ask for dif ference but means instead 'I didn't give a damn 
wha t the d i f f e r e n c e is.' The same grammat ica l pat tern engende r s two 
meanings that are mutually exclusive: (he literal meaning asks for the concept 
(d i f fe rence) whose existence is denied by the figural meaning." See Paul de 
Man, Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, 
and Proust (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), p.9. 
Man, Allegories of Reading, p , ! 3 1. 
^ de Man, Allegories of Reading, p. 10. 
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h e r m e n e u t i c s , and it .still seems that a radical or nega t i ve 
hermeneut ics may be built up. De Man seems to be saying that -
through a deliberate bl indness towards the extratextual intention -
the rhetoric of language has terminated the wish of mastering a text, 
and it is the rhetoricity that becomes the host of interpretation.5 9 
H o w e v e r , such a quest ion will convenient ly fol low: whether the 
rhetoricity of de Man's own language would let him accurately claim 
in his text (hat all languages are doomed to be rhetorical. He has to 
face a paradox that his own language is also doomed to be rhetorical. 
But, if so, how are we going to judge exactly which meaning, figural 
or literal or other, he is actually referring to? Or he does not try to 
mean anything at all? In invoking this 1 call to mind Bai Juyi's "On 
Reading Lao Zi," 
"One who speaks does not know; one who knows is silent": 
This remark I have heard from the Old Master, 
If you say the Old Master was one who knew, 
Wherefore did he himself write his "Five Thousand Words"? 6 0 
James Liu makes a comment on Bai in this way: 
Since Lao Zi has spoken, he is not one who 
knows, and therefore his words cannot be 
taken as true, including the statement "one 
*or a more elaborate account of the notion of "host" I invoke here, 
please refer to J. Ilillis Miller, "Critics as Host," in his Fiction and Repetition: 
Seven English Novels (Cambridue; Harvard University Press, 1982). 
60 B 
ai Juyi* "On Reading Lao Xi," houji, juan 13, la; translation quoted 
[from Liu, Language, Farad ox. Foe tics, p.7. 
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who speaks does not know," in which case this 
statement cannot be taken as proof that Lao Zi 
does not know. This circular argument could 
go on forever, but for our present purpose we 
had better stop."6 I 
Ironic is the point that Bai's statement cannot hold that Lao Zi does 
not know although Lao Zi does demonstrate that he does not know in 
his own line of argument. This implies that, provided that there is 
reading, de Man's rhetoricity of language is doomed to fall into the 
same circle: .. his text, albeit inadequate to show his argument about 
rhetoricity since it is rhetorical itself, does not paralyze his ideas, as 
our text faces the s a m e aporia and thus we cannot claim that de Man 
does not know this. It is most ironic when this can also be reversed: 
I may have "blindness" towards de Man's idea, but due to the 
rhetorici ty of my language, it does not necessarily follow that I do 
not know. In other words, as long as there is reading, .there is a 
paradox of textuality and I think, contrary to Liu's opinion that we 
had "better stop," for our present purpose we have to go into the 
paradox to see who is able to manipulate "meaning," or else the 
hermeneutical framework would only forever be a circle that repeats 
itself, (re)producing dominant ideologies. Strangely enough, readings 
^ Liu, Language, Paradox, Poetics, p.7. Liu also tries to use Bertrand 
Russe l l ' s "object language" and "meta- language" to account. 1'or this: "We can 
avoid the above paradox by adopt ing Bertrand Russe l l ' s d is t inct ion be tween 
' ob jec t l anguage ' ( i .e . l anguage that talks about things) and 'me ta - Ianguage ' 
( i .e . l a n g u a g e that ta lks about objec t l anguage ) . Howeve r , we c a n n o t 
r e t r o a c t i v e l y prohib i t an ancient ph i losopher f rom ta lk ing about l a n g u a g e 
that talks about language. In any case, to say that this statement is true of all 
l a n g u a g e s excep t ' l a n g u a g e that ta lks about l anguage ' Is to talk abou t 
language, and we are back where we started,M p.7. 
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of readings may illuminate the process of this eternal repetition of 
the hermeneutical circle. 
Unfortunately, it would again be too optimistic if we simply 
claim that the critic can be the host, as Hillis Miller argues in his 
"Critics as H o s t . " " A s de Man has noted, very often the "insight" of a 
critic is generated from his "blindness," thus we can hardly say that 
the crit ic is the host. But as we have shown, rhetoricity cannot 
exhibit its power without the critic's reading, and thus it cannot be 
the host either. Liao Ping-hui has raised the question about the host 
of in te rp re ta t ion , and by analyzing Samuel Tay lo r Coler idge ' s 
"Christabel," he concludes that "the position of the host is not stable, 
and at last no one is able to be the h o s t . " " However, to claim that 
"no one is the host" is another de Man tan "negative truth": one has 
already become the host, or else he does not have the power to make 
such a claim. The paradox thus continues, and let us go on to 
examine Hartmau's "hermeneutics of indeterminacy" to continue the 
p a r a d o x . 
Hartman's • "hermeneutics of indeterminacy" proposes "a type 
of analysis that renounces the ambition to master or demyst i fy its 
sub jec t (text, psyche) by technocratic, predictive, or authori tarian 
f o r m u l a s . " 6 2 1 This indeterminacy does not merely delay the 
determination of meaning, as "the delay is intrinsic: f rom a certain 
point of view, it is thoughlfuIness itself, Keats's 'negative capability, ' 
Hillis Miller, "Critics as IIosl," in his Fiction and Repetition: Seven 
English Novels (Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1982). 
6 3 S 
ee Liao Ping-hui, Jiegou piping lunji (Taipei: Dongda, 
1985), pp. 316-320. ' 1 % 
^ G e o f f r e y Hartman, Criticism in the Wilderness (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 19X0), p .299 , 
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a labor that aims not to overcome the negative or indeterminate but 
to stay with it as long as is necessary."65 So, in Hartman's view, 
criticism is within literature, and in a sense poetry is less naive than 
phi losophy since "it does not pretend to go beyond the fal lacy of 
unmedia ted e x p r e s s i o n . " ^ T h i s "hermeneutics of indeterminacy" has 
some curious affinities with the picking of lines of poetry to comment 
on poetry in the Chinese tradition that we have mentioned above.-
H o w e v e r , if the hermeneut ics is indeterminate , we cannot j u s t 
inadver ten t ly put the two on a par, or else the power of this 
indeterminacy will be determined by the powerful discourse. By the 
way, Hartman's view is not improblematic, even leaving aside his 
nihilistic belief in the impotence of criticism. He does admit that 
"when I called my book The Unmediated Vision, I was perfectly 
aware that I was haunted by the opposite."67 "Indeterminacy" is not 
someth ing that Can save us from bewilderment - even Hartman 
himself has to be haunted by being in an indeterminacy. As 
comparatists, we cannot but feel we are astray if', we are to rely upon 
an i n d e t e r m i n a t e h e r m e n e u t i c s . In the e x t r e m e , such a 
"hermeneutics of indeterminacy," albeit similar to traditional Chinese 
poe t ics , s imply leaves everything to the power fu l d iscourse to 
determine. Hartman does try to play down the task of interpretation 
by a style of paradox, but such a paradox will be demyst i f ied , 
unfor tunate ly , since his "hermeneutics of indeterminacy," in face of 
the limitation of textuality, is not effective enough to free his own 
Har t in an, Crilicism in the Wilderness, p.270. 
66 H artinan states this in an interview; Saluszinky, Criticism in Society, 
p .85 . 
* ^ Q u o t e d from the interview with 11 art man; vSaluszinsky, Crilicism in 
Society, p.83. 
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style f rom being interpreted. So he is "haunted" when calling his 
book The Unmediated Vis,Pn. But the more important point is that 
he can still .call it an u.unediated vision. Why and how is this 
l e g i t i m a t e d ? 
It ihM goes back to our former question: who is the host of 
t hese in te rp re ta t ions , who is .0 de te rmine the i nde t e rminacy? 
Mil ler ' s deconstruct ion of the semantic implications of the terms 
"host" and "parasite" is lucid enough, but if the role of the host is not 
determinate , then who is the one to determine this indeterminacy of 
the host? Or whether the indeterminacy is sustained or not; that is 
to say, is it an "indeterminacy" left for the privileged to determine? 
In general , (he Post-s tructural is t belief in "negat ive t ruth-
blurs the boundary between crit icism and text. Derrida 's "text as 
orphan" or Barthes's "death of the author" has dictated that reading 
should simply be. a game consisting of wordplay. In such a case, 
writ ing is a Jen d'espri,. However , as we have shown, such 
"wordplay" is not an innocent game, although it seems to be one. 
Barthes would believe that reading aims at a pleasure of the text. 
However, I would say, Tor a critic to claim that reading is a game is 
hardly convincing. There is a Chinese fable that Zhuang Zhou dreams 
of a butterfly and at last he cannot distinguish between being Zhuang 
Zhou or being the butterfly. Without transcending the rules of the 
game one cannot fully engage oneself in (he game. A butcher has to 
forget his knife and how to use his knife before he can perform his 
job with utmost efficiency. However, Bardies has to admit that "the 
reader is the space on which all the quotations that make up a 
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wr i t ing are inscribed."** Such a pleasure of reading is doomed to be 
bound up by rules of writing. I , , other words, the rules of reading 
have not been transcended, and thus it is as if one is claiming that 
one has forgotten whether one is Zhuang Zhou or the butterfly by 
pretending to be in a dream, but with eyes wide o p e n . This kind of 
pleasure is only a pleasure of deliberate self-deceiving negligence of 
the rules of (he game, but not an actual transcendence. 
We have been discussing deconstruction and I now wish to 
turn to the implication of the decons t ruc t ive enterpr ise to our 
h e r m e n e u t i c a l a im. Severa l h e r m e n e u t i c a l f r a m e w o r k s are 
d e c o n s t r u c t e d , and then some d e c o n s t r u c t i o n i s t t heo r i e s are 
examined to see their desires - conscious or unconscious - of being 
interpreted. It gives the impression that they are the poles of the 
evolut ion of contemporary interpretation, and so I think a carefu l 
analysis of the intertext of (he two may be helpful. Deconstruction 
41 
has s ignif icant ly foregrounded the necessity of misreadings, alterity 
and the impossibility of structure. Facing everything deconstructed, 
perhaps, one has to become more cautious, but not more impudent in 
reading. In an age of disbelief, one should not simply give oneself to 
the disbel ief , or the belief in disbelief would mean surrendering to 
subjugation. Hopefully, disbelief may also be positive in helping us 
to de / fo r In the s t ructure, if we are sensi t ive and se l f - re f lex ive 
e n o u g h . 
The critiques of deconstruction made by traditional scholars 
are worth noting here. Among others, M.H. Abrams claims in his 
6 8 RoInnt l Burl lies, Ima^e, Music, Text (New York: Hill & Wang, 1977), 
p. 14,8, 
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"The Deconstructing Angel" that "if all criticism (like all history) of 
texts can engage only with a critic's own misconstruction, why bother 
to carry on the activit ies of interpretation and c r i t i c i s m ? " " (my 
emphas i s ) I ci te Abrams with no intention of de fend ing his 
traditional critical stance - 1 am more sympathetic with the belief in 
the alterity that a text, produces. However, through Abrams, I would 
like to raise the quest ion "why" we should bother to carry on the 
ac t iv i t ies of in terpreta t ion and cr i t ic ism. Abrams asks such a 
ques t ion , obviously enough , with an eye to a de fense of the 
t radi t ional belief in c r i t i c i sm's , demyst i fy ing power. However , I 
w o u l d r a t h e r see the i ssue f rom the c o m p l i c i t y b e t w e e n 
hermeneut ics and deconstruct ion. Deconstruction, I realize, should 
only be the "provisional and intractable starting points," to borrow 
Gayatri Spivak's words, of our de/formation of the hermeneut ical 
f ramework. Spivak states that deconstruction interests her in, 
its disclosure of complicities where a will to 
k n o w l e d g e would c rea te oppos i t ions ; its 
insistence that in disclosing complicities the 
cri t ic-as-subject is herself complicit with the 
object of her cr i t ique; its emphasis upon 
"history" and upon the ethico-political as the 
"trace" of that complicity - the proof that we 
do not inhabit a clearly defined critical space 
f r ee of such t races ; and, f ina l ly , the 
,H. Abrams, "The Deconslrueli ve Angel," in Critical 
(Winter 1977), p.434. 
Inquiry 3 
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acknowledgment (hat its own discourse can 
never be adequate to its example.™ 
M e a n w h i l e , as Frank Lentr icchia c lear ly indicates , "Pol i t i ca l ly , 
decons t ruc t !on t ransla tes into that pass ive kind of conserva t ion 
called quietism it thereby plays into the hands of the established 
p o w e r . " 7 1 -Never adequate to its example," a discourse is often; left 
in a suspense to be appropriated. This "inadequacy" may carry 
i l lumination on the reason interpretation and criticism still f lourish. 
Hermeneutics and the Discourse of Power 
In the Pos t -s t ruc tura l i s t in ter text , there is no longer a 
d e t e r m i n a t e and s table centre from which we can j u d g e the 
re la t ionship between "to say" and "to mean." However, an empty 
c la im that the author has died is not adequate. As Foucaul t has 
suggested, the death of the author exposes a space that we have to 
e x a m i n e , 
It is not enough, however , to repeat the 
empty a f f i r m a t i o n that the au thor has 
d isappeared . Instead, we must locate the 
s p a c e l e f t e m p t y by the a u t h o r ' s 
disappearance, follow the distribution of gaps 
and breaches, and watch for the openings that 
this disappearance uncovers . 7 2 
7 0 C h iya l r i C h a k r a v o r l y Sp ivak , w IJfflijmtll/1 by M a h a s v e t a Dev , 
t ransla ted with a foreword by Spivak, in her In Oilier Worlds: Essays in 
Cultural Politics (London: Roulledue, 1987), p. 180. 
7 1 F 
rank Lentricchia, Criticism and Social Change (Chicago: Universi ty 
of Chicago Press, 1983), p.5 1. 7 2 M i c h e l Foucault, "What is An Author?" in his Language, Counter-
memory, Practice, ed. Donald Buchard (Oxford: Blackvvell, 1977), also in Josue V. 
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Foucault goes on to note that "author" exhibits a function. The most 
in teres t ing character is t ic of the "author-funct ion" is that it may be 
appropr ia ted by someone ' other than the individual who wri tes the 
text. If we are to follow the Post-Structuralist "criticism as text," we 
shall descry the dance of interpretation here: the "cr i t ic-funct ion" in 
•a cr i t ical commen ta ry may also be appropr ia ted . This "cr i t ic-
funct ion" in a certain theorist 's writing becomes an "ideological f igure 
by which one marks the manner in which we fear the proliferation of 
m e a n i n g . " 7 3 W e m a y ! ) j e ( 1 p o i n l t Q , | ) e i r o n y . ( h e p r o I i f e r a t i o n o f 
l imit lessness of. meaning in the Post-structuralist intertext is l imited 
by the "critic-function". So it is not strange to see "Derrida," "Barthes" 
and even "Yale critics" being used in a highly metaphorical way. This 
k ind of m e t a p h o r , h o w e v e r , is pro tec ted f rom s h o w i n g any 
" impress ion i s t i c" cha rac t e r s ince it is backed up by the whole 
tradition of intertext. For instance, de Man rewrites Derrida, Derrida 
< 
rewrites Rousseau, and eventually the critics are all appropriated by 
ano the r c o m m e n t a r y us ing these names , on the one hand to 
d i s semina te the meaning of them and on the other to l imit the 
prol i fera t ion of meaning. Such a limitlessness of meaning is thus 
somewhat different from the Derridean differanee in terms of levels 
of d i scourse . At the level of reading a text, the in ter textual 
differetnee is backed up by another discursive level of cliffercince, 
that is the one in the "inter-crilical" text. In that sense, the archival 
grounds that engender disciplinary power have to be examined since 
Harari ed., Textual Strategies: Perspectives in Post-Structuralist Criticism 
(I thaca: Cornell Universi ty Press, 1979), p. 145. 
7 3 Foil caul (, "What is An Author?" p. 159. 
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the "he rmeneu t i ca l framework" as exposed in h e r m e n e u t i c s and 
deconstruct ion may only be a tip 0 r the iceberg. 
I " f ac t , in the la ter d e v e l o p m e n t of d e c o n s t r u c t i v e 
hermeneut ics of younger scholars like Jonathan Arac, Daniel O'Hara 
and Paul Bove'74, w e h a v e d i f fe ren t ^accounts of the h is tory of 
ins t i tu t ion. I a m reluctant to go into historical genealogies , but I 
wou ld ra ther use some of the dominan t charac te r i s t i cs of this 
genealogy of critical humanism to show how the de/formation of the-
hermeneu t ica l f ramework can find its basis. My analysis of the 
genea log i e s of cr i t ical power is oriented from the v i ewpo in t of 
interpretat ion. Consequent ly , 1 have to go back to examine the issue 
of hermeneut ics , but with a re-orientation of it as a f r amework of 
intel lectuals in power. 
B o v e s remark that "literary criticism becomes established as 
a legi t imate insti tution precisely because it is, f rom the beginning, 
inscribed within the material ly e f fec t ive and expanding discourse of 
the h u m a n i s t i c h e g e m o n y 1 ' " has shed light on the fact that should 
there be hermeneut ics in (he West , the hermeneutical f r amework is 
no s i m p l e t heo ry of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , but one tha t b e c o m e s 
inst i tut ional ized. The whole tradition of hermeneutics ranging f rom 
Schl iemacher to Ricoeur has been developing within, and into, an 
i n s t i t u t i o n . P e r h a p s , one may say , h e r m e n e u t i c s and i ts 
institutionalization evolve in a hermeneutical circle. But it is equally 
7 4 For iJistiiticc, tlicrc arc, among others, Jonathan Arac, Critical 
Genealogies: Historical Situations for Postmodern Literary Studies (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 19X7). Dwili O'Hara, The Romance: of Interpretation 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1985) and Paul Dove, Intellectuals in 
Power: Genealogies of Critical Humanism (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1986). 
75 p aul D o v e , Intellectuals in Power, p .42 . 
Chu 122 
valid to say, if the former argument stands, that an institution is the 
p lace where the hermeneut ica l circle can be inscribed. It sounds 
pa radox ica l , but 1 make no excuse for saying so. In our line of 
a rgumen t , 1 see paradox as an art, in both hermeneut ics and the 
a c a d e m y . This paradox is often a means to blur the compl ic i ty 
b e t w e e n he rmeneu t ics and other "radical" forms of in terpre ta t ion 
which in turn blocks the investigation of the Other. 
1 have been discuss ing hermeneutics and deconstruct ion, and 
I f ind the hermeneutics of reconciling (he (wo a very good example 
to i l lustrate the relat ionship between hermeneutics and the discourse 
of power . In this respect, Paul Ricoeur offers a good starting point 
f o r our d i s c u s s i o n . R i coeu r ' s ea r l i e r e f f o r t in r e c o n c i l i n g 
Structura l ism, or other "objecti vist" strategy, and phenomenology can 
be seen as having paved the way for his later hermeneut ics dealing 
with phi losophical hermeneut ics and deconstruct ion. In Freud, and 
Philosophy and The Conflicts of Interpretation Ricoeur calls into 
ques t ion the "hermeneut ics of suspicion" which tries to "dethrone 
and cas t into doubt the c la ims of both Cartesian se l f - t ransparency 
and any direct fo rm of s e l f - k n o w l e d g e . " 7 ^ Ricoeur seems to 
denounce the notion of hermeneutics in its classical sense. Gadamer , 
in comment ing on (he "hermeneutics of suspicion," tries to argue that 
"every form of hermeneut ics is a form of overcoming an awareness 
of s u s p i c i o n . " 7 7 Very true, we may thus say that the d ichotomy 
b e t w e e n c l a s s i c a l h e r m e n e u t i c s and R i c o e u r ' s s o - c a l l e d 
7 6 S e e Don Hide, " Interpre t ing Hermeneut ics : Origins, Deve lopments , 
Prospects, in Man and World 13 (1980), p.337. 
7 7 Hans-Georg Gadamer, "The Hermeneufics of Suspicion," in Man and 
World 17 (1984), p.373. 
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"hermeneutics of suspicion" is actually a binarism with which one is 
able to resolve everything. A reconciling effort of these two is in fact 
us ing one 's world to project two worlds and cla im that the 
interpretation is a mixture of these two worlds. Ricoeur claims in 
this way in his Interpretation Theory, ' 
If the reference of the text is the project of a 
world, then it is not the reader who primarily 
i 
p r o j e c t s h imse l f . The reader ra ther i s . 
enlarged in his capacity of self-projection by 
receiving a new mode of being from the text 
i t se l f . 7 8 
In a deeper sense, "Ricoeur develops Husserls' idea to claim that the 
subject knows itself in terms of its world, its 'Other'."79 However , 
such an "Other" is an element belonging to the same homogenous 
system. If we are to see it from a different angle - from a discursive 
level of interpreting interpretations - we can see that such an Other 
is fated to be something projected by the Subject. What I have to 
stress here is that the dance of meaning is systematically concealed 
in the conflicts among different schools of hermeneutics. 
Ricoeur 's use of psychoanalysis, linguistic s tructural ism and 
analyt ical ph i losophy of language cle facto extends the field of 
hermeneutics, but such an extension simply disguises the alterity in 
interpretation by a seemingly possible merging of "worlds" in his 
hermeneutics. It is interesting to note that Ricoetir's own position in 
con tempora ry he rmeneu t i c s seems to be a merging of d iverse 
Tlf 
'au! Ricoeur , Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of 
Meaning (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1975), p. 101. 
7 y I l u l e , " In te rp re t ing Merineneulies," p .337. 
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herineneulics. U , = r „e u , n , s ,„ r K 0 „ c i l e o ^ , , l e r m e i l e n t i c s 
of tradition" »,„, H l l b e r m a , s o f i ( | e o | o g y , . „ ^ ; ^ 
however, as ,„oS1 people would agree, i s aecep.able. This c a „ „ o , be 
termed plural is t ic nor monis t i r i r , 
m o n i s t i c . 1 f l n d l l m p o s i t i o n w o r t h w h i l e 
noting since i, can show that different hermeneutics can co-exis t 
with pa radox , but without confl icts . Ricoeur is a se l f -ev iden t 
example of this, or else his theory cannot even s t a n d i m t h i s 
thesis, I wish to shed light on (he way to let the Chinese critical 
tradit ion actively par t ic ipate in l h i s "co-existence," and eventual ly 
function as a real "difference." 
The most ironic, if not absurd, point of these hermeneutics -
we have to bear in mind that he rmeneu t i c s i tself impl ies 
in terpre ta t ion and unders tanding - is , h a t h e r m e n e u t i c S can be 
formulated from di f ferent forms of hermeneutics by inject ing other 
d i sc ip l ines , but wi thout a reflexive reading method of these 
hermeneutics. In saying so, I mean that the interpretation theories 
as outlined in d i f ferent hermeneutics may be paralyzed in facing 
W a c h l c r l r m ' s t - r ' ^ " T / " , l c r m c ! l c u , k ' s "><= C r i t i q u e o f I d e o l o g y , " i n B r i c e 
W d c l U c r l u u s e i e d . , lle.rmeneuues and Modern Philosophy ( A l b a n y S t a t e 
U n i v e r s i t y o l N e w Y o r k P r e s s . 1 9 K 6 ) . p p . 3 0 0 - 3 3 9 , ^ . n a n y . M a t e 
F r a n t wi! * * " " . r r c d H r a n k i s i u , 0 l I , c r example of reconci l ing. See Manf red 
m , „ f , .H'0*'™'""'"*"'? With a n introduction by Martin Schwab 
( M i n n e a p o l i s : Unive r s i ty of Minneso ta Press , 1989). f„ F rank ' s v iew 
s u b j c c L v i f y and tex tua l i ty are Ihe two poles in a he rmeneu t i c s equa l ly 
capable ol taking a general and an individual perspective." (p.xxxv) I consider 
ine po le ol sub jec t iv i ty to be that of hermeneut ics which or ig ina tes f rom 
Husscrl and the pole of textual i ty is obviously from Post-s t ructural is ts . In 
other words, Frank's hermeneut ics is a hybrid of the two, trying to reconci le 
them. ^ It. is noted that Frank's What is Neo Slmclralism'! bears witness to "a 
s emio t i ca l ly e n l i g h t e n e d he rmeneu t i c s f t h a i j can a c c o m m o d a t e ex i s t en t i a l 
s t ruc tura l , or o ther interpret ive al t i tudes, among them even d e c o n s t r u c t ve 
transaction with texts." (p. xxxv) Meanwhile, Schwab claims that Frank is 
reconci l ing " ra t iona l i sm" and "ant i - ra t ional ism." p.xl i i i . In our d i scuss ion , 
however , the emphasis is not placed upon "rationalism," and so I am reluctant 
to dwell upon a discussion of these two terms at this point. Please refer to 
Schwab 's Introduct ion for fur ther details. 
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their own textuality, In contemporary hermeneutics, quest ions like 
these are seldom raised, let alone answered. At last there are 
comments like this one of Gadamer, 
' • * exactly because we give up a special idea 
of foundation in principle, we become better 
p hen omen o l o g i s t s , c l o s e r to the r e a l 
givenness , and we are more aware of the 
rec iproci ty between our conceptual e f fo r t s 
and the concrete in life experience,8 2 
No foundation in principle, no hermeneutical framework is possible. 
We are back to the start. The hermeneutical circle can be pushed to 
another discursive level as theories of interpretation interpret each 
other in a circular way. It is not a circular dialectic, however, since 
many hermeneutical positions, such as Hirsch's and Gadamer 's , seem 
to be oppos i t e s . ^ j W Oukl see the dichotomy of opposites as having 
b e c o m e tools of ( r a d i t i o n a l i z a t i o n , p r o f e s s i o n a l i z a t i o n and 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n . H 4 jn this sense, different hermeneutics in the 
l i t e ra ry f ie ld are " sys tems and products "of k n o w l e d g e " as 
8 2C5adamer, "Hermeneut ics of Suspicion," p.323. 
® 3 Nietzsche oncc asks if there are any opposilcs at all. See Friedrich 
Nie tzsche , Beyond Good and FviL irans. Walter Kaul'mann (New York: Vintage 
Books, n.d.}, § 92. Nietzsche writes, "One may doubt . . . whether there are any 
o p p o s i l c s at a l l . " Sec a l so G.B. M a d i s o n , "The H e r m e n e u t i c s of 
( In te r )Sub jec t iv i ty : Mind /Body Problem Deconstructed," in Man and World .21 
(1988), p. 169; also in his Hermeneutics of Poslmodemiiy: Figures and Themes. 
(B looming ton : Indiana Univers i ty Press, 1988). 
do not in tend to dwell upon the process of this so -ca l l ed 
"p rofess iona l i za t ion" here, Bruce Kobbins has a telling account of it in his 
"Oppos i t iona l Profess iona ls : Theo ry and the Narrat ives of P ro fess iona l i za t ion , " 
in Consequences of Theory, Jona than Arac and Barba ra J o h n s o n eds . 
(Ba l t imore anti London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), pp. 1-21. In 
this essay k o b b i n s even conce ives Ihe history of l i terary c r i t i c i sm in i ts 
rece ived vers ions .as "a narra t ive of p rofess iona l iza t ion ." See also his "The 
History of Literary Theory: Starling Over," Poetics Today 9 (1989), pp. 767-781. 
Chu 126 
"representa t ions generated by the roles of discourse secur ing the 
reg ime of truth."** This truth may then be attacked by counter-
truth, negative truth or even non-truth, and this will recur. 
I" Uns postmodern era or ours, it seems that a different way 
of tackl ing with hermeneut ica l problems is des i rable . In his 
Hermeneutics of Pasimodemity, G.B. Madison proposes that "it would 
be bet ter for us as hermeneut ic is ts concerned with what people 
d.o."M ( m y emphasis). Such hermeneuticists have to get rid of the 
metaphysics which can only think in terms of opposites, and "we 
must not ask, as in meiaphysics one naturally tends to, what the self 
or the subject i s . " " B e i n g a Chinese critic of hermeneutical theories, 
(I am ful ly conscious of the double implication: hermeneuticists of 
Chinese origin and theorist or Chinese theories of interpretat ion) 
perhaps one should not ask what i.s Chinese critical discourse. One 
even does not have to distinguish between the double implication 
above, or else one's hermeneut ics will simply be trapped in a 
metaphysics of insti tutionalization as to which school one belongs. 
Let me cite an example from Plato to illustrate the reading position 
of Chinese critical discourse. Plato once asked, "How can the eye see 
itself?" and his answer i.s that not in a mirror, but in another eye 
which mirror one's eye. Madison has tried to make a comment on 
this and, though with no image of Chinese critical discourse in his 
eyes, there carries a glimpse of illumination, 
8 5 B 
ovc, Intellectuals in Power, p.309. 
"6G.B. Madison, liermeneuiics of Posimodernily: Figures and Themes. 
S e e in particular (he chapter "The f Icrnieneulics of (Inler)Subject ivi ty , or; 
Mind-Body Problem ' Deconstructed." 
8 7 Mad ison, Hermeneutics of Posimodernily, p. 159. 
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In order to fascinate, captivate, seduce that 
other regard, that other desire, to make it 
desire our desire, we make of our living body 
a speaking b o d y . N X 
Seeing the Other seeing and reading the Other reading - an active 
reading and rereading of the contemporary tradition of hermeneutics 
and poetics - is a way to speak one's own voice. We need to see 
contemporary Western hermeneutics as a sedimentation of power of 
interpretation and the interpretation of power. There always exists a 
tendency of traditionaliz.ation, such .as that f rom Schl iermacher to 
Hi r sch , that f rom Heidegger to Gadamer , the decons t ruc t ion i s t 
enterpr ise and the so-called "negative hermeneutics" as represented 
by Ricoeur. Any attempt of clearing up a hermeneutical f ramework 
needs to deform the framework from within, but, unfortunately, at 
once that forms another framework within the structure. It would 
only be frustrated in systematical ly clearing up a hermeneut ica l 
f ramework of (he West where "hermeneutics" is a turbulent field by 
itself. Worse still, the institutionalized hermeneutics from which the 
critical Other is faled to be excluded (or into which incorporated) will 
be in power. "Hermeneutics" may be interpreted as a means of 
s tabi l iz ing the highly insti tutionalized structure, and any possible 
at tempt to strive for a Chinese critical discourse must be vigilant 
towards the t radi t ional iza t ion of the inst i tut ional hermeneut ica l 
f r a m e w o r k . 
Nietzsche's "eternal recurrence" has already warned us of the 
fact that there is nothing new under the sun. The reading position of 
™ Madison, I'/eruwiieulics of Posimoder/iify, p. 16 6. 
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a critical Other should need a new sun. Let me cite a goan to see if 
we can be enlightened about the new sun, 
Question: "What is the real Tao?" 
Master (Fa-an wenyi) replies, "First I wish to 
teach you to act, and second I wish to teach 
you to ac t . " (The Book of Lamp 
Tra nsmissio 
< i t i > & * 
8 9 Q u o l c d from Wu Yi . Gongan chtmyu fc^-iSjii* (Taipei: Dongda, 
1988), p. 132. Translation mine. 
Chapter Four: 
Reading Feminist Reading and a Critique of 
Chinese Critical Discourse 
It should not be possible for anyone writing about Chinese 
li terature in English to avoid comparative questions. Likewise, it is 
imposs ib le to read women ' s l i terature and cr i t ic ism wi thout an 
awareness of the male dominant. The past ten some years saw a 
signal development in contemporary criticism; the advent of the 
discourse of the Other. Since the production of knowledge is not 
evenly distributed, the centre is either the West (in the case of East-
West opposition) or the male (in the case of Man-Woman opposition). 
There fore , Chinese critical discourse and feminist cr i t ic ism should 
share something in common: both being a discourse of the critical 
Other . In this chapter I am trying to juxtapose the reading of 
feminist reading with that of Chinese critics, mainly represented by 
James J.Y. Liu, in order to investigate the similarities and differences 
between the reading strategies of the two. For instance, both of them 
are deemed to be a critique of hegemonic interpretation, but when 
"woman" may be defined upon the definition of "man," (as Gayatri 
Chakravor ty Spivak asser t s 1 ) Chinese theories of interpretation can 
scarcely depend upon "hermeneutics" which is by itself a turbulent 
discursive field from which Chinese discourse is always excluded. 
1 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Feminism and Critical Theory," in her 
In Other Worlds: lissays in Cultural Politics (London: Routledge, 1987), p.77. 
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With regard to feminist discourse, there have been pieces of 
w o m e n ' s l i tera ture pra ised by crit ics in general as s u c c e s s f u l 
chal lenges to the mascul ine prerogative. However, to read feminis t 
readings without a ref lexiveness of the role of the (m)other in the 
patriarchal critical tradition is definitely one-sided. As Spivak notes, 
"It seems particularly unfortunate whet / the emergent perspect ive, of 
feminis t criticism reproduces the axioms of imperialism."2 That is to 
say, the fact that the violent hierarchy of man over woman may 
easily be disregarded with the individual achievement of so-called 
feminis t writing. To read and write against domination, one simply 
cannot afford to ignore the intertext created by the critical tradition 
on the "feminist" text. If we are to have a meta-reading of the 
feminis t readings and the readings on them, we may recognize that 
the whole feminist orientation is still struggling to speak in its own 
voice in a context which has a lways been prede te rmined by 
patr iarchal norms. 
Such a reading of feminists ' readings would lend a good 
opportuni ty for us to examine Chinese critical discourse f rom a 
different angle. The (m)other in a critical intertext has to be oriented 
with a sense of complexi ty , or else an affirmation of individual 
achievement would simply become a means of incorporation of the 
female "voice" into the male orchestra. Let us begin with feminism. 
For a woman to read and write as a woman is no easy task. 
Being the oppressed, women have been trying to speak against the 
rules of patriarchy for centuries. However, not until 1985, with the 
2 Gayatr i Spivak, "Three Women's Text and a Critique of Imper ia l ism," 
in Critical Inquiry 14 (Autumn 1988), p.243. 
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publication of Sandra Gilbert's and Susan Gubar's Norton Anthology 
of Literature by Women, women's literature did not even have a 
"legitimate" place in the literary scene. Yet, such a "place" does not 
mean that women's l i terature has successfully fought against the 
"inequality" between the sexes. Perhaps such a "place" is another 
means to stabil ize (he male-dominated scene. The ma le / f ema le 
opposi t ion, (hough necessary to be deconstructed, is none the less 
there, and (he feminist effor t may eventually be appropriated by 
male critics. I n ' t h e first ' part of this chapter I intend to use Jane 
Austen 's Emmet as an example to demonstrate the appropriation of 
the oppressed by the dominant voice. Ian Watt! in his The Rise of 
the Novel, stales that A u s t e n has completed the job in challenging 
the "mascu l ine p r e r o g a t i v e . H o w e v e r , I would say that this 
challenge - even if it is a "challenge" - is by no means a complete one. 
Be that as it may, it is "complete" only in the eyes of male critics. A 
rereading of Emma as an example will show how a practical criticism 
of the story may be convenient ly appropriated by the dominant 
voice and then (he male/female opposition is dissimulated. 
When Jane Austen claims that her heroine in Emma is one 
"whom no one bul (her)self will much like,"4 she must be addressing 
the male-dominaled audience because a heroine like Emma may not 
be a lovely figure - she has many limitations, at least at the first 
s tages in the novel. As a woman she cannot receive her due 
accolades, much like Shakespeare's sister in Virginia Woolf's A Room 
3 Ia» Wall, The Rise of Ihe Novel (London: Penguin, 1953), p .339. 
\ lames.- Edward A u s l e n - L e i g l i , Memoir of his Aunt ( L o n d o n , 1 8 7 0 ; 
Oxford, 1926) p. 157. Quoted from Wayne C. Boolli, The Rhetoric of Fiction 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969), p.245. 
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of One's Own. Being a novel written by a female about a heroine, 
Emma does provide an opportunity to see how a woman (seems to) 
write(s) as a woman, as well as how a woman (seems to) read(s) as a 
woman in the sense that being the author of the work, Jane Austen is 
intimately reading Emma's behavior in the novel. 
An author as shrewd as Jane Austen will definitely make full 
use of the narrative perspective in her novel. She creates a narrator 
who clearly knows her own distance from the heroine, and that 
distance is often, believed - to be an ironic one. Emma herself is 
unaware of her own deficiencies in the story, and so the distance 
b e t w e e n the nar ra tor and the charac te r , must be c a r e f u l l y 
manipulated, or else Emma will not remain pathetic, and "the reader 
will not wish for and delight sufficiently in her reform"^ At the very 
beginning of the story, the narrator seems to keep herself at an 
"ironic distance" from the heroine; 
Emma Woodhouse , handsome, clever, and 
rich, with a. comfor table home and happy 
disposit ion, seemed to unite some of the best 
blessings of existence; and had lived nearly 
twenty-one years in the world with very little 
to distress or vex her. (my emphasis) 
The word "seemed" has vividly shown that the narrator is trying to 
keep Emma at arm's length. Anyhow, elsewhere in the novel, we 
have many opportunities to "see" Emma's thought. The narrator may 
still be present, but at those moments of- (he inside views, we feel no 
5 B o o t h , The Rhetoric of Fiction, p .244 . 
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ironic separation from Emma. For instance, in Chapter 16, Emma 
reflects on her misjudgment of Mr, Elton: 
• • * but Mr. Elton was proving himself, in 
many respects, the very reverse of what she 
had mean t and be l i eved h im; p r o u d , 
assuming, concei ted; very full of his own 
claims, and little concerned about the feelings 
of others. . . If she had jw misinterpreted his 
feelings, she had little right to wonder that he, 
with self- interests to blind him, should have 
mistaken hers. 
As Booth has denoted, such a "double vision" - "our inside view of 
Emma ' s worth and our objective view of her great faul ts" runs 
throughout the book / ' Through the use of such a distance, we are at 
f irst in an ironic position from the character, and later when the 
ironic texture gradually diminishes, we begin to love Emma as the 
book progresses. Booth has already pointed out that "if we fail to 
love her more and more as the book progresses - we can neither 
hope for the conc lus ion , a happy and deserved mar r iage with 
Knightley fol lowing upon her reform.""7 In other words, the careful 
manipula t ion of the distance between the narrator and Emma will 
ef fect ively arouse our sympathy towards the heroine, and in such a 
sense, the novel is a success. One need not gainsay what Booth 
spends a whole chapter in his The Rhetoric of Fiction to sustain, but 
the Chicago critic has placed the sole emphasis on the expressive 
The Rhetoric of Fiction, p.256. 
7 Booth , The Rhetoric of Fiction, p.245. 
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dimension. On the face of it, the novel is written with outstanding 
narrative technique. Since the protagonist of the novel is a woman, it 
well fol lows that should the novel be considered a success, the 
feminine facade conveniently gives the illusion that Emma, a novel 
about woman written by a woman, is a feminist manifesto. From 
now on, my analysis of Emma will be based on Booth's critical 
discourse and its intertextual appropriation of the "seeming" feminist 
effort of Emma. 
• At first glance, the "ironic distance" between the narrator and 
the heroine may be a successful technique employed by the writer to 
win over our sympathy for Emma despite her limitations. Obviously 
Austen is well aware of the Tact that, as Booth has argued, "the 
dramatic illusion of her presence as a character is thus ful ly as 
important as any other elements in the story."* Booth would believe 
that with the narrator as a friend and guide, we can have "the 
illusion of travelling intimately with a handy little band of readers 
whose heads are screwed on tight and are in the right place,"9 In 
that sense we are happy to sympathize and eventually empathize 
with the heroine. The sympathy here can be seen as a consequence 
of the gradual dissolving of the ironic distance, as Booth has rightly 
noted. Yet, I would say, such dissolving of (he ironic distance must 
be accompanied - otherwise it will not work - by the so-called 
"corrections" of the heroine's shortcomings in the story. 
At the outset of the story, the heroine is not aware of her own 
"faults". The readers, through the narrator, have the privilege to see 
8Booth, The Rhetoric of Fiction, p.266. 
9 Booth, The Rhetoric of Fiction, p.266. 
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through Emma's thoughts. At times the readers have the feeling, but 
Emma does not, that her thoughts are actually not well-founded. The 
correction of such l imitat ions is well reflected by Mr. Knightley 's 
declaration that Emma becomes "faultless in spite of her faults." It 
thus gives the impression that the correction of these faul ts is a 
prerequis i te for the perfect marriage at the end of the story. In 
o ther words , the nar ra t ive technique used shows the gradual 
d i s so lv ing of the ironic d is tance which changes E m m a into a 
sympathet ic heroine whom the reader approves. This change is 
highlighted in the story through the growth of Emma as a "woman". 
The correct ion of the heroine 's shortcomings foregrounds Emma's 
growth as a woman. Without such growth the perfect marr iage 
would not have been possible, as reflected by the fact that with the 
loss of the ironic dis tance towards the end of the story, Emma's 
"v i r tues" are seeming ly conf i rmed . Through such a nar ra t ive 
technique it seems that Emma gradually grows up in the novel and 
acquires her real status as a "woman". At the end of the novel, the 
marriage of Knightley and Emma is a perfect one as "it is a union of 
feeling, of 'taste,' ' tenderness, ' 'love,' 'beauty'.") « 
Jane Austen gradually narrows the ironic distance to create a 
per fec t marr iage , i ronical ly enough, at the expense of creat ing 
another irony, an irony detrimental to the "feminist outlook" of the 
n o v e l . T h e c a r e f u l m a n i p u l a t i o n of the " i ron ic d i s t a n c e " 
systematically silences the paradox that Emma has to "grow up" or 
else she cannot acquire her status as a woman. At the end, however, 
we cannot but question if Emma is still speaking in her own voice. 
l 0 B o o l l i . The Rhetoric of Fiction, p .259. 
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Jane Austen 's reading Emma as a woman and Emma's l i fe as a 
woman are ove rwhe lmed by the male-dominated norms , or the 
euphemist ic term "virtues." . The paradox is that should Emma have 
not grown up according to the male-dominated norms, she could not 
b e c o m e a "woman" who deserves the perfect marr iage . It is 
Knight ley who asserts the "violent hierarchy" when he says in 
Chapter 8, "Men of s e n s e , whatever you may choose to say, do not 
want silly wives." (my emphases) So Emma has to correc t her 
l imitations in order to become a "sensible" man-like woman, before 
the marr iage. This paradox, however, is well dissembled by the 
seeming success of the narrat ive technique. With the successfu l 
manipulat ion , of the "ironic distance," we tend to hold that Emma's 
"virtues" are real "virtues" of women. In Emma, the sad but all true 
fact that woman's "virtues" have to be determined by man is silenced 
by the careful manipulat ion of the ironic distance. At the end, 
however , the audience is fascinated by the perfect marr iage, and 
well forgets the appropriation by the masculine voice. 
The concept of "woman" has become, paradoxically enough, a 
male-oriented concept. Yes, we may be won over by Emma at the 
end, by her "virtues" that Booth depicts; unfortunately the seeming 
growth of Emma as a woman is a .growth oriented by patriarchal 
norms. Knightley, at almost every point of the story, is the shrewd 
judge of virtues and behavior. It is he who tells us the limitations of 
Emma. For instance, in Chapter 43, Knightley points out exactly what 
Emma has done in being rude to Miss Bates; 
"Emma, I must once more speak (o ,you as I 
have been used to do: a privilege rather 
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endured Hum allowed, perhaps, but I must 
s l l M l l s e i L 1 cannot see you acting wrong, 
without a remonstrance. Mow could you be so 
unfeeling to Miss Bates? How could you be so 
insolent in your wit to a woman of her 
character, age, and situation? - Emma, I had 
not thought it possible." 
He also tells Emma that "Mr. Elton may speak sentimentally but he 
will act rationally." He is the prophet of the story, as well as the 
teacher of Emma. Throughout the novel Knightley is a lways with 
Emma, physically and spiritually. We cannot see Emma without the 
inf luence of Knightley. 
Moreover, through Knightley the paradox mentioned above is 
f u r t h e r sys t ema t i ca l ly concea led when he becomes ina r t i cu la te 
before proposing to Emma: 
"As a fr iend!" - repeated Mr. Knightley. -
"Emmg, that 1 fear is a word - No, -I have no 
wish - Stay, yes, why should 1 hesitate? - . . . 
It seems that since most of the dialogue is organized and balanced in 
the story, the moment that Mr. Knightley becomes inarticulate bears 
an implicat ion that the male/female boundary has become tenuous. 
Knight ley ' s inarticulation gives the dangerous impression that with 
Emma's growth as a "woman," a man as articulate as Knightley would 
become inarticulate in front of her. Such a sudden change easily 
fascinates the readers and well conceals the irony that Emma is no 
longer a woman on her own, but a "woman" already dominated by 
male -or ien ted norms. 
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The more effort Jane Austen spends in using inside views to 
examine the heroine's deeper feeling, the more ironic is the fact that 
E m m a is changing according to everyone's wish: Knightley 's , the 
narrator 's, the author's and above all the audience's. Such a change 
does not necessarily indicate Emma's actual growing up - even if we 
consider that as growth - to a mature "woman" since the change is 
still preconditioned by male-dominated values. By so doing Jane 
Austen does hit the fancy of the male audience since they see a 
woman whom they desire, and the female audience are fascinated by 
a promise of a perfect marriage that Emma does, and every one of 
them may, deserve. The audience of Austen may mainly be women 
in her own day, but what 1 am trying to stress here is the acceptance 
of Emma as a successful work by male critics. Such a promise seems 
to warrant a perfect marriage if a woman grows up like Emma, 
wi thout knowing that the marriage is by no means a guaranteed 
gratui ty, but only a Cinderellean fantasy. Jane Austen is not a 
s imple ton, and she knows very well the diff icult ies of marriage. 
However, from a reader's point of view, the marriage can be seen as 
< 
a "gift" of Emma's growth. Contingency is counterfeited as warranty 
and the loss of identity is compensated by a "fantasy," 
Jane Austen tactfully employs an irony in the story that 
Emma is actually a dupe although she thinks she knows what is going 
on. However, this is actually a "double irony" - In a sense a reader 
th inking that she reads as a woman, perhaps including Austen 
herself, is a similar, if different, dupe. When the readers intimately 
walk in the heroine's shoes, they tend to forget that had she not 
changed in order to acquire the virtues of the dominated voice, the 
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fab le- l ike ending would not have been possible. The change of 
dis tance between the narrator and Emma is thus a mere device to 
disguise the paradox that the change of Emma would terminate the 
ability of the author reading as a woman or the heroine writing her 
own story in life as a woman. Emma and Austen are no longer 
speaking as women, but merely "like" women. 
Suff ice it to claim that the aim of Austen's character is to 
integrate well with society. Emma's change in the novel is a kind of 
mere adjustment to society. Anyhow, such a concern with society 
cannot be regarded as a real concern with women's social status. 
Although Jane Austen "thought of woman overwhelmingly in respect 
of their social s i tuat ion and scarcely at all in terms of some 
d i f f e r e n t i a t e d p s y c h o l o g i c a l make -up , " 1 3 1 would say, the "social 
situation" of Emma is doomed to be male-dominated. In the course 
of the novel the "social concern" has silently turned into a kind of 
individual fulfillment: for a young woman to get as "well" married as 
she can, Jane Austen is bound by the ideal "woman" and the 
marr iage that she creates, and her narcissistic tendency of being a 
woman at best merely give the novel a "feminist" outlook. 
The real irony is that the more successful ly Jane Austen 
depicts the "apparent" growth of Emma through the ironic distance, 
the more she represses the voice of a real woman. The seemingly 
"real" woman is sat isf ied with the seemingly ideal, but actual ly 
melodramat ic , ending of the story. When Austen tries to elevate 
Emma as a woman in . herself, she actually lowers the general value of 
1 1 Keith M. May, Characters of Women in Narrative Literature 
(London: Macmillan, 1981), p.60. 
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woman. A seeming successful woman's novel, regrettably to say, is 
successful only because or suppressing the voice of woman. Through 
an a p p r o p r i a t e hermeneut ics by the dominant critical t radi t ion, 
Emma does not so much elevate as debase woman. Let us examine 
how this a p p r o p r i a t e interpretation works. 
Ian Wad holds that "women were playing an increasingly 
important part in the literary scene,"'2 so much so that woman has 
established her position in literature. Taking a closer look at the 
case, one would not be surprised to descry that such a remark simply 
stabilizes the scene which is traditionally dominated by male critics. 
"Woman" is a mere tool in their critical discourse, perhaps no more 
than a trope or a way of characterization. Using a male character to 
replace Emma will hardly make any significant d i f ference to the 
story. If we are to rewrite the story of Emma, and imagine that 
Emma is a male character , there will simply be another kind of 
b i I dungs r a m a n common in, say, Charles Dickens's novels . 1 3 The 
1 2Wall , The Rise of Novel, p.339. 
1 3 () 
ne may argue dial we can also use a female character to replace 
Knightley to make the story a "feminist" one. However, I wish l.o stress what I 
try lo highlighl here is ihe dominant patriarchal norms. Let me cite an 
example f rom Donald Davie's description of Edward Said to illustrate my point. 
Dav ie wri tes , "When his | Said 's f parents married, (hey had to regis ter the 
marr iage with the authorities of what was at that time a British mandate. The 
Brit ish o f f i ce r , having registered the marriage, then and there tore up Mrs. 
Said 's Palest inian passport , explaining that by doing so he made one more 
vacancy in (lie quota of permit ted immigrants to Palest ine f rom among the 
dispossessed of war-devastated Kurope, The feminist response to this - 'Aha, it 
was the wife's passport that was destroyed, not the husband's '" - wholly fails to 
recognize the outrage that Mrs. Said felt, which her son now feels on her 
behalf . For if the law had been such that the husband took his bride's name, so 
that, it was the man's passport that was destroyed, the outrage would have been 
jus t the same." Donald Davie, "Poet; Patriot; Interpreter," Critical Inquiry 9 
(Autumn 1982), p.34. Here Davie is obviously noting the issue from a typical 
patr iarchal point of view. I am far more sympathetic with Spivak's comment 
on this: "If I may descend into unseemly levity for a moment, I will quote my 
long-deceased father: 'If Grandmother had a beard, she would be Grandfather . ' 
For the point is precisely that in a patriarchal society there are no such laws." 
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hero/heroine gradually becomes mature and know more about him-
/herself . To claim that a work like Emma is a challenge to the 
"mascul ine prerogative" is . a lavish praise and the seeming "place-
s imply ca jo les women into a belief of their establ ished status, 
although this practice is perhaps ostensibly made by the male critics. 
In saying that women play an important part, , one could easily be 
al lured by the achievement of such a "place" which is a mere 
euphemism of "subordinat ion ." . In this sense Emma is a mere 
extension of the androgynist poetics from the Enlightened Women, 
such as Mary Wolls tonecraf t , and such an androgynist dream does 
not but limit the woman's reading and writing as a woman; since she 
has become complacent that she actually grows up to become a 
woman in herself. 
As Mary J a c o b u s r ightly indicates , Mary W o l l s t o n e c r a f t 
at tempts to "appropriate the language of Enlightenment Reason for 
her own sex" in /I Vindication of the Rights of Woman, but "this 
access to a male-dominated culture may equally be felt or bring with 
it alienation, repression, division - a silencing of the feminine, a loss 
of women ' s inher i t ance . " 1 4 It is Apparent that the growth of Emma 
can be viewed as an appropriation of the "virtues" of the Other, the 
language of the patriarchal discourse. But, as we have shown above, 
such an appropr ia t ion is i tself appropria ted by the d o m i n a n t 
d iscourse . At this point I shall permit myself to make a slight, 
digression from the 19th to the 20th Century, projecting my view to 
Gayalr i Spivak . In Oilier Worlds: Essaxs on Cultural Politics (London: Rou t l edge , 
1987), p . m . 
ary Jacobus. , Reading Woman: Essays in Feminist Crilicism (New 
York; Columbia University Press, 1986). p.27. 
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Virginia Wool! and (hen looking back at Emma to see how that kind 
of female appropriation is doomed. 
Virginia Woolf 's A Room of One', Own is generally agreed by 
modern feminist ' cr i t ics to be the first modern text of femin is t 
cr i t icism. One of the criteria that Woolf believes a woman should 
possess in order to be a writer is an income of five hundred pounds 
per annum, and this bears a curious resemblance to Emma. Emma 
can afford her eccentricity because she is rich. It then seems that 
Emma cannot speak as a woman because, in Woolf's sense, she lacks 
the second criterion: a room of her own. Indeed, Woolf 's room is 
actually referring to the privacy and freedom that a woman needs, 
and this "room" has long been discussed as the project of modern 
feminis t cri t ics. '* Meanwhile, the point which is worth mentioning is 
that Woolf also wisely observes that "while it is unpleasant to be 
locked out (from the university library, the symbolic sanctuary of 
the male logos). . . it is perhaps worse to be locked in."16 To have 
one's room may be a mere "spatialization" of the technical success in 
Emma\ the irony of the ironic distance in Emma is objectified into the 
"room" in Woolf 's work. To be "locked in" the technical success is 
worse still. Doris Lessing's To Room Nineteen has, perhaps painfully, 
exposed (he impossibility of having a room of one's own as a room is 
only a part of the whole social discourse . Lessing 's heroine 
eventually has to face a tragic ending as her renting of the room is, 
ee Catherine R. S thnpsom "Wooll ' s Room, Our Project: The Building 
of Feminist Crit icism," in Ralph Cohen ed. The Future of Literary Theory (New 
York & London: RouUcdge, 1989), pp. 129-143. 
' ^ Q u o t e d f rom ivlaine S h o w a l t e r , " F e m i n i s t C r i t i c i s m in the 
Wilderness , " , in Showaller ed., The New Feminist Criticism: Essays on Women, 
Literature and Theory (London: Virago, 1986), p.244. 
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albeit not just i f iably, rejected by social norms. A room can never 
exist on its own outside the social discursive field. 
F e m i n i s m has been • w a l k i n g hand in hand wi th 
deconstruction, in, the sense that it has to "decenter" the male/female 
violent hierarchy. But as Derrida has noted, 
Feminism has been necessary and is still 
necessary in certain situations. But at a given 
moment , to close oneself in feminism is to 
reproduce the very thing one is struggling 
aga ins t . 1 7 
Derrida's remark reminds us of the danger that to close oneself in a 
room will not but stabilize the "violent hierarchy." In a sense, 
W o o l f s A Mark on the Wall tries to build the room of one's own in 
language , in the stream of pure consciousness. The shi f t f rom 
androgyny to the essent ial is t ic belief of the female sensibi l i ty 
towards language is apparently a progress. But in fact to shut 
oneself up in the room is not being able to voice against domination. 
Elaine Showalter 's remark, "women's literature is still haunted by the 
ghosts of repressed language, and until we have experienced those 
ghosts, it ought not to be in language that we have our theory of 
d i f f e r e n c e , " h a s hinted that language may not be a way out. Even 
the stream of consciousness be a new dimension which may exhibit 
the female sensibility, women still do not have a voice of their own. 
One just has to take a look at the fact that contemporary feminist 
limes Creech , Peggy Kamuf and Jane Todd, "Decons t ruc t ion in 
A m e r i c a : An In terv iew with Jacques Derrida," trans. J. Creech , Critical 
Exchange 17 (Winter 1985), p.30. 
1 ^Showal lcr , "Feminist Criticism in the Wilderness," 256. 
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critics have [o speak in (he masculine voice to be convinced. 19 The 
"room" may be her own, but the voice is not in a d iscourse 
"organized" to exclude the voice of the oppressed. Such a room will 
only be another "Room Nineteen" in Doris Lessing's story. One may 
also say that Emma's "success," such as the ironic distance, can also 
be treated as a room in literary creativity. To be complacent in the 
room is merely overlooking the dominant masculine discourse and 
claiming, perhaps ostensibly, (hat the room is the world. 
Another complacency is hereby exposed: from androgyny to 
essent ial ism a woman seems to have a room of her own. As 
discussed above, such a room is another device to disguise the 
underlying irony that (he room, at its best, is only a room in the 
male-dominated mansion. So to blindly criticize the 19th Century 
women's novels and treat the 20th Century as a progress in feminism 
is to be trapped by the double irony in Emma, that is to say, to 
become another dupe who claims to know everything. 
Rereading Emma has given us a hint that to simply point out 
how the 19th Century women's novels are not sufficient , is again 
insufficient by itself. It can well be a starting point, but one cannot 
be satisfied with the analy sis of the past women in a wonderwoman-
like honor. For Instance, /I Room of One's Own has been 
mong others , we have HIaine Showaltcr , "Feminist Cri t ic ism in the 
W i l d e r n e s s " - •Geo f f r ey Madman ' s Criticism in the Wilderness ( N e w H a v e n : 
Yale University Press, 1980); Mary Jacobus, "Is There a Woman in T h i s . T e x t ? " -
Stanley Fish's Is There a Text in This Class? ( L o n d o n : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y 
P re s s , 1980); A n n e t t e Ko lodny , "A Map lor Reread ing : Gende r and the 
Interpretat ion of Literary Texts ," - Harold Bloom's /\ Map of Misreading (New 
York & London; Oxford University Press, 1975); and Sandra Gilbert and Susan 
Gubar , "The Mirror and the Vamp: Reflect ions in Feminist Cr i t ic ism" - M.H. 
Abrams ' s The Mirror and the Lamp (London: Oxford University Press, 1953) 
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r e in t e rp r e t ed and rewr i t t en again and again in c o n t e m p o r a r y 
c r i t i c i sm M j a n e M a r c u , i s perspicacious in noting that 
" what these wri ters have in common with 
Woolf and Townsend Warner. . . is obstinacy 
and slyness. . . One after the other they have 
cl imbed in the pantry window of l i terary 
criticism taking note of the" muddy footprints 
of their predecessors . 2 1 
However , if as Marcus further states, this is "the way that literary 
cri t icism moves along," we can only see a literary criticism of the 
dominant voice, and the affirmation of the "mother's work" is only 
another way of stabilizing the male-dominated scene. 
Tradit ionally feminist critics tend to concern themselves with 
woman writers, and place the emphasis on "difference" in women's 
literature. By rereading Emma as example, I hope to shed light on 
the fact that such a f f i rma t ion of the woman wri ter and the 
complacency in the "difference" is never enough to achieve a real 
feminist criticism. Our analysis of Emma has shown that to read and 
wri te as a woman one should eschew f inding sa t i s fac t ion in 
imagining that Emma and one is the same kind of woman. We also 
2 0 See Jane Marcus , "Still Practice, A/Wrested Alphabet : Toward a 
Femin i s t Aes the t i c , " in Shari Bens tock ed., Feminist Issues in Literary 
Scholarship (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), p.94. The examples 
provided by Marcus are Mary fill man's Thinking About Women ( L o n d o n : 
Virago, 1982, first published 1968), Adrienne Rich's On Lies, Secrets and 
Silence (New York: Norton, 1979), Tillie Olson ' s Silences (New York: Dell, 1965), 
Carolyn Hoi I burn's Reinventing Womanhood (New York: Norton, 1979), Lillian 
R o b i n s o n ' s Sex, Class, and Culture (B looming ton : Indiana Univers i ty P ress , 
1978), Joanna Puss's How To Suppress Women's Writing (Austin: Universi ty of 
Texas Press1, 1983), and Alice Walker's In Search of Our Mother's Gardens (New 
York: Harcourl Brace Jovanovich, 1983). 
2 1 M a r c u s , "St i l l P r a c t i c e , " p .94 . 
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have to deal with men; for instance, Knightley, Booth and Watt . 
However , when Jane Miller writes about novels by women and about 
the men in their novels in her Women Writing About Men, she has to 
note that 
In c o n s i d e r i n g how women have writ ten 
about men I have needed to allude, often too 
glancingly , to debates within the women 's 
movemen t and , more par t i cu la r ly , wi thin 
feminist discussion of literary crit icism and 
literary theory.2 2 
In this sense, an inadvertent discussion of men will easi ly be 
appropr i a t ed by the mascul ine d iscourse , and thus a so-cal led 
"writing about man by woman" is something written according to the 
patriarchal norms which have been controlling "literary criticism and 
l i terary theory." Feminist cr i t icism restricted to woman writers 
would easily be appropriated by the dominant voice. A discourse of 
the Other as "feminis t cr i t ic ism" would be marginal ized by the 
dominant , so the male "discourse" on women's literature has to be 
dealt with too; otherwise, the effort will be appropriated by the male 
dominan t crit ical t radi t ion, such as that of Booth and Watt as 
mentioned above, and it will then become at best a sub-division in 
the dominant tradit ion. In this respect, Mary Jacobus 's remark 
sounds like a better way of marking the path of feminist criticsi 
What we need is a woman's writing that 
works within "male" d iscourse but works 
2 2 J ane Miller, Women Writing About Men (London; Virago, 1986), p.9. 
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ceaselessly to deconstruct it: ( 0 write what 
cannot be written.23 
However , we also have to . bear in mind that it may be possible to 
deconstruct the male "discourse," but the female discourse will then 
also be "deconstructed" by itself and the literary discourse would in 
turn appropriate that "deconstruct ion" into its structure. Here- I 
would like to quote Booth, with whom I begin my argument. Booth's 
d is t inc t ion between freedom from and freedom to^ - similar to 
Jacobus's view - 'is definitely justified. But such a freedom, be that 
from or to\ has to be concluded in the dominant discourse. As 
ref lected in the case of Emma and Knightley, in the dominant 
discourse one can hardly sense any trace of "restraints" - one has 
been "inhibited" to have the feeling that one is. actually being 
" inh ib i t ed . " The dominan t would sys temat ica l ly cont ro l the 
"freedom" by silencing the "restraints." For instance, by seizing the 
power .of language and using the euphemistic term "virtues" to 
replace "restraints." In a sense, Booth's analysis in his The Rhetoric 
of Fiction, almost twenty years before he notes the so-called 
"freedom," had already disguised the "restraints" which inhibit the 
" f reedom," though Booth may not be responsible for this, A 
"difference" of view in this sense, if we put the issue back to the 19th 
Century, is just like the "difference" in having a woman character as 
the protagonist in the women novels, like Emma, The rereading of 
Quoted hy Showal ter in lier "Feminist Criticism in the Wilderness ," 
p.254. See also Jacobus, "The Difference of View," in Reading Woman, pp.27-40. 
Wayne C. Booth, "Freedom of Interpretation: Bakhtin and the 
Cha l l enge of Feminist Cri t ic ism," Critical Inquiry 9 (Autumn 1982), pp.45-76. 
Booth bel ieves that there is a distinction between freedom from ex te rna l 
restraints and the power of others to inhibit our actions, and freedom to act 
e f f e c t i v e l y when res t ra in ts d i sappear . 
Chu 148 
Emma has demonstra ted that such a "difference" is only a seeming 
success ; actually It i s a ' "d i f ference" of terms rather than a real 
"difference" of voice, let alone sex. 
It may thus be said, that Jacobus's view that "what is at stake 
fo r both women writing and writing about woman is the rewrit ing of 
these f ic t ions - the work of revision which makes 'the d i f fe rence of 
v iew' a question rather than an answer, and a question to be asked 
no t s imply of women , but of writing t o o " " ' is par t ly sus ta ined . 
Rewri t ing the fiction can be a way to expose how the male discourse 
enc roaches on the female one and thus silences the f ema le voice. 
This is related to practical criticism and the question of writing. But 
the "d i f fe rence of view" has to be vigilantly considered. It gives the 
impress ion that the quest ion can be directly asked about women . 
H o w e v e r , without the female writ ing on wri t ing and read ing on 
read ing , the quest ion about women .cannot even be asked in their 
own voice . Suf f i ce it to say we cannot let " feminis t c r i t ic i sm" 
fasc ina te us. It carries no promise of illumination without a proper 
rewr i t ing and rereading of the feminist discourse in a pat r iarchal 
cr i t ical t radi t ion. 
To relate (he reading position of Chinese critical discourse to 
that of f emin i sm i.s perhaps as easy as to conf la te f emin i sm and 
decons t ruc t ion . Feminism and Chinese critical d iscourse are both 
being the (m)other , and so a reversal of the violent hierarchy seems 
to be essential. However, due to the different natures of the two, the 
process of othering by the dominant culture is apparent ly not the 
same. Spivak has rightly pointed out that "unlike the race and class 
*'iieeohuB, "The IJiITercncf of View." p»*)<>« 
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si tuat ions, where academic people are not likely to get much of a 
hear ing, the women's struggle is one they can support ' f rom the 
ins ide ' . "26 The process of othering is ceaseless in the discursive field 
and thus, in facing feminism, Chinese discourse may also risk being 
o the r ed . 
Julia Krisleva's challenge of the deficiencies of the Western 
d iscourse in About Chinese Woman is in fact a kind of "double 
o ther ing ."27 Through the sexualization of the Chinese tradition as the 
feminine when compared with the West, Kristeva is merely trying to 
cri t icize Western discourse, but not the imperialism inherent in such 
a " sexua l i za t i on" . Let a lone the unnecessary a t t r ibu t ion of 
"otherness" to China 2 *, Kristeva\s book is a very clear example of 
using China as an antidote for the spiritual deficiency in the Western 
c iv i l i za t ion . 2 9 As Rey Chow rightly indicates, 
Even though Kristeva sees China in an 
interest ing and, indeed, "sympathet ic" way, 
there is nothing in her arguments as such that 
cannot be' said without "China".3 0 
2 6 S p i v a k , "The Polit ics of Interpretation,* in her In Other Worlds 
p . 1 3 3 . 
* 7 Julia Kristeva, About Chinese Woman, trans. Anita Barrows (New 
York & London: Marian Boyars, 1986). 
Rey Chow argues thai to a t t r ibute China as the Other is not 
appropr ia te in her Woman and Chinese Modernity: The Politics of Reading 
between West and East (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991). For 
details refer to pp.8-9. Chow is arguing in a different line, and so I shall not 
dwell upon this point in my argument. 
2'-'Sue the case of Fredric Jameson, "Modernism and Imperia l ism," in 
S e a m u s Dearie ed. Nationalism, Colonialism, Literature. ( M i n n e a p o l i s : 
University of Minnesota Press, 1990), p.51. See also note 3 in Chapter One. 
•Wet. ow, Woman and Chinese Modernity, p.7, 
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"China" is as manipulated as the "woman figure" in Emma - both of 
them being mere tools - and many other "feminist writings": she acts 
as a "ca thar t i c ' too l . to channel the over-flooding of the mascul ine 
des i re of power-cont ro l . The problem here is that Kris teva is 
c h a l l e n g i n g the mascu l ine prerogat ive in Western d i scourse by 
committ ing a similar, if different, imperialist crime. The othering of 
China is a strategical reading through which the feminists find their 
s t andpo in t . As. Kr is teva bel ieves that "woman can never be 
de f ined , "31 an othering of China is a way to define Western "woman" 
in a relat ive context . By a definit ion of woman as "negative",-
Kristeva utilizes China as an image to mirror (he violence imposed 
thereby. Unfor tunate ly , such an identification of China with the 
f e m i n i z e d has a l ready p resupposed the Western d i s cou r se as 
mascul ine, and hence superior. She thus borrows the representation 
of China with no regard to the accu racy^ j„ h c r discourse as such, a 
representat ion is a mere means of subjugation in facing the Other. 
Kristeva's reading transcendentally assumes that there is an accurate 
representat ion of China in Western discourse which may be equated 
to the often disregarded feminine in the West. So, in addition to Rey 
Chow's criticism of Kristeva's dogmatic attribution of China as an 
a b s o l u t e Other,33 I read Kristeva's text as an othering of China to 
secure a homogeneous system of the Western discursive field which 
feminism can safely react against from within. Such a text is viable 
3 1 Cho w, Woman and Chinese Modernity, p.7 note 3* 
*On , ' 
- z S p i v a k has commented on Krisleva's unusually arbitrary analys is 
on China in "French Feminism in (lie International Frame," in her In Other 
Worlds, pp, 136-141, I believe Kristeva pays Ihe price of "blunt(ing) her fine 
e d g e of her approach to literature" lo appropriate the representation of the 
alien Other, China. 
3 3 C h ow, Woman and Chinese* Mode.mily, p.8. 
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to be appropriated by the Western critical tradition through the 
charge that the equation of "woman" , 0 "China" is not accurate 
enough. Through such a criticism, although woman can never be 
defined on its own, she is defined on the "otherness" of China through 
a double othering. Spivak is more reasonable in defining "woman" as 
rest ing on the word "man."34 Without such an awareness of the 
appropriation of the dominant, the "First World feminism" of Kristeva 
simply stabil izes a hierarchy of Man-Woman-Chinese, presupposing 
the t ranscendenta l acclaim of an ideally mascul ine l i terature in 
Western discourse and reacting against it. Spivak's cri t icism of 
About Chinese Woman is very acute and t e l l i ng^ , but I shall not 
dwell upon a discussion of it. Ins-tead, I would suggest that Spivak's 
remark that "the fact that Kristeva thus speaks for a generalized 
West is a naturalization transformed into privilege"-™ has already 
sounded the alarm of the danger of feeling oneself as a woman in the 
Western patriarchal discourse. Such a complacency can only be built 
upon an "othering" which has made herself the victim. 
As seen in (he different definitions of the impossibility to 
define the (m)othet\ it should not be possible for us to squarely face 
Chinese critical discourse without an attempt of (re)defining it. Such 
a (re)defi nit ion, I realize, has to be based upon a dedefinition of the 
seduction from the simple semantic implication of the term. A close 
examinat ion of the term is helpful before going on. Here let me 
34See Spivak, "Feminism and Critical Theory," in In Other Worlds, p.77. 
" S p i v a k , "French Feminism in an International Frame," see pp.136-
141 in par t icular . 
36$pjvuk, "French Feminism in an International Frame," p. 140. 
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provisional ly use the term that 1 have abandoned in Chapter One -
"Chinese hermeneutics" - as an example. 
It a lmost goes without saying that "Chinese hermeneut ics" 
should be a Chinese way of interpretation. However, the definition of 
" C h i n e s e h e r m e n e u t i c s " is supposed not to d e p e n d upon 
"hermeneutics ," just as the definition of "woman" may depend upon 
"man," or else "Chinese hermeneutics" is simply an extension of 
Western hermeneut ics , having been feminized and othered. Worse 
still , "Chinese hermeneut ics" does not even possess a being like 
woman. "Woman" may claim to have her essence since she is not 
noth ing , she must have something different f rom other things.3 7 
However , the ideal of comparative literature always reminds us that 
in a compara t ive discourse any suppression from one side is not 
doing the other justice. Definitely in the eyes of Chinese theorists the 
term "Chinese hermeneut ics" is significant in the word "Chinese," 
which marks it as a national theory of interpretation di f ferent . f rom 
o ther he rmen eu t i c s . . "Chinese hermeneut ics , " ideal ly speak ing , 
should be able to accommodate the difference that Chinese makes in 
the f ield of interpretation - in other words, the Chinese way of 
interpretat ion may follow rather different rules of reading f rom the 
Western tradition. Unfortunately enough, a "Chinese hermeneutics" 
in the modern scene seems to be only secondary to Heidegger 's , 
3 7 Acco rd i ng to the a rgument A u g u s t i n e used to r e f u t e a c a d e m i c 
skept ic ism, (see for instance De Civitate Dei, X.I, 26) "Since I cannot doubt that I 
exis t , this p roves that there are truths that I can attain to, it p roves the 
e x i s t e n c e not only of a subs tan t ia l soul but also, u l t ima te ly tha t of a 
me taphys ica l or on to- theologica l God which, as pure being, is also^ absolute , 
immortal substance." G.B. Madison writes, "To ask what something is, is to seek 
out its essence . . ." "The Hermeneut ics of ( Inler)-Suhject ivi ty: The Mind/Body 
Problem Deconst ruc ted ," in Man and World 21(1988). p.4 and note 3. 
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G a d a m e r ' s , R i c o e u r ' s and Habe rmas ' s and o the r k i n d s of 
hermeneut ies , as it has to come into being by locat ing Chinese 
sources to suit these theories of interpretation. Such a "Chinese 
hermeneutics," admittedly, may be able to deny "exclusion," but the 
"neut ra l iza t ion" of the "other" elements inherent in the Chinese 
t radi t ion , which paves the way for the " incorporat ion" into the 
d o m i n a n t h e r m e n e u t i c s , leaves no room for a real "Ch inese 
h e r m e n e u t i c s " which is supposed to be Chinese theor ies of 
interpretat ion. It becomes as if "Chinese hermeneutics" is only a 
kind of reading, not to say discipline, in which Western hermeneutics 
is a t aken - fo r -g r an ted reading strategy used to read Ch inese 
materials f rom a di f ferent discursive level. For instance, it is not 
uncommon to hear a Ricoeurian reading of Zhuang Zi, whereas it 
would be rather ridiculous to have a Taoist reading of R i c o e u r . 3 8 i f } t 
is so, to borrow Mailman's phrase, "the cure is worse than the 
d i s e a s e . " 3 9 
With respect to such a " worse - than-d i sease" cure , f ew 
questions have been raised, let alone answered. However, ironically 
enough, being the oppressed we cannot simply approach the issue 
f rom the other way around. A simple Derridean dedef ini t ion of 
"Chinese hermeneut ics" would mean nothing but "exclusion." (or 
Chinese deconstruct ion?) A more active redefinition is essential to 
1 am fully conscious of (lie fact that a reversal like "a Taoist reading 
of R i c o e u r " is pos s ib l e ; howeve r , (his will be charged with be ing an 
e thnocen t r i c approach and will s imply secure i l l own exclus ion f rom the 
mainstream discourse. To avoid exclusion, such a so-called "Taoist" reading can 
only use Ricoeur as Ihe centre; (he reading is actually "a Ricoeurian Taoist 
reading of Ricoeur" ; thai is to say, the hermeneulics issues still centre on 
R i c o e u r . 
3 9 Quoted from an interview with Hartman, in Imre S a l u s i n s z k y , 
Criticism in Society (New York & London: Methuen, 1987), p.75. 
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p r e v e n t our e f for t f rom being d i rec t ionless . Such a d i rec t ion 
presumes, I have to state, that no direction is possible unless a sense 
of knowing where and what, we are in the discursive field of power-
re la t ion. It would be s trategical ly compatible to de f ine "Chinese 
h e r m e n e u t i c s , " s u p p o s e d l y t heo ry 0 f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , by an 
interpretat ion of the rhetoric of the term. Before we actually move 
onto a reading against neutral izat ion and incorporation in the term 
"Chinese hermeneut ics ," let me cite .he example f rom John Keats 's 
f amous "Beauty Truth" as an illumination. 
Paul de Man has touched on the relation of the gesture of 
rhetoric to epistemology in general in Keats's famous line, "Beauty is 
t ru th , t ruth beau ty . "40 I n d e Man's view, such a t o p o l o g i c a l 
displacement has been a common epistemological strategy in modern 
rhetoric. I have no intention of claiming that "Chinese hermeneutics" 
is merely a' d i sp lacement , but in dealing with the t r ans fo rmat ive 
d i sp lac ing of the mean ing in between the two words, an ac t ive 
"Chinese he rmeneu t ics" may be redefined in l ight of this "truth 
b e a u t y . " 
Opin ions about the meaning of "truth beauty" have been 
s t rangely divergent , but it is generally accepted that "truth beauty" 
is a product of Keats's art. In a sense, "truth" and "beauty" are 
conceived as two elements articulated in art. There seems to give an 
impress ion that through a Romantic transcendence, truth and beauty 
will dissolve into one to be contained in art. Be that t ranscendence 
naively idealistic or not, the Grecian urn speaks by its "action" in 
lie Man, "Anlhropomorphism and Trope in (he Lyr ic ," in his 
The Rhetoric of Romanticism (New York: Columbia Universi ty Press, 1983 ) 
p . 2 3 9 . 
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Keats 's discourse. Phenomenological ly speaking, the urn "urns" in 
Keats 's discourse. In other words, "truth" and "beauty" cannot be 
separated for individual interpretation. One has to bear in mind that, 
in addition to Keats's so-called "negative capability," it is mainly the 
in te r -d i sp lacement of the two words, "truth" and "beauty ," that 
allows the urn to "urn" in Keats's discourse. An active transformation 
of the insufficient def ini t ions of "truth" and "beauty" into seeming 
independen t de f in i t ions of the two is not possible wi thout the 
combinat ion of (he two. We should still well remember the tale 
about spear and s h i e l d s Any effort of the definition of spear or 
shield is paradoxical since both of them claim to be capable of failing 
every opponent . 
In Keats's discourse, the soundless pipe plays music sweeter 
than that of the heard melody, and (he figured lover has a love more 
pan t ing than thai of breathing flesh and blood. The "unheard" 
me lod ies are not paradoxical , not simply due to a metaphor ic i ty 
opera ted in the term', but more s ignif icant ly due to the inter-
displacement of (he definition of "(ruth" and "beauty." We need not 
aim at a transcendence of art through which "truth" and "beauty" are 
organical ly transformed into an art (hat speaks for itself. But we 
need to understand how the paradox - (he insufficient definitions of 
"truth" and "beauty" separately - is dissimulated in Keats's discourse. 
The "metaphoricity" between "truth" and "beauty" affords to let the 
defini t ions of the two terms be unanswered, but such silence is again 
sweeter than any other definition, as any definition is doomed to be 
4 ' For my account uf the spear and Hie shield, please refer to Chapter 
T w o . 
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paradoxical . A displacement of the two terms, albeit a seeming silent 
non-sequi tur , strangely def ines them both, providing a se l f -evident 
defini t ion of. art. 
If we are to separate the terms "Chinese" and "hermeneutics," 
we are doomed to face an aporia in which no definition of "Chinese 
hermeneut ics" is not paradoxical since hermeneutics is a Western 
concept f rom head to toe. As we have shown, it is not possible to 
have a c lear Western hermeneut ica l f r a m e w o r k buil t up, so 
"hermeneutics ," „ i, i s a l u r b u l e n ( r i e | d w h i c h i s a | w a y s c h a n g i n g > 
can never be fully defined, just like "truth" and "beauty." So any 
hope of es tab l i sh ing the hermeneut ica l f r amework of the two 
tradit ions and comparing them would be trapped in a "tropological 
d isplacement" which would definitely favour the dominant discourse. 
F r o m , the lesson of (he r e / d e d e f i n i t i o n of " C h i n e s e 
he rmeneu t i c s , " we should notice that Chinese crit ical d i scourse 
should be treated as a kind of discourse which is also always 
changing. If the tradition is in an eternal standstill, Chinese critical 
d i scourse is fated to be stagnant, as long as there is no clear 
definit ion of the term. Chinese critical discourse calls for the urgent 
need of a se l f - ref lexi veness in the intertextual discourse and a 
rereading of the contemporary orientation, or else the term "Chinese 
hermeneut ics" cannot establish itself through an inter-displacement 
of the meaning of the two constituents since one side of the term has 
been dominated by the other side. It cannot become a self-sufficient 
organic whole. 
At this poipt one may raise the question whether the work of 
a critic of Chinese literature or a critic of Chinese origin should be 
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considered to be a real Chinese critic. I, seems that we cannot 
s imply use the expedient reply, "perhaps both," to answer such a 
q u e s t i o n . The re may well be d i f f e r ences be tween the two 
approaches, but in dealing with the discrepancies we do not have any 
criteria to rely upon. The situation is somewhat similar to that of the 
d i f fe rence between critics of Third World literature and Third World 
cri t ics. It is obvious that anyone who has access to Third World 
l i terature and competence in literary criticism can claim to be critics 
of Third World literature, but only those writing with a strong sense 
of the Third World, and its relation to the First World , may be 
considered genuine Third World critics. The approach to Chinese 
cri t ical discourse should be that of the latter case. The reading 
posit ion of Chinese critical discourse should be oriented with a strong 
sense between cultures and a vigilance towards the dominat ion of 
the powerfu l discourse. 
If we are to compare contemporary reading of Chinese poetics 
with the development of feminism, it would, be rather "disgraceful" 
to note that the development of Chinese critical d iscourse is no 
fur ther along than the first stage in Elaine Showalter's periodization 
of feminis t development. Shovvalter periodizes the women's literary 
historical development into three phases: 
The initial "Feminine Phase", from 1840 to 
1880, involved imitation by women novelists 
of the dominant tradition and internalization 
of its literary and social .standards. The second 
"Feminist Phase", from 1880 to 1920, entailed 
protest aga in s t p r eva i l i ng modes and 
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advocacy of minority values and rights. The 
final "Female Phase", from 1920 onward, 
evidenced a turning inward in search of 
identity and a relaxation of depending on 
oppos i t ion . 4 2 (my emphases) 
By far James J.Y. Liu's Chinese Theories of Literature is still the only 
work in a Western language extensively devoted to Chinese literary 
theories. I have a particular acquaintance with this book since it was 
the very first book that I encountered criticism of Chinese literature 
in English. (I read his earlier books, like The Art of Chinese Poetry, 
later on) I remember when I pursued my master degree in America, 
I would almost feel paralyzed without the book at hand when I 
wrote about Chinese and comparative literature. The pervasiveness 
of the "contribution" of the book in the study of Chinese literature 
has demons t r a t ed a seeming impor tance of using sys t emat i c 
methodology to cope with Chinese literary theories. I can well 
remember Jeannelte L. Faurot's review of Liu's book in Modern 
Language Journal: 
James Liu's most recent book, Chinese 
Theories of Literature, will be welcomed by 
scholars of Chinese and comparative literature 
as the first comprehens ive work in any 
El it i ii o S h o w a l t e r , A Lite rut lire of Tlieir Own: British Women 
Novelists from limine to Lessing. London: Virago, 1978. Quoted from Vincent ' 
Le i lch , American Literary Criticism from the 30s lo the• 80s (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1988.). p.313. See also Showalfer, "A Criticism of Our 
Own: A u t o n o m y and Assimi la t ion in Afro-Amer ican and Feminis t L i te ra ry 
Theory," in Ralph Cohen ed. The Future of Literary Theory (London: Rou l l edge , 
1989), pp .359-368; ,there is a lucid account of ihe feminist critical revolution. 
Besides, it seems that the Black critical revolution also follow similar s tages; 
see pp.350-.359. 
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language to analyze Chinese theories of 
l i t e r a tu r e us ing c o n t e m p o r a r y Western 
methodolog ies .43 ( m y emphases) 
The ideological implicat ion in "any- language using "Western-
methodology is .self-evident. It leaves generous room for other 
l anguages , even non-Western ones, to use such a contemporary 
methodology to deal with (heir own literatures. In a sense, only 
Western methodologies can provide a scale upon which literatures of 
any languages can be measured. At that time I was not conscious of 
such kinds of colonial remarks and 1 even found myself in sympathy 
with Stephen Owen's comment that "(he book is a c lear and 
worthwhile contribution to both Chinese literary studies and literary 
history in general. All we might ask is that it beget a much longer 
s e q u e l . " 4 4 \ w n s o n c e c o n f j d e n t that a sequel of meta-reading of 
Liu's book would proliferate Chinese theories of interpretation. I 
need not deny the "contr ibut ion" of e f for t as such, but the 
"contr ibut ion" is def ini te ly limited to Western critical discourse. 
Wi thou t "contr ibut ion" as such, neutral ization and incorporat ion 
would not be possible. Exclusion is not as good a means as these two, 
to be sure. However, 1 have strong doubts if being neutralized and 
incorporated is any belter than being excluded. 
Supposedly trapped in a Western discourse, I would not mind 
measur ing the development of James Liu's early stages of career 
( b e f o r e Chinese Theories of Literature) aga ins t Showa l t e r ' s 
43Quoted I'roiu the back cover til' James I.in, Chinese Theories of 
Literature, paperback edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975.) 
4 4 s t e p l icii Owen , Modern Language Notes, quoted f rom the back-cover 
of Chinese Theories of Literature. 
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periodization. One ean (hen see i, i s predominantly the first phase 
that Liu's effort is in: (he imitation of the dominant tradition.4* i d o 
not deny that such treatment of Chinese literature does mark a new 
path of the study of Chinese literature, but the problem is that such 
an imitation which grounds its textuality on Western discourse must 
have Chinese critical discourse articulated wholly in dominant voice, 
and the problem is that the representation of Chinese discourse may 
be appropriated by (he West to suit its own needs. Liu may not have 
an, eye in doing so,' but as we have shown in the first half of this 
chapter, the dominant critical tradition is likely to exercise its silent 
power over his text. As James Liu has stated elsewhere, he himself 
is an " interpreter of t radi t ional Chinese l i terature to Western 
r e a d e r s . " 4 6 Unfortunately such an interpretation to Western readers 
has been curiously and extensively employed by Chinese readers as 
well. The appropriation of the suppression from the dominant culture 
as another form of suppression would initiate negative cycles of 
appropriation using values of dominant culture as "standards." Liu 
may not foresee such an outcome. 
Liu has mapped the direction of his earlier stages in "Toward 
a Synthesis of Chinese and Western Literary Theories." He admits 
that in The Art of Chinese Poetry his methodology is influenced by 
some New Critics, chiefly I.A. Richards and William Empson.4? In 
fact, in the books after The Art of Chinese Poetry, such as The Poetry 
There are, I am sure, reasons Tor Liu lo pursue such a path , such as 
t h o s e of in t e res t , target a u d i e n c e and ins t i tu t iona l s y s t e m , but I will no t 
a t t empt to account for them s ince my point is to mark the cha rac te r i s t i c s of 
such deve lopmen t as an i l luminat ion of my cr i t ique of Ch inese he rmeneu t i c s . 
4 6 j a m e s Liu, " T o w a r d a Syn thes i s of C h i n e s e and Wes te rn L i t e r a ry 
Theor ies , " in Journal of Chinese Philosophy 4 (1977), p . l . 
. 4 7 u u, The Art of Chinese Poetry, p.2. 
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of Li Slmng-yin: Ninth-Century Baroque Chinese Poet and Major 
Lyricists of Northern Sung, we can still detect a very profound 
influence of the reading strategy of the New Critics. I would leave 
the critical analysis of Liu's works to the following chapter. Now I 
wish to focus on the implication and development of that influence. 
Chinese Theories of Literature marks a development of James 
Liu f r o m the me thodo logy of the New Cri t ics to that of 
p h e n o m e n o l o g y , a l though his c l a s s i f i ca t ion of theor ies into 
metaphysical , expressive, affective and pragmatic ones is basically 
derived from M.Il. Abrams « I do not doubt Liu when he says that 
he "had had no knowledge of phenomenologica l c r i t i c i sm or 
aesthetics" while he writes the Chinese Theories of Literature, but I 
am skep t i ca l about his t rea tment which re la tes T a o i s m to 
phenomenology in such an unusually arbitrary way. He seems to 
have blunted one edge of his "double-edged sword""? when he claims 
that "the phenomenological theorists. . . such as Mikel Dufrenne and 
Roman Ingarden developed their ideas with ' incomparable greater 
subt le ty and complexity'."-™ 1 cannot see why it is not possible to 
read the Taoist texts with subtlety, and complexity is not necessarily 
valuable. Liu allows the dominant discourse to capture the Taoist 
ideas under his. very nose, and it further gives the impression that 
the development of traditional Chinese literary theories has to follow 
the Western trend of literary criticism by and large. Yes, Liu does 
4 8 S e e M.Il. Abrams, The Mirror and ihe Lamp (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1953), pp.6-7. 
4 9 A 
praise from kicliard John Lynn, the editor of James Liu's last 
book , Language, Paradox, Poetics (New Jersey: Princeton Univers i ty Press , 
1988) . S e e the edilot's introduction. 
5 0 L iu, Chinese Theories of Literature, p.2. 
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show a progress (o "take a further step toward the fulf i l lment of his 
p u r p o s e " - ^ . by a t t empt ing , 0 synthes ize e lements of Ch inese 
(especial ly metaphysical) and Western (especially phenomeno.ogica l ) 
theories of literature, but this progress seems to forever lag behind 
the development of Western critical views. The Western view is 
developing, for instance, from New Criticism to phenomenology in 
Liu's case. A simple "synthesis" would never be possible when the 
Western view is growing while the Chinese is at an eternal standstill. 
Ef for t s as such, will definitely be outgrown by the dominant critical 
tradition. Besides, from a "practical criticism of Chinese literature" to 
"a synthesis of Chinese and Western critical views" there insinuates a 
false hope of founding a Chinese critical discourse by a meta-reading 
if the two levels can be firmly established. We can well remember 
our rereading of Emma has shown that "a practical criticism," such as 
Booth's benevolence in his The Rhetoric of Fiction, is doomed to be 
captured in an intertext not free from the axioms of imperial ism. 
Perhaps a synthesis is possible only if the Western critical scene is 
also in a standstill.52 
In the introduction to Chinese Theories of Literature, Liu states that 
one of his purpose was to "pave Ihe way for a more adequate synthesis than yet 
exists of Chinese and Western eritieal views so as to provide a sound basis for 
the practical criticism of Chinese literature." 
In a talk on Mareh 25, 1992 at Chinese University of Hong Kong, 
"The Main Lines of Western Literary Theories," Hazard Adams claims that there 
are basical ly three .stages in Ihe development of Wcsiern philosophy: ontology, 
e p i s t e m o l o g y and language. Ontology spans more than Iwo thousand years, 
e p i s t e m o l o g y more than three hundred and language only about a hundred 
(Adams bel ieves thai the age of language has ended recently). i would see this 
shorter and shorter span as a resull of the increas ing cross -cu l tura l 
communicat ion. The dominant tradition has to develop more rapidly than the 
alien Other so as to facilitate ils oppression of il. This has extended far beyond 
the scope of this dissertation and i will not go into it. 
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Liu's next book, The Interlingual Critic, regrettably to say, 
does not exhibit a significant progress from Chinese Theories of 
Literature. Although Liu centres the book on "interlingual criticism," 
his approach still, basically speaking, aims at a kind of "synthesis" as 
expounded in "Toward a Synthesis of Chinese and Western Literary 
Theor i e s ."53 Although in this book Liu is still bound by the fallacy 
that the text is transparent and possibly to detach for examination, 
his concern with "the interlingual critic," that is to say, the reading 
position of the critic, has silently paved the way for a progress from 
a mere "synthesis". The impact of such an approach, as I see it, finds 
its echo in an explicit discussion of textuality In his last book, 
Language, Paradox, Poetics. 1 see Liu's last book as the one closest to 
the goal of his career. I believe this is the only book that Liu 
a t tempts to squarely face the problem of textual i ty . In the 
introduction, Liu has shown a direction quite different from all of his 
previous works, 
I f u r t h e r s u g g e s t p o s s i b l e po in t s of 
convergence between the traditional Chinese 
poetics of paradox and contemporary Western 
poetics and hermeneutics .5 4 (my emphasis) 
F rom "synthesis" to "convergence" Liu may have observed the 
infeasibi l i ty of the former in facing "the poetics of paradox" (a 
chapter in Language, Paradox, Poetics) - the text, which may be self-
privileging, is no longer a transparent and innocent medium for Liu. 
So in this book James Liu simply "juxtaposes" texts f rom two 
5 3 Act 
ually this article is partially reprinted in The Interlingual Critic 
(B looming lon: Indiana University Press, 1982). 541 Ju , Language, Paradox, Poetics, p.xi. 
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d i f f e r en t t r a d i t i o n s " Although he is s t i l l n bit over-optimistic when 
he claims that "such juxtaposit ion wiil also enable us to become 
aware of the unspoken presuppositions about the nature of language, 
poetry , poetics and interpretation that underlie each tradition, thus 
paving the way for a genuinely comparative poetics, free f rom both 
Eurocent r i sm and S i n o c e n . r i s m , ^ ' the direction of pointing towards 
paradox of textuality and interpretation - utterly different f rom his 
whole series of books - offers some sobering thoughts for us to 
consider . Perhaps it is by facing this "paradox of interpretation" 
which underlies every tradition that Chinese critical discourse can be 
established without an eternal standstill on the Chinese side. 
Meanwhile, Rey Chow has also touched upon the issue of 
"e ternal s tandst i l l" of the Chinese tradition and how Kris teva 
espouses it again "from a feminized, negativized perspective."57 I a m 
reluctant to linger upon the "metaphysics or feminizing the other 
(culture)" which has been discussed elsewhere in my arguments, but 
rather I would say that any effort as Liu's (up to The Interlingual 
Critic) is a "traditionalization" (to be distinguished from traditioning) 
of con tempora ry Chinese crit ical d iscourse - in other words , 
imprisoning the development of Chinese critical discourse within the 
scope of the past. This traditionalization will conveniently create a 
tradition of its own (but oriented by the dominant Western system) 
in the contemporary scene and sediments itself. By saying that the 
critical discourse is in the past, I dp not imply that by going through 
the phases s imilar to Showalter 's periodization Chinese crit ical 
55 Liu. Language, 'Paradox, Poetics, pp.xi-xii . 
JII, Language, Paradox, Poetics, p .x i i . 
-"ClH >w, Woman and Chinese Modernityt p.9. 
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discourse can really acquire a "Room of One's Own" which is a kind of 
"Amazon Utopia" in the feminist s e n s e d Since the self-definition of 
f emin i s t feel ing as a woman often simply leads to an opposit ional 
a f f i r m a t i o n of gender , I .see the deve lopment of the f emin ine , 
feminis t and female phases as a "progress" within the scope limited 
by .patr iarchal discourse. 
In fac t , Showal t e r ' s "gynocr i t i c i sm" advoca tes a theory 
concerned with "the history, themes, genres, and statues of literature 
by w o m a n , " M and this kind of criticism concerned with woman as 
writer aims at a set of standards free from "the linear absolutes of 
m a l e l i t e r a ry history."M) • U n f o r t u n a t e l y , such a S h o w a l t e r i a n 
gynocr i t ic exposes a limitation when she asserts that "if we study 
s tereotypes of women, the sexism of male critics, and the limited 
roles of women .in literary history, we are not learning what women 
have felt and experienced, but only what men have thought women 
should be ," 6 1 Such a remark implies that "gynocrities" can directly 
feel and exper ience what the woman feels and experiences in the 
text. This kind of humanistic approach falls back to where it begins: 
a patr iarchal empir ic ism. Every problem of textuali ty has been 
ignored. No real "gynoeentric-criticism" may be possible unless we 
are able to consider the intertext created in the critical tradition 
which would appropriate the text - not a transparent one - for the 
5 8 S 
cc vS how alter, "Toward a Feminist Poetics" in The New Feminist 
Criticism, p. 139. "The Amazon was repeatedly involved as the emblem of female 
creat ive autonomy, from the muse of the poetry journal Amazon Quarterly to 
T i -Grace Atkinson's feminist manifesto, Amazon Odyssey." 
-^Showii l ter , "Toward a Feminist Poetics," p. 128. 6 0 Showal tc i \ "" Toward a Feminist Poetics, H p. 131. 
6 1 Sliowallcr, "Toward a Feminist Poetics," p. 130. 
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pat r iarchal norms. I, i s evident that Showalter 's "gynocri t ic" is 
a lways under the inf luence of patriarchal cr i t ics . In "Feminis t 
Crit icism in the Wilderness," she tends to replace the so-called White 
Fathers like Freud, Lacan and Bloom, whom she criticizes, with Edwin 
Ardener and Clifford Geertz although she insists that she does not 
mean it: 
No theory, however suggest ive , can be a 
s u b s t i t u t e for the c lose and e x t e n s i v e 
knowledge of women's texts which constitutes 
our essential subject . . . 6 2 
Such a gross differentiation of "knowledge" and "theory" does not but 
rep lace her " theory" with the term "knowledge." In a sense, 
Showal te r ' s position is terminological ly , at best methodologica l ly , 
d i f ferent from (he "feminine" and the "feminist" phases. However, in 
view of establishing a feminist criticism of one's own, she has only 
redecora ted the room. The room is still not f ree f rom male 
domina t ion . Although Myra Jehlen also exhibits a def ic iency in 
t e x t u a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n , " her a rgument - s ince there is no 
Archimedean point outside patriarchal discourse, one should has to 
shif t back to the patriarchal ground - is not as unreasonable as it 
sounds. Showaiter comments on Jehlen by claiming that such a shift 
might mean an abandonment of a feminist e n t e r p r i s e . Y e s , as far 
as Jehlen is concerned, her call for a "radical comparativisim" inside 
6 2 S h o w a l l e r , "Feminist Criticism in the Wilderness," p.266 
n " A r c h i m e d e s and the Paradox of Femin i s t C r i t i c i sm , " Jeh lcn 
be l ieves that " l i terature is itself already an interpretation that it is the critics ' 
task to decipher ." There is a limitation that she still holds that, a critic is to do 
jus t i ce to the author. Indeed, a critic may try to do so, but this should not be 
the sole concern. Signs 6 (1981), pp.575-601. 
6 4 Sho \va l t e r , "Comments on Jehlcn," Si^ns 8 (1982), pp. 160-4. 
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pa t r i a rcha l d iscourse may not even claim to be f emin i s t in 
Showalter's sense, but to act against domination one may say it is not 
essent ial to be termed "feminist" in a patriarchal d iscourse . As 
Showalter herself says, the function , of "gender" is to " p r o b l e m a t i c 
t h e d o m i n a n t . *s As long as the work achieves such a 
problemat izat ion, it i s not necessary for it to have a "feminis t -
outlook. Meanwhile, there is no denying the fact that Jehlen's view is 
problematic - clue to her blindness about textuality - in laying the 
fulcrum on "male ground." . Such a fulcrum is not even possible in 
the patriarchal discourse. Feminism may not be in need of a fulcrum; 
probably what it demands is a context detotalized: "Women's voice is 
not one voice to be added lo the orchestra; every voice is inhabited 
by' the sexual differential."«•> (original emphasis) 
Taking the feminist effort into consideration, we may hasten 
into the conclusion that the reading position of Chinese critical 
d iscourse may simply elude the "feminist" and "female" phases 
altogether. As Spivak rightly remarks, "unlike the race- and class-
situations, where academic people are not likely to get much of a 
hearing, the women's struggle is one they can support from inside."6? 
Therefore , without examining the academy from within one needs 
not be happy lo see "feminist achievements" as an indication of the 
Other writing back . In the course of writing this chapter I found 
my greates t sympathy leaning towards a Third-World feminis t , 
Gayatr i Spivak; Chinese critical discourse has to be reread and 
rewritten with a. keen sense of the social text. This is not simply a 
A Criticism of Our Own, " p.3,^7. 
6 6 S p i v a k , "The Politics of Interpretation," p. 132. 
. 6 7 S p i v a k , "Tiie* Politics of Interpretation," p.133. 
Chu 168 
fortui tous coincidence, and the reason is not simply that the two are 
both doubly-o lhered , but that of a common need of a reading 
strategy with a sharpened sense of the dialectic between d i f fe rent 
forms of dominat ion . Only with such a reading strategy may one 
have a clear view of the colonialism in interpretation. 
I am fully conscious that I may be accused of replacing Liu, 
N e w Cri t ics and phenomeno log i s t s with Said and Spivak , l ike 
Sho wai ter ' s point about the "White Falhers" ment ioned above . 
However , if U is so, my discourse has already freed Chinese critical 
discourse f rom the suppression of its tradition, and thus it is f ree 
f rom an eternal standstill. In addition, 1 believe, such a progress can 
only be made with an acute rereading, and at the same t ime 
rewrit ing, of the contemporary situation. This should be something 
like a "mimicry"; Hon.i Bhabha rightly notes that "mimicry" is a form 
of "civil d i sobed ience with the discipl ine of c ivi l i ty ; s igns of 
spec tacu la r r e s i s t a n c e . " ^ Meanwhile, Showalter has expressed her 
doubt in such a "mimicry" in quest ioning that "in mimicking the 
language of the dominant , how can we guarantee that mimicry is 
understood as ironic, as civil d isobedience?"^ (my emphasis) I would 
say, however, perhaps we do not even have to ask such "mimicry" to 
be understood as ironic - understanding is by itself a turbulent issue, 
and without that mimicry perhaps it will never be free f rom the 
colonizing discourse. Thus the point is that such a mimicry can 
afford to place (he two discourses on the same level, that is to say, 
making reading (as) the other possible. So I am sympathetic with 
6 8 H fiflli Bliahhn, "Signs Taken for Words," in Critical Inquiry 12 
(Autumn 1985), p. 162. 
6 9 Showai lcr , "A Crii idsm of Our Own," p.369. 
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Said ' s cal l for a "cri t icism that would account for quotidian po l i t i cs 
and the s t ruggle for p o w e r " (my emphas is ) and Spivak 's re la t ion of it 
to " f e m i n i s t he rmeneu l i c s . "70 Y e t , we have seen how Kris teva 's "f irst 
w o r l d f e m i n i s m " c o l o n i z e s the Ch inese t rad i t ion . T h e r e f o r e , qu i te 
u n l i k e the feminis t e f fo r t , it seems that Chinese crit ical d i scour se has 
to r ead with a s t rong s ense of q u e s t i o n i n g d o m i n a n t "va lues" by 
r e a d i n g the t rad i t ion in to the c o n t e m p o r a r y d i s cou r se . T h i s is a 
f u n d a m e n t a l r ead ing posi t ion of Chinese crit ical d iscourse . Moreove r , 
I b e l i e v e that t radi t ion is a very s ign i f ican t d i f f e r e n c e of C h i n e s e 
c r i t i c a l d i s c o u r s e f r o m o t h e r m i n o r i t y d i s c o u r s e . I n s t e a d of 
" t r a d i t i o n a l i z a t i o n , " C h i n e s e cr i t ica l d i s c o u r s e shou ld let t r ad i t ion 
" t r ad i t i o n , " as how Keals ' s Grecian urn "urns" ; or e l se w e c a n n o t 
a c h i e v e a reading s tance of reading as the Other as well as read ing 
the O t h e r . A r e a d i n g of read ing , h o p e f u l l y , i nhab i t s a t r ad i t ion 
e q u a l l y rea l , or equal ly i l lus ionary, unless the Platonic Ideal ( that art 
is an imi ta t ion of imi ta t ion) is s tubbornly insisted. Only by enter ing 
i n to the quot id ian d i scour se can one f ree the t radi t ion f r o m eternal 
s t ands t i l l and d i s s e m i n a t e the s i gn i f i c ance of the t rad i t ion . Let us 
see h o w this idea d i s semina tes itself into the fo l lowing chapters . 
7 " S p i v n k . "The Politics of In terpreta t ion," p.131. 
i 
Chapter Five: 
The Problem of Reading in Contemporary Chinese Critics: 
Three Exemplary Positions 
\ '" I n t rod u c t ion 
In the preVIOUS chapters, I have already pointed out that 
fIdmodern Chinese critics tend to "traditionalize" Chinese hermeneutic 
~! j essences. In such a so-called "traditionalization," Chinese critical 
il discourse can only remain in the tradition. In this chapter I will 
!l;rehistoricize the · study of Chinese critical discourse, and on one level 
U will try to underscore the problems of the kind of Chinese critical 
i discourse which lacks an adequate consciousness of reading (as) the 
lCOther, and on the other I will show that a "traditionalization" of 
I: Chinese hermeneutical essences has to be actively and 
[rtransformatively reread. Through the rereading of the three critics, 
l£iTames Liu ', Stephen Owen, and Wai-lim Yip, it may be possible to let 
Jf the Chinese hermeneutic tradition reveal itself in the spaces opened 
q:JP by a critique of their texts, and thus arrIvIng at a self-
£' transformative Chinese critical discourse in these discursive 
GTJractices. When I highlight the positions of the three critics In 
E! ;eading traditional Chinese poetics in order to note the problem of 
rl ':hinese critical discourse, far from reconciling their positions, I aim 
.It bringing forth a reading position and the indispensable factors for 
;)' . cogent Chinese critical discourse. 
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The reason I choose these three critics as the ground of my 
critique is that they represent three different approaches of reading 
Chinese poetics, which I see as useful in opening textual and political 
spaces for us to problematize given discursive categories. The late 
professor J ames Liu is to a certain extent still the leading figure in 
the field of traditional Chinese poetics in America. He represents the 
role of a Chinese critic writing about Chinese literature in the 
Western institutional system. . Stephen Owen, on the other hand, 
represents a Westerner writing about Chinese literature. Wai-Iim 
Yip's position is somewhat different. The "comparative poetics" that 
he advocates IS a "comparative" discourse which places much 
emphasis on C~inese literature. The three critics' texts may open 
different spaces for us to inquire into, and in these spaces we may 
examIne our reading position in face of the reproduction of dominant 
ideologies. The ground of my inquiry into these texts can thus be 
seen as an "ungrounding" of the interpretive "obviousness" in their 
texts. 
All in all, I will examIne 1). the critics and their approaches, 
2). the Chinese hermeneutic tradition in their critical texts. and 3). the 
reading position of a critic in a comparative discourse. After reading 
the aporias that surface in their discourses, my inquiry will point to 
the ideological implications of reading between cultures. 1 
1 This approach may gi ve the impression that I have not noted the paradigm 
shifts among the three critics under discussion. I do think that these paradigm shifts 
are very important factors in contemporary Chinese critical discourse. I have slated 
in Chapter Three that the critical genealogies of contemporary critical discourse 
should be significant, but I intend to focus my discussion on the issue. of 
interpretation. Let me use the example of Henry Louis Gates J r. to. illustrate my pOInt. 
In "Critical Fanonism" Gates rehistoricizes the use of t.he paradIgm, Frantz Fanon, 
. and traces the itine:ary of the appropriation of this figure in modern colonial 
discourses. However, Gates laments in the conclusion that this paradigm carries no 
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The Inter-lingual Critic: lames l. Y. Liu 
My analysis of lames Liu in the last chapter may have gIven 
the impression that Liu's critical discourse is grounded upon the 
Western dominant discourse, and so it needs deconstruction. It IS no 
coincidence that' the discourse of the Other is often deemed to be -in 
need of a kind of deconstructive effort to reverse the "violent 
hierarchy" laid down by ' the dominant discourse. However, in this 
chapter, I will first try to show that such a deconstructive reading 
may not be able to achieve what it claims to achieve; to use a 
deconstructive Jargon here, we may say that it IS "self-
deconstructi ve." In this sense, the apparent deconstruction of the 
dominant suppression will end in vain, and the self-deconstructive 
nature of a deconstructive discourse will becolne self-defeating. This 
will in turn displace and cover up the iIpperialist dimension In a 
comparative discourse. Before we actually move on to a reading of 
lames Liuts reading, an overview of lames Liuts works related to 
Chinese-Western cOIn'parative poetics is in order. 
promise of liberation or decolonization. ,He suggests we should treat the figure as a 
battlefield and it means "reading" him. Gates's lesson Inakes me aware of the 
limitation of "comparing" the three critics that I am going to discuss in this chapter. 
I do not deny that a more convincing survey would show the conflicts of 
interpretations and paradignl shifts, but I wish to restrict my discussion to treating 
them as a "battlefield" of reading. What I try to do is to go into the three critics' texts 
which open up textual/political/critical space for the recycling of those discourses 
required to legitimate the practices that enable existing . set of representation to 
endure. This "synchronization" or "homogenization" may have significantly 
simplified the issue, but I decide to limit my anlbition in the process of reading, and 
the interpretive differentials in that process. I thus deliberately evade the issue of 
paradigm shifts which, as I see it, requires another thesis-Iengt~ study to .deal with. 
See Henry Louis Gates Jr., "Critical Fanonism," in Critical Inqulry 17 (Spnng 1991), 
pp.457-470. I will con1C back t.o this essay in Chapter Six. 
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In this chapter, I am gOIng to focus on Liuts The Art of 
Chinese Poetry, Chinese Theories of Literature, The lnterlingual Critic 
and Language, Paradox, Poetics which are able to show Liu's 
interpretation of traditional Chinese poetics and literary criticism. 
Some of his other works, like The Poetry of Li Shang-yin, and M aj 0 r 
Lyricists of Northern Sung are less pertinent to our concern here. 
The Art of Chinese Poetry is generally agreed to be the first 
systematic approach In · treating traditional Chinese poetry in a 
Western language. In the book, the author begins by analyzing 
Chinese language as a medium of poetic expression, and then he 
moves on to some traditional Chinese views on poetry. Curiously 
enough, the last part of the book IS dedicated to a so .. called 
"synthesis" although the subject of the book is Chinese poetry. 
Obviously this part paves the way for his later "Interactions and 
Syntheses" in Chinese Theories of Literature and "Toward a Synthesis 
of Chinese and Western Literary Theories." Although Liu aims at a 
synthesis towards the end of The Art of Chinese Poetry, he 
nonetheless has concerns about expreSSIng Chinese VIews on 
literature In English: 
And when one tries to discuss these terms [of 
the Chinese critics] In a language other than 
Chinese, the problem of how to translate them 
appears at first sight well-nigh insoluble, for 
to translate is to interpret and define. 2 
2Jamcs Liu, The Art of Chinese Poetry (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1963), p.63. 
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In the "Epilogue" of the same book, James Liu admits that his 
"obvious tendencies toward systematization and analysis are 
probably due to his contact with Western culture at an early age, and 
. 
are In any case encouraged by the fact that [he is] trying to interpret 
Chinese poetry to Western readers in terms readily comprehensible 
to them. "3 He also admits that this kind of systematization and 
analysis is not part of the Chinese mind. . 
Chinese Theo'ries of Literature can be seen as an expanSIon of 
the second part of The Art of Chinese Poetry, and this effort of Liu 
tries to fulfill the task that he mentions in his earlier book: "To write 
a complex history of the criticism of Chinese poetry would require a 
volume probably several times the size of the present one and would 
involve long and intricate discussions on abstract concepts . and 
tec hnical detai 1 S. "4 The probable reason is that when Chi n e s e 
Theories of Literature boasts the second part of The Art of Chinese 
Poetry into a book size, it gives the impression that the "interactions 
and syntheses" are more apposite, and through a systematization of · 
Chinese Theories of Literature, it is possible for the readers to 
comprehend a variety of Chinese literary works. Indeed, it is a 
paradoxical progress from The Art of Chinese Poetry to Chinese 
Theories of Literature since in the former Liu has already admitted 
that his analysis is not part of the Chinese mind. This paradox 
continues in his "Toward a Synthesis of Chinese and Western 
Theories of Literature." Perhaps if we bear in mind that the progress 
is based upon a paradox, it is not surprising that after the two 
3Liu, The Art of Chinese Poetry, p.153. 
4Liu, The Art of Chinese Poetry, p.63. 
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"syntheses" in the two books mentioned above, Liu is still only 
movlng "towards" a synthesis. In this article lames Liu recalls his 
earlier effort In' this direction, and he states that on the 
methodological level, his "discussions of Chinese poetry were 
influenced by some New Critics," and thus in his later "Toward a 
Chinese Theory of. Poetry," he uses New Critics, such as R.G. 
CoIlingwood, I.A. Richards, Rene Wellek, William Wimsatt, as the 
topics of discussion. 5 In "Toward a Synthesis of Chinese and Western 
Theories of Literature," he goes on to say that what he tries to do in 
Chinese Theories of Literature is to synthesize elements of Chinese 
(especially metaphysical) and Western (especiallyphenomenological) 
theories. He then tries to formulate his own theory by a reading of 
Tao in comparison to the phenomenological "Being," and centre his 
discussion on the issue "What is Literature?" by viewing literature as 
a combination of art and language. 6 Although "Toward a Synthesis of 
Chinese and Western Theories of Literature" appears in part in Liu's 
next book, The ' Interlingual Critic, Liu's direction deviates a bit from 
his earlier works which stress "synthesis." In The Interlingual Critic, 
he differentiates two kinds of critics who write in English about 
Chinese literature: 
First, native speaker of Chinese (no matter 
what dialect) who were born and educated in 
China but are now living In an English-
SLiu "Toward a Chinese Theory of Poetry," in Yearbook of Comparative and 
General Lit~rature (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1966); reprinted with 
slight revision in The Poetry of Li Sha ng-yin: Nin th-Centu ry Baroque Chinese Poet 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), pp.199-206. 
6Liu, "Toward a Synthesis of Chinese and Wester.n The?ries of Literatur~," in 
Journal of Chi1lese Philosophy 4 (1977), pp.1-21; reprInted In a shorter verSIon in 
The Illterlingual Critic (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), pp.4-5. 
speaking country or at least working at an 
academic institution where the medium of 
instruction is English. Second, native speakers 
of English or some other European languages 
who have studied Chinese as an academic 
subject · and are engaged professionally In 
teaching or studying Chinese literature. 7 
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He then analyzes the role of the critic as reader, translator, 
interpreter and arbiter respectively. In this book, Liu aims at 
putting forward the relation between "interlingual criticism" and 
"comparative literature. "8 In dealing with the role of a critic, Liu 
gradually moves towards the language of the critic and the paradox 
of language that a critic inevitably has to face. This point is exactly 
the thing that he tries to achieve In his last book, Language, Paradox, 
Poetics. 
In his last book, James Liu seems to keep on assumIng the 
role of an interlingual critic without ethnic origin: "Having grown up 
1n the Chinese intellectual tradition but having lived in the West for 
more than three decades, I do not wish to have the question raised 
as to which culture I consider alien."9 It is such an identity that 
makes him believe that "only by means of juxtaposition of texts from 
two different traditions can we bring into relief: what is truly 
7 J ames Liu, The Inte rlingual Critic, p.ix. J anles Liu himself belongs to the 
first kind, and in this chapter I would use Stephen Owen as an example of the second 
kind. 
8This "intcrlingual" criticism seems to contradict his earlicr saying in T Iz e 
Art of Chi1lese Poetry that he is trying to interpret Chinese poetry to Western 
readers. (See note 2) We should note here that Liu seems to have become more 
ambitious. 
9 James Liu, Language, Paradox, Poetics (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1988), p.xii. 
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distinctive in each tradition."lO The utmost aIm of lames Liu's last 
book, perhaps even including his earlier works although they may 
not be seen as successful In synthesizing Chinese and Western 
theories, IS to enable us to become aware of the unspoken 
presuppositions about the nature of language, poetry, poetics and 
interpretation that underlie each tradition, thus pavIng the way for 
a genuinely comparative poetics. In fact, lames Liu has been 
working against critical pluralism and eclecticism throughout his 
critical career. 
This brief overVIew of lames Liu's work certainly needs 
further exposition, but it would be more pertinent to my topic to 
offer . a reading of his ideas about "interlingual criticislll" and 
"comparative literature" wi"th relation to theories of understanding. 
In line of my argument in the previous chapters, I would begin my 
reading with a reading of James Liu, that is, William Touponce's 
deconstructive reading of the problem of mimesis in James Liu's 
Chinese Theories of Literature .11 In this article, Touponce uses a 
. deconstructive reading to point out the problem that lames Liu 
deliberately suppresses the mimetic aspect in Chinese discourse in 
order to put forward his "metaphysical" theories, which constitutes 
one of the theories that Liu considers as "Chinese". (The others are 
"Deterministic and Expressive," "Technical and Aesthetic" and 
"Pragmatic" Theories.) 
1 0Liu, Language, Paradox, Poetics, pp.xi-xii. 
11 William Touponcc, "Straw Dogs: A Deconstructive Reading of the Problem 
of Mimesis in James Liu's Chi1lese Theories of Literature," in Tamkang Review 11 
(1980-81), pp.359-390. 
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Touponce notes the blindness and insight In Liu's 
methodology, and he claims that due to the rhetoric of Liu's own 
discourse and his blindness towards that rhetoric, Liu fails to 
"exclude mimetic phenomena from his own discourse." 12 In other 
words, Touponce is trying to focus on Liu's lack of self-reflexiveness 
in Chinese Theories of Literature. In thrs respect I am sympathetic 
with Touponce, but I would say that the emphasis of Touponce's 
charges is somewhat misplaced. Let me quote in full what Touponce 
quotes from Liu to illustrate my point, 
However, if we wish to find deeper significance 
in the m~taphor, we should first of all realize 
that to these critics (Yen Yu and Wang Shih-
chen) poetry is not the mirror that reflects 
reality but · an image in the mirror, and if we 
pursued this analogy ruthlessly, we would have ' 
to conclude that since according to Buddhist 
doctrine "reality" is only an illusion, poetry is 
an illusion of an illusion - a conclusion even 
Inore damning than Plato's that poetry IS twice 
removed from reality. As a matter of fact, the 
Ch'an masters did reach such a conclusion 
about language In general, and therefore 
. refused to write anything and even warned 
their disciples not to remember their words. 
Fortunately for us, Chinese poet-critics who 
held . metaphysical views of poetry did not go so 
12Touponce, "Straw Dogs," p.360. 
far; instead, they followed the examples of the 
Taoists Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu in accepting 
the paradoxical nature of language as the 
inadequate but necessary means to 
communicate the incommensurable. 1 3 
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Touponce claims that in this passage Liu consciously refuses to name 
the question of mimesis. However, in his own deconstructive reading 
of James Liu's suppression of mimetic discourse, Touponce's 
discourse has to appeal to Rene Girard's theory of mimesis which acts 
as another centre in his discourse (this centre would certainly be 
denounced by Derrida) 14. Meanwhile, Girard hims~lf declares that he 
is different from Derrida. 15 In other words, Touponce's own insights 
on Liu's "blindness and insights" again have a certain blindness 
towards the rhetoric of his own reading strategy In his own 
discourse. According to Liao Ping-hui, this self-deconstructive nature 
of Touponce's deconstructive reading is basically due to his blindness 
towards the metaphoricity of Taoist discourse. 16 We may say that 
Liao's reading Touponce's reading Liu's reading Taoists 
simultaneously exposes and suppresses the paradox immanent in 
their texts. Liao claims that if Touponce is trying to reveal the 
paradox which Liu significantly silences in his text, it is no different 
13Liu, Chinese Theories of Literature, pp.50-51. Quoted by Touponce in 
Touponce, "Straw Dogs," p.379. 
14 See Jacques Derrida, "Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of Human 
Sciences," in his Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1978): See in particular p.279. 
15See, Rene Girard, "Interview," in Diacritics (1978), p.40. 
16See Liao Ping-hui, "Blindnes~':) and Insights: Recent Positions of Read~ng 
Chuang Tzu," in his liegou pipi1lg lUllji '~ ~ m1tt~ ft, (Essays on Deconstructtve 
CriticisIn) (Taipei: Dongda, 1984), p.95. 
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from embracing both dimensions of the paradox that lend the text to 
be appropriated by the dominant vOice. So it is not surprising to see 
that Girard gradually displaces Chuang Tzu (Zhuang Zi) or Lao Tzu 
(Lao Zi) and becomes the centre in a metatext talking about Tao. 
Chang Han-liang's question raised after Touponce's article is in this 
aspect particularly illuminating: "Is Girard free from ethnocentrism 
and can he posit the universal presence of mimesis when his theory 
is a cri tique launched against the structuralist differen tiation and 
embedded in its socio-historical setting?" 17 Let us see how Touponce 
responds, 
If on the one hand we characterize 
ethnocentrism simply as the taking of qne's own 
culture as a center of reference for the 
establishment of meaning, then Girard's thought 
is certainly not to be termed as such ... But on 
the other hand if we define ethnocentrism a 
little more broadly and try to show, as Derrida 
does in Of Granunatology and elsewhere, that the 
attempt to escape it is part of Western thought 
about structure then I suppose that Girard does 
not entirely escape Western discourse. After all, 
it is only in the West where the project of 
ethnology originates as a critique of 
1 7 Chang Han-liang, Comment on Touponce's "Straw Dogs," in Talnkallg 
Review 11 (1980-81), p.387. 
ethnocentrism and a de-centering of European 
culture. I8 
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Liao Ping-hui does rightly -note that Touponce's response here IS only 
focusing on post-structuralist thoughts without any attention to the 
internal difference of Derrida and Girard, although even Girard 
himself believes that he is different from Derrida. 19 The ideological 
implication in such a tendency is not difficult to detect: the "Western" 
system, when facing the mysterious Chinese culture, will become 
"homogeneous" so as to exhibit a silent power across the comparative 
discourse. So Touponce tends to think that Girard and Derrida must 
have something in common when they are to be compared with 
Taoist discourse. When Touponce says that he "attempted to read 
Liu's project for a universal poetics,"20 I would say, regrettably, this 
so-called "universality" IS merely based upon a homogeneous 
Western unIverse. 
A deconstructive reading like Touponce's merely appears as a 
kind of Derridean "erasure"21 that crosses Liu's reading. 
Unfortunately enough, if we are to follow this kind of deconstructive 
reading, the text under erasure will ironically be covered up and 
foregrounded at the same time. Chinese materials will be covered by 
the cross whereas the "Western" part is foregrounded SInce any 
erasure like this is to be determined by the hegemonic culture. Let 
I8William Touponce, "Response" to the comment of Chang Han-liang(see note 
9), in Talnkallg Review ' 11 (1980-81), p.388. 
19Liao, liegou piping lurzji, pp.94-95. 
20Touponce, "Straw Dogs," p.388. 
2 1 "Erasure" means writing a word, crossing it out, and then printing both 
the word and deletion. "Since the word is inaccurate, -it is crossed out. Since it is 
necessary, it rernains legible." See Gayatri Spiva~~s intr~duc.tion to her translatio,n of 
Derrida, . Of Granllnatology (Baltimore: lohns Hopklns University Press, 1976), p.XIV. 
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me go on by using the well-known butterfly dream of Zhuang Zhou 
as a temporary "centre" for my discussion. (We would realize that in 
a comparative discourse we will eventually be forced to drift away 
from this.) In an earlier article, Touponce employs Lacan (another 
Girard?) as the model of reading Zhuang Zhou's butterfly dream. 22 
Although he" later reformulates his reading of Zhuang Zhou's butterfly 
dream In his "S traw Dogs," Touponce does still use Lacan as the 
model to displace Liu's reading of the dream in "The Way of the 
Subject." 'iouponce questions Liu's phenomenological interpretation 
of Zhuang Zhou's butterfly dream, bu t after he displaces the 
phenomenological reading by a Lacanian reading, he eventually 
declares that Zhuang Zhou's butterfly dream is a self-deconstructive 
tex t which "prefigures its own misreading in an unblinded mode. "23 
I-Ie then goes on to claim that "in trying to decide the text for 
phenomenology, [Liu's reading] has lost Zhuang Zhou's insight into the 
nature of literary language which tends to undermine its own 
authority to say what it says. "24 However, he also has to admit that 
"Lacan's Structuralist rhetoric blinds him to the nature of the double 
"narrative voice in Chuang Tzu [Zhuang Zi], that philosopher who 
appears to be both inside and outside his own dream experience. "25 
Interestingly enough, Toupon,ce's so-called "deconstructive reading" 
of lames Liu's reading Zhuang Zhou's butterfly dream builds its own 
insights on the blindness of Lacan's structuralist rhetoric. In other 
22See William Touponce, "The Way of the Subject: Jacques Lacan's Use of 
Chuang Tzu's Butterfly Dream," in Tanlkang Review 11 (1980-81), pp.249-265. 
23Touponce, "The Way of the Subject," p.364. 
24Touponce, "The Way of the Subject," p.364. 
25Touponce, "The Way of the Subject," p.364. 
Chu 183 
words, in praising Zhuang Zhou as both inside and outside his own 
dream experience, Touponce also assumes himself a place both inside 
and outside of his own discourse. Touponce is surely right in 
pointing out that, 
[James Liu] IS one of those scholars who 
thinks they have found in phenomenology, 
and particularly in the thought of Martin 
Heidegger, a neutral ground, the opening of a 
regIon which is above the opposition East and 
West, beyond the clash of tradition and the 
confl ict of in terpretations. 26 
However, In arguIng that Liu is unfamiliar with Heidegger,27 
Touponce has already had a commitment toa correct interpretation 
of Heidegger. However, in asking if "we [are] only going to consider 
how each tradition, East and West, has found a name for Being," 
Touponce has taken for granted that in tracing the two traditions to 
their origins one can transcend oneself and assume a position in that 
neutral ground. However, regrettably to say, Touponce forgets that 
the act of going back to the origins of each traditions is intertwined 
with the East-West opposition, that between Tao and Being in this 
case; that is to say, the supplementary origin is merely founded upon 
a kind of suppression in the East-West comparative discourse. 
Touponce's emphasis on a deconstructive reading of "mimesis" 
IS only another "deconstructive" reading with inadequate queries 
about the East-West opposition. It certainly adds a certain sequel to 
26Touponce, "Straw Dogs," p.366. 
27Touponce, "Straw Dogs," p.360. 
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de Man's "blindness and insight" of the rhetoric of contemporary 
criticism, but Touponce's text · certainly claims its insights by noting 
the blindness of Liu towards Western tradition. At every point of 
Touponce's article we cannot see the real spirit of deconstruction that 
he tries to advocate, and if Liu's text is self-deconstructive in its 
rhetoric, I would say, Touponce's text is simply self-deconstructive 
on another level of discourse: ironically, on that of East-West 
opposition to which. he claims that he has paid the greatest attention. 
Let nle cite as an example the text in Tao Te Ching to which Touponce 
refers as a text "in the wholly indigenous Chinese tradition that 
points unmistably to mimetic phenomena," 
In the world there IS nothing more 
submissive and weak than water. Yet for 
attacking that which . IS hard and strong 
nothing can surpass it. This is because there 
IS nothing that can take its place. 
That the weak overcomes the strong, 
And the submissive overcomes the hard, 
Everyone in the world knows yet no one 
can put this knowledge into practice. 
Therefore the sage says, 
One who takes on himself the humiliation of the state 
Is . called a ruler worthy of offering sacrifices to 
the gods of earth and millet; 
One who takes on himself the calamity of the state 
Is called king worthy of dominion over the entire 
Empire. 
Straightforward words 
Seem paradoxica1.28 (My emphasis) 
~ 1-~~~~)0* I ?to '!,5z ~ JU~i ,at ~~ ~ 
L1~ 1t ~ ~;«:t ~ c ~~ 2 ~~ s~ / .~, -2 ~ ~ j I 
~ T- *~~~ ~ ~t IrJ 0 :t v), -=t ~ :z; ~ 
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Touponce believes that lames Liu's observation that "Lao Tzu's words 
are a paradoxical attempt to express the inexpressible" is often gIven 
in "a ritual context. "29 The most important word in this passage, I 
think, is the word "seem." In Taoist thought, the so-c'alIed "opposites" 
are not really opposites. In modern criticism, Taoist philosophy IS 
often appropriated by Western critics who regard it as a unIon of 
opposites. 3D Let me cite another passage from Lao Zi to illustrate my 
point, 
Thus something and nothing produce each other; 
The difficult and the easy complement each other; 
The long' and the short off-set each other; 
The high and the low incline towards each other; 
Note and sound harmonize with each other; 
28Lao Zi, Tao Te Clzing LXXVIII trans. D.C. Lau (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 
1963), p.140. (This is the version that Touponce uses.) A reprinted bilingual version is 
also. available, (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1982). 
29Touponce, "Straw Dogs," p.380. 
30See for instance, Robert Magiola, Derrida Oil the Mend (West Lafayette: 
Purdue University Press, 1984), p.91. Magiola asserts, "The fact remains that 
scholars just about everywhere agree that the Tao of Taoism has always represented, 
in one formulation or another, the union of opposites." lames Liu claims that 
"Zhuang Zi did not try to. unite or reconcile, but actually refused to accept the 
existence of opposit.es as such," see Liu, Language, Paradox, Poetics, p.13. 
Before and after follow each other.31 
"f$z. 1B ~ 4 fl .!:l i ~i ;t ;Jll -,;:;. ; 
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The translator of this passage, D.C. Lau, claims that "the point here is 
that opposite term·s are relative. Take away the high, and there will · 
no longer be the low. This line of thought, pushed to its logical 
conclusion, IS capable of destroying the di s tinction between 
opposites. "32 I agree with Lau in his opinion that there is no 
distinction between opposites, but his use of the phrase "pushed to" 
seems somewhat misleading and it needs clarification. We merely 
need to "push to" the conclusion since that conclusion is so-called 
"logical"; in fact, the distinction between opposites is not even 
welcolne in Taoist discourse. With this in mind, if we turn back to 
, 
the earlier passage from the Tao Te Ching quoted above, we should 
understand why Lao Zi says that it "seems" paradoxical. To use 
"logical" terms, we have to say that such a way of expressing the 
inexpressible is paradoxical, but actually it is not, since it is the only 
way to do so. Without the distinction between opposites, we can also 
hardly s·ay that : "the weak overcomes the strong" and "the submissive 
overcomes the hard" is paradoxical, bearing in mind that "before and 
after follow each other." In this line of argument, Touponce is 
perhaps right in decentering the Taoist discourse, but definitely 
wrong In laying the centre on mimetic discourse. Mimetic discourse 
can only be seen as a metaphorical process that points towards the 
3 1 Lao Zi, Tao Te Clzing 11. Translation quoted frODl D.C. Lau, Tao Te Ching 
(Hong Kong : Chinese University Press), p.5. 
32D.C. Lau, Tao Te Ching, "Introduction," p.x·xxii. 
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"paradox" which IS actually not a "paradox" In Taoist thought. 
Touponce Ignores the metaphoricity here in order to recenter the 
Taoist discourse in, the concept of mimesis, and that is definitely 
against the spirit of deconstructive reading. 
Of course, I fully understand my aporia - I cannot but centre 
the notion of "paradox" in Taoist discourse. I would in this case show 
that a deconstructive reading may not be able to decenter the 
suppression of Chinese hermeneutical element in wholly Chinese 
indigenous text, or in the intertext created in Liu's and Touponce's 
texts. One should definitely be conscious of one's position in such a 
comparative discourse, and perhaps, as lanMohamed and Lloyd claim 
when they write towards a theory of minority discourse, what we 
have to read In Liu's text ' is "the very difference that has always 
been read as' symptoms of inadequacy can be reread 
transformati vely as indications and figurations of values radically 
:. 0 pp 0 s ed to th 0 s e 0 f the do mi n ant cuI tu re. " 3 3 . In th is sen se I treat 
Liu's text as inevitably bearing a colonial tendency over Chinese 
indigenous te'xt, and a rereading of the interpretive differentials can 
transform the suppreSSIon into a kind of oppositional position 
towards the dominant culture. This is the reason I set aside so much 
space for Toupbnce. In his reading of Liu, we can see how Liu's 
interpretive differentials may be appropriated by the Eurocentric 
hegemonic interpretation as a means to exercise its power. 
In this respect let me begin' with Liao Ping-hui's reading of 
the other limitations of lames Liu's reading. Liao denounces Liu's 
33 Abdul lanMohamed & David Lloyd, "Toward a Theory of Minority Discourse: 
What Is To Be Done?" in The Nature and Context of Minority Discourse, lanMohamed & 
Lloyd eds. (London & 'New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p.3 
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tendency of revIsIng and over-simplifying 'Western literary theory in . 
his discourse. The point in issue is Liu's reformulation of M.H. 
Abrams's co-ordinC\tes of art criticism into a tetradic circle 
comprising of the universe, the writer, the work and the readers. 
Liao claims that such a deconstruction is merely a simplification of 
the Western model, and thus creating lots of confusion. 34 In a sense, 
if Liu really causes confusion in the dominant discourse, if his 
reading does problematize the dominant discourse, then his effort 
would be more contributory to a Chinese-Western comparative 
discourse. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Quite the contrary, Liu 
is almost al ways trying to suppress that kind of "problematization." 
Liao criticizes Liu's "danda"35 and claims that Touponce is able to 
overthrow his theory from another field by looking for another kind 
of evidence other than ethnological ones such as Liu's.36 Liu's 
reading IS certainly mIssIng the importance of that "rhetorical 
movement" - a modification of Abrams's framework - and Liao's 
reading Liuts reading does not point out that the "rhetorical 
movement" is predetermined by the mainstream culture. In this 
case, indeed, to look for other "danda" in the dominant culture to 
make Liu's danda' self-defeating is not too difficult, but I would say, 
the more significant point is that as Chinese-Western comparatists 
(Liu will not admit he is exactly a comparatist), we need to have a 
34 See Liao Ping-hui, liegou plpl1lg lUllji, p.95. 
35 Stephen 'Pepper advocates that "data" is some unassailable raw materia~s 
which anyone can prove its existence, but Itdanda" calls for the proof of hermeneutIc 
structure; it is a product of models. See his World Hyplzotlzesis (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1942), pp.48-50; quoted ~n Wayne .C. ~ooth, 
Critical Ullde rstalldillg: The Powers ' and Limits alld Plurali.nn (Chicago: UniversIty of 
Chicago Press, 1979),pp.246-24 7. 
36Liao, .liegou piping lunji, p.99. 
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sense of exposIng the rhetorical movement when the dominant 
suppresses the voice of the alien Other. 
In this sense, Liu's' shortcoming In establishing the tetradic 
circle is not merely a kind of simplification; but rather, I would say 
the reason it is so easily vulnerable to the polemi~s of the Other is 
Liu's insufficient effort in noting his role as a marginal critic in face 
of the hegemonic culture. (Although Liu claims elsewhere that he is 
affiliated to Western culture as much as Chinese one, the tr~dition 
that he is trying to voice is still Chinese.) I am not trying to say that 
since Liu is a Chinese, he has to face a kind of racial discrimination. 
If that IS the case, the solution will be far more simple. Racism is 
indeed something which everyone will claim to hate. The more 
important point lies in the fact that Liu is trying to articulate a so-
called Chinese voice. Touponce IS definitely hostile to, as Liao rightly 
indicates, Liu's complacency in founding his own hermeneutical 
fralnework - a framework that Liu believes to be able to represent 
the Chinese hermeneutical essences. This tendency would easily be 
condemned as "ethnocentric posing as anti-ethnocentric," but Liu 
seems to have neglected that an ethnocentric discourse would 
conni ve at other ethnocentric ideologies, or else nothing would be 
ethnocentric, and nothing would be non-ethnocentric either. 
In his argument, Liao Ping-hui uses Edward Said as an 
example to say that Liu is exhibiting a kind of "mastery power." I 
can see little difference in Liao's use of Said to criticize Liu from Liu's 
arbitrary use of Western concepts to juxtapose with that of Chinese 
literature. Indeed, I am not trying to say that it is justified to do so; 
such a reading would merely assimilate Chinese discourse into the 
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. dominant discourse. I am rather doubtful towards Liao's use of Said 
to establish a hermeneutical framework. Such a "framework," I fully 
understand, IS a kind of reconciliation between deconstruction and 
, 
hermeneutics (Liao terms this the "conventions" of interpretations), 
and we have already noted the limitation of it in the second chapter. 
The two will rapidly decontextualize each other and so it would be 
impossible to develop such a framework, particularly when we are 
situated In a never innocent position In the Chinese-West 
comparative discourse. 
Bearing this in mind, let us go on to a rereading of J ames Liu's 
The lnterlingual Critic in which he uses "the tetradic circle" as the 
basis of developing his analysis of the role of a critic. In fact, he has 
already established this framework way back in "Toward a Synthesis 
of Chinese and Western Theories of Literature," and In The 
Interl~ngual Critic he "is still clinging to that conceptual framework. 
In this framework he IS definitely having In his mind the 
phenomenological aesthetics, basically represented by Roman. 
Ingarden. Liu openly declares that he is trying to "synt,hesize 
elements of Chinese (especially metaphysical) and Western 
(especially phenomenological) theories ' of literature," and his 
theorizing is synthesizing since he is influenced by both traditions.3 7 
Unfortunately, his discourse is paralyzed by an uneven development 
of the two discourses. Phenomenology, ever SInce Husserl, has been 
developing through Heidegger into a kind of philosophical 
hermeneutics In Gadamer. However, the "metaphysical" theories that 
Liu is talking about are discussed in the closure of the Chinese 
37 Liu, "Towards A Synthesis," p.4. 
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literary tradition. In this case, when .. compared with Western 
discourse, Chinese discourse is always insufficient since it can be 
seen as something that has always already been inscribed In the 
dominant discourse. ' At best it can only be reinscribed in a Western 
VOIce In contemporary discourse. 
This uneven development IS further made worse by Liu's 
collapsing - perhaps he does this on purpose - of different levels of 
discourse (that of literary works, criticism and meta-criticism) in his 
"tetradic circle." Liu holds that the created world In a poem IS the 
extension of reality. Then, IS the so-called "created . world" 
represented In the critical text an extension of reality too? How is it 
related to the poetic world? How are they suppressing each other? 
To make things worse, in a Chinese-Western comparative discourse, 
how are the two different "worlds" compared? It seems that he 
treats "the extension of reality" as a transcultural and transhistorical 
field, ' but in this sense, his methodology is no different from 
assumIng a transcendental signified. His synthesis is only conducted 
on that "innocent" ground which is outside his own discourse. Like 
· Touponce, he then seems both inside and outside of his own 
discourse at the same time. The discussion of the critic in the rest of 
the book seems basically grounded upon such a formulation which, 
as I have repeatedly shown in the previous chapters, is in fact 
intertwined with a comparative discourse between the oppressor and 
the oppressed. Such a comparative discourse will not let the critic 
assume such an Archimedean point. To ground one's discourse on 
such an Archimedean point will simply leave the paradox generated 
In the discourse free to be appropriated by the dominant voice 
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spontaneously. So we can say that Liu's denunciation of eclecticism 
when he mentions Owen Aldridge's "East-West Relations: Universal 
Literature, Yes; Common Poetics, No,"38 is simply a kind of eclectic 
writing at another level of discourse. He does not pay adequate 
attention to his own role in the comparative discourse, and he thus 
then sees himself as a disinterested cri tic. His eclectic tendency IS 
indirectly shown in his belief that he is trying to have a synthesis of 
"s 0 111 e elements of Chinese theories and so m e elements of certain 
Western ones. "39 (my emphases) However, he forgets that those 
"some" elements he chooses have been predetermined by the 
dominant discourse. Liu does not reflect on the different levels of 
discourse until the end of the book. At the beginning of the book, he 
claims that we .' should modify Archibald MacLeish' s sayIng that "A 
poem should not mean, but be" to "A poem should not be, but 
become."4o Not until the end does he seem to put this belief into 
practice by a similar process of making his book "become, but not 
simply "be." He states at the end of his book that "when it comes to 
"'literary criticism, yet another paradox is produced: the literary critic, 
unlike the music critic or art critic, has to use the same medium, 
language, as the artist whom he dares to criticize, is suffering from 
the same limitations of the medium itself. "41 If he had placed more 
emphasis on this from the outset, he would " have realized more about 
the role of the critic in facing the dominant culture and impersonal 
38Liu, The ' Interlingual Critic, p.l0S. 
39Liu, The Interlillgual Critic, p.l06. 
40Liu, The Interlingual Critic, ' p.lO. 
41 Liu, The Illterlingual Critic, p.t08. 
method when he writes about Chinese literature in English. 
develops in his last book, Language, Paradox, Poetics. 
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This he 
As I have mentioned before, James Liu no longer alms at a 
"synthesis" In his · last book, but rather he tries to have a 
"convergence" of Chinese and Western theories.42 He argues that the 
juxtaposition of Chinese and Western theories "will enable us to 
become aware of the unspoken presuppositions about the nature of 
langu age, poetry,. poetics and interpretation that underlie each 
tradi tion, thus paving the way for a genui nely comparative " poetics, 
free from both Eurocentrism and Sinocentrism."43 This argument is 
only partly right. Here he does go into the paradox of textuali ty that 
I outlined In the second chap.ter, but his so-called "genuine 
comparative poetics" at times seems abashed when facing Western 
theories. 
, 
In other words, the centre of discussion of this 
"genuineness" is still Western dominant theories. In Chinese 
Theories of Literature, he has already been ver"y vigilant towards 
this, 
I shall not deal with twentieth-century 
Chinese theories, except those held by purely 
traditionalist critics, since those have been 
do 111 i na t e d by one sort of Western influence 
or another, be it Romanticist, Symbolist, or 
Marxist, and do not possess the same kind of 
value and interest as do traditional Chinese 
4 2 I~ i u, Lallg ua ge, Pa radox, Poetics (New Jersey: Princeton Uni versi ty Press, 
1988), p.xi. 
"43Liu, Language, Paradox, Poetics, p.xii. 
theories, which constitute a largely adequate 
source of critical ideas.44 (my emphasis) 
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On the face of it, this merely shows that Liu wants to deal with 
indigenous Chinese theories. However, as we have already noted, Liu 
fails to observe his own situatedness in the westernized context. He 
believes that he can assume a position outside the modern 
"westernized" discourse where he himself is situated. In that context 
he thinks he is outside the "dominated" scene. However, Liu 
elsewhere admits that he is under the influence of the New Critics 
and shares close resemblance to the phenomenologists. In other 
words, Liu is definitely not "purely traditionalist" himself. Although 
he tries to avoid dealing with theories dominated by Western 
influence, he cannot but bring in Western influence through his own 
situatedness. 45 
In his last book, J ames Liu is still handcuffed by · such a belief. 
Let me cite as an instance his use of the term "juxtaposition" instead 
of "alienation": · 
I have considered the term "alienation 11 
because, in the fist place, with 
. . IS varIOUs 
Marxian, Freudian, Brechtian overtones, the 
term can easily be misunderstood ... 46 
Such a deliberate avoidance of the overtones generated from the 
dOlninant discourse, at first glance, is a way to avoid suppression 
44Liu, Chinese Theories of Literature, p.5. 
45Unfortunately, this is the predicament as well as condition of practice .. 1 do 
not mean it is impossible for a critic educated in the West t.o. talk about Chlne~e 
critical discourse. What matters is the problems that such CrItIcs have to face 10 
dealing with Chinese discourse. 
46Liu, La1lguage, Paradox, Poetics, p.xii. 
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from the dominant culture, as Liu believes. However, one may say 
that, unfortunately enough, his mentioning of the overtones has 
already revealed a paradox.. In the above passage he tries to avoid 
suppression by pointing out that he avoids uSIng terms which may 
have overtones in the dominant discourse. This belief has already 
spoken volumes for Liu's awareness of the intertextual situation 
across cultures In modern context, but it is obvious that he is not able 
to observe that the struggle. today should be that over 
"conservative/liberal vs. marginal/radical political theories/ 
practices/positions. "47 What he is trying to do here is simply 
eschewing this issue. It seems that he believes he can "witness"48 
the juxtaposition of Chinese and Western theories without taking a 
position himself. Therefore, he says, "1 do not wish' to have the 
question raised to which culture I consider alien,"49 but without 
knowing that his conceptual vocabulary has already been 
predetermined by the Western culture which sees the Chinese 
culture as an alien in his discourse. Liu 's position IS by no means 
indifferent, although he tries to transcend both of the discourses. At 
this point, it gives the impression that he is showing far more 
American optimism than the so-called "paradoxical light" of a Chinese 
critic. 50 
47 Mas'ud Zavarzadeh and Donald Morton, Theory, (Post)Modernity, 
Oppositions: An "Other" Introduc tion to Lite rary and Cultural Theory (Washington 
D.C.: Maisoneuve Press, 1991), p.31. 
48S ee Liu., Language, Paradox, Poetics, p.8. 
49lju, Language, Paradox, Poetics, p.xii. 
, 50When Liu compares Lu Ji and Gary Snydcr's attitudes toward the paradox of 
the "axe-handle" which is made of wood, but also being used to cut another wooden 
handle the former shows a paradoxical light, and the latter shows a typical American 
oplinli~m. See Liu, Language, Paradox, Poetics, p.S5 . I will come back to this later. 
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Be that as it may, I would be rather reluctant to term this 
attitude "self-deconstructive," as Touponce and Liao Ping-hui may 
say. As- we have shown in Touponce's reading, a deconstructive 
reading alone cannot cope with the situation in a comparative 
discourse. Besides, such a reading would merely discard the effort of 
James Liu. I do not think the effort of Derrida in deconstructing 
Western metaphysics would simply denounce the thought of Plato, 
Rousseau and the like. Liu's contribution should not be underrated; a 
reading like Touponce's simply misses the point of a transformative 
and oppositional reading which I see as desirable in a Chinese-
Western discourse. (Of course, Touponce wOuld not feel the need of 
an oppositional reading.) However, Liu IS trying to evade it in his 
work. In this respect I am going to focus on Liu's "The Paradox of 
Interpretation" (Chapter Four) for further discussion. 
In this chapter, Liu begins by noting the paradox of 
in terpre ta ti on, 
Although critics who disbelieve In the 
possibility of interpretation may treat the 
texts' they interpret as palimpsests, 
presumably they still wish theIr oV/n texts to be 
read and understood rather than misread and 
misunderstood. Such IS the paradox of 
interpretation. 51 
In the course of this chapter Liu goes on to expound different 
attitudes, East and West, in facing this paradox of interpretation, and 
I do not want to dwell upon them here. (1 have already gone through 
_ 51 Liu, Language, Paradox, Poetics, p.94. 
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a similar reading in Chapter Two.) I will pick out SOIne cases to 
underscore the ' results of Liu's reluctance to engage himself in a 
genuinely comparative context. 
Let me begin with Confucius's "notorious" misinterpretation of 
the line "si wu xie"lb ~:~ ~ .52 In Liu' s account, Confucius is interested 
not in interpreting the Shi ling (Th e Book of Poetry), but rather in 
borrowing words from it to suit his own purposes. No one would 
deny it was totally , legitimate for Confucius to use such a "punning" at 
his time. But perhaps the more interesting problem is that what 
makes this legitimate. The superior status of Confucius in the 
"Confucian hermeneutic tradition"? Or the paradox of ' interpretation 
that has already stated that "there are no interpretations, but only 
misinterpretations"? I shall try to answer these questions now. 
If Confucius"s dominant role In the Chinese hermeneutic 
tradition permits him to borrow words to suit new context according 
to his own purpose, what would the situation be' when James Liu 
juxtaposes the two traditions facing the paradox of interpretation at 
the same tiIne? Will the dominant tradition enjoy a similar privilege 
when facing its counterpart?53 Liu simply stops at the point of noting 
the paradox of interpretation as a ground of this kind of 
appropriation as Confucius's, and he fails to pay due attention to this 
52See Liu, Language, Paradox, Poetics, p.95. "'Sie wu xie' actually describes 
horses running "without deviating" (wu xie), and 'si' is only a metrical particle. But 
Confucius takes it to mean 'thoughts without deviation/evil/depravity'." Sec also The 
Book of Odes, trans. Bernhard Karlgren (Stockholm: Museum of F. Eastern Antiquities, 
1974). . 
53 1 may be offending many Chinese scholars in referring to the West as the 
dominant tradition here, but in Liu's discourse one can feel almost everywhere the 
use or' Western scholars (as a teacher?) to sustain his point. Perhaps this is due to his 
introduction of Chinese literature to Western readers, but his discourse nonetheless 
speaks volumes for treating the West as the dominant, at least in his own 
contemporary situation. 
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kind of power in a comparative context. This power, I would say, a 
comparatist will ignore at his peril. 
In fact, this "blindness" has already existed In The 
Interlingual Critic in which Liu believes that a critic can be truly 
"interlingual." I do agree with him that it should not be . possible to 
write about Chinese literature in English, or vice versa, without 
raIsIng comparative questions. The point that I am trying to make 
here is that the coexistence of both Chinese and ' Western codes in a 
comparative discourse will not allow any truly "interIingual" cri tic to 
situate himself above the comparative discourse.· 
This "blindness," I believe, permeates the last book of J ames 
Liu. Paul de Man may say that this is an inevitable condition of the 
rhetoric of criticism, and "blindness" may also generate "insight. "54 I 
do not deny this ' strange relation between "blindness" and "insights," 
but the "insight" generated by Liu's "blindness" here in his discourse 
will unfortunately be that of the dominant. So at the end the most 
that Liu can do is to note the paradox in Gadalner's theory:. "through 
one's consciousness of one's own historicity, [Gadamer believes that] 
one can transcend one's present horizon and achieve a fusion of 
horizons. "55 Liu is partly right in pointing out that "paradoxically by 
becoming aware of the unspoken pres'uppositions as well as 
consciously held beliefs of one culture, a person may hope to 
transcend them and understand those of another culture. "56 (my 
emphasis.) We have already analyzed the place of paradox In 
54 See Paul de Man, Blindness and Insight: Essays ill the Rhetoric of 
COllten1porary Criticis,n (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971). 
55Liu, La1lguage, Paradox, Poetics, p.ll8. 
56Liu, Language, Paradox, Poetics, p.ll8. 
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comparative literature in the second and the third chapters. Liu is 
not able to see the way the "paradox" functions, and this blindness 
conveniently leads to his own over-optimistic conclusion In favour of 
a fusion of cultural horizons.57 Let me elaborate the example that 
Liu raises at the end of "The Metaparadox of Poetics" (Chapter Two) 
to further elaborate my point. 
James Liu quotes Lu Ji's use of the wooden-handled axe as a 
symbol of the metaparadox of poetics since the . handle of the axe 
which is used to cut another wooden handle IS also a wooden one. 
This is a situation similar to a critic who uses language to criticize 
literature written in the same medium. Lu Ji turns the allusion in S hi 
ling 58 to view : himself as one who uses poetic language paradoxically 
In describing poetry. Liu later addresses a reference to Gary 
Snyder's use of the same · symbol, 
Not only did Snyder name his recent 
collection of poems "Axe Handles," bu t he also 
quoted from Lu Ji while acknowledging his 
indebtedness to Ezra Pound and to Ch'en Shih-
hsiang, who translated the Wen-fu and taught 
Snyder Chinese. However, there IS an 
interesting difference between Lu Ji and 
Snyder. Whereas the former saw the wooden 
57Liu, Language, Paradox, Poetics, p.118. 
58 The poem in Shi ling reads~ "To cut an ax~-handle, how?/No axe, no 
success.lTo take a wife, how?/No matchmaker, no gettlng.lTo cut an axe-handle, 
yea,lThe model is not far,!I meet this young person;/The ceremonial ,ve~sels arc 
arranged." Liu states in the endnote that "most comn1cntato:s take thiS young 
person' to refer to the b..r ide , but Gao Heng updcrstands .... It to refcr t? th.~ 
matchmaker." See Gao Heng ~ 1" ,Shijing jinzhu i=% i~ ~: >L (ShanghaI: GUJl 
chubanshe, 1980), p.213. Translation quoted from Jan1cs LIU, Language, Paradox, 
Poetics" p.41. 
axe handle in a paradoxical light, the latter, 
perhaps with a typical American optimism, 
sees it in a more positive light, as a symbol of 
the concept of poetry being transmitted from 
one generation to the next. Snyder declares 
that Pound, Ch'en, and himself are · all axe 
handles, as he now shows his son how to 
make one.59 
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To read from the margIn of Liu's text (a footnote on p.148), we would 
discover that Liu IS comparing this to Fredric J alneson. In The 
Political Unconscious, Jameson writes, 
As the Chinese proverb has it, you use one 
axe handle to hew another: In our context, 
only another, stronger interpretation can 
overthrow and partially refute an 
interpretation already in place. 6 ° 
Jameson's use of the symbol, as Liu says, IS indeed a sO-'called 
"Marxist twist." However, if a "paradox" can be twisted, does it mean 
that we have to pay attention to its function? When Liu is 
complacent in noting Snyder's optimism, he is trapped in his own 
optimism that such a note will be adequate. to give a "sophisticated" 
hue to Chinese poetics and hermeneutics. However, the optimistic 
tendency of treating paradox as an art is exactly the way to keep the 
axe handle in hand. Without the axe, one cannot make a "twist," be it 
59Liu, Language, Paradox, Poetics, p.55. There is 'a rnistake in the book which 
misprints "Snyder" as "Synder./I 
60Fredric Jameson, The Political Uncollscious: Narrative as a Socially 
SYlnbolic ' Act (Ithaca: Cornell Uni versity Press, 1981), p.13 
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Marxist or whatsoever. In that case a "stronger interpretation" In 
Jameson's sense can definitely overthrow Liu's interpretation~ 
Indeed, Liu is not · totally unaware of the struggle between 
Chinese and Western discourse. His awareness of this struggle can be 
seen when he criticizes Hugh Kenner's assumption that "what a 
modern American critic calls poetry must be a universally recognized 
phenomenon" smacks of ethnocentrism. 61 However, his remark is 
too briefly stated and his emphasis is somewhat misplaced. Let us 
see how he goes on to relate Taoist and Lacan's identification with 
the "transcendental signified," 
Lao Zi emphasizes the feminine and seemingly 
pas~lve rather than the masculine and 
seemingly active. Jacques Lacan nlight 
identify the "transcendental signified" with 
the phallus. Lao Zi appears to identify it with 
the female sex organ. This orientation is the 
opposite of phallocentrism and may be called 
vaginocentrism. 62 
Here Liu IS referring Lacan to Derrida63 , and he quotes the following 
from Lao Zi as an example, 
The spirit of the valley does not die,. 
This is called the mystical female. 
The gateway of the mystical female 
Is called the root of heaven and earth. 
, 
61 See Hugh Kenner, "The Poetics of Error," in Tan1kang Review 6 (1975-6), 
pp.89-97. 
62See Liu, La1lguage, Paradox, Poetics, p.21 
3 Of G toIogy (B altimore: Johns Hopkins 6 See Jacques Derrida, rainma 
University Press, 1976), p.lxv. 
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Darkly, darkly, seemingly there: 
Use it, it will not be exhausted.64 
/~ '*t ~- pk:, I ~-c ~ -E jLJ ' 
-t J-u ~ f~ J <l~~ ~ -r,tJ;t~ 0 
~-~/!,~ /11- , 7tl ~ 7F-XjJ 0 
In line of a typical Taoist attitude, Liu is right In stating that "one can 
quote' from Daoist [Taoist] texts to support Derrida's deconstruction of 
Western philosophy, or alternatively, one can say that from a Daoist 
perspective, such deconstruction is unnecessary. "65 However, he 
does not realize that this so-called "unnecessary" deconstruction still 
speaks against Taoist discourse here. When Liu says, "Daoism 
provides a useful counterweight to Western logocentrism, 
phallocentrism and the metaphysics of presence, It he tends to forget 
that he has also stated correctly that "Daoists regard you (presence) 
and w u (absence) as mutually complementary rather than 
diametrically opposed. "66 He tends to identify on the one hand logos, 
phallus, presence and the West with male, and on the other vagina, 
absence and China with female. So what Liu means by 
"counterweight" here is something like the strategy of decentering. 
This strategy contradicts the Taoist perspective which tends to see 
presence and absence as complementary to each other. With a kind 
of "multiple periodization," their roles would continue to change, and 
thus Lao Zi claims this on another occasion: 
In the world there is nothing more submissive and 
640ao Heng, Lao Zi Zlzenggu, (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1956), pp.16-18. 
Translation quoted from Liu, Language, Paradox, Poetics, p.21. 
65Liu, Language, Paradox, Poetics, p.2l. 
66Liu, La1lguage, Paradox, Poetics, p.20. 
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weak than water. Yet for attacking that which IS hard 
and strong nothing can surpass it. . .67 
If we proceed with an · oppositional reading stance against the 
dominant here, we can see that we should identify the female with 
China as the submissive and absence, but we also have to note that 
the feminine and the masculine are incessantly switching their places 
in Taoist philosophy. Therefore, Liu's approach in stating Taoist as a 
"counterpart" to deconstruction curiously stabilizes the feminization 
of China, and at the same time Derrideans would complain that 
deconstruction does not take any counterpart. (As we mentioned 
above, deconstruction cannot rely upon a "reversal" since a kind of 
"displacement" ,will occur and displace that reversa1. 68 ) Although an 
oppositional reading . "takes the decentering of texts as an inaugural 
moment in emancipating political practices, [it] by no means stops 
there."69 The problem of Liu's reading here IS that he satisfies 
himself by pointing out the "unnecessary" nature of deconstruction 
from Taoist perspective, but he tends to forget that the dominant 
deconstructi ve discourse would not think that it is "unnecessary." 
Above all, he is able to locate the paradox, but he fails to grasp the 
67Tao Te Chillg LXXVIII, trans. D.C. Lau, 82, p.I i3. 
68See Spivak, "Explanation and Culture: MarginaIia," in her III Other Worlds: 
Essays ill Cultural Politics (London: RoutIedge, 1987), pp.I03-106. Spivak writes, "The 
peculiarity of deconstructive practice must be reiterated here. Displacing the 
opposition that it initially apparently questions, it is always different from itself. It 
is neither a constitution nor, of course, a regulative form. If it were either, then 
fen1inist activity would articulate or strive toward that fulfilled displacement of 
public (male) and private (female): an ideal society and a transcendental humanity. 
But deconstruction teaches one to question all transcendent idealisms. It is in terms 
of this peculiarity of deconstruction then that the displacement of male-female and 
public-private marks a shifting limit rather than the desire for a complete reversa1." 
(original emphases). 
, 69Zavarzadeh and Morton, Theory, (Post)Moderllity, Opposition, p.7. 
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chance of seeIng how that paradox functions In a Chinese-Western 
discourse. 
I have been trying ' to account for Liu's negligence of the 
function ' of the paradox of interpretation by claiming that he 
erroneously believes that he can assume a truly inte rlingual position. 
However, throughout Liu's career it is apparent that the target 
audience of his writings is mainly English-speaking readers, although 
his works are quoted by many Chinese students studying Chinese 
literature. (The ideological implication here should be self-evident: 
Chinese criticism lacks a voice of its own in the contemporary scene, 
and so even a Chinese' student writing about Chinese literature In 
Chinese may find it necessary to quote Liu's work.) At the outset of 
his career, Liu has already confessed that 
Meanwhile, honesty compels me to clarify my 
own position as an interpretation of Chinese 
poetry to English-speaking readers (for 
interpretation is the first part of a critic's 
task).70 
Since then he tries to include as few Chinese characters in his books 
as possible. 71 So it is reasonable to say that his so-called 
"interlingual" position is oriented to this tar&et audience. Worse still, 
he is trying to free himself from any traces of Chinese or Western 
prejudice, but, of course, his discourse fails him. On the face of it, it 
may perhaps be a result of his so-called "paradox of language" that a 
However, l'f l't IS really his words person often says "words fail me." 
70Liu, The Art of Chinese Poetry, p.x. 
7 1 Liu openly admits this; see Liu, The Art of Chinese Poetry, p.xxii and 
Language, Paradox, Poetics, p.xiii. 
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that fail him, the words are "Western" ones. Touponce has made a 
complaint that "a passage describing the putative Chinese mind is so 
couched in Western terminology (the hierarchy is of essence and 
appearance, lived experience and abstraction) that we may well 
wonder what is distinctively Chinese about it," 
Another trait of the Chinese mind which IS In . 
favour of short poems IS its concentration on 
the e s se nc e of an object of experience rather 
than its details. The Chinese poet is usually 
intent on capturing the spirit of a scene, 
mood, a world, rather than depicting its 
multifarious manifestations. In VIew of what 
I said in the last paragraph, the Chinese 
mentality presents something of a paradox; as 
far as indi vidual experience is concerned, the 
Chinese mind is inclined to concentrate on the 
e ss e nee rather than the appearance, and is 
therefore "essentialist"; ' but in its attitude 
towards life as a whole, it IS more 
"existentialist" than "essentialist" In so far as 
it concerns itself with actual living 
. . 
experIence 
rather than with Platonic or abstract 
categories. 72 (my ' emphases) 
Indeed, Touponce's 0plnIon is rather overstated SInce it should be 
impossible to avoid Western terms in expressing the Chinese mind to 
72Liu, The Art of Chinese Poetry, 153. Touponce also quotes this passage in 
his "Straw Dogs," p.362. 
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English-speaking readers, but Touponce's charge may not be as 
unreasonable as it sounds. Liu should not think that he can evade 
comparative issues. Besid'es, Touponce's idea does raise an Issue 
which' is pertinent to our discussion. After reading Touponce's 
remark, it gIves the impression that if Liu tries to free his discourse 
from "Western" discourse, some "putative" Chinese mind could be 
exposed. Liu's concern with the "westernized" context of modern 
Chinese literature mentioned above makes him believe that if he cuts 
the modern "westernized" context off from his discourse, he will be 
able to truly describe traditional Chinese poetry and poetics as an 
autonomous system of ideas.73 Regrettably, this is not the case. It is 
inevitable for Liu to bring in modern Western conceptual vocabulary 
since he is speaking to an English-speaking audience, and thus his 
own discourse is also as "westernized" as the modern Chinese literary 
context which he tries to exclude from his discourse. His own 
position as a critic has already involved that "westernized" context in 
his ' discourse, and he forgets that his own discourse is also exactly 
situated in such a context. 
Meanwhile, Touponce also claims that the "paradox" which Liu 
finds as operative in the Chinese mind, that of the contradiction 
between "essentialist" and "existentialist" tendencies, is one that also 
developed historically In the West as the· phenomenological 
movement itself departed from the project of its founder, Edmund 
73 See Liu, Chinese Theories of Literature, p.S. Liu writes, "1 shall. n.ot d~al 
with twentieth-century Chinese theories, except those held by purely .tradItiOnalIst 
critics since these have been dominated by one sort of Western Influence or anolhe~, be it Romanticist, Symbolist, Marxist, and do not possess the same kind of 
value and interest as do traditional Chinese theories which constitute a largely 
independent source of critical ideas." 
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Husserl."74 This kind of remark is exactly due to the fact that Liu 
treats the traditional Chinese poetics In isolation and he thus makes 
it become an eternal standstill, as we have mentioned In the last 
chapter. So Liu's discourse is facing another aporia: the Western 
tradition that he has to bring into his discourse (for his target 
audience) keeps on gathering status and history, but the "Chinese 
mind" that he is treating is in an eternal standstill. The most ironic 
point here is that the so-called "independent source of critical ideas" 
in Liu's sense is nothing but a closure to be . exhausted by the growing 
Western critical tradition. 
Touponce is r,ight in noting that Liu's discourse is "so couched 
In Western terminology," but of course Liu would say it should not be 
possible to avoid these terms since he is writing ~n English. In a 
sense Liu may be right; however, he is still oblivious of the dOlninant 
power In appropriating the "putative Chinese mind." In other words, 
Liu is facing a double-bind: either using vocabulary with which his 
English-speaking audience IS not familiar or USIng Western 
vocabulary to distort the Chinese discourse. I understand that my 
argument may gIve the strange impression that there are some 
terms totally tran sparen t, which are able to transnlit Chinese 
discourse into Western discourse without being couched In Western 
terminology. Indeed, I am not saying so. I am reluctant to deny the 
possib~lity of translation which is a vast Issue that I have little 
COlnpetence. My point is that the "blindness" of Liu's discourse, to 
borrow Touponce's term in describing Liu, is not due to his use of 
74Touponce, "Straw Dogs," p.362. 
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Western terms, but due , to a silent struggle between the colonizer 
and the colonized in his discourse. 
Chinese Rules of Reading: Stephen Owen 
Here I shall move on to another critic, Stephen Owen, whose 
career is similar to Liu's, but his discourse is almost free from 
Western critical vocabulary, at least on the face of it. I am not gOIng 
to present a comprehensive analysis of O~en's' works, nor will I go 
into the evolution of his critical ideas. Instead, I am more interested 
in reading Owen's reading of Chinese poetics and his ideas about the 
hermeneutics of the Chinese tradition. So I will only focus on, among 
his other works, Traditional Chinese Poetry and Poetics, and two 
other articles, namely "The Historicity of Understanding" and "Poetry 
and Its Historical Ground. "75 My reading of Owen's text may be 
accused of being a kind of subjective creation, but my "creation", if it 
be a creation, originates from the ' silenced voice in Owen's texts 
which we, as Chinese-Western comparatists, ignore at our own risk. 
In the "Prologue" of Traditional Chinese Poetry and Poetics, 
Owen clearly and "honestly" states that "the book promises no simple 
addition to a store of learning; it does not ride on the whitecaps of 
the latest critical wave if you seek for those things, look 
75 Traditioflal Chinese Poetry and Poetics, (Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1985), "The Historicity of Understanding," in Tamkang Review 14 (1983-84), 
pp.435-466; "Poetry and Its Historical Ground," in CLEAR 12 (199?), pp.l07-118. 
Owen's other major works · include The Poetry of Han Yu and Meng Clllao (New !lave.n: 
Yale University Press, 1972), The Poetry of Early T'allg (New Haven: Yale UnIversity 
Press, 1977), The Great Age of Chinese Poetry: The Jligh T'ang (New. haven: Yale 
University Press, 1981), Remembrances: Onlen of the W.0rld (Cam~ndge: Har:ard 
University Press, 1986) and Mi-Iou: Poetry and the LabYrinth of DeSlre, (Cambndge: 
Harvard ' University Press, 1989) .. 
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elsewhere. "76 One can thus find almost no "Western critical concepts" 
in the discourse of his works. He also states in the introduction that 
"unlike my earlier works 'of literary history, this book was not 
written in the sense of sitting down to do research on a prearranged 
topic. "77 This indicates that Owen, In this book which bears a title 
closely related to our discussion of the Chinese hermeneutic tradition, 
swerves from his earlier works which are mainly dedicated to 
literary history. In this book which demonstrates a significant 
change from his former career, the approach as well as readership of 
Owen's book are very different from that of J ames Liu, as he states 
that this book is "an introduction not to the easily named features of 
. 
a poetry but to its intangibles."78 When compared with The Art of 
Chinese Poetry which is obviously about the easily named features, 
Owen's book focuses on another aspect. In the course of the book, 
Owen tries to shape the "rules of reading" in ' the Chinese tradition. I 
stress "the Chinese tradition" because Owen always emphasizes that 
China represents a different literary civilization from the "West."79 
. He begins by mentioning the "rules of reading," and via "linguistic 
adequacy and inadequacy, reading the poet, reading the world, and 
eventually to "integrating meaning: the whole pOelTI." By arguing that 
a text anticipates its hermeneutics,80 Owen incessantly envisages the· 
plight of the commentator and poses the question that his o\vn 
760wen, Traditional Chi1lese Poetry and Poetics, p.3. 
770wen , Traditional Chinese Poetry and Poetics, p. vii. 
780wen, Traditional Chinese Poetry and Poetics, p. 3. 
79 Sce for instance, Owen, Traditional Chinese Poetry and Poetics, p.56. 
80See for instance, "The Historicity of Understanding," p.451. 
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discourse may raise. 8 1 This is a typical style of Owen, and this is 
obviously due to his argument that eyery text anticipates its 
hermeneutics, and thus he ' uses his own texts as a self-exemplary 
case. In other words, Owen is always self-conscious of his own role 
and the hermeneutics that his texts anticipate. He keeps on reading 
his own reading in his discourse which is basically about "rules of 
reading." Thus a rather strange condition arises: a' Western discourse 
about rules of reading of the Chinese tradi tion is in turn a self-
exemplification of the hermeneutics of that tradition. 
closer to see how this works. 
Let us get 
Owen begins by a careful reading of the title he himself sets, 
"Transparencies: Reading the Chinese Lyric." He accounts for the 
metaphoricity immanent in such a title, and then he moves onto the 
"rules of reading. "82 In this part he has a rather strange opinion, "In 
the Chinese tradition of reading, the meaning of a poem as a whole is 
not taken as metaphysical (except In a limited number of 
subgenres). "83 Owen distinguishes the Chinese and Western rules of 
reading at the outset, and believes that the Chinese lyric tradition IS 
"nonfictional." 84 In this line of argument, he then claims that "the 
reader moves towards the two ends of the reading process - the poet 
and the world that produced the text and thus "reading the poet and 
reading the world" are the two primary objects of attention in the 
8 1 See for instance, Traditional Chinese Poetry alld Poetics, pp.41-44, in the 
midst of his discourse he incorporates "someone's questions" and his answer to them; 
or pp.248-250, in th~ part of the "imaginary interlocutor's c?nclusion".. In "The 
Historicity of Understanding" he even writes a commentary to hIS own artIcle. 
. 82See Owen, Traditional Chinese Poetry and Poetics, pp.54-55. 
830wen, Traditional Chinese Poetry alld Poetics, p.57 . 
. 84See Owen, Traditional Chinese Poetry and Poetics, pp.58-63. 
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Chinese reading process. 85 His self-reflexive discourse then confesses 
that, 
The simple distinction between reading the 
poet and' reading the world is an ill usion of 
convenience ... [since] both of the goals of the 
reading processes are known simultaneously. 
What we actually do is read the poet In the 
act of reading the world, see the world 
through his eyes. 8 6 
Owen is brilliant in letting his own discourse speak its own rules of 
reading, as he tends to believe that "the most basic presupposition of 
the reading process can be inferred from theoretical and interpretive 
texts, but there are only a hollow set of general and indeterminate 
rules" and "we must somehow allow the reading tradition to unfold 
in texts without binding ourselves to the historical categories of 
reading."87 So far so good. Owen tends to believe that his use of 
Chinese texts can unfold the Chinese reading tradition In his 
discourse which anticipates a hermeneutics of its own. Therefore, his 
discourse IS always written with a keen self-reflexiveness to 
anticipate its herlneneutics since that will be the hermeneutics of the 
Chinese reading tradition. His argulnent here is rather similar to that 
of ours in the previous chapters, in the sense that he tends · to argue 
for the need of participation in Chinese discourse in order to reflect 
the Chinese reading tradition in his own English discourse without 
850wen, Traditional Chinese Poetry alld Poetics, pp.62-63. 
860wen, Traditional Chinese Poetry alld Poetics, p. 73. 
870well, Traditional Chinese Poetry and Poetics, p.62. 
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distortion. Let us look at how Owen uses an allusion of a poem by Du 
Fu to "illustrate" his approach, 
There's a story about that too, how every year 
a man noticed a raft floating past on the river, 
until finally one year he got on it and found 
himself carried off into the Milky Way: to 
earthbound men he seemed a "wandering 
star."88 
When we read Traditional Chinese Poetry and Poetics, it 
seems that such an approach is reasonable. However, if we read 
along Owen's other works, especially the one explicitly dealing with 
hermeneutics, "The Historicity of Understanding," then the problems 
of such a discourse on the rules of reading in the Chinese' tradition 
will be underscored. Starting his career as a literary historian of 
Chinese literature, Owen has been committing himself to a 
"historicist" interpretation of Chinese poems. Not only does he stress 
"social context" in his early works,89 but he also believes that a 
hermeneutic tradition is deeply rooted in its historical context. 
Owen continues to adopt this approach In his "The Historicity 
of Understanding'" and at the very outset of the article he has 
already declared: that his article IS an "ugly sibling" which concludes 
that' "interpretation is necessarily an art form."90 However, this art 
8 8 Owen Traditional Chinese Poetry and Poetics, p.287. 1 Here Owen is 
referring to Du FUls "Spending the Night at White Sands Post Station, tI 1~ r§ i:"J; ~ in 
Chiu-chia chi-chu Tu-shih, Vo1.2 of William Hung cd., A Concordance to tlu! Poltms of 
Tu Fu, Harvard- Yenching Sinological Institute Series no.14 (Reprint Taipei, 1966), 
25/9, pp.543-44. 
89 See for instance Owen, The Great Age of Chinese Poetry, liThe Social 
Context" l pp.19-26. 
900wen, liThe I-Iistoricity of Understanding," p.435. 
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form is curiously dealing with the act of interpretation, that is to say, 
"hermeneutics" In Owen's own term. If we have read Owen's 
previous works, it should be clear that he does not favour riding on 
, 
the whitecaps of the latest critical wave. In the introduction of this 
article Owen once again lays down the problem that "the conceptual 
vocabulary of Western poetics can subtly and se'riously distort the 
Chinese poetics to which it is brought. "91 So in this article he keeps 
on avoiding Western concepts, such as structuralism and 
deconstruction. He accounts for these concepts in the commentary he 
writes himself by saying that "read properly, the essay should show 
that I have allegiances neither to semiotics and structuralism nor to 
deconstruction. "92 Anyhow, the term "hermeneutics" IS almost 
everywhere in the article. Indeed, Owen is using the term with its 
neutral sense, which implies the "study of interpretation, and in its 
broad sense, of understanding In general. "93 It thus gives the 
impression that Owen's "hermeneutics" IS Immune from any Western 
influence. However, I do not know whether Owen has Hans-Robert 
J auss in his mind when he uses the term "literary hermeneutics, "94 
but it is apparent that he fully understands that his analysis of 
1 anguage IS reI ated to s truc turalis t and decons tructi ve theories 
(judgin g from the presence of terms such as "paradigmatic," 
910wen, "The Historicity of Understanding," p.436. 
920wen, "The Historicity of Understanding," p.456. 
930wen, "The Historicity of Understanding," p.436. 
94 Jauss understands "literary hermeneutics" as the task of interpreting the 
tension between texts and present as a process in which the dialogue between author, 
reader and new author deals with the temporal distance in the back-and-forth of 
questi~n and answer, of original answer, present question, and ~ew solution, and 
concretizes meaning in ever different ways, ~nd therefore more. rIchly.. See H~n~ 
Robert J auss, Aesthet ic Expe rience and Llterary He nnelle ullcs (M 1 n n e a poll S . 
University of Minnesota Press, 1982), p.xxxvi. 
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"syntagmatic': and the like). On the other hand, in the commentary, 
Owen claims that he would evade the Issue between 
semiotics/structuralism and deconstruction as to whether system 
genuinely governs semiotic operations or whether it is, as a unifying 
structure, a tainted and misguided historical enterprise."95 This 
evasion has already demonstrated the influence that he receives 
from structuralism and semiotics In his discourse. He simply 
accounts for this influence in a typical historicist attitude: "Both sides 
in the dispute would agree that it has been and continues to be a 
historical enterprise. "96 Douwe Fokkema notes In his commentary on 
Owen's essay that Owen's approach IS a typical "historicist" 
hermeneutics. 97 However, Owen does not mind being a "historicist." 
He thinks there is nothing odious in using the approach of (Western) 
hermeneutics to talk about the historicity of Chinese understanding. 
But in view of Owen's highly self-reflexive style in his discourse 
which is deemed to be one that reflects Chinese rules of reading, it is 
rather strange that he shows no reflexi ve though t about this issue. 
Owen . would perhaps reply by saying that his argument is self-
evident in his : discourse, but some problerns will arise when the 
dominant critical tradition speaks from the "margins" of his discourse 
that IS, from the footnotes or the commentary he writes himself. 
Owen is perspicacious in laying down the dognla that "the 
conceptual vocabulary of Western poetics can subtly and seriously 
950wen, "The Historicity of Understanding," p.457. 
960wen, "The Historicity of Understanding," p.457. 
97Douwe Fokkema, Comment on "The Historicity of Understanding," in 
Talnkallg Review 14 (1983-84), p.467. 
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distort the Chinese poetics to which it IS brought."98 Therefore, he 
would say it is legitimate to eschew Western "conceptual vocabulary" 
in his discourse. Does · it subsequently mean that comparative 
literature is not possible? If possible, how? These questions are not 
raised in Owen's discourse, let alone answered. From the fact that he 
has to address the influence of structuralism and semiotics in his 
commentary we can see that his approach cannot conceal" the effect 
of the dominant discourse. Owen believes that his reading of Chinese 
texts with his deliberate avoidance of Western conceptual vocabulary 
will be well protected from Western influence, and he hopes that his 
approach can then generate a discourse through which Chinese rules 
of reading can be "overheard" by the audience. As we know and 
Owen himself definitely knows, his discourse cannot be free from 
Western vocabulary, and what he means by "Western conceptual 
vocabulary". here IS perhaps limited to critical labels such as 
"structuralism," "semiotics" and "deconstruction". lIe also must have 
realized that it is inevitable for these dOlninant "labels" to come into 
. the scene. 
In Traditional Chinese Poetry and Poetics, he is still confident 
_ or pretends to be confident - that he can free his discourse from 
these contemporary influences. So with a quick check into the 
endnotes and index, what we find is that among the Western names, 
none of them are contemporary critical labels. 99 Owen chooses to use 
those labels which are not "contemporary" and "conceptua1." These 
980wen, "The Historicity of Understanding," p.436. 
99"Western" names include Aristotle, William Hazlitt, Ben 10nson, mimesis, 
Plato, Ezra Pound, Fricdrich Schlegel, Sir Philip Sidney, leremy Taylor, lames 
Thomson, William Wordsworth; "fictionality" and "metaphor" are assumed to be 
neutral terms. 
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labels, in Owen' s sense, are rather neutral in use, just like some dead 
symbols which have lost their original fresh signifying power. I am 
not trying to say that he should rid his discourse of these terms, nor 
do I want to claim that it is possible to do so. The reason I point this 
out is to demonstrate that Owen seems to be oblivious of his use of 
these labels which also have "extension" into the contemporary 
Western situation. One . of the main arguments of Owen in "The 
Historicity of Undet:standing" IS that he believes that interpret~tion 
should be an "extension" rather than a repetition of the 
hermeneutical tradition. lOO These seemingly neut,ral labels do still 
exert their intertextual infl uence upon his discourse. 
reason we can see such a tendency in Owen's discourse: 
This is the 
We must wonder if the fusion in modern 
vernacular Chinese of the traditional 
conceptual world and the Anglo-European 
conceptual world will allow the continuation 
and extension of traditional hermeneutics. 10 1 
He tends to cut the contemporary period off from his discourse and 
hopes that the contemporary concepts can be done away with in his 
discourse. He believes that "in face of the continuing and inevitable 
fusion of Western conceptual tradition with Chinese conceptual 
traditions in the vernacular language, the con tinuity of the reading 
tradition is less certain." 1 02 This tendency of cutting the modern 
away from the traditional Chinese poetics bears a curIOUS 
resemblance to J ames Liu's approach, and it thus exhibits a similar 
100See for instance Owen, "The Historicity of Understanding," p.452. 
1010wen, "The Historicity of Understanding," pp.452-453. 
, 1020wen , "The Historicity of . Understanding," p.453. 
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limitation that the ~ritical discourses of their own are also enmeshed 
in the "westernized" context. Even if there IS a "certain" reading 
tradition, it has to be revealed through Owen's own discourse. 
Besides, it is quite obvious that Owen's reading of the Chinese 
text is in fact influenced by (or it bears a close resemblance to) 
Western concepts. The book ReIn e In bra 11 c e S IS full of 
phenomenological conception of time. I03 We may even say that the 
Western conceptual vocabulary "silently speaks" in Owen's discourse. 
In "The Historicity of Understanding" and "Poetry and Its Historical 
Ground" he has . to address this influence, although he IS still reluctant 
to put them into the body of his essays. He simply lets them speak 
In the margins, that is to say, in the forms of a footnote or a 
commentary. 
In the commentary of "The Historicity of Understanding," he 
discusses Derrida. (Perhaps due to the fact that this paper IS 
delivered in a comparative literature conference.) In the footnote of 
"Poetry and Its Historical Ground," we can see "Georg Lukacs (note 1), 
Theodor Adorno (note 5) and Hegel (note 7). Owen seems to 
understand that it is difficult, if not totally impossible, to talk clearly 
and profoundly about his "historicist' hermeneutics" without 
mentioning these critics. In these two articles, Owen still 
believes in the arg~ment that takes shape in Traditional Chinese 
Poetry and Poetics that, 
By obsessing the coherence of the herIneneutic 
tradi tion, to extend it, to show the possibili ty 
103For instance, when he talks about "Fragnlents" in chapter four; see Owen, 
Rem e In bra Tl C e s , p. 66. 
of understanding poems In terms 
commensurate with but not the same as the 
kinds of terms and comments found In 
traditional hermeneutics. the new readers of 
the literature participate in the tradition. l04 
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At the same time, since he believes that Western vocabulary will 
distort this tradition, he chooses to leave these critics at the margin. 
Unfortunately, this is not an effective act of addressing the dominant 
culture without letting it dominate/distort the Chinese hermeneutic 
tradition. Owen uses the following analogy to illustrate his own 
reading position: 
I live In a darkened room with no windows. 
You listen from a hidden microphone. There 
is someone else in an adjoining room who 
speaks to me through a thin spot in the wall. 
I have no confirmation of his existence 
beyond. that VOIce. I speak constan tly to 
entice him to respond, but the voice comes 
only when it pleases and at unexpected 
intervals. I can conceive the possibility that 
what I hear migh t be only private fantasy, 
but when the VOIce comes, I recognIze it as 
belonging to someone else, with his own 
identity and his own things to say, I know I 
am not saying those things. But as I 'said, I 
l040 wcn "The Historicity of Understanding," p.455. , , 
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can conceIve that I might be deceived. But 
you who overhear will not be deceived.I05 
Ideally speaking, the one who overhears the voice in the dark room 
"will not be deceived," but perhaps Owen should need to take into 
account the voice of the dominant tradition . in such a situation. The 
voice that one overhears is not solely the voice from the Chinese text, 
as Owen supposes. It is thus not surprising that Fokkema would use 
, 
Western "scales" to comment on his article. 1 06 
The Inost ironic case seems to be that about the term 
"hermeneutics. " Owen seems to use the term without any Western 
overtones (such as those of Gadamer, Hirsch or Ricoeur), but one 
cannot but query the legitimacy of the use of such a term if it does 
not ' refer to the intertextual influence generated from the Western 
hermeneutic tradition, or Western "hermeneutics." As Fokkema 
rightly indicates, "part of the misunderstanding [about past and 
present] may derive from an unexpected expansion of the term 
"hermeneu tics." 1 07 Fokkema challenges Owen by an argument that I 
see as very "ironic." He uses the concept of hermeneutical circle of 
past and present to note that Owen's belief in the hermeneutic 
tradition as an extension of the past does not take into consideration 
the point that "the present should be allowed to question the 
1050wen , Traditional Chinese Poetry and Poetics, p.ll. 
106 See Fokkema's "Comment," p.466. Point three: "Professor Owen stresses 
the point that the author an ticipates .the defermen t .of 111canin~. M an~ texts, 
however were not intended as literature and only In later tImes received as literatur~ or the other way round, intended as literature and later not received as 
such. ThiS' was explained already by Viktor Shlovsky in the 1910s;" point ~ive: 
"Professor Owen maintains that texts have the capaci ty to pose their own questIons. 
This was also the position of Roland Barthes, but I believe that Barthes has been 
. criticized on this point rather convincingly by Hans-Robert Jauss." 
1 07Fokkema, "Comment," p.465. 
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pas t. "108 Strangely enough, Owen believes that "there IS no shared 
contract between the Chinese texts and Western hermeneutics 
through which those texts can unfold the process of meaning," and "a 
proper hermeneutics for Chinese poetry can be founded upon the 
tradition of Chinese hermeneutics."109 Owen seems to take for 
granted that there is a Western hermeneutics, but only Chinese texts 
- the "Chinese hermeneutics" Owen posits can only reveal itself in 
prImary texts. In Owen's line of argument, then, although we should 
not use Western hermeneutics on Chinese texts, there is still a need 
to note "the tradition of Chinese hermeneutics" upon \vhich a proper 
hermeneutic for Chinese poetry is founded. Owen claims that the 
problem in the phrase "founded upon" mainly lies in the danger of "a 
sterile historicism which would claim that a text can be understood 
only in the terms through which it might have been understood 
when ' it was written. It 11 0 From this we can see that Owen believes 
that it is both possible and necessary to reconstitute the hermeneutic 
tradition in a way that can avoid this danger. Owen thinks that there 
are two imperatives to reconstitute the conditions of understanding a 
lost art (the hermeneutics inherent in Chinese texts): 
First, it must be reconstituted as itself and not 
assimilated into the conceptual and artistic 
world within which it is reconstituted; second, 
it must be known not as an object but as an 
108 Here Fokkema uses a rather "mild" lone. Actually the hermeneutical 
towards past and present may even clainl that our present viewpoint 
predetermine the past. 
1090wen, "The Historicity of Understanding," p.446 . 
. 1100wen, "The Historicity of Understanding," p.447. 
view 
will 
art, a presence in which the reader/ 
viewer/audience participates. I 11 
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It seems that Owen as'sumes here . the existence of such a 
hermeneutic tradition and through these two imperatives one can 
"reconstitute" it. In the course of reconstituti~g, he stresses the use 
of indigenous Chinese terms, as he thinks the rules of reading are 
integral to the tradition of poetry-making itself. Unfortunately 
though, his discourse here betrays his optimism. When he tries to 
"participate" in the Chinese tradition, posing its old questions afresh, 
and hence extending the tradition, he inevitably brings in the anxiety 
of influence from the dominant discourse. So even when he tries to 
use the term "hermeneutics" as neutrally as possible, the term still 
seems to call for a reconstituting of the term itself (in the West). He 
is definitely right, I believe, in saying that 11 action," "participation" 
and "the process of literary understanding" are significant in 
hermeneutics, but he has under-estimated the complexity of the 
action. This action is erroneously taken as one that can be 
participated in a homogeneous fashion (by deliberately avoiding 
Western terminology, by pushing the dominant to the margin), but 
Owen is blind towards the fact that the present is able to question 
the past and he commits a similar fault with J aITIeS Liu in using the 
easy way of cutting off the conte.mporary period from his 
"hermeneu tics." He takes the seemingly simple and homogeneous 
tradition as one that can be reconstituted In a simple and 
h 0 In 0 g e n eo us sit u a ti 0 n . 
. 11lOwen, "The Historicity of Understanding," p.453. 
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Vnfortunately, the contemporary quotidian discourse cannot 
be cut off in such an easy manner. I have to admit that Owen's 
practice IS not as impractical as it looks, but such a self-
. demonstrating discourse . . aImIng at reflecting the hermeneutic 
tradition in his own text cannot perform its function since this prism 
is carved in a way that is not able to refract "Western" and "modern" 
rays. In "The Historicity of Understanding'" and "Poetry and Its 
Historical Ground" , Owen must have realized this and tries to carve 
his prIsm with the Western concepts at the margIn, but, 
unfortunately, it seems that the "margin" IS more sensitive to the 
light ray and thus dominates the spectrum refracted. He mIsses the 
point that the source of the rays is predominantly Western. If his 
reading method IS a mIrror to reflect the Chinese tradition, 
regrettably there are no light rays free of Western concepts. Where 
language is value-charged, whether or not Western jargon is used 
seems to have nothing different. Owen's deliberate avoidance of 
comparative discourse paralyzes his method in face of the dominant 
discourse. He does not show adequate attention to the Other in his 
reading, as he believes that his discourse can appropriate the 
problem of the Other in his own participation. Yet one may say that 
he lnust be reading the Other when he tries to see the Chinese 
hermeneutic tradition with relation to the Western one, but such a 
reading without a sense of reading (as) the Other seems lacking the 
significant factor of an opposit'ional reading, and thus the 
participation of his discourse inevitably becomes the Other, but not 
the reading of the Other as he aims at. It may be possible to adopt 
Owen's . approach In a homogeneous situation; in that case the 
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dominant discourse may not predetermine the "light rays" of the 
reflection of . the rules of reading. 
By the way, in his ' most recent book, Mi-lou: Poetry and the 
Labyrinth of Desire, Owen adopts a markedly different approach in 
handling issues of eros in both Chinese and Western poetry. There is 
an unprecedentedly enormous amount of "Western" quotations. The 
book is a strange blend of Eastern and Western, modern and 
traditional materials. I am reluctant to dwell upon this book as it 
seems not a specialized analysis of the Chinese poetic tradition, but 
rather a playfully creative work which is to be understood by itself. 
In the book, Owen claims that, 
Don't worry - it is not really true - poems are 
nothing more than the interpretations we give 
them, and those interpretations are made by 
readers who consider the poems from an 
impregnable distance. I assure you: it all 
happened long ago and in another country 
[China]. It is we who look and judge; it is not 
true that we feel ourselves obsessed by the 
poem In return. . Don't worry - we "learn: from 
reading poetry; we "gain" frOIn the 
experience; it is a mere acquisition, a civilized 
possession that makes no claim on us. It IS 
safe and fun - only art. Il2 (my emphases) 
Owen's strange blend of different kinds of poetry of different periods 
alms at bringing us into the "labyrinth of desire" - the subtitle of his 
. 
1120wen, Mi-lou, p.5. 
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book. After all, he claims that "it is safe and fun - only art" in the 
somewhat ironic remark quoted above. The "we" he IS . . sayIng IS 
obviously referring to Western readers. However, as Chinese-
Western comparatists, we cannot take this as simple as an "art". For 
the "observer" of the Chinese tradition it may be safe and fun, but for 
the observed it is dangerous and suffering. The observers may 
"learn "in reading the poetry of the Other, but this is definitely a kind 
of appropriation. 
This nl i -Iou (mystic chamber) has diverged from our 
discussion of Owen's notion of the hermeneutic tradition, and we had 
better turn to the work exclusively on "hermeneutics" by one of his 
students, Steven Van Zoeren, to see how his own tradition extends. 
I do not know if Owen would treat Van Zoeren's "Poetry and 
Personality: A Study of the Hermeneutics of the 'Classic of Odes'" as 
an "extension" of his own hermeneutic tradi tion .113 The rules of 
reading jn this work ,is obviously Western - the rules of reading in an 
Western institution. In that case shall we still consider this as an 
"extension" of Owen's "Chinese hermeneutics"? Van Zoeren 
acknowledges Owen by saying that "his influence is on every page of 
this thesis."114 Using the Classic of Odes (Shi ling) as the centre of 
discussion, Van Zoeren traces the hermeneutic tradition from the 
ages before the Han Dynasty all the way to the age of Zh u Xi --* \l:. 
In the last chapter Van Zoeren goes on to suggest the relevance of 
Zhu Xi's "hermeneutics" for readers today. (He is using, like his 
113 Steven Van Zoeren, "Poetry and Personality: A Study of the Hermeneutics 
of the 'Classic of Odes'" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1986), Michigan: University 
Microfilm International. 
.114Van Zoercn, "Poetry and Personality," p.ii. 
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teacher, the term "hermeneutics" without mentioning Western 
concepts, but it is apparent that he IS talking about the scriptural 
aspect of hermeneutics.) This approach is apparently based upon a 
kind of "extension" of hermeneutic tradition advocated in Owen's 
works. Van Zoeren's discourse is basically confined to the Chinese 
tradition, that is to say, without obvious treatment of the Western 
materials with Western concepts. Let us see how Van Zoeren states 
his target: 
W e come to the study of the great texts of 
another, remote civilization like China's out of 
a hermeneutical interest: we want to discover 
what is different and counterintuitive there, 
and yet at the same time to understand that 
difference, and to bring it within the grasp of 
our understanding, so that it is no longer 
utterly alien. 115 (my emphases) 
,The "we" here is obviously referring to English-speaking readers. For 
this kind of readership, perhaps the interest IS' entirely on that 
"difference," and the way to bring it within the grasp of "their" 
understanding. I stress the word "our" here because it is strange, at 
least to a comparatist with a Chinese background like me, that an 
"alien" Chinesehermeneutics is to be understood by Western ("our") 
understanding without mentioning any Western concepts. In other 
words, the hermeneutics of the Chinese tradition is to be grasped by 
Western hermeneutics, and this is the ultilTI'ate goaL With such an 
aIm, it is not unnatural to study the hermeneutics of the Chinese 
115Van Zoeren, "Poetry and Personality," pp.7-8. 
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tradition without mentioning "Western" concepts, SInce it has already 
been presumed to be a homogeneous "ready-for-appropriation" 
tradition which enables English-speaking readers to grasp the alien 
with their collective (that is, "our") understanding. So there is no 
--.l-. v 
discussion of whether yi ~\. is equal to "intention" and yi* is 
"signific ance. "116 The author is free to use hermeneutical terms like 
"application" and "understanding" without qualification,117 since they 
come from a homogeneous tradition of the readers. 
Indeed, I am "not saying that it is possible to read the Chinese 
hermeneutic tradition without these concepts or terms. But the point 
that I am trying to make is that the superficial confinement to the 
Chinese reading tradition (seemingly without distortion from 
Western thoughts) IS basically conducted In a homogeneous situation 
predetermined by the rules of reading In the West. In this sense, to 
think that Van Zoeren's discourse can reflect the hermeneutic 
tradition of China is definitely an oversimplification perhaps w'orse 
, than distortion. · In other words, the Chinese reading tradition seems 
to be a mere appearance which is only one single aspect of the 
reality of the Western reading tradition. It gives the impression that 
we can read Chinese poetry and through this reading one can 
generate a hermeneutics, but, on the other hand, the West keeps on 
writin.g its hermeneutics. The homogeneous Western critical and 
hermeneutic tradition becomes a "transcendental signified" whereas 
different reading traditions are merely signifiers. 
116Yan Zoeren, "Poetry and Personality," pp.298 &' 359. 
,117Yan Zoeren, "Poetry and Personality," pp.347-348. 
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The lack in Owen's discourse is vividly exposed in Van 
Zoeren's discourse. Without an oppositional stance the "Chinese 
hermeneu tic tradition" is valid only in the eyes of the readers 
without interests in establishing a truly "Chinese hermeneutics" from 
the Chinese point of view. Unfortunately, I cannot force Owen or Van 
Zoeren to aim at something other than their target Western readers. 
For them "Chinese hermeneutics" may be an ephemeral pastime, but 
for us we cannot afford to think so. 
OWen is defini,tely right in saying that "the danger that seems 
to hang about IS mere subjectivism - that the reading IS all my 
creation. But this is not so great a danger as it might seem: the real 
danger is silence, not ventriloquism." 118 His opinion does provide us 
with the necessary point of departure for our establishment of the 
rules of reading in the· Chinese tradition when he says the real 
. danger is silence. However, let me recall Owen's analogy of the "dark 
room" as an example to illustrate his blindness and the difficulty that 
we are facing,. We have to bear in mind that the articulation of our 
ventriloquism, and .our overhearing of the mysterious voice will both 
be influenced by a voice that is from another adjoining rOOIn. This 
voice is louder and will thus dominate, if not distort, our overhearing 
and articulation. 
COJn1110n Poetics: Wai-liln Yip 
In terms of r'eadership, Wai-lim Yip definitely has a different 
target when he devises his "comparative poetics." Not only are his 
11 80wen , Traditional Chinese Poetry alld Poetics, p.ll. He claims that 
. d' 1 b f he uses the analogy of the dark room to illustrate his reading Imnle late y e ore 
posi tion . . 
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recent publications mainly In Chinese 1 19", but he is also trying to 
"compare" Chinese and English poetics explicitly, and in this aspect 
his approach is somewhat different from that of Liu and Owen. 
At the very outset of his career, Wai-lim Yip has already 
stated in his Zhixu de shengzhang ~fo{)~~:k (The Growth of Order) 
that he is discontented with English literature since he cannot accept 
the eternal Platonic "Idea" which is actually a hUlnan construct. 120 I 
find the development of Yip's works since this book basically a 
comparative effort defending a kind of Chinese poetics that English 
translations can never attain. This is an admirable intention, indeed. 
Yip later admits in the preface of his Bijiao Shixue I::t:-~ ~-1'~ 
(Colnparative Poetics) that his first essay on comparative literature IS 
""Jingzhi de zhongguo huaping," --~~ ~~ + ~~ ~~ ("A Still Chinese 
Vase"),121 and in this essay he has already begun his analysis of 
traditional Chinese poetry with an aesthetic point of view. He holds " 
that Chinese language enables the expressIon of Chinese aesthetics in 
Chinese poetry, and this expression will be seriously distorted when 
it is trans~ated into English since the English language does not have 
the flexibility of Chinese language. In this inaugural essay of his 
later career, Yip tries to show how T.S. Eliot breaks the chains of 
English grammar and thus achieves some of the effects in Chinese 
poetics. Actually this essay has already laid down the direction of 
Yip's later development. His "comparative poetics" is mainly 
grounded on a comparIson of language and aesthetic, with Taoist 
119To the best of my knowledge, Yip is going to have a book published in 
English. Unfortunately I do not have more information at this stage. 
120Sce Wai-lim Yip, Zhixu de slzengzlzallg-1:~1-5 ~~ l ~ (Taipei: Zhiwen, 1971) 
third edition, 1975, p.1. , 
i 21 Wai-lim Yip, Bijiao slzixue bt:.~ ii ~ (Taipei: Dongda, 1983), pA. 
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aesthetic as representing the Chinese tradition and Platonic "Idea" as 
the fountainhead of 'Western thoughts and poetics. Developed on this 
basis, his later works mainly focus on Chinese and Romantic 
landscape poetry. In "Translating Chinese Poetry:' The' Convergence 
of Language and Poetics - A Radical Introduction," he clearly states 
that, 
[Chinese poetics] offers something 
significantly different from the' syllogistic 
procedures of Western poetry. Both the 
Taoist and the Confucian poetics demand the 
submission of the self to the cosmic rather 
tha'n the Kantian attempt to resist and 
measure oneself against the apparent 
almightiness of nature, resulting in a much 
greater degree of non-interference · in artistic 
presentation. 122 
At the same time, he also points out the reason he translates Chinese 
poetry: "hoping to put the readers out of gear, so to speak, so that 
they can more enjoy the specific aesthetic horizon of the Chinese." 123 
In other words, Yip's effort is directed against the distortion of 
Chinese aesthetics in English translation. 
Gradually Yip moves towards a comparlson of aesthetics in 
"Aesthetic Consciousness in Chinese and Anglo-American Landscape 
P oe try. 11 124 In this article he is" still comparing the difference of 
1 2 2 W a i -li m Y i P , Chi II e s e P oe t ry: M aj 0 r M 0 de s all d G e n re s (B er k el e y & Los 
Angeles: University of, California Press, 1976), p.41. 
123Yip, Chinese Poetry, p.42. 
124Yip, "Aesthetic Consciousness of Chinese and Anglo-Anlerican Landscape 
Poetry," ' in Comparative Literature Studies XV (1978), pp.211-241. 
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aesthetics in the two traditions, and he tfl·es I to use examp es of 
modern Western poetics, such as William Carlos WilIiams, Gary 
Snyder and Rextroth as exa I f b k· mp es 0 rea lng away from "the 
Platonic world of ideas and concepts," and thus achieving some of the 
aesthetic essences of Chinese poetics. Yip later even uses Snyder as 
an example to show a cultural diffusion from the East to the West in 
"Against Domination: Gary Snyder as an Apologist for Nature." 125 By 
"against domination" Yip is indeed talking about the domination of 
man over nature, but the term seems to have an overtone of the 
domination of Western syllogism over Chinese aesthetics. Chou 
Ying-hsiung's remark is illuminating to our discussion here, "That an 
artist from the West should favour the little tradition of an alien 
culture is a meaningful act." 126 I would say the lneaningful aspect 
here lies not merely in the fact that a Western poet is influenced by 
Chinese culture. As I have pointed out in the analysis of E m m a as a 
feminist novel in the fourth chapter, this IS at best a kind of 
"tokenism." 127 Snyder can only be seen as an exceptional case who 
addresses Chinese issues at the periphery of Western institutions. 
The more important aspect should be that it speaks in a way against 
125 Yip, "Against Domination: Gary Snyder as an Apologist for Nature." in 
Chi1lese Text, ed. Chou Ying-hsiung (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1986). 
126Chou Ying-hsiung, "Introduction" to The Chinese Text, p.xix. 
127Refer to Spivak, III Other Worlds, pp.106-107. Spivak cites a passage from 
Adrienne Rich's speech delivered at Smith Colleg~ in 1979 to illustrate the so-called 
"female tokenism": "There is a false power which masculine society offers to a few 
women who 'think like men' on condition that they use it to maintain things as they 
are. This is the meaning of female tokenism: that power withheld from the vast 
majority is offered to a few, so that it may appear that any tru.ly ~ualified woman c~n 
gain access to leadership, recognition, and reward; hence that JustIce bas~d on ments 
actually prevails. The' token woman is encouraged to s.ce herself as different from 
most other women, as exceptionally talented and deserVing; and to separate herself 
from the wider fenlale condition; and she is perceived by 'ordinary' woman as 
separat.e . also: perhaps even as stronger than themselves." 
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domination. Yip is trying to show that Western language is not 
capable of expressing the Taoist aesthetics. Yip uses Snyder as an 
example of liberating English from the chains of grammar and syntax 
in order to show that language may imprison a poet in ideas and 
concepts. This argument is problematic, indeed. On the face of it, 
one can easily raise criticism concerning comparati ve linguistics that 
the natures of Chinese and Western languages are different and Yip 
is simply employing a Chinese model to assess Western languages.128 
One may similarly complain that Yip is distorting the aesthetics of 
the West in using Snyder as a counter-example to the Western 
tradition. Unless one can prove that language and aesthetics are two 
separate and different categories, and that language is used to 
express the aesthetics behind, Yip's approach must be considered 
problematic. . In fact, to believe in such an idea is to believe in 
metaphysics originated from the Platonic Idea ' that Yip denounces. 
Interestingly enough, Yip always warns us of the "model pitfall" in 
Chinese-Western comparative literature, that a fish can only 
. envisage the human world by forming in its mind "a fish, wearIng a 
hat and clothes, with a stick under its fins and shoes dangling from 
its tail." 129 Thus, when we read Yip's "Against Domination," perhaps 
we should place the emphasis on "against" instead of on 
"domi nation. " 
In much of what follows we shall" be examining Yip's 
theoretical framework of Taoist aesthetics to see how his reading 
128See Liao Ping-hui, liegou piping lunji, pp.81-82. K.Y. Wong, a student of 
Yip, makes some complementary remarks to Yip's approach. 
129Wai-lim Yip, "The Use of Models in East-West Comparative Literature," in 
Talnkang Review 6 (1975-76), p.109. 
Chu 232 
diverges from our. aIm of reading oppositionally, although he is also 
talking about "against domination." In "The Taoist Aesthetics: W u-
yen tu-hua, the Unspeaking~ Self-generating, Self-conditioning, Self-
transforming, Self-complete Nature," 130 :. Yip tries to formulate a 
hermeneutical framework from Taoist aesthetic by using the Taoist 
belief of wu-yen tu-hua (wu-yan du-hua) ~ i ~~ 1)0 
(deverbalization arid self-transformation). He holds that "a 
deverbalized word is the first step towards grasping the totality of 
things," and Zhuang Zi's aesthetics can afford to protect "the 
wholeness of the original cosmic scheme, which classifications and 
conceptions tend to dissect its separate units."131 So through Wtl-yen 
(deverbalization) Chinese poetics is able to reac~ the state of tu - h u a 
(self -tran sf ormati on). In other words, in this article Yip advocates 
what he believes Zhuang Zi advocates: to let the self-so-complete 
Nature "nature" through a decreative-creative dialectic (from 
deverbalization to self-transformation). "The special set of 
perceptual-expressive procedures that characterizes much of Chinese 
poetry and poetics is opened by this dialectic," Yip states. 132 
Such a "deverbalization," indeed, is not totally without words, 
and even the belief itself has to be expressed in words. So Yip 
, concludes the essay by appealing for "a use of language as a pointer ' 
towards the finer interweaving of the unspeaking, concrete, changing 
Nature, like the word Tao which we are to forget once it is 
130y· ;'The Taoist Aesthetics: Wu-yell tu-hua, the Unspeaking, Self-lp, N ". N generating, Self-conditioning, Self-transforn1ing, Self-con1plete atur~, I? e w 
Asian Academic Bulletin 1, (1978) Special issue on East-West Comparatlve LIterature, 
pp.I7 -32. 
131 Yip, "The Taoist Aesthetics," p.18. 
1.32Yip, "The Taoist Aesthetics," p.17. 
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pron ou n ced. " 133 Language, in other \vords, should not be used as a 
mere tool to express the ego-reflecting nature behind, but rather "it 
is used to punctuate the rhythm of the things they emerge from and 
merge into Phenomenon, innocent , free, original." 134 
One of the limitations of Yip's Taoist discourse IS reflected in 
his opinion that "the poetic language is conditioned to a cl os est 
possible degree of approximation of Nature as it is." 135 (my 
emphasis) W ecan at best talk about "a closest possible degree," so to 
speak. I read this "closest possible degree" as an ,attempt to ease the 
embarrassment that Yip is reading Guo Xiang's - one of the most 
popular commentators of Zhuang Zi - reading of Zhuang Zi. This 
reading of reading definitely cannot claim to be self-generating, self-
conditioning, self-transforming and self-complete. Unlike Owen who 
tries to make his critical discourse a self-transforming one, Yip is 
"talking" (cf. deverbalization) about Taoist aesthetics on a different 
level of discourse. Ironically enough, his "verbal" demystification of 
the Taoist aesthetics has to use "deverbalization" as its main theme. 
Consequently, this limitation makes Yip's discourse self-
decon s truc ti ve. 136 Amidst Yip's reading of Guo Xiang's reading of 
Zhuang Zi, there Inust be an inevitable "paradox of interpretation" as 
James Liu conceIves of the term. I would say such a self-
deconstructive aspect in Yip's discourse is not the most significant 
point to . note in our oppositional point of view, however. Instead, I 
133Yip, "The Taoist Aesthetics," p.32. 
134Yip, "The Taoist Aesthetics," p.32. 
135 Yip, "The Taoist Aesthetics," p.3!. 
136For a deconstructive analysis of Yip's concept, please refer to Liao Ping-
hui, liegou piping lunji, pp.62-76. 
Chu 234 
think we should pay attention to the fact that Yip has to "protect" 
Chinese poetics against domination by using words to reveal the 
Chinese essence which stresses "deverbalization." The rV U - ye 11 
nature of the Chines poetics make it difficult for a critic to have it 
articulated In a comparative discourse, and the "deverbalized" 
aesthetics may then be conveniently appropriated by a Western 
VOIce. This aporia· that Chinese poetics faces will easily let the 
dominant . VOIce consider the opposition against domination self-
defeating, SInce one cannot but use language to express the Taoist 
aesthetics which devalues language. 
Liao Ping-hui says that Yip's theoretical fraITIeWork is not 
consistent: on the one hand he warns us of the "model pitfall,"1]7 and 
on the other he uses Fredric J ameson "dialectical cri ticism" 138 which 
examines both sides of the interaction and historicizes the abstract. 
Liao criticizes Yip by saying that he uses Chinese as the lTIodel and 
then criticizes the West. 139 Liao attributes this to the "blindness" of 
Yip's . discourse, but I am afraid this account does not do Yip's 
discourse justice. Liao's opInIon seems impertinent to our issue - an 
oppositional reading. He notes that Yip's choice of Guo Xiang as the 
sole commentator of Zhuang Zi has already had historical, political, 
academic and other contextual reasons, and . wu-yen tu-hua is also a 
137 "Model Pitfall" is a famous waning of Yip. He reminds us of the danger 
that applying a model in one culture to another culture must be problematic. Scc 
his "The Use of 'Models' in East-West Comparative Literature," in Tanlkallg Review 6 
(1975-76), p.l09. . 
138For more details ' please refer to Fredric Janleson, Ma~xisl11 a1ld Fonn: 
Twe1ltieth-Century Dialectical Theories of Literary Producllon (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1971), pp.306-416. 
139Liao, liegou piping lunji, p.62. 
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"cultural construct."140 I would say · Yip does not try to deny this. 
Liao uses a term borrowed from Edward Said, "cultural 
superiority"141 to describe Yip. However, ~ see Yip's so-called 
"cultural superiority" as his means of reading against domination. 
Indeed, his discourse may be self-defeating, but Yip can nonetheless 
make a noise through his comparative poetics to note the dominatio'n 
in such a discourse. Although the theoretical framework exposes a 
limitation of Yip, I would rather see Yip's works at this stage as an 
effort engaging East-West comparative discourse In a struggle. 
Besides, we can also see from Yip's so-called "cultural superiority" 
that an ethnocentric emphasis on Chinese culture, aesthetic and 
poetics will not be able to generate a sound Chinese critical discourse 
since it will easily be read as self-defeating as we have analyzed 
above. 
Liao's reading of Yip's reading, in addition, bears a limitation 
("blindness" In Liao's own word) since he places the emphasis (his 
"insight") on the deconstructive aspect of Yip's discourse, 
'Deconstruction, In the spirit of Derrida, should not be an end. Similar 
to Touponce In the analysis of James Liu, Liao's focus on 
deconstruction does not cope with the factors which he uses to 
deconstruct Yip's discourse, such as "the socio-cultural aspect of 
I an g u age" 0 r " w u -yen tu -h u a a sac u It u r a I con s tr u c t. " L i a 0 can 
perhaps go further ' in a comparative discourse which does not 
connIve at domination if he histoticizes his deconstructive tools. 
Indeed, Liao would say that his own discourse should be self-
140Liao, liegou plplllg lunji, pp.62 & 67. 
141See Edward Said, OrientaliSln (New York: Vinatge Books, 1978), p.7, and 
Liao p.76. 
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deconstructive, and ' this is exactly his maIn argument In his reply to 
Liao Chao-yang's comment on his article. 142 Liao holds that his own 
deconstructive insights must inevitably bring blindness. In addition, 
Liao Ping-hui tries to turn his "blindness" in the original article into 
an' "insight" in an appendix added later. There he claims that he 
basically believes that "deconstructive criticism has to assimilate 
hermeneutics, cultural-social criticism, reader response criticism in 
order to transcend the limitation of deconstruction as a purely 
formalistic criticism." 143 This remark, indeed, is more high-sounding 
'than practical. In his discourse we do not see any development in 
th is direc ti on. 
I have set aside so much space for Liao's reading of Yip's 
reading since I believe that on the one hand it can underscore the 
danger of deconstructive rhetoric, and on the other it can highlight 
the interpretive differentials in Yip's reading. Between the "insight" 
and "blindness" one may easily let the dominant culture appropriate 
the VOIce and exerCIse its silent power across culture, since the 
dialectical indeterminacy between "insight" and "blindness" has to be 
determined by the one who can appropriate the critic-function, as we 
have extensively dealt with in the previous chapters. At the same 
tilne, Liao's reading does pinpoint the fact that Chinese cri tical 
discourse cannot take the stance of writing back by using Chinese 
aesthetics and poetics as the centre. The reason is that there will be 
a theoretical limitation which I am going to mention next. 
142See Liao Chao-yang's comment on Liao, liegou piping lunji, pp.119-135. 
and Liao Ping-hui's own reply to that, pp.137-140. 
·143Liao, liegou piping lunji, p.118. 
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We can notice from Yip's discourse that although it seems not 
possible to use Western models to assess Chinese literature, but the 
limitation in such an approach IS simply that the models are 
incompatible. But if we are to approach from the other way round 
by using Chinese culture as the centre, there will be a "theoretical" 
problem since we d~ not have a model that can speak in its own 
voice. This "theoretical" problem cannot be born by any conscientious 
cri tics. I am sure that Yip is not unable to see the theoretical 
problem In his discourse, but he simply ignores it to set off his effort 
of writing against domination. From the point of VIew of an 
oppositional critic, to linger upon the so-called "problems" will 
merely provide a self-subversive discourse. From Yip's later essays 
on comparative poetics we can perceive a conspicuous change in his 
approach, and this change is moving closer to "hermeneutics" which 
IS our topic of discussion. 
In the preface of his Lishi, chuanshi, n1eixue £~ I /t=¥i'f" "* ~ 
(History, Hermeneutics, Aesthetics), Yip employs Gadamer's concept 
of "di,alogue" with the tradition to illustrate the necessity of the state 
of "open dialogue" and "fusion of horizons" In a comparative 
discourse. 144 He states that Chinese-Western comparative literature 
should be an open dialogue between the two cultures. In fact, this 
144 Yip, Lishi, chuanshi, Meixu~ (Taipei: Dongda, 1988), pp.3-4. For the 
details of the three modes of dialogue with the tradition, please refer to Hans-Georg 
Gadanler Truth and Method (New Yo'rk: Seabury Press, 1975), pp.321-325. In brief , . . 
the three modes are that 1). "seeks to dissolve things that are typical in the behavlor 
of one's fellow men and is able to make predictions concerning another person on 
the basis of experience"; 2)."the 'Thou' is acknowledged as a person, but that ?espite 
the involvement of the person in the experience of the 'Thou', the understandIng of 
the latter is still a fornl of self-relatedness"; and 3), "lh,e openness to tradition" with 
the belief that "to stand within a tradition does not limit the freedom of knowledge 
but makes it possible." 
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"open dialogue" marks the direction of Yip's later essay. He employs 
a point from Gadamer's "hermeneutics of tradition" to claim that the 
modern and the tradition should also be in an "open dialogue." This 
makes Yip somewhat different from Liu '. and Owen who cut the 
modern off from their discourse. Yip does not cut the modern 
context off from his discourse, but judging from the development 
from his "Against Domination" to his advocation of "open dialogue," 
Yip must have under-estimated the power of the dominant discourse. 
As the title Lishi, chuanshi, meixue (History~ Hermeneutics, 
Aesthetics) suggests, Yip intends to add two dimensions to his 
former discourse which uses aesthetics as the centre of discllssion. 
Yip understands that focusing only on aesthetics may have the 
limitation of comparing different models. In order to have an "open 
dialogue," he has to incorporate history and hermeneutics which deal 
with the models from a different level of discourse, and through this 
he may be able to arrive at a "fusion of horizons." However, in some 
of the articles in this volume, we can still detect the extension of his 
former approach. For instance, in "Zhongguo gudian shi zhong de 
chuandshi huodong," "f ~ ~ ~ ~.:} t 1J'::d~- JPf 5~ it 1J ("The 
Hermeneutic Activity of Traditional Chinese Poetry"), Yip declares 
that the essay is an extension of his former essays.145 In this article 
Yip is trying to bring out the Chinese hermeneutical activity by using 
classical Chinese poetry as an example. In his treatment, the 
145 See Wai-lim Yip, Lislzi, chuanslzi, meixue, p.55 and Bijiao shixue, pp.27 -86. 
"The Hermeneutical Activity of Traditional Chinese Poetry" is written in Chinese, and 
to the best of my knowledge, there is no English version. Anyhow, I deliberate~y use 
the Chinese version in this book since in this book Yip translates hermeneutlcs as 
ch u ails Iz i ~ ~ ,meaning transmission and interpretation, and this. i_~gt~er di.f!crcn~ 
from . the con~~Jtional translation of the term, such as quanshl 1;::£*1 ' ] I e s h l 
et.c. J 
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predominant underlying principle IS still grounded on Taoist 
aesthetics. He criticizes Wang Li's ± ./J annotation of certain Chinese 
poems in his Hanyu shilu xue ~lj~ ~1?f~ -amodem classic of using 
Chinese linguistic to analyze the form of poetry - since he thinks that 
Wang confuses the poet's sensation with logical thinking. Being 
bound by Western conceptions such as syntax, Wang misses the 
, 




Hanging Wind Break Bamboo 
Wang Li reads the line as "green [leaves] hang froIn the bamboo 
broken by the wind." However, Yip thinks that "in the experience of 
the poet, the condition should be like this: "when the poet suddenly 
saw a green patch hanging down on his way, he did not know what it 
is, he realized only afterwards that was a bamboo tree broken by the 
wind. This is the priority of the experience." 146 In other words, the 
syntax used by Wang Li after the experience is a kind of logical 
conception, and that is not the exact experience itself. Such an 
! 
interpretation after logical reasonIng inevitably distorts the 
experIence itself. I bring forth this example with an eye on showing 
that Yip's "hermeneutic activity" of traditional Chinese poetry is still 
based upon Taoist aesthetics which advocates the ingenuous world 
before logical reasoning. In this article about the "hermeneutic 
activity," there seeIns nothing about the Chinese hermeneutic 
tradition. Is it possible for us to claim this "herrneneutic activity" in 
classical Chinese poetry to be the Chinese tradition of hermeneutics? 
146Yip, Lishi chuanslzi meixue, p.66. 
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Does it mean that- "the rules of reading" should be based upon pre-
conceptual experience.? If so, is it a paradox of interpretation - "to 
read" has already implied ' logical reasoning? In other words, what 
Yip means here by "hermeneutic activity" has the difficulty of USIng 
the term "hermeneutics" to stand for "aesthetic exp~rience." He 
deliberately translates the term "hermeneutics" as transmission and 
, 
in terpretation (c h u a n s hi) in order to emphasize the transmissive 
aspect. Anyhow, a transmission still has to be interpreted. Of course 
I am not denying that Taoist aesthetics deals with the self-so-
complete Nature; I am simply believing in the fact that hermeneutic 
actions will distort the "Tao" as expounded by Yip. Such an emphasis 
on ingenuous Nature would make it difficult, if not totally impossible, 
to pose a Chinese hermeneutical framework, since even the word 
"framework" has always already implied logical reasoning. As we 
have mentioned above, Lao Zi's famous dictum, "The tao that can be 
taoed is not the constant tao," has already openly admitted the 
paradox of interpretation. What we have to do, from our 
'comparative point of view, IS to see how to let the reading of Taoist 
! 
aesthetics, which is paradoxical by itself, become the rules of reading 
of the Chinese tradition without becoming self-defeating in the logic 
of Western discourse. 
Yip of course does not stop at the point of noting the Taoist 
aesthetics in the "hermeneutic activity" of Chinese poetry. Yip tries 
to use the idea of "mi xwng pang tong·~).ff% iifL (indirect 
comprehension through abstruse overtones) to represent both the 
Taoist idea of "the tao that can be taoed is not the constant tao" and 
the Confucian belief that "writing does not exhaust words, and words 
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do not exhaust intention." This phrase "mi xlang pang tong" is drawn 
from Liu Xie's ~Venxin d~aolong. In the chapter of "The Recondite and 
the Conspicuous" (Yinxiu ~;J3 ), Liu Xie writes, 
The recondite, as a form, suggests ideas which 
are beyond linguistic expression and are 
comprehended indirectly through abstruse 
overtones, which unabstrusively reveal 
hidden beauty .147 
* f.t z ~ ~ ,~~ iz ?} > 
;?)t ){r it illL ,1*:-* }~ ~ · 
Yip concludes that the Yi Jing)u i~ (The Book of Change)148, the 
Confucian tradition and the Taoist tradition all agree that the ideas 
are "beyond linguistic expression" and language is only used to 
generate overtones. Here we should be able to realize the aporia of 
the Chinese reading tradition: readings should only produce readings 
since linguistic expressions are basically used to suggest· overtones. 
Yip believes that the Chinese hermeneutic activity has to rely upon 
'the interaction of the concrete images, preserving the state of the 
ambiguity between the "spoken" and "not-yet-spoken." I do not 
doubt whether Yip's approach is an insightful treatment of the 
meaning and language In the Chinese tradition, but, on the face of it, 
we cannot perceive any "comparative" dimension here. I am not 
sayIng that to talk about Chinese literature (in particular he is 
writing in Chinese and the target audience is Chinese) one has to use 
147Liu Xie, Wenxin diaoiong, Chapter XL. Translation quoted from Vincent 
Yu-chung Shih, The Literary Heart and the Carving of Dragons (Hong Kong: Chinese 
University Press, 1984), p.415. 
148Liu Xie uses an allusion from the Yi ling in his "Yinxiu". For the origin of 
this please refer to Yip, Lishi chuanshi meixue, pp.l01-104. 
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a comparative viewpoint, but I have strong doubts whether his so-
called "hermeneutics" will still preserve that "ambiguity" when 
translated into English. I am afraid terms like "intertextuality," 
"meaning," "significance" would come int? the picture. 149 At that 
time, how are we able to cope with the "Chinese" tradition? If the 
hermeneutics and aesthetics of the Chinese tradition is as Yip argues, 
then the problem should be how to let this "not-yet-spoken" "aporia" 
have a voice of its own; otherwise, it must have to borrow a VOIce 
from another culture. If borrowing a voice is the only alternative, 
the question is how to borrow it with an oppositional stance lest 
letting it distort our tradition. In this respect it is exactly the 
"aporia" that Yip has to face. The reason Yip eschews talking about 
the chance of suppression in the interaction of two discourses is 
basically due to his over-optimistic belief in the Gadamerian "open 
dialogue. " 
In the article extensively talking about "hermeneutics," "Yu 
zuopin dui hua: chuanshi xue de zhumao,"~1~~\.-t-j "R :i~~~ il~;;S~ 
("In Dialogue with the Text: Different Faces of Hermeneutics If) Yip 
lays down at the very outset the reason he uses a different term to 
"translate" hermeneutics. 150 The fact that he tries to "translate" 
hermeneutics differently means that he has to find· a Chinese term 
which is compatible to Western hermeneutics. This IS not merely a 
problem of finding a compatible model, however. The new 
translation In turn gives rIse to the distinction between the 
149See for instance, Yip's "Piping lilun jiagou de zaisc"Jl:ttt.;,l.~·~~,~1J~-JlJ-~' 
"The Framework of Critical Theories Reconsidered" in Lishi chuahslll melxue, p.lO. 
Yip uses the word "text" without Chinese translation. 
150Yip, Lishi chuanslzi meixue, pp.17-53. 
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"transmission" of· the author and "interpretation" of the readers. 
Actually this will sound rather strange if we relate this to the Taoist 
aesthetics that Yip advocates elsewhere, since both of the two parts 
of hermeneutics (transmission and interpretation) are . a kind of 
experience, and it is Yip's logical reasoning which separates the two 
processes here. In Yip's sense, however, it is wrong to do so -
, 
interpretation should be the "transmission" to other transmissions. 
However, In ' discussing Western hermeneutics, he must divide the 
processes into two separate entities before he can 'discuss them with 
relation to a hermeneutical circle, the notion of "meaning" and the 
possibility of standard and objective (a very strange term tn Taoist 
sense indeed) interpretation. All of these; as we have mentioned 
before, are some of the co-ordinates of Western hermeneutics. We 
have also noted the paradox of these concepts. What Yip tries to do, 
however, is to use Chinese text to "supplement" - I am consciously 
using it with a Derridean overtone - these concepts. In Part Five of 
the essay, Yip addresses the notion that hermeneutics should be an 
o·pen dialogue, a concept clearly borrowed from Gadamer, albeit 
1 
without documentation. lSl Yip then cites a passage from Mang Zhang 
(M encius Book V, Part A) to illustrate his point, 
Hence in explaining an ode, one should not 
allow the words to obscure the sentence, nor 
the sentence to obscure the intended 
meanIng. The right way is to meet the 
151 Yip, Lishi chuanshi meixue, pp.46-47. See also Gadamer, Truth and 
Method, p.145. The version that Yip uses is translated by Ganellt Sardeh and John 
Cumming (Latan, 1975), pp.322-325. 
intention of the poet with sympathetic 
understanding. 152 
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At first glance, it may seem strange for Yip to use an example from 
Mencius instead of Lao Zi or Zhuang Zi from whom he is very fond of 
quoting. This is perhaps an indication of Yip's choice of materials In 
fixing his stereotype of building up a Taoist aesthetics before, and 
now since he talks about hermeneutics, he has to appeal to Me 11 c ius 
or Analects in which there are more relevant elements since Taoists 
do not favour "interpretation." (This IS obviously a choice of 
materials.) From this we should realize that these concepts are 
actually "cultural constructs." We may see Yip's discussions of Taoist 
aesthetics earlier on, and that of hermeneutics now as efforts of 
carving himself i,nto a stereotype in comparative literature. So it 
would be apposite to read his works as an effort filling the niche of 
earlier comparative ' works by drawing a circle of Taoist aesthetics. 
When he shifts to hermeneutics, it seems that he has to leave his 
Taoist aesthetics behind. 
Back to the passage quoted above, we should pay attention to 
Yip's use of "yi yi nl zhi" VlJ.-. -i" it;t, ("to meet the intention of the 
poet with sympathetic understanding") to mean that there must be a 
certain mediation during the encounter between the author and the 
reader. "Interpretation is a mediation," he writes. 153 However, in his 
discourse, this mediation IS In turn "mediated" by Gadamer's ' 
"theory" 154 of open dialogue. Let us now envisage the transmission of 
152Translation quoted from D.C. Lau's translati0n of M e ne ius (Hong Kong: 
Chinese University Press, 1984), Vo1.2, p.l8,6 . . 
153Yip, Lishi ehuanshi meixue, p.45. 
154 I am being very cautious in using the term "theory" since most 
hermeneuticists, probably including Gadamer himself, will deny that "open dialogue" 
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Yip's discourse. Yip IS the tran smi tter of the "meaning" (here the 
"meaning" is the need of an open dialogue) and we are the ones who 
interpret. Yip believes that between the . transmitter and the 
perceivers there must be a kind of mediation. Here he uses 
Gadamer's point that there should be an open dialogue as the 
mediation in this context. "Open dialogue" thus becomes the centre 
of this discursive situation. Since "open dialogue" is the centre, Yip 
has to use terms of hermeneutics to expound Mencius's lines. Let us 
see how he concludes at the end, "To a certain extent, Orient may be 
an antidote to Western hermeneutic system." 155 This remark at once 
reminds us of lameson's "puzzle" and the missing pieces. 156 By this I 
mean Mencius seems to become a kind of plastic material in Yip's 
text and it is moulded into the right shape to fit the space left by the 
missing pieces in the Western puzzle. This kind of production of 
meaning In Chinese texts to suit the Western hegemonic 
interpretation seems legitimate since Yip has brilliantly laid down 
the underlying principle of "yi y~ ni zhi." In so saying I do not mean 
that Yip is aiming at this kind of domination. I am only saying that 
an inadvertent belief in "open dialogue" and "fusion of horizons" will 
leave generous room for an imperialist enterprise. 
or "fusion of horizons" are "theories." However, what I perceive in Yip's use of these 
concepts is that he is treating them as the theories of reading and tries to apply it in 
an East-West comparative context. 
155 Yip, Lishi clzuanslzi meixue, p.53. 
156Jameson once uses an analogy of a puzzle to illustrate the postmodern 
situation of the West. He claims that the West is like a puzzle missing a few pieces. At 
times he declares that China is the hope of the West, and I see this as trying to lo~k 
for the missing pieces in Chinese culture, since they cannot be reproduced In 
Western culture. See Fredric Jameson, "ModernisITI and Irnperialism," in Terry 
Eagleton, Fredric Jameson & Edward Said, Nationalism, Colonialism, Literature 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), p.S1. 
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Yip's over-optimistic attitude towards an "open dialogue" is 
perhaps due to his presumption that "East" and "West" can each have 
their own voice, and these voices can be. communicated In a fair 
situation. However, as lanMohamed says, "every time when we 
speak or write in English, French, German, or another European 
language, we pay homage to Western intellectuals and poli tical 
hegemony." 157 Even though Yip is writing in Chinese on some 
occasions, he cannot but borrow English terms. This is an interesting 
contrast to Owen. Owen uses English which is free of Western 
conceptual vocabularies to " write about Chinese literature, whereas 
Yip uses "Chinese" terms which are translations from English or full 
of Western overtones. ' From both we can detect the coexistence of 
the codes of two different systems - the West as the dominant voice. 
Yip should well be clear that translation of Chinese poetry will distort 
the Chinese poetic tradition, but he may have overlooked the fact 
that the translation of English terms into Chinese in a Chinese text 
will also distort the indigenous situation. This limitation IS 
apparently a result of his treatment of poetry and criticism as two 
different categories of discourse. In the Chinese tradition, however, 
the two are not separate. It seems that Yip considers the most 
significant aspect of criticism to be "meaning" and that of poetry to 
be its aesthetics. In Yip's sense, the "meaning" of the critical 
discourse can be communicated in an open dialogue. So eventually 
what we find in Yip's essay IS only a repetition of Western 
hermeneutics in Chinese, but the voice is, definitely but regrettably, 
157 Abdul lanMohamed & David Lloyd, "Toward a Theory of Minority 
Discourse," in The Nature and Context of Minority Discourse (New York and London: 
Oxford University Press, 1990), p.6. 
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not Chinese. He does not realize the influence of the dominant in a 
comparative discourse. Whether one writes in Chinese or English, the 
dominant VOIce IS still . the hegemonic system of the West. 
Unfortunately, this is a harsh fact that one has to admit, as Lao Zi 
admits that "The tao that can be taoed is not the constant tao" by 
using language as the medium. Like Derrida, we have also to see this 
as . " a strategy of using the only available language while not 
submitting to its premises."158 Indeed, without admitting this, one 
cannot put into practice what Henry Louis Gates Jr. once says, "only 
the master's tools will ever dismantle the master's house."159(orig~nal 
emphasis) 
In the article "Yiyi zugou yu quanti jiagou, "1:,* lli~-J,i;p,f jJ~"..'~ 
(liThe Structure of Meaning and the Power Framework") Yip shows 
that he is not unaware of ideology of the production of meaning. 
Here he talks about the danger caused by the power of language, and 
the possibility of reading the same stuff into different meanings 
acco~ding to the wish of the hegemonic interpreter. In other words, 
the politics of hermeneutics can be appropriated by the dominant. 
In the article Yip . cites very lucid examples from both China and the 
West to illustrate this appropriation, and I think the most important 
argument in these illustrations is that he takes notice of the fact that 
Copernicus is using the original structure of meaning to dismantle the 
given structure. 160 Copernicus puts forward his theory which takes 
the sun as the centre of the universe by using exactly the same 
158S ee Derrida, Of Grammato[ogy, in particular the translator's introduction 
by Gayatri Spi vak, p. viii. 
159Henry Louis Gates Jr., "The Master's Pieces: On Canon Fornlation and the 
African -American Tradition," in South Atlantic Quarterly 9 (1990), p.107. 
160Yip, Lislzi clzuanslzi meixue, p.218. 
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approach as the Ptolemaic theory. "In other words," Yip writes, "one 
has to use language to conquer language, and this is a self-reflexive 
critique." 161 He then claims in a parenthesis that this paves the way 
for postmodern thinkers. This is again a self-deconstructive aspect 
of the nature of language. But I am afraid I have to repeat this 
agaIn: we cannot stop at the point of deconstructiort. 
Yip does not stop at this point, indeed. He go~s on tQ claim 
that (in Part 11) there are two ways of overruling a power structure. 
First, using rereading and reinterpretation of a certain classic to 
support a kind of subversion. For instance, the founder of Zhou 
Dynasty reinterprets the classic to claim that it is lien ming --:t::....kr 
(God's will) to overrule the Shang Dynasty. However, Yip believes 
that to use a power structure to replace another structure is still 
distorting the Nature. A Copernician revol ution is not desirable in 
Yip's view, since it merely uses one structure to replace another. Yip 
thus believes that the second way, that is, to radically dismantle the 
danger that the structure of meaning will bring by founding it upon a 
critique of language. 162 He quotes from Tao Te Ching to illustrate his 
pain t, 
The way is for ever nameless. 
Though the uncarved block is small 
No one in the world dare claim its allegiance. 
Should lords and princes be able to hold fast to it 
The myriad creatures will submit of their own accord. 
Heaven and earth will unite and sweet dew will fall 
161 Yip, Lislzi clzuanslzi nleixue, p.218. 
162 Yip, Lislzi chuanshi meixue, p.244. 
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And the people will be quitable, though no one so decrees. 
Only when it is cut are there names ... 163 
~tl~~A .71i~(i{J' ,'*T*~~li~. 
1-t £;t' ~ t-* ~ I ~ tfJ> ~la:t . 
~:t~;J:~k w,( ~-Jt~ • ~~ :L4~ ~ i;tJ . 
~~ ~~ ~ ~ " 
Here let us recall James Liu's "paradox of language." We have 
already shown that the paradox of language can be appropriated by 
the dominant, and so here I doubt whether Yip's belief that the use 
of the destruction of shi zhi you ming ~~ ~j;f-j~ (Only when it is 
cut are there names) from inside - in fact, this IS a deconstructive 
practice - can resist being "reinterpreted" by the powerful (the first 
instance mentioned above) to 'stabilize the hegemonic interpretation 
again. 
Yip's discourse, albeit showing a Foucauldian influence here, 
does point to a direction that an oppositional hermeneutics may need 
to take. However, the way to handle classical materials still has to be 
examined. We have seen from Liu's and Owen's cutting the modern 
off from their discourses that they have put themselves outside the 
modern "westernized" context and thus they over-optimistically 
believe that they are themselves on an innocent ground. On the 
other hand, Yip has certainly tried to consider the modern aspect. 
For instance, in his "Refl~ctions on Historical Totality of Modern 
Literature," he tries to deal with the modern Chinese context. 164 In 
163Lao Zi, Tao Te Ching XXXII, translation quoted from D.C. Lau trans., Tao Te 
Ching (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1982), p.49. 
164Wai-lim Yip, "Reflections on Historical Totality of the Studies of Modern 
Literature," in Tamkang Review 10 (1979), pp.35-55. Chinese version in Lishi, 
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this' article Yip seems to be uSing an approach \vhich contradicts his 
Taoist aesthetics. Yip borrows Fredrlc lanleson's "dialectical 
criticism" as a model to discuss the westernized context of modern 
Chinese literature. However, in his theory of lvu-yen tu-hua and m 1 
. 
xiang pang tong, Yip does not use a dialectical approach himself. He 
examines only the Chinese side and treats it as the centre. It seems 
t~at since he is talking about a "westernized" context, it is legitimate 
for him to discuss with reference to Western concepts. Here Yip 
shows a similar attitude to Liu and Owen. The former two avoids 
talking about the modern, and Yip treats the lTIodern and the 
traditional in different ways. We can further detect from this 
tendency that In his treatment of the traditional comparative poetics, 
Yip is confining himself under the title of "Taoist aesthetics" and this 
concept becomes a great hindrance for him. 
problem of his so-called "common poetics." 
This is exactly the 
In the conclusion of this article, Yip claitns that, 
As we must now see, the study of this period 
must begin with this complex ambivalence in 
the process of appropriation and negotiation 
between Chinese and Western cultural modes. 
To fully understand the interpretation of 
planes and surfaces of past and present, 
native and alien cultures which have been 
constantly in a double state of attraction and 
repulsion, one must possess a clear awareness 
. pp.251-277. According to Yip, in the rewriting of the English quallshi, melxue, 
version into Chinese he has adopted a certain change of ,tone. 
of historical totality, an awareness' that will 
require us to step out of single, monocultural 
perspectives (particularly those that are cut 
off from. the life-process of concrete history) 
and beyond set space-frame and time-frarne 
so as to witness the simultaneous sequences 
of dynamic growth and change of cultural 
traits in the torrential flow of concrete 
history.165 (my emphases) 
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There are two reasons to cite this paragraph extensively here. First, 
Yip shows that he thinks it is possible to "step out." Second, he keeps 
on saying that we must begin with a complex "ambivalence" in the 
study of this period. He seems to I believe that the modern situation 
IS In a complex ambivalence and the tradition is free from this. 
Judging from the open dialogue of past and present that he 
advocates, however, Yip seems to have neglected his own role in the 
modern context - the complex and ambivalent modern context will 
inevitably predetermine our view of the tradition. This limitation can 
be seen as basically due to his belief that one can "step out" of ' the 
modern situation. However, it should now be clear that one's own 
position should not be able to transcend one's own discourse, and so 
Yip's position should also be growing In a context of "complex 
ambi valence." Yip's double standarQ towards the tradition and the 
modern let him analyze the traditional Chinese poetics in a closed 
circle under the name of "common poetics," but this will become 
paralyzed In face of the modern situation. It will be 
165Yip, "Reflections on Historical Totality," p.54. 
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decontextualized, and then recontextualized by the hegemonic 
system of interpretation. I think Yip's idea mentioned in the passage 
quoted immediately above is rather reasonable for our study if we 
get rid of the hope of stepping out and change the word from "of" to 
"in," since I see no reason any study in our period can avoid the 
complex ambivalence In our context. 
Meanwhile, Yip also claims that "it was initially against , 
foreign domination that they [the Chinese intellectuals] turned away 
from tradition, but they have now embraced a world view the 
implied practice of which would eventually throw them into another 
form of domination."166 Yip, indeed, is not turning away from 
tradition, but the result of his effort may not be too different from 
that. He turns towards the tradition to avoid ~domination, and this 
will also "throw him into another form of domination" since "the 
implied practice" of it will only be a form of exclusion of ' the Chinese 
poetics as mysterious. By using the term "COmlTIOn poetics," it seem 
that we can step out of inter-cultural situation to examine different 
cultures. Therefore, although he claims that "we find that the total 
fabric of the modern Chinese intellectual negotiation between native 
and alien cultural modes is meshed with ambivalence," 167 he still 
simply steps out himself. He hits the issue and runs at once, and 
then. moves on : to another ambitious project in "Beyond Chinoiserie: 
Differentiating Sameness in the Oriental Hermeneutic Community." 168 
In this article he claims that we' should differen'tiate the sameness in 
166Yip, "Reflections on Historical Totality," p.53 . 
167Yip, "Reflections on Historical Totality," pp.53-54. 
168Wai-lim Yip, "Beyond Chinoserie: Differentiating Sameness in Oriental 
Hermeneutic Community," in Tamkang Review 15 (1984-85), pp ~ 221-232. 
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the hermeneutic systems under the large indiscriminate Oriental 
umbrella. This IS a case strangely similar to the articulation of 
minority discourse. The· application of funding for the conference 
"The Nature and Context of Minority Discourse" in 1986 is turned 
down by the National Endowments of Humanities, and the reason IS 
that to bring together in a few days of papers and discussions of 
various ethnic literature "would be anything but diffuse. "169 
To differentiate sameness In the Orient hermeneutic 
community in Yip's sense may give rise to "diffuse" discourses in the 
view of the dominant culture. So we are actually facing a dilemma: 
not to differentiate the sameness will create an Orient which is to be 
appropriated by the West, and to differentiate the sameness may 
give rise to "diffuse" discourses. So perhaps we should first deal with 
the reason that makes these appropriative processes legitimate; or 
else, we are simply talking about killing a dragon without knowing 
what a dragon is. Yip's proposal is of course insightful in a sense, but 
without a sense of oppositional reading there will only be clusters of 
"diffuse" discourses which cannot communicate homogeneously In 
the eyes of the National Endowments of Humanities. For instance, 
how are we going to publish an English version of the encyclopaedia 
about the Orient, as Yip suggests, without undue suppression? This is 
not only a pro~lem of translation, but also that of interpretation. The 
problem of interpretation is an issue that should receive attention 
before any further projects suggested by Yip can be realistically 
conducted. 
169 See in particular lanMohamed and Lloyd, The Nature and Context of 
Minority Discourse (the book-form of the proceedings of that conference), pp.3-4. 
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* * * 
In the course of this chapter I have been reading three major 
positions of reading traditional Chinese poetics and literary theories. 
I aim at using them to demonstrate the interpretive differential's in 
reading traditional Chinese poetry and poetics, and how these 
differentials can be used to build up or suppress the Chinese 
hermeneutic tradition. 
From lames Liu's role as an inter-lingual critic we should be 
clear that it should not be possible to situate oneself outside the 
Chinese-Western discourse to act as a real inter-cultural critic. There 
is · no Archimedean point for that position. We also learn that Liu's 
disco~rse may be self-deconstructive, but what we need IS not a 
complacent denunciation of the contradictories in his works, but a 
transformative reading of the materials that the late professor has 
prepared for us. From Owen we notice that it should not be possible 
to protect Chinese discourse from Western influence by simply 
avoiding Western vocabulary. Owen's example nonetheless shows us 
an interesting insight that the spirit of reading Chinese text would 
itself be self-evident "Chinese hermeneutics." From Yip we perceive 
the importance of a comparative struggle. However, we should not 
be over-optimistic towards an easy "open dialogue" and "fusion of 
horizons." Yes, I admit that there must be a "fusion of horizons," but 
the proportion of that fusion and how that fusion is mediated is 
always predetermined by the dominant tradition. Yip's argument 
about "power structure" offers us an approach of conducting an 
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oppositional reading: to critique language (but not merely Chinese 
language, but also. the rhetoric of contemporary theories) and 
subvert th~ domination ftom within 6y admitting the necessity of 
"paradox" in that c.ritique. One has to bear in mind that "paradox" is 
only a "paradox" in logical terms, but not in Taoist sense. However, 
Yip's obstinate clinging to the Taoist aesthetics in this aspect may be 
a limitation (the idea of shi zhi you ming may be appropriated by the 
. dominant discourse as well). In finding a voice for the Chinese 
hermeneutic tradition in these critics, we should notice that there IS 
no way to avoid the dominant discou·rse. The point that matters IS 
how to participate in the dominant discourse, using the Chinese ways 
of thinking to subvert that discourse from within. It is a futile, if not 
vulgar, effort to "deconstruct" the effort of these critics. For instance, 
Touponce's deconstructive reading of James Liu is only another 
ethnocentric cultural superiority, and that totally misses the spirit of 
a deconstructive reading. 
The admirable efforts of these critics have drained the swamp 
for us, who, in this (post-)colonial context, should perform a 
transformati ve reading of their discourse so as to es tablish an 
oppositional stance against domination. We · are to reread and 
rewrite some modern positions of hermeneutics of Chinese literature 
In the context of a grand · (anti- )colonial narrative - to be anti-colonial 
IS often another colonial enterprise. However, it is impossible for us 
to reach a genuinely post-colonial ' situation,170 and so we cannot start 
a new project as if colonial times had gone. Instead, through such a 
rereading of these positions, \ the works of these critics can be reread 
170See for instance Gates, "Critical Fanoniam," pp.469-470. 
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transformatively as t,he rules of reading of the Chinese tradition by a 
decontextualizing-recontextuaIizing dialectic. 171 We may 
decontextuaIize the three critic's works which have their specific 
target audiences and historical backgrounds, and then 
recontextualize them in a (post-)colonial context. In saying so, I do 
not mean it is simply a combination of the three critics' approaches 
that I mention in this chapter. The readings of these critics' readings 
provide us with a sense of our reading position which leads us into 
the battlefield where we critique the grand colonial narrative. Only 
then we can have a self-transformative reading which problematizes 
given discursive categories, opening new discursive spaces for a 
critical discourse of our own. 
In the concluding next chapter I will try to use different 
reading positions in (post-) colonial discourse to shed light on the 
"place" of Chinese critical discourse in the world scene, through which 
the Chinese hermeneutic tradition may find a way. to articulate itself. 
Chinese critical discourse in the (post- )colonial context, should take 
an oppositional reading stance; or else, it would simply become 
another epheme,ral pastime of the dominant culture. 
1 71 See Paul Ricoeur, "Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology," in Brice 
Wachterhauser ed., Hermeneutics and Modern Philosophy (Albany: University of 
New York Press, 1986), p. 329. Ricoeur writes, "The peculiarity of the literary work, 
and indeed works as such, is nevertheless to transcend its own psychological 
conditions of production and thereby open itself to an unlimited series of readings, 
themselves situated in socio-cultural contexts that are already different. In short, 
the work decontextualizes itself, from the social as well as the psychological point of 
view, and is able to recontextualize itself differently in the act of reading." 
Chapter Six: 
An "Other" Conclusion: 
Towards an Oppositional Reading in a (Post-)Colonial Context 
Introduction 
From the analyses in the preVIOUS chapters it should be 
apparent that Chinese critical discourse has to be grounded on a 
reading of different reading positions in dominant critical discourse. 
In this (post- )colonial context, then, what position should the reading 
of Chinese critical discourse take? The problem of "reading position" 
sho'uld be situated in contemporary discourse; · there will hardly be a 
"position" if we do not know where we are. It would thus be helpful 
for us to consider the "place" that Chinese critical discourse should 
assume in contemporary discourse before we · actually adduce the 
reading position of this oppositional discourse. 
Throughout the whole thesis, I am fully aware that my 
discourse is enmeshed In the dominant critical context. The 
development of my argument IS trapped In the dominant discourse. 
One may thus find it fair to ask" "How IS it possible to break the 
bounds laid down by the hegemonic culture?" Without paying 
adequate attention to this issue, my discourse will, of course, be 
doomed to become self-defeating SInce one is merely attacking the 
ground that one inevitably relies on. However, this thesis is a 
deliberate problematization of the given dominant categories and my 
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discourse is self-reflexive of the complicity with the dominant critical 
discourse. I have shown in the previous c!1apters that the dominant 
critical tradition will generate its power and thus the juxtaposition of 
Chinese hermeneutic tradition with it will inevitably represent the 
Chinese side according to the Western signification system. I then 
move on to show that the reading position of Chinese critical 
discourse should have be very sensitive towards the issue of Other. 
Illuminated by the feminist discourse, I believe that Chinese critical 
discourse has to go into the textual/political spaces opened by 
dominant critical discourse. Along this line of argument, several 
critics of Chinese poetics are examined to see how dominant 
ideology may reproduce itself in their texts. This kind of analysis 
aims at problematizing ' the given dominant discursive categories such 
as "interpretation," "meaning," and above all "hermeneutics." I do 
realize, however, that the questioning of these categories does not 
necessarily guarantee a voice of one's own SInce we are none the less 
in the shadow . of the dominant tradition In the course of such 
"problematizati on." One has to transform that problematization of 
the given categories into a new ground on which one can articulate a 
real difference. Therefore, this chapter :. aims at examining how we 
can base ourselves on the ' problematized ~ategories to have a new 
reading position which may hopefully transcend the limitation of the 
given dominant categories. This kind of effort may seem less as a 
positive than as a critical project. However, I wish to state that I see 
this thesis only as a point on the plane of activity and praxis with a 
decentered consciousness. When his Orientalisln is criticized by 
others as being not able to provide a positive conclusion, Said lists in 
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"Orientalism Reconsidered" a series of critics all writing with a 
decentered consciousness. These works are at least non-totalizing, 
and in some cases anti-totalizing. Said claims that they are "planes of 
activity and praxis," rather than "one topography commanded by a 
known centre." In addition, these works, unlike Orientalist 
scholarship, "are not based on the finality and closure of antiquarian 
knowledge, but are investigative open model of analysis. "I By 
mentioning the example of Said I mean that this chapter has expelled 
the extravagant wish of giving a constructive conclusion by itself. 
Instead, it is conceived as one of the non/anti-totalizing discourses, 
and it has to be viewed together with other non/anti-totalizing 
discourses 'on the same plane. Therefore, this project may give the 
impression that it is more positional than programmatic, but it is in 
this "other" respect that this conclusion can be seen as constructive.2 
The "Place" of Chinese Critical Discourse 
To talk about the reading position of Chinese critical 
discourse, I find it necessary to go into the notion. of "place". Within 
the comparative discourse, to talk about the "place" of Chinese critical 
discourse one must first occupy a place. In this sense, it should be 
impossible to talk about "place" if we are to discuss Chinese critical 
.1 See Edward Said, "Orientalism Reconsidered," In Francis Barker et al 
eds. Literature, Politics and Theory (New York: Methuen, 1986). 
21 think this kind of analysis may be constructive in the sense that it 
can clarify the "subject position" of Chinese discourse. I strongly feel. that wc 
have to re-orient the subject position of "China" in contemporary dIscourse, 
with a keen sense of the issue of the Other,' in order to reconstruct Chinese 
cultural identity which in my view has been dea.d aft~r the U~ium .War.. · This 
subject position may help us unite different dIscursIve pr~ctlces In dIfferent 
fi e I d s - un i tin g the m i n to a d i s cur s i ve g rea t w a I 1. 0 n.l y th 1 s m a y g e n era t e. a 
genuine Chinese discourse, without which there wIll be no constructIve 
dialogue between Chinese and Western discourses. 
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discourse. The occupation of a place when talking about "place" 
spontaneously gives rise to a problem: whether the "place" of the 
Chinese interpretive subject in the critical text or the "place" of the 
self-privileging critical text is the thing that one wants to achieve. In 
the most ideal case the two are actually the same, but such a utopian 
dream, perhaps itl a sense practical, must be over-optimistic fn view 
of the place of Chinese texts in a comparative discourse. In Chapter 
Two I have shown that interpretation will inev~tably generate a kind 
of paradox which will leave generous room for the dominant critical 
tradition to disseminate its power onto the colonized. Suffice it to 
claim that the "place" of Chinese critical discourse in Western 
discourse is never an innocent representation of a Chineso way of 
interpretation. Therefore, we have to consider the "place" of Chinese 
critical discourse in the East-West comparative discourse before any 
hope of reading towards a Chinese critical discourse may be realized. 
Both Foucault and Said grant "place" an important place in 
their discussions of author, text and critic. For instance, Said holds 
that the notion of place "involves relations, affiliations, the critics 
fashion with the texts and audiences they address; it also involves 
the dynamic taking place of a critic's own text ~s it is produced. "3 
Here I would borrow the point that in criticizing a text the critic's 
work cannot but become another self-privileging text. A series of 
questions conveniently follows, and an apparent one of them would 
be whether that critical text can actually stand between the reader 
and the text it studies or not. Such a question, according to Said, is 
3Edward Said, The " World, the Text a1ld the Critic (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1983), p.50. For further details of the different modes of 
"place" please refer to pp. 50-51. 
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due to the conventional attribution of criticism as secondary to 
prImary text. In fact, criticism inevitably transforms itself into 
another text and subsequently forms an intertext with the original. 
So we have to keep a wary eye on the representation as well as the 
self-presentation of Chinese critical discourse In a comparative 
discourse. 
In discussing what an ' author IS, Foucault no longer considers 
the notion of "author" as simple as an individual who produces the 
text; but rather, author exhibits a "function."4 By the same token, 
. "critic" is also no longer an individual but one that exhibits a "critic-
function" which does not point towards a simple indi vidual. 
Whoever appropriates . the "critic-function" would become the master. 
It then silently voices what we dare not think: Chinese critical 
discourse may be vulnerable to be appropriated by dominant 
Western discourse. When Foucault claims that "we would hear 
hardly anything but the stirring of an indifference: 'What difference 
4 See Michel Foucault, "What Is an Author?" in his Language, Counter-
M emory, Practice, trans. Donald F. Bouchard '. and Sherry Simon (Ithaca: CornelI 
University Press, 1977). The "individual" I invoke here is referring to the one 
who writes the' text, who is traditionally considered as the "author". However, 
the Post-structuralist claim of "the death of the author" has left empty a space 
previously occupied by this "individual." Foucault believes that it is not 
enough "to repeat ~he empty affirmation that the author has disappeared," and 
"we must locate the space left empty by the author's disappearance." (p.145) 
Foucault goes on to differentiate four characteristic traits of the "author-
function" - a term that he uses to "locate the space left empty by the author's 
disappearance" . The four traits are as follows: "1. the author-function is 
linked to the juridical and institutional system that' encompasses, determines 
and articulates the universe of discourses; 2. it does not affect all discourses in 
the same way at all times and in aI1 types of civilization; 3. it is not defined by 
the spontaneous attribution of a discourse to its producer, but rather by a 
series of specific and complex operations; 4. it does not refer purely and simply 
to a real individual, since it can give rise simultaneously to several selves, to 
several subjects - positions that can be occupied by different classes of 
individuals." (p.IS3) 
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doe~ it make who is speaking?',"5 one cannot but worry if we do not 
adequately consider the colonization of the powerful discourse, the 
Chinese subject cannot" speak In its own voice. 
explicating the "indifference" in Foucaulfs text. 
Let us go on by 
It is not simply 
disinterested - yes, there may be no difference \vho is speaking, but 
the powerful discourse would most likely appropriate the "critic-
function" and thus subjugate the Other. 
In establishing Chinese critical discourse, therefore, one must 
have a keen sense of reading as the Other. A reading with deliberate 
complexity to read the "place" of Chinese critical discourse and even 
the place of that place is essential in a comparative discourse. No one 
can deny that cultures are actually inter-determining zones, and the 
"place" in such an intertext would mean an effort to displace other 
cultural traditions- though it sounds ironic. In a comparative 
discourse, the role of the "place" of Chinese critical discourse should 
aim at disseminating its meaning across cultures, be that textual, 
cui tural or his torical. As shown in the previous chapters, any 
Chinese critical discourse - an anti-colonial discourse - is doomed to 
be a colonial discourse. Said has pointed out elsewhere that "Orient" 
IS only a silent Other to the West, and the analysis of such an "Orient" 
IS an extension of "colonialism. "6 Such an argument has been very 
5Foucault, "What is An Author?" p.160. 
60ne may ask here why Said is pertinent to a "Chinese" critical 
discourse since he is' not Chinese. The point is that Said brings forth an issue -
colonizer vs. colonized, East vs. West - that is pertinent to the situation of a 
Chinese-Western comparative discourse. Although Said's argument is not 
flawless (for instance, Bhabha's comments onhinl is quite reasonable - I am 
going to mention this later on), he did establish a ~e,: discursiv~ categor.y. in 
which the critical Other can make different enunclatlons. ChInese cntIcal 
discourse may utilize this discursive space to establish new discursive 
categories of its own. 
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polemical over the years, and in a more recent article, "OrientaIism 
Reconsidered," after a response to some of the charges against him 
Said concludes as follows, 
Lastly, [we need] a much sharpened sense of 
the intellectual's role both in the defining of a 
context and in changing it, for without that, I 
believe, the critique of Orientalism IS simply 
an ephemeral pastime. 7 
We have already noted above that Chinese critical discourse has to 
be a representation as well as a self-presentation. For instance, 
lames Liu's Chinese Theories of Literature can be seen as a 
representation of the , traditional Chinese ways of interpretation. 
However, Liu's model is basically derived from a predominantly 
Western model of Abrams. Liu's text thus suppresses the re-
presentation of the traditional 'Chinese ways of interpretation. Take 
the example of Liu Xie ~'J ~--- James Liu claiIns that Liu Xie 
"perpetrates the omission of any logical explanation of the connection 
between the expressive nature ascribed to poetry and the pragmatic 
functions it is supposed to serve. "8 One cannot but query whether 
Liu Xiehas "expressive" and "pragmatic" theories in his mind when 
he writes his monumental Wenxin diaolong ~A,,:.,' ff)(ii3ts. The tetradic 
circle that lames Liu uses, obviously enough, is something imposed 
upon Liu Xie's theory which can be seen as developing as a unity of 
the four elements in the circle. In other words, the representation of 
7Edward Said, "Orientalism Reconsidered," in Francis Baker ed. 
Literature, Politics, Theory (London: Methuen, 1986), p.229. 
8 lames Liu, Chinese Theories of Literature (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1975), p.126. 
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Liu Xie's theory in J ames Liu's text has silenced the other voices 
inherent in Liu Xie's text besides those suitable for the discussion of 
the tetradic circle. Liu Xie's text does not have a "logical" 
explanation, simply because the self-representation of Liu Xie's text 
is terminated in James Liu's text which silences other voices inherent 
In Liu Xie's text. Unfortunately, James Liu's work, upon canonization, 
becomes something presenting the Chinese theories of interpretation, 
and this "filtered" representation of the traditional Chinese theories 
of interpretation will inevitably make them seem "illogical." 
, 
The self-privileging texts of modern Chinese critics seem to 
secure the re-presentation of traditional Chinese poetics in its text (in 
StephenOwen's case, for instance) and thus provides it with a 
context. However, to have a cogent critique of Chinese critical 
discourse would not be as facile as "to define and change the 
context," as the context - always enmeshed In the colonizing 
narrative- IS almost impossible to define. The intellectual's role in 
the critique of Orientalism may, at its best, deconstruct Orientalist 
effort. Unfortunately enough, if we stop at that point, such an effort 
cannot but be incorporated by the Occidental discourse to become 
another similar, if different, tool of subjugation. Said's discourse of 
Orientalism IS incapable of generating a kind of Chinese critical 
discourse. 
It seems that Chinese critical discourse is a discourse of the 
Other, but as a marginal discourse it is at the same time similar to 
and different from the discourse of the Third World, the Black, or the 
Feminist. It is actually located "between" the dominant and the 
. · d' (Th d "between" here IS somewhat mInorIty Iscourse. e wor 
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misleading, since the two can never be reconciled.) The 
representation of the "tradition" of Chinese critical discourse further 
complicates the issue. This I will discuss later. Now let us examine 
some theories of decolonization to see how the reading position of 
such a Chinese critical discourse should be oriented. 
Decolonizing Interpretation 
Robert Young once criticized Said's argument, 
Said's constant questioning of the role of the 
intellectual assumes - against the evidence 
and argument of his own book -" his or her 
ability to operate In a separate space 
independent from contemporary ideology, 
even with the customary benefit of the 
scientific knowledge of "Marxism. 9 
Although Said stresses that "he cannot give himself over to the VIew 
that an Archimedean point existed outside the contexts he was 
"d e s c ri bin g ," 1 0 he is none the less bound by the Derridean self-
deconstructive nature of a text: his discourse exhibits a paradox that 
he has to operate "in a separate space" to argue against the role of 
intellectuals since he himself belongs to the same category. So such a 
, 
paradox may render Said's text "self-defeating" in the dominant 
discourse. In other words, the powerful discourse will, either 
intentionally or unintentionally~ appropriate that paradox and defeat 
9Robert Young, White Mythologies: Writing History and the West 
(London: Routledge, 1990), p.132. 
10Edward Said, "Representing the Colonized: Anthropology's 
Interlocutor," in Critical Inquiry "15 (Winter 1989), p. 211. 
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the cri tique of Orientalism. In a sense, the Orientalist effort is 
su'stained even if it is problematic, since the critique itself is equally, 
if not more, problematic. Therefore, one cannot wholly rely upon a 
critique of Orientalists since such a critique has also to be grounded 
upon dominant discourse. 
An anti-colonial discourse must thus be very sensitive to its 
own textuality. One should not forget that the rhetoric of theoretical 
discourse remains exclusively to be that of Western discourse. As we 
know and Said himself knows, the critique of Orientalism has to be 
conducted within the powerful discourse, but self-consciousness does 
not guarantee an accurate definition free from suppression. As 
J ohannes Fabian rightly remarks, "Consciousness-raising can only be 
preparatory to a critique that might have a chance of being truly 
subversive." 11 We may say that only when the "paradox of 
textuality"12 actually diminishes, the defining of the context can be 
disinterested and the changing of it be effective. But obviously we 
cannot imagine this. Therefore, to ignpre the paradox of textuality 
would mean letting Orientalism encroach on Chinese discourse. The 
most ironic point in Said's discourse is that his critique of Orientalism 
connives at - he may not be responsible for this - the occupation of a 
place by Orientalism in the comparative discourse. Therefore, Young 
is able to make a comment like this: 
The Orient, we might say, operates as both 
poison and cure for Europe: it constitutes both 
1110hannes Fabian, "Presence and Representation: . ·The Other and 
Anthropological Writing," in Critical . Inquiry 16 (Summer 1990), p.768. 
12 For an elaborate account of this "paradox of textuality" please refer 
to Chapter Two. 
the greatest threat to European civilization at 
the same time as it represents a therapeutic 
for the lost spiritual values of the West, 
offering hope for the regeneration of Europe 
by Asia ... The problem of Ori entalism is that 
without a concept of inner dissension Said is 
constantly led simply to condemn 
Qrientalism's projection of discourse on to 
external geographical or radical difference -
even as h~ himself repeats such a structure 
by identifying Orientalism as "for" or 
"against." 13 
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I cite Young's criticism of Said with no intention to glve myself to 
Young's view. On the contrary, we have to be as skeptical towards 
Young as Young towards Said. We may even say that Said's model is 
more benevolent - at least, less malicious - towards our discourse. 
As Antony Tatlow indicates, "the First World prepares to extricate 
itself from its local disasters by expor'ting them." 14 So we should 
only consider Said's effort as preparatory In creating a truly 
subversive argum~nt, and this IS exactly why I use his theory to 
pave the way for my further arguments. The discourse of the 
critical Other, facing the aporia of the self-deconstructive textuality, 
is appropriated by the dominant VOIce. The critique of Orientalism 
ironically becomes a very good antidote to Western discourse in the 
sense that it channels the hard feelings, should there be any, aroused 
13Young, White Mythologies, p.140. 
14 Antony Tatlow, Repression and Figuratio1l: From Totem to Utopia 
(Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, 1990), p.128. 
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by the charge of imperialistic extension through Orientalism. In 
such an intertext created by Said's critics, the critique of Orientalism 
cannot fulfill its original aim since the critique is incorporated into 
the Western critical tradition and becomes a part of it. 
Meanwhile, Homi Bhabha touches on the issue of 
"ambi valence" in the process of represen ting the Orien t by ttte 
colonizer, criticizing Said's approach as a simple binarism of East and 
West, which neglects the alterity and ambivalence in between, and 
"allows them to be correlated as a congruent system of 
representation that is unified through a political-ideological intention 
which, In his words, enables Europe to achieve securely and 
unmetaphorically upon the Orient." 15 Bhabha "shifts Said's 
perspective, which emphasizes the representation of the Orient for 
consumption within a dominant Western culture, to focus on 
Orientalism's role when used as an instrument of colonial power and 
administrations." 16 Although Bhabha's belief that power is not 
sitnply possessed by the colonizer sounds reasonable, his affirmation 
of ambivalence of colonial discourse generously leaves too much 
room for textuality to generate its power. What is "ambivalent" is 
basically "defined" by the standards legitimated by the dominant 
critical tradition. For instance, Bhabha is fond of quoting Frantz 
Fanon's famous 'line, "The Black man is not. <caesura> Any more than 
the White man." 17 Bhabha believes that the caesura in the line IS 
15 Homi Dhabha, "Difference, Discrimination and the Discourse of 
Colonialism," in Francis Barker et al eds. The Politics of Theory (Colchester: 
University of Essex Press, 1983), pp.199-200. 
16Young, White Mythologies, p.142. 
1 7 See for instance Homi Bhabha's recent article, '''Race', Ti me and the 
Revision of Modernity," in Oxford Literary Review 13 (1991), p.194. In an 
informal interview with Bhabha by Liao Ping-hui published in Chinese in The 
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exactly the place that indicates the ambivalent relationship between 
the (White) colonizer and the colonized (Black). He is attacking Said's 
"binarism" of the East and the West at this point. However, to 
emphasize only the ambivalence, I would say, will let the hegemonic 
interpretation exercise its power in the production of meaning to 
"demystify" the ambivalence. In other words, although the caesura 
is present, it will disappear in the production of meaning since the 
hegemonic interpretation will only legitimate the "meaning" of "The 
Black man is not any more than the White man." Therefore, the 
sentence ironically secures the hierarchy between the colonizer and 
the colonized SInce the ambivalence In between cannot be 
foregrounded in face of the gIven dominant category of "meaning" In 
the hegemonic interpretation. If we cannot radically challenge the 
given dominant category of "interpretation" and halt at the point of 
"ambivalence" (ambivalent only In the sense defined by the 
dominant category), the colonized is wholly existing for the sake of 
the discourse of the colonizer. Blinded by the so-called 
"ambivalence" between the colonizer and the colonized, one would 
easily be trapped in the ' shadow of the definitions of "colonizer" and 
"colonized," and thus will not be able to break away from our 
complicity with the hegemonic interpretation. While I do think that 
there is much space of negotiations between the colonizer and the 
colonized, I have to state that what I wish to foreground in this 
thesis IS the "dominant" signification system. Definitely, the 
colonized may appropriate the power of the colonizer and thus 
Call-temporary (M.arch, 1992), Bhabha admits that this is his most frequently 
quoted line fronl Fanon,. p.21. 
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makes the relationship between the two "ambivalent," but I still 
think that the "power" exerts its function according to the 
signification process of hegemonic interpretation. 
Bhabha's theory may be anti-colonial in a sense, but such an 
anti-colonial effort cannot be unproblematic. Derridean 
deconstruction has pointed out elsewhere that a text is fated to 
transgress the rules that it lays down. A mundane criticism against 
this deconstructive effort has been rather common: it is only a 
pathological recurrence of infinite deconstructive readings of 
readings. No one should deny that it may simply be a matter of 
reading strategy, but in terms of Chinese critical discourse one cannot 
oversimplify the issue by claiming that such a reading strategy IS 
simply tautological and meaningless. Very often colonialism In 
interpretation is germinated from the interstices . among different 
readings of this kind. The interstices are exactly where a 
comparatist should go into, or else the colonial power, be it 
ambivalent or not (only a difference of terms), would then be 
secured by the text when discussions like these are still mediated In 
the dominant discourse. Like other binarislTIs, any paradox ("spear 
and shield" in Chinese) IS customarily split into two poles of reason. 
In fact, the spear and the shield need not be opposed to each other, 
as they are possessed by the same person - the colonizer in our case. 
To challenge the paradox would easily fall into the aporia of the 
textuality of the Western discourse. So a reading of the colonial 
discourse may be another weapon of permeating colonialism. Any 
anti-colonial disco,urse has to pay homage to colonialism and without 
a careful reading of colonial discourse and its relation with anti-
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colonial discourse, there would never be a real post-colonial 
situation. 
Facing the colonialism In interpretation, Chinese critical 
discourse IS definitely marginal, just like feminism and black 
aesthetics. Indeed, it . IS essential to rearticulate the vOice 
marginalized by the transcendental vOice of universalizing Theory of 
the hegemonic culture. However, we have · already shown that the 
traditional concern "What is or ought to be?" should · turn to the only 
meaningful question for Chinese critical discourse, that is, "What is to 
be done?" (borrowing lanMohamed's and Lloyd's questions)18 In this 
sense, Chinese critical discourse may only be something done by 
critics, but not something out there for us to find. So I would see 
Bhabha's model as one that may overwhelm us with the so-called 
"ambivalence" and thus blind us towards the ideological implication 
behind the ambivalence In one's textuality. In this respect Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak's effort of decolonization may provide us with a 
point of departure towards a Chinese critical discourse reoriented. 
·One can immediately tell from the title of Spivak's In Other 
Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics that she wants to advocate the 
presence of other worlds besides the metropolitan West. In "Three 
Women's Texts and a Critique of Imperialism," Spivak notes that she 
attempts to "examine the operation of the "worlding" of what is today 
called the Third World." 19 Such an effort is significantly different 
18 Abdul lanMohamed and David Lloyd, "Toward a Theory of Minority 
Discourse: What Is To Be Done?" in .The Nature Gild Context of Minority 
Discou rse, lanMohamed and Lloyd eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1990), p.16. 
190ayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Three Women's Texts and a Critique of 
Imperialism," in Critical Inquiry 12 (Autumn 1985), pp.243-4. 
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from an anti-colonial one SInce it places the ultimate concern on the 
alterity of the Third World as a critical Other. In addition to the 
(re)presentation of the ·Third World (Said's "Orient"), Spivak also aims 
at a "worlding" of the Third World, letting it speak in its own voice 
and challenge the ethnography of imperialism. Although Spivak's so-
called' "epistemic violence" de facto points out that history is by no 
means a series of facts, her analysis of colonial discourse cannot be 
mediated outside the historical narrative of imperialism. Indeed, 
Spivak is alert to the impotence of a radical anti-colonial discourse 
(t~at is why she puts more emphasis on the "subaltern"),20 but her 
decolonization, unfortunately enough, has to confront a strategic 
aporia faced by Derrida - who has a profound influence on Spivak -
that "no structure" has to be based on "structure." So critics would 
challenge, as Young does, "the paradox of Spivak's own work remains: 
it seems as if the heterogeneity of the Third World WOInan can only 
be achieved .. through a certain homogenization of the First. "21 One 
may then charge that Spi yak's text is self-defeating: on the one hand 
it attacks the totalization of the imperialism and on the other it has 
to rely upon a totalization of the discourse of the Third World which 
must be to a significant extent homogeneous, or else hardly would it 
be meaningful in an imperialist discourse. If we are to see Spivak's 
effort with relation to Chinese critical discourse, we shall descry that 
her error lies In aiming at a direct transformation of the "worlding" 
of the Third World into the discourse of imperialism. The process, as 
we shall see, is a far more complicated one. 
20This kind of radical criticisms will unconsciously reproduce 
imperialist assumption. See Young, White Mythologies, p.162. 
21 Young, White Mythologies, p.167. 
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Spivak's greatest contribution to the reading position of our 
Chinese critical discourse IS that she always reminds us of the 
complexity of the "position" of the "subaltern": 
. . . not only the relationship between the 
three domination systems (class, racial/ethnic, 
and sex/gender) that is "dialectical," but that 
In the theaters of decolonization, the 
relationship between indigenous and 
imperialist systems of domination are also 
"dialectical," even when they are variously 
related to the Big Three Systems cited 
above. 22 
As long as the subalterns cannot speak in their own VOIce, any 
seemingly radical critique is only reproducing the system that they 
intend to write against. By understanding the position of the 
subaltern one may know better why the subaltern cannot speak. In 
this sense Spivak's theory is not incompatible with Chinese critical 
discourse. One should not consider China as culturally identical with 
the Third World and" Chinese critical discourse as a typical minority 
discourse - Chinese literature once had its own tradition. In a 
comparative discourse, however, Chinese critical discourse can only 
be subaltern. Different from other oppressed, such as the Third 
World, the Black, and woman, Chinese cannot help returning to her 
tradition to search for treasures. Along that line Chinese critical 
discourse cannot but be a repetition of the "tradition" in Western 
discursive categories. In the worst case the treasures would be 
22Spivak, In Other Worlds, p.251. 
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appropriated by the dominant discourse, and in general the raiders 
of the lost tradition are trapped in a dijjerance, that is to say, forever 
chasing after the tradition which recesses infinitely with a speed 
higher than that of their approaching. In other words, the Chinese 
tradition is in an eternal standstill, and the Western critical tradition 
is rapidly developing. The so-called "tradition" will thus become 
farther and 'farther away from us since it has lost its power of 
transformation. 23 Yet we cannot make the casual claim that the 
burden of tradition should simply be lifted. The place of "tradition" 
in Chinese critical discourse becomes a central issue of our theory of 
reading. Similar to the "text" of a tl text" and the "place" of "place" 
that we mention earlier, one needs to treat the treatment of the 
tradition In Chinese critical discourse. We have to analyze the 
analysis of Chinese tradi tion and reread the readings of modern 
attempts In the field of Chinese critical discourse (such a meta-
reading IS essen tial) to see how Chinese critical discourse IS 
marginalized. 
Ever . Since the May-Fourth Movement, Western uSing 
methods in a Chinese context has been a very popular issue. But as 
we have repeatedly shown, borrowing Western theories without self-
reflexiveness will not contribute to the articulation of the indigenous 
discourse. Yet the problem that the Chinese tradition lacks a voice of 
its own still persists. Chinese culture has to be articulated in a 
Western voice, or else it cannot be communicated with the West. If 
23The efforts of contemporary Neo-Confucian, such as Du Wci-ming, 
are very lucid examples of this loss of power. Thcy all aim at a transformation 
of traditional Chinese culture in the modern contcxt. Examples are too ample 
to need citation. 
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we insist on the essence of Chinese culture which cannot be 
perceived by the West, then we are simply ascertaining our role of a 
critical Other which is to be excluded from the mainstream culture. 
Chinese-Western comparative literature finds itself situated in this 
kind of dilemma. Now let us go into the reading between cultures to 
see if we can resolve this dilemma. 
Reading Between Cultures 
Let us recall ' the case of the National Endowments of 
Humanities mentioned in the previous chapter. The turning down of 
the proposal of IanMohamed and Lloyd's conference on , minority 
discourse is obviously a "legitimate marginalization," and this c:tn 
also be seen a~ a weapon of subjugation by keeping the minority at 
arm's length from one another. Anyhow, we should not simply 
believe that to bring together the minorities to produce a "coherenf' 
theory is a way out. The "incoherent" th,eory ("impressionistic" in the 
case of Chines~ theories) may seem to be a limitation, but not a real 
"weak spot" of minority discourse. Value is often relative. The 
production of values, just like that of knowledge, is not evenly 
distributed; the colonizer's self being the centre. In fact, "the very 
differences that have always been read as symptoms of inadequacy 
can be reread· transformatively as indications and figurations of 
values radically opposed to · those of the dominant culture."24 
J anMohamed and Lloyd believe that minority critics, unlike post-
structuralists who deconstruct its identity from within, must begin 
from a position of objective "nonidentity" that is rooted in their 
24JanMohamed & Lloyd, "Toward a Theory of Minority Discourse," p.8. 
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economIC and cultural marginalization vis-a-vis the HWest. "25 Such a 
"non-identity", regrettably; is merely theoretical. Unless the utopian 
claim of Spivak that · "post-colonial intellectuals have to unlearn their 
privileges"26 is realized, a scholar-critic brought up in the Western 
institutional system can hardly acquire such a "non-identity." It may 
seem that although a minority critic is a marginalized intellectual In 
an institution, his/her "minority discourse" has occupied a place In 
the system. As discussed earlier in this chapter, this "place" would 
then occupy a place in the discourse between the dominant and the 
minorities. Such a place becomes Said's "Orient" in Young's sense, at 
the same time "the poison and cure" for the Western scholastic 
system. The presence of the "margin" at the centre of institution can 
be seen as another way to secure the structure authorized by the 
centre. 
This situation implies that the tradition should not be 
something that one should fall back on as an "oppositional 
affirmation of an essential ethnic or gender identity. "27 This position 
hints at a reading strategy that in a comparative discourse, a critic 
can acquire a "non-identityH - which does not fall back to an essential 
ethnic or gender identity - ' by saturating the discourse with a 
"consciousness" transformed from traditional Chinese values. So this 
consciousness may then function to silently revalue the Eurocentric 
values. Let me cite an example. An "impressionistic" nature has long 
251anMohamed & Lloyd, "Toward a Theory of Minority Discourse," p.I5. 
26S ee Gayatri Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak? Speculations on 
Widow Sacrifice," Wedge 7/8 (1985), pp.120-130. Rev. cd. reprinted in Marxism 
and the Interpretation of Culture, ed. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg 
(London: Macmillan, 1988), pp.271-313. 
. 271anMohamcd & Lloyd, "Toward a Theory of Minority Discourse," p.16. 
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been attributed to traditional Chinese criticism, but towards a 
rereading of the Western criticism, as shown in the previous 
chapter, one would descry that the systematic outlook is only a 
means to cover the paradox of textuality' and the wish of subjugation. 
It IS generally agreed that Chinese literary criticism IS 
"impressionistic. "28 After a detailed analysis of the impressionistic 
nature of the C'hinese critical tradition, Wong points out that in 
traditional Chinese shi-hua ~1~ and ci-hua if] ~ (poetry-talks), 
albeit saturated with impressionistic elements,' there are also very 
systematic analyses, such as Chen Tingzhuo's rW,-tf~ Bai yu zhai shi-
hua /8 f,fu"~ ~~ ~. (Chen first defines the term "chen yu';.z:}~., and 
according to this definition he tries to evaluate various poetic works.) 
Therefore, to put the Chinese tradition under an undifferentiated 
umbrella of "impressionistic criticism" is rather dogmatic, as Wong 
has rightly indicated. Wong then goes on to ask whether New 
Criticism and impressionistic criticism are simply following different 
routes, but actually aiming at the same destination. "Is the only 
difference between the two merely a difference between simplicity 
and complexity in the use of language?" Wong asks. Along our line of 
argument, the "systematic" outlook - the complexity of language - of 
Western criticism can be considered as a means to "disguise" the 
paradox of textuality and the wish of subjugation.29 
28For instance, Zhang Xueqeng =J ~ ~P\ ' Guo Shaoyu 1i' i?!~ .. ' Yao 
Yiwei -*.~ (,. - 1ft , Yen Yuanshu ..-~A-~~ .. and James LIJ all Cnl1~lZe the 
impressionistic 7lature of Chinese critical tradition. See Wong Wal-Ieung, 
Zhongguo shixlie z/zongheng lun ~ ® i% ~ £{~~ itif (Taipei: Hungfan, 
1982) 
29Unfortunately, it seems to me that it is impossible to avoid all th~se 
jargons. As nly thesis is dealing with hegemonic interpretation, I do ~ot thInk 
it is possible to evade these so-called "jargons." W?cn one mentl?ns. the 
vocabularies of others, one is obliged to refer to theIr names. ThIS IS a 
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With respect to the Chinese tradi~ion, lames Liu has 
complained about the difficulties in studying Chinese literature. One 
of the most significant · difficulties is that "some Chinese critics use 
"highly poetic language to express not so much intellectual concepts 
as intuitive percepts, which by their very nature defy clear 
definitions. "30 This complaint has vividly underscored the ' "very 
nature" 'of "impressionistic criticism" - it defies definition. However, 
"definition" does not guarantee a "better tl way of un'derstanding 
Chinese literary criticism. The point should be that the Chinese 
tradition which defies definition has lost its power of transformation 
In contemporary critical discourse. 
As Wong Wai-Ieung notes, "impressionistic" and "systematic" 
criticism should be seen as two different ways of criticism. Under 
the Eurocentric value systems which hold structure In esteem, 
unfortunately, the "impressionistic" nature is seen as something not 
yet adequately e)}pounded. The modern institutionalised system of 
interpretation, originated from the tlsystematic" pursuit of 
knowledge, predetermines the "values" of "systematic" and 
"impressionistic" criticism. The other voices - the "systematic" nature 
(or the other way of conceIvIng "systematic" nature) and the 
"impressionistic" nature under the "systematic" outlook of Western 
c~iticism - are to a very significant extent silenced. 31 Consequently, 
fundamental requirement of any scholarly work. So I wish I will not be 
understood as using names after names and jargons after jargons to mystify 
the audience. I use them since I have to deal wi th them. So I wish to be 
understood as using critical vocabularies rather than jargons. This is the 
predicament as well as the condition of possibility of my practice. 
30 lames Liu, Chinese Theories of Literature, p.6. 
31 Although there are still "impressionistic" critics like ~.artin Esslin, 
but I have the impression that on the one hand these cntIcs arc not 
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the task of Chinese "impressionistic" criticism is to re-present itself in 
Western "systematic" disc·ourse by revaluing the system legitimated 
by the dominant traditIon. 
Therefore, the ultimate goal of Chinese critical discourse is to 
let traditional Chinese ways of thinking re-present itself in Western 
discourse when it revalues the "values" legitimated by the dominant 
critical tradition. Different from Spivak's "worlding" of the Third 
World, such an effort tries not to depend upon any homogenization 
or heterogenization of the Western discourse. Conversely speaking, 
such "traditioning" of Chinese critical discourse aims at disseminating 
the significance of paradox into Western discourse to let it face its 
own paradoxical otherness. 
The reading position of such a Chinese critical discourse is 
closely related to one's identity between cultures - between the 
colonizer and the colonized. As I have repeatedly shown in the 
previous chapters, it is impossible for us to assume a posi tion 
between, but outside, the two cultures. The two discourses are 
overlapping and inter-determining. In other words, our reading of 
the Chinese tradition must be situated in this context. Our Chinese 
critical discourse as an oppositional reading has thus to be 
conceptualized In this context between (but not outside) cultures, and 
in the context of the quotidian critical discourse. In so saying, I do 
not mean that Chinese critical discourse has to be hierarchically 
subsumed under Western critical discourse; but rather, an 
articulation of such a Chinese critical discourse IS inevitably 
"impressionistic" in the same way as the Chinese cri lies', and on the other they 
are also minority in institutions nowadays. 
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enmeshed with Western critical discourse and any pre-comparative 
mode is only naively idealistic. 
In this respect, Rey Chow's WOlnan and Chinese Modernity: 
The Politics of Reading Between West and East provides us with a 
very suitable discussion topic of a reading between cultures. For the 
sake of scope here, I shall only focus on the first chapter which I 
regard as a theoretical framework of a reading between cultures, and 
the following chapters extensively rely on this framework. 32 
Rey Chow tries to formulate a theory of ethnic spectatorship 
In her work by employing "a deliberate and 'impractical' complexity" 
In her reading. 33 Chow holds that the modernity of Chinese 
literature is deeply rooted in a westernized context and so her theory 
of ethnic spectatorship focuses on being the subject and the reader: a 
westernized Chinese should read In a more complex (in the best 
sense of the word) context than a simple binarism of the East and the 
West. Such a reading strategy places much emphasis on the reading 
In between, but, I would argue, in this case Chinese is agaIn 
marginalized in Western discourse. The,. ideological implication of the 
title of the book is self-evident ("West and East"). Yet Chow seems to 
show no reflexiveness of the inversion of the title in the course of 
her book, and 'let us see how she recommends us to read her 
theoretical framework: 
... the felicity within which my analyses can 
proceed owes itself to the reversal of history 
32Rey Chow, Woman and Chinese Modernity:' The Politics of Reading 
Between West alld East (Minneapolis: University of MInnesota Press, 1991). T~e 
first chapter is "Seeing Modern China: Toward a Theory of EthnIC 
Spectatorship. " 
33Chow, Woman and Chinese Modernity, p.xiii. 
that informs the development of theory In the 
West. This reversal makes available to those 
who think and write In the West a 
spaciousness that . IS for their necessary 
conceptual mobility, experimentation, and 
advancement, and that is nonetheless possible 
only because many others continue to be 
excluded from the same spaces. The following 
discussion should be read In this light. 
(original emphasis)34 
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This sounds a fair enough inaugural speech. However, what we 
subsequently find in her discourse seems detached from this "light" 
in which she recommends us to read. When she analyzes Bernardo 
Betrolucci's film, The Last Emperor, she cites the example of 
Kristeva's About Chinese Woman. 35 Rey Chow is definitely right In 
sayIng that "what she [Kristeva] proposes is not so much learning a 
lesson from a different culture as a different method of reading from 
within the West. "36 In chapter four I have already touched on Rey 
Chow's insight about this, and now I wish to say more about her 
"reading" that she supposes to be not reading from within the West 
when compared with that of Kristeva. 
After reading The Last Elnperor for quite some time, Rey 
Chow admits, quite to our surprise, that 
34Chow, Woman and Chinese Modernity, pp.3-4. 
35 Julia Krisleva, About Chinese WOl11an, trans. Anita Barrows (New 
York & London: Marion Boyars, 1986) Original French version Des Clzinoises 
(Edition des Femmes, 1974). 
36Chow, WOlnan and Chinese Modernity, p.8. 
So far, my reading strategy with regard to 
The Last Emperor has been more or less 
congruent with the method of dissecting 
"narrative cinema and visual pleasure" given 
to us by Laura Mulvey in her essay of the 
same title. 37 
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I am not saying that, of course, Rey Chow is simply borrowing a 
reading strategy from Mulvey. In fact, she does later try to 
"complicate" this strategy: 
My use of Mulvey's mode of critique 
therefore complicates it in two ways. First, I 
extend the interpretation of lmage-as-woman 
to image-as:-feminized space. . . this use of 
"femininity" does not abandon the politics of 
"to-be-Iooked-at-ness," . The second 
c'omplication is my use of the elelnents of this 
cinematic analysis for a polemics of cross-
cultural inquiry ... 38 
Here Chow is trying to collapse the boundary between male and 
female, showing that there can be an inlage-as-feminized space 
curiously occupied by a man. She deliberately reads in a way to 
complicate seemingly simple matters, and her utmost aim is to show 
that "these identificatory acts are the sites of productive relations 
37Chow, Woman and Chinese Modernity, p.16. The essay at issue is 
"Afterthoughts on 'Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema' inspired by Duel in 
the Sun," Framework 6 (1981); reprinted in Constance Penley ed. Feminism, 
Film, Theory (New York: Routledge, 1988), pp.69-79. 
38Chow, Woman and Chinese Moderllity, pp.18-19. 
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. that should be reread with the appropriate degree of complexity. "39 
The lack of self-reflexiveness in Chow's discourse raises a problem 
here. The so-called "sites of productive relations" are obviously 
located by a r~ading strategy from Laura Mulvey, a strategy from 
within the West. Chow is collapsing two levels of discourse. On the 
one hand, she uses a strategy from within the West to dissect The 
Last Emperor, and on the other she uses this dissection to locate the 
"sites." She seems to have treated the two as belonging to the same 
level of discourse. This is not true unless she is reading from within 
the West, but not 'between West and East as she claims in the title of 
the book. 
So it should not be surprising to see that Rey Chow does not 
recommend Chinese to obsess themselves with "China" or 
"Chineseness." She subsequently uses the position determined by the 
"sites" mention'ed above to act as the basis of her discussion about 
currently prevalent attitudes revolving around the study of China: 
Depending on the interest of the person, 
"sinocentrism" can either take the theoretical 
position that China's tradition is adequate to 
itself, or perform, In practice, elaborate 
reinscriptions and hermeneutical readings of 
Chinese history/texts. 4o 
The approaches that Rey Chow mentions here I hope I have already 
responded to. So far, the issues that Rey Chow raises seem rather 
39Chow, WOfnan and Chinese Modernity, p.27. 




mine, but we collide on the answer to the question that she 
How to strive for authentic .. . Ofl gl narlness, 
when the history of China In the nineteenth 
and· twentieth centuries IS inundated with 
disruptive contacts with the West? Where 
could authentic origins possibly come from?41 
In responding to these questions, Rey Chow is doing quite the 
opposite of James Liu and Wai-lim Yip. She believes that since the 
Chinese context nowadays is modernized and westernized, it is 
necessary that the view of a modern Chinese is that of the 
westernized Chinese subject/reader, "who is caught between the 
sinologist's gaze and the 'images' of China that are sewn on the screen 
of international culture. "42 Therefore, Cho\v legitimates the use of 
Western conceptions. From this we can see why she is free to talk 
about Kristeva and Mulvey when she talks about Chinese literature, 
and it is legitimate to talk about a reading between West and East (in 
her word order) by talking about a film about China by a Western 
director. On the face of it, this attitude is not different from our 
analysis. However, we are going to see how the two approaches 
significantly and radically diverge from each other. 
The conclusion that Chow makes is that "extending the notion 
of female spectator, I ask whether we cannot also begin to theorize 
the posi.tion of the ethnic spectator, who is caught, in a cross-cultural 
context, between the gaze that represents her and the image that is 
41 Chow, WOfnall and Chinese Modernity, p.28. 
42Chow, WOfnan and Chinese Modernity, p.29. 
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supposed to be her. "43 From this conclusion that Chow draws, it 
would be helpful for us to talk about her "theorizing" with respect to 
Paul Ricoeur's opinion. (This is legitimate according to her thesis, I 
suppose.) 
In writing towards a hermeneutics of historical conSCIousness 
in his Time and Narrative, Ricoeur mentions the relation between 
being "an agent" and "an observer" when he talks about the 
"Historical Present," 
. . . ' Indeed, it IS not from the same attitude 
that we observe something that happens or 
that we make something happen. We cannot 
be observers and agents at the same time. 
One result is that we can only think about 
closed systems, partial determinisms, without 
being able to move on to explorations 
extending to the whole universe, except at the 
price of excluding ourselves as agents capable 
of producing events. In other words, if the 
world is the totality of what is the case, doing 
cannot be included In this totali ty. Better, 
doing means [fa i t] that reality IS not 
totalizable. 44 
Although we are not trying to "extend to the whole universe" here, 
we can still see that Rey Chow's approach IS formulated in a closed 
system within the West. If we turn back to Chow's formulation, it 
43Chow, Woman and Chinese Modernity, p.32 
44Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, Vo1.3, trans. Kathleen Blarney and 
David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), . p.231. 
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becomes apparent that she bases her theory of ethnic spectatorship 
on a totalizing West which has already pre-contextualized her 
reading, and so it is ' impossible to say anything about "Chinese" in 
such a discourse. She seems ' to forget that we cannot be the agent 
and the observer at the same time. Her so-called "gaze" contributes 
nothing between West and East (in her word order), nor any'thing to 
the "image." Ironically enough, the totalizing West in her discourse 
has always already determined what the gaze should gaze at. Her 
approach merely demystifies the gaze in a Western context, but fails 
to examIne the authority attributed to that gaze. 
Rey Chow's "doing," in other words, will simply extend the 
"seeing" of her "doing" from a Western point of view. She seems not 
to be dealing sufficiently with the tradition. By tradition I do not 
imply a "burden" - ' in Chow's sense it seems a burden - but rather I 
would see it as a means to ground our contemporary "rootless" 
discourse on an ethnic identity which we cannot do away with. In 
terms of "ethnic identity," I see R. Radhakrishnan's formulation In his 
.". 
"Ethnic Identity and Post-Structuralist Differance" as pertinent to our 
discussion. 
In the post-structuralist context, Radhakrishnan wisely notes 
that "post-structuralist politics will not allow us any kind of return to 
naive empiricism or historicism. "45 In other words, it is impossible 
for us to establish a pure ethnic identity free from the influence of 
the dominant discourse. We may treat his opInIon below as a 
response to Rey Chow's theory of ethnic spectatorship: 
45R. Radhakrishnan. "Ethnic Identity and Post-Structuralist 
Dilleranee ," in The Nature and . Context of Minority Discourse, p.51. 
A merely short-term affirmation of ethnicity 
certainly leads to a substitution of ' the 
'contents' of history but leaves untouched the 
very forms and structures in and through 
which historical and empirical contents are 
legitimated. 46 
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Radhakrishnan believes that the question that we have ' to face is not 
the one that Chow raises; but rather, he is· striking for a "post-" or 
" 
radical ethnicity, which is actually a kind of "double-moment" - as 
disruptive as inaugura1. 47 Like the critics that we mention in the 
earlier half of this chapter, he also talks about the role of the 
. 
intellectual that hermeneutical questions have to be oriented. 
Radhakris hnan juxtaposes Foucault and Gramsci for a 
discussion of the role of intellectual. Citing Foucault and Gramsci's 
notion of "the role of intellectual,"48 he uses Foucault's case to add to 
Gramsci's notion of "professionalization" that of "institutionality." 
That is to say, there is a kind of academic legitimation in complicity 
with the inscription of power. From this he proceeds to a series of 
questions which are particularly applicable , to our discussion: 
Is there a pure and radical "break" between 
the two reg1mes [the "colorless" and the 
"colored"]? If the "ethnic" is the emergen t 
mode, where 1S it emerging from? How does 
46Radhakrishnan, "Ethnic Identity," p.50. 
47Radhakrishnan, "Ethnic Identity," p'.5I. 
48S ee Michel Foucault, "Intellectuals and Power," in Language, 
Counter-Memory, Practice, trans. Donald F. ~ouchard ~nd" Sherry Sin:on 
(Ithaca: CornelI Uni versity Press, 1977) and Antonlo Gr~~scl, The FormatIo.n 
of Intellectuals," in The Modern Prince and Other Wrltl1lgs, trans. Dr. LOUIS 
Marks (New York: International Publishers, 1957). 
the "emergent" mode emerge counter-
mnemonically (to use Foucault's telling 
concept) from the dominant and the 
hegemonic models? 
the "ethnic" name 
And crucially, how does 
itself? What kind of 
identity is asserted through this name? The 
problem here is as ethnic as it is theoretical 
and epistemological. 4 9 
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Obviously, in Rey Chow's case, she prefers to abdicate one's radical 
ethnicity in order to acquire an ethnic spectatorship. But here let me 
cite Radhakrish,nan's lucid illustration of the "naming" and 
"unnaming" process of the ethnic Other before I try to relate the 
questions above to our issue. Radhakrishnan writes, 
The program of naming and unnaming takes 
the following historically determinate steps 
(different phases of a developmental 
sequence): ethnic reality realizes that it has a 
"name"," but this name IS forced on it by the 
oppressor, that IS, it IS the victim of 
representation; it achieves a revolution 
against both the oppressor and the discourse 
of the oppressor and proceeds to unname 
itself through a process of Inverse 
displacement; it gIves itself a name, that IS, 
represents itself from within its own point of 
49Radhakrishnan, "Ethnic Identity," p.58. 
vIew; and it ponders how best to legitimate 
and empower this new name. 50 
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Rey Chow's approach c.an be seen as cutting the process by avoiding 
a revolution against the oppressor and the discourse of the 
oppressor. She uses a "self-subversive" approach to admit that pre-
oppressIve situation IS not imaginable. The wish to "unname" 
becomes a wish to "unname" one's radical ethnicity in Rey Chow's 
case. This definitely misses the essence of a (post)modern critique. 51 
What we need here is a self-reflexiveness of being the Other, and in 
particular a critical Other, in a comparative discourse. 
Indeed, the process of unnamlng also bears a limitation that 
"the assumption .that there exists an essence (African, Indian, 
feminine, native, etc.) ironically perpetrates the same ahistoricism 
that was identified with the enemy during the negative/critical or 
'deconstructive' phase of the ethnic revolution."52 This reminds us 
once agaIn of the fact that deconstructive "unnalning" should only be 
a means in an ethnic revolution. Moreover, the issue that we have to 
face is how to articulate this "self-deconstructive" nature of our 
ethnic identity without rendering it "self-defeating." Radhakrishnan 
uses the concept of "radical identity" which is enmeshed in the post-
50Radhakrishnan, "Ethnic Identity," p.59. 
51 According to Mas'ud Zavarzadeh and Donald Morton, it is necessary 
to distinguish "critique" from "criticism". They believe that the function of 
(posl)modern critique is "unlike that of criticism, is to demystify the 
"authority" attributed to all the discourses and practices of culture." In 
contrast, "criticism" is a traditional humanist un-self-reflexive mode. See 
their Theory, (Post)Modernity, Opposition (Washington D.C.: Maisonneuve, 
1991), pp.13-14. I would say, however, their generalization needs 
clarification. There is indeed "self-reflexive" criticism in the West. What they 
imply seems to be that in modern cri~ical discours.e, there a:e. cri.ticisrr,ts which 
do not consider the legitimation of theIr own practIces, and It IS In thIS aspect 
that "criticism" is not self-reflexive. 
52Radhakrishnan, "Ethnic Identity," p.59. 
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structuralist context to cope with this problem. He then goes into the 
rhetoric of the "post- tt and claims that 
To restate this [to in-mix critical energy with 
the convictions and intentional commitments 
of affirmation] in the context of my entire 
presentation, if the "ethnic" were to remain 
purely ethnic it would still be trapped within 
the many larger and general economies of 
representation that I have been 
problematizing so far. The "Post-Ethnic" ~ on 
. 
the contrary, is the moment or the topos that 
dramatizes, I could almost say, allegorizes its 
own doubleness. 53 
Radhakrishnan goes on to assert that "the momentous undertaking 
that radical ethnicity is entrusted with is the creation of a future 
where oppression will not just be immoral or unconscionable, but 
virtually, 'unthinkable'. "54 This sounds ideal, of course. However, 
regrettably, the utopian stage where "oppression" is "unthinkable" is 
even more "unthinkable" for us in our context. Let me raise the use 
. of the figure Frantz Fanon in contemporary colonial discourse as an 
example. Henry Louis Gates 1r.'s brilliant account of the use of Fanon 
has provided us with a very illuminating illustration. Gates writes, 
By focusing successive appropriations of this 
figure [Fanon] as both totem and text, I think 
53Radhakrishnan, "Ethnic Identity," pp.70-71. 
54Radhakrishnan, "Ethnic Identity," p.71. 
we can chart out an itinerary through 
contemporary colonial discourse theory.5 5 
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However, Gates conclusively admits that "rehistoricizing Fanon, \-\le 
can hear a lament concerning the limits of liberation, concerning the 
very intelligibility of his dream of decolonization. "56 He then goes on 
to lament that "we, just as much as Fanon, lnay be fated to rehearse 
the agonisms of a culture that may never earn the title of pos t-
colonial." (original emphasis)57 In other words, we cannot dream 
that Said's, Bhabha's, Spivak's, Fanon's or even Gates's theories may 
illuminate a way out of the colonialism in interpretation, and in 
discussing these theories one has already been trapped iQ the 
colonial discourse in interpretation. We cannot anticipate any theory 
to bring us into a real post-colonial era. So Radhakrishnan's idea can 
be seen as both beneficial and harmful to our discourse. He does not 
consider the reading of the rhetoric of the "post-" in this post-
structuralist context as a sufficiently oppositional discourse which 
should not anticipate a post-colonial era. 
01) po sit i 0 11/ Pro f e s s i 0 n/ Po s t colon i a lit y 
We may be able to arrive at this stage, but I will not let my 
practice depend on that utopian dream that "we "",ill." One has rather 
to treat the "post-" as a battlefield; otherwise, this "post-" would 
simply become a product produced for the West. As Kwane Anthony 
Appiah's perspicacious remark indicates, "the predicament of the 
55Henry Louis Gates Jr., "Critical Fanonism," in Critical Inquiry 1 7 
(Spring 1991), pp.457-458. 
56Gates, "Critical Fanonism,"469 . 
. 57 Gates, "Critical Fanonism," p.470. 
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post-colonial intellectual is simply that as intellectual. . . we are, 
indeed, alwars at the risk of becoming otherness machines, with the 
manufacture of alterity as our principal role. "58 The minority critic 
would merely resemble an "otherness machine" which sells 
marginal(ized) cultures at the periphery of institution, in a sense 
"proving" the high-sounding equal-opportunity system. Such a 
critical stance brings us another puzzle: a minority critic with the 
formative years spent in Western institutions can hardly achieve 
"non-identity," since the critic himself is an "other" product of the 
"otherness machine." 
From our analysis above, and our stance against borrowing 
Western theories without self-reflexiveness, it is clear that we should 
not treat these critics in the Western institutional system, even post-
colonial critics, as our critical paradigms. Unless we are able to 
objectify the spirit of the oppositional stance in Said's and Spivak's 
discourses, . I would say there IS no difference between choosing 
Gadamer and Hirsch or Said and Spivak. If we are not treating Fanon 
as a battlefield but as a paradigm, we , will at best become a white 
Lacan and this does nothing for an anti-colonial discourse. In that 
case, "opposition If will only become w.hat the (Western) profession 
requires. 59 "The role of the intellectual" has to be treated as a 
5 8 Kwane Anthony Appiah, "Is the Post- in Postmodernism the Post- in 
Post-colonial?" Critical Inquiry 17 (Winter 1990), p.356. Appiah also claims in 
th is arti cl e th at" postco 1 on i ali ty is the cond ition of what we mi gh t 
ungenerously call a comprador intellengentsia: a relatively small, Western-
style, Western.,.trained group of writers and teachers, who mediate the trade in 
cultural commodities of world capitalism at the periphery." 
5 9 See Bruce Robbins, "Oppositional Professionals: Theory and the 
Narratives of Professionalization," in Consequences of Theory, eds. Jonathan 
Arac and Barbara lohnson (Baltimore: 10hns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 
p.4. Meanwhile, I have to state that what I n~ean by. "oppos~tion" is not an 
ethnocentric subversion of the West to establIsh ChInese dIscourse as the 
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battlefield in which Chinese enunciation finds its VOlce, or else it IS 
difficult for one to truly participate in quotidian critical discourse. 
It would be helpful for us to consider the (post-) colonial 
context in order to enter this battlefield. First of all, we need to 
distinguish two forms of "post( -)colonialism". In "What Is Post(-
)colonialism 1" Vijay Mishra and Bob Hodge state that ther'e is a 
difference between "postcolonialism" (without a hyphen) and "post-
colonialism" (with a hyphen): 
The first, and more readily recognizable, is what 
we call oppositional postcolonialism, which is 
found in its most overt form in post-independent 
colonies at the historical phase of "post-
colonialism" (with a hyphen) ... The second form, 
centre. Such · an approach is as imperialistic as an Orientalist practice. Being 
oppositional does not necessarily mean that the colonized has to deconstruct 
the colonizer'~ system and crown himself as the master, fornling another 
system which is equally imperialistic. Being oppositional, in the scope of this 
thesis, is conceived as anti-systematic, anti-totalizing, and such a practice will 
not aim at simply reversing the violent hierarchy be~ween the master and the 
slave. It will rather try to liberate different voices to head for a more open 
and heterogeneous system. Let me use the example of Confucianism and 
Taoism as an example to illustrate my point. I see Taoist thought as an 
oppositional discourse which reacts against the dominant Confucian system in 
traditional Chinese culture. The Taoists are uncomfortable about the process of 
naming as well as the structure and institutionalization brought by that 
naming of Confucianism. The Taoists thus advocate "the name that can be 
named is not the constant name." On this basis Taoists seem to have other 
nihilistic sayings, such as "Destroying literature, abandoning five colours." 
However, that doe,S not mean that the Taoists are aiming at an anarchic society 
which devalues literature and arts. Taoist effort should rather be seen as an 
oppositional discourse which questions Confucian "normality." History has 
already told us that Taoist thought is one of the most influential thoughts in 
Chinese literature and arts. (cf. "Destroying literature and abandoning five 
colours") The point is that Taoism exerts a pressure on dominant Confucian 
thought, and it is thus able to open a cons,tructive dialogue with it. Their 
relationship makes the evolution of Chinese culture a more open system. 
"Oppositional" does not have to be egocentric - it nlay be so only in all 
imperialistic discourse. In our sense, being "oppositional" is to make an open 
model of analysis possible. 
equally a product of the processes that 
constituted colonialism but with a different 
inflection, is a "complicit postcolonialism," which 
has much In common with Lyotard's 
unhyphenated "postmodernism": an always 
present "underside" within colonization itself.60 
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From this differentiation, we can realize that the use of so-called 
"post-colonial theories" in our discussion does not necessarily mean 
that we are reading oppositionally. If we treat these theories as 
some kinds of consultants, we are only reading for a "~omplicit 
I 
postcolonialism" which can be seen as a mere extension of the project 
of colonialism. We have already noted in the case of Qates that 
rehistoricising Fanon without treating him as a battlefield of post-
colonial issues, we cannot even dream of a real pas t-colonial era (if 
there be one). In this so-called "neo-colonial" times - of ours, as 
Robert Young indicates, "colonialism's 'neo,' nevertheless, has 
broached the borders of Western modernity: if there is a post-
modernity, then it is, let it be said, a Western phenomenon, a 
breakdown of totalizing systems that itself tries to be totaIizing. "6 1 
(my emphasis) Being situated in this "neo-colonial" context, we nlay 
find a hermeneutics of our own unthinkable. There may well be 
more and more Chinese critics writing about Chinese literature, but 
there seems no reason to believe that their works are not by 
themselves colonizers. In a way, comparative literature produces 
60 Vijay Mishra and Bob Hodge, "What Is Post(- )colonialism?" in 
Textual Practice 5 (1991), p.407. 
61 Robcrt Young, "Neocolonial Times," in The Oxford Literary Review 
13- (1991), p.3. 
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colonizers (such as the examples in Chapter Five) if the juxtaposition 
of the two sides are not questioned to an adequate extent. As Spivak 
mentions In an interview, the nature of this so-called "neo-
colonialism" is "economic rather than territorial and cultural that the 
production of knowledge within neo-colonialism seeIns to have a 
much subtler role and it is much harder to pin down. "62 
In the age of neo-colonialism, perhaps it may be easy for us 
to detect the unfair suppression in analyzing Chinese literature by 
using Western conceptions. For instance, one can easily claim that 
C.T. Hsia's A History of Modern Fiction is rather an unfair treatment 
of Chinese fiction. In the book he arbitrarily juxtaposes Chinese 
fiction with English ones. 63 It is apparent that he represents Chinese 
narratives according to the existing set of signification of Western 
discourse. But when C.T. Hsia's work becomes a minor classic in the 
study of modern Chinese fiction, when students of Chinese in the 
United States - be they of Western or Chinese origin - and even 
Chinese students studying in a Chinese community curiously use the 
book as a tool to dissect Chinese culture, the ideological implication of 
this situation should not be neglected. We cannot silTIply say that we 
should get rid of unfair juxtapositions since the discourse with the 
West as the centre is still silently, but significantly, exerting its 
power. We cannot even put our faith in a "Chinese" school. 
"Chinese," in this sense, is "westernized" as Rey Chow notes. Spivak 
620ayatri . Chakravorty Spivak, "Neocol?nialism and the. Secret A~ent 
of Knowledge," an interview by Robert Young, In The Oxford Llterary Revlew 
13 (1991), p.221. 
63Chi-tsing Hsia, A History of Modern Chinese Fiction (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1962), translated into Chinese by S.M .. La~ et al. (Hong 
Kong: Yau Luen, 1975). The examples are too ample to need Cl talIon. 
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well points out the fact that "if you participate in a certain kind of 
way you are an Orientalist, and it does not matter whether you are 
white or black. Today you don't need to have the right kind of skin' 
colour in order to be an Orientalist. "6 4 
More and more scholars of an ethnic origin other than the 
metropolitan West are educated In Western institutions. Obviously, 
there are at once pros and cons to this. More and more critics 
growing in these institutions may imply more "indigenous" voice of a 
certain culture in the West, but more and more critics affiliated to 
Western institutions may also mean the reinforcement of the neo-
colonialism of "institution." In this "neo-colonial" situation when one 
has to reread as well as rewrite a radical kind of hermeneutics of 
one's own alnidst all these unfavorable factors,65 one has to face at 
least two more problems that I am going to mention next. 
How Radical? How Chinese? 
In the course of this chapter, I have been trying to plot the 
itinerary of post-colonial discourse In order to examIne the 
oppositional reading stance of Chinese critical discourse. This Chinese 
critical discourse, as I see it, has to be a "radical" questioning of given 
dominant discursive categories. When one talks about "radical 
64Gayatri Spivak, "Criticism, Feminism, Institution: An Interview with 
Gayatri Spivak," in Thesis Eleven 10/11 (1984/5); reprinted in Sarah Harayam 
ed. The Post-colonial Critic (New York & London: Routledge,1990), pp.1-16. 
65 The so-called "unfavourable" factors" here are referring to the 
colonization of language and interpretation, the complicity b~tween 
interpretation and the institutionalization in the academy, and th.e ~Isk. of 
becoming "otherness machines" in the periphery of Western InstItutIon. 
Although I term them as "unfavourable," in my articulation they are factors 
that I cannot avoid. What I am trying to do is to use them "positively" to define 
a reading position for a critical Other. 
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Chinese critical discourse", one has to ask oneself, "What is "radical" 
about it? And what is "Chinese" about it?" I shall try to ans\ver these 
questions which I have already raised in the introduction by re-
situating it in a neo-colonial context. 
In a recent MLA newsletter, Linda Hutcheon and Satya 
Mohanty raIse a serIes of questions concernIng colonialism, 
postcolonialism and neocolonialism. Among the twenty some 
questions they ask, I find the following ones particularly pertinent to 
this discussion: 
Under what conditions can we say that a 
genuinely postcolonial culture exists, one that 
has in fact moved beyond the colonial to 
frame its own questions and analyses from 
the point of view of its own autonomous 
interest? · Would it be seriously misleading to 
see a postcolonial culture as one entity, SInce 
"it" is itself often internally split along lines 
defined by class, religion, sexualities and so 
on? . . . How do we begin to think through 
literary Issues such as the function and value 
of dominant vs. indigenous languages and 
conventions or the controversies over 
appropriation and "authentic" voice?66 
These questions , well echo the analysis of Wai-lim Yip in the last 
chapter. In Yip's sense, the hermeneutic cOlnmuni ties under the 
66Quoted from "Special Topic: Colonialisrn and the Postcolonial 
Condition," in MLA Newsletter (Fall 1991), p.14. 
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umbrella "Orient" should be differentiated. In this line of argument, 
"Chinese" should be differentiated into different hermeneutic 
communities by "class~" "religion," "gender," "sexualities" and so on. 
But we have already shown In the last chapter that this 
differentiation will easily be suppressed by the dominant voice by 
saying that the discrete discourses are nothing but "diffuse." "Radical 
Chinese critical discourse" has to adopt another reading stance. 
"Chinese" first. One may first of all ask why we have to 
devise a "Chinese" critical discourse. Are we going to have "Chinese 
psychoanalysis", "Chinese deconstruction" and the like? This is a 
question similar - to those which asks why there is no Chinese 
anthropology or Chinese psychology but there is Chinese literature 
and Chinese philosophy. Why and how "Chinese"? I am afraid I 
have to quote once agaIn from Gates. In his "The Master's Pieces: On 
Canon Formation and the African-American Tradition," Gates 
analyzes the canon formation of African-American literature and the 
ideological implications of editing a Norton Anthology of this ethnic 
literature. A Norton Anthology, in Gates's opinion, "can function in 
the academy to create a tradition, as well as to define and preserve 
it."67 (my emphasis) Yet he adds that they have to confront "the 
hegemony _ of the Western tradition, generally, and of the larger 
American tradition, specifically. "68 The biggest charge that such a 
canon formation may have to face is that of being "racist," 
"separatist," "nationalist" and "essentialist." Gates also mentions his 
67 Henry Louis Gates, "The Master's Pieces: On Canon Format.ion and the 
African-American Tradition," in South Atlantic Quarterly 89 (WInter 1990), 
p.l0l. 
68Gates, "The Master's Pieces," p.l07. 
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friend's question about having a black canon, and it IS particularly 
imperative to us here: 
What is wrong with you people, our friends ask us 
in genuine passion and concern; after all, aren't we 
just citizens of literature here?69 
Why do we bother ourselves to have "Chinese" critical discourse? It 
is exactly because we are all "citizens of literature," but we do not 
have an identity, the rights of a citizen and a voice of our own. 
Here I ,would say the reading position of Chinese critical 
discourse has to be designed as a double-edged sword - however, an 
Orientalist may find this sword without even an edge - which I use 
to highlight on the one hand the nece~sity of engaging in Western 
discourse, and on the other the one of proposing Chinese theories of 
interpretation. Let us first examine the relationship between the two 
"edges. " In G ate s ' sop i n ion, it is in tell e c tu ally sou n d to h a v e a 
"thoroughly integrated canon of American literature since white texts 
do inform and influence black texts (and vice versa). "70 Likewise, it 
is also intellectually sound to have a so-called "common poetics" in 
Wai-lim Yip's sense, or a "convergence" of Chinese and Western 
literary theories in James Liu's sense. Yet no one can deny that 
Chinese has a different way of understanding the universe, and thus 
different ways of interpretation. The only problem is how to let it 
articulat~ itself without undue distortion from Western VOIce. 
Without this voice there will not be something genuinely "common" 
or "converged." If Chinese critical discourse is essentialist In a way, 
690ates, "The Master's Pieces," p.l08 
700ates, "The Master's Pieces," p.108. 
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then, as Gates notes, "it IS no more, or less, essentialist to make this 
claim [in his'- case, about black canon formation] than it is to claim the 
existence of French, English, German, Russian or American literature 
as long as we proceed inductively from the texts to the theory. "7 1 
From Gates we should learn the importance of creating a "canon," and 
from the irony of canon formation - that any canon formation ' has to 
be operated in Western institutions in which the newly-formed 
canon tries to make a dif.ference - we should also detect a lack of 
critical tradition to support that "canon." What we aim at, therefore, 
is a critical discourse of our own, or else a discourse of the critical 
Other will not be able to take shape. 
It should be stressed that when I defend the necessity of 
establishing a reading position for Chinese critical discourse, I do not 
intend to imply that we have to essentialize it without relation to the 
dominant VOIce. Indeed, an essentialization will be an easy way out 
to avoid domination superficially (by against ,"borrowing" Western 
theories), but it is in fact exclusion, as we have noted elsewhere in 
this dissertation. As revealed in what Gates cites from Hortene 
Spillers's opinion of "calling for a revoicing of the master's discourse 
in the cadences and timbres of the Black Mother's voice,"72 we cannot 
simply neglect the mother's VOIce In his brilliant account of Said's 
Orientalism, James Clifford claims that 
Said writes as a Palestinian but takes no 
support from a specifically Palestinian culture 
71 Gates, "The 
72Gates, "The 
"Mama's Baby, people 
by Hortene Spillers. 
the essay at hands. 
Master's Pieces," p.l08. 
Master's Pieces," p.l09. The essay that Gates refers to is 
Maybe," a paper delivered at Cornell University in 1990 
Unfortunately, I do not have a published manuscript of 
or identity, turning to European poets for his 
expression of essential values and to French 
philosophy ' for his analytical tools. A radical 
critic of a major component of the Western 
intellectual tradition, Said derives Illost of his 
standards from that tradition.73 
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This situation may also be applicable to my position here. I do not 
have a firm support from a specifically Chinese culture since I do not 
believe that the support can ever be "firm" in face of the power of 
the dominant critical tradition. Clifford goes on to remark that he 
mentions the above situation of ' Said since he wants to "suggest 
something of the situation within which books such as Orientalism 
must inevitably be written" · and he also points out that Said has 
e 1 sew h e re call e,d t his con te x t " age n era 1 i zed con d i t ion 0 f 
homelessness."74 When we are "inevitably" writing in this kind of 
situation, we should note that the support from ,one's own culture has 
to be transformed into a conSCIousness of problematizing the 
dominant tradition in the revoicing of the other tradition. From this 
we may proceed to a discussion of the (re- )voicing of our "radical" 
Chinese critical discourse. 
John Caputo's Radical Hermeneutics provides us with a very 
suitable topic of discussion about "radical" critical discourse. 75 I find 
it fair to say that Caputo's hermeneutic project here is a "radical" 
reconciliation of the philosophical hermeneutics and deconstruction. 
73 James Clifford, The Predicament of Culture (Canlbridge and London: 
Harvard University Press, 1988), p.271. 
74Clifford, The Predicament of Culture, p.271. 
75 John Caputo, Radical Henneneutics: Repetition, Decollstruction, and 
the Hermelleutic Project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987). 
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This "radicalized" hermeneutics, however, is not the right direction 
for us, . although I do not deny that Caputo's book is at times 
insightful. From his notion of "radical" we may see more clearly how 
"radical" our Chinese critical discourse should be. 
As Jacqueline Vaught Brogan, the reviewer of Caputo's book, 
points out, "Radical Hermeneutics is a work, even a phenomenology, 
which must be read poetically (as well as logically) to be 
understood. "76. Brogan goes on to claim that "the point is that reading 
Caputo strictly analytically - for his correct or mistaken reading of 
Gadamer, for example, even for the "logic" of the hermeneutic project 
itself - is to miss what is so "radical" in ~adical Herlneneutics. "77 She 
believes that it is in the poetry that Caputo's hermeneutics is 
"radical. " 
Meanwhile, Caputo also writes, "I want to defend an ethics 
which arises from cold hermeneutics, the hermeneutics without 
comfort. "78 This ethics that Caputo tries to defend can obviously be 
seen as that destroyed by the Derridean whirlwind. However, if 
radical hermeneutics is "radical" in its "poetic" nature, as Brogan 
suggests, I strongly doubt whether this "hermeneutic project" merely 
gives rise to another "hermeneutic" project itself. Brogan also notes 
that "what IS so 'radical' about Radical Hermeneutics is that it pushes 
us to question continually any easy notion of 'communal' teleology 
while, ironically (radically) assuming responsibility to and for his 
76Jacqueline Vaught Brogan, "Eradification/Rcification: Or, What's So 
Radical about Radical Hermeneutics?" in Diacritics (1990), p.76. 
77Brogan, "Eradification/Rcification," p. 77. 
78Caputo, Radical Henneneutics, pp.238-239. 
Chu 303 
very cosmo(s)/polis. "79 No matter Caputo IS "radical" in uSIng 
deconstruction to radicalize hermeneutics and defend against "cold 
hermeneutics" or In "pushing us to question continually any easy 
notion of 'communal' teleology," his notion of "radical" is different 
from ours. His "radical" can only be seen as some radicalization of 
the traditional hermeneutic project inside Western tradition In 
complicity with deconstruction. This so-called "radical" hermeneutics 
that lingers between the dominant categories of "hermeneutics" and 
"deconstruction" can be seen as a blurring of the complicity between 
the two, and this will block the "political interrogation" of our Chinese 
critical discourse. 8o So it seems legitimate for this hermeneutic 
project to call for another "hermeneutic project" since they all exist In 
a homogeneous Western systems of interpretation. In our sense (a 
Chinese-Western comparati ve discourse), however, 
p.14. 
[a "radical" theory] must rigorously work to 
demonstrate that literature IS In itself a 
historical construct, the effect of global frames 
of intelligibility that designate certain texts of 
culture as literary in order to preserve in that 
space a private place for the circulation of 
required values and assumptions about the 
Real through the operations of the 
"aesthetics." 81 
79Brogan, IEradification/Reification," p.84. 
80See Zavarzadeh and Morton, Theory, (PosOModernity, Opposition, 
81 Zavarzadeh and Morton, Theory, (Post)Moderllity, Opposition, p.219. 
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First and foremost, what a radical hermeneutics should achieve is 
trying to problematize "hermeneutics." Radical Chinese critical 
discourse should thus . problematize Western critical discourse and 
the works done by Chinese critics like those we mention in the last 
chapter. As we have remarked, "From the perspective of radical 
critical theory, th~ function of literary studies is to inquire into the 
ways "meaning" IS produced and disseminated In all texts of 
culture. "82 Now I find it suitable to add, another opinion of 
Zavarzadeh and Morton: "in contrast to humanist and ludic theory, 
the task of radical critical theory is to change the dominant social 
relations of production. "8 3 However, I would rather see this issue 
from the point of view that we have first to participate in the so-
called "ludic" hermeneutics. We simply cannot alter the "production" 
of meaning from the outside. Only from within one can achieve this 
purpose, as we have shown In Gates's and SpilIer's example (one has 
to use the master's tools to dismantle the master's house). Indeed, to 
dismantle the master's house is not equal to destroy the Western 
traoition - it is only trying to dismantle the interpretive obviousness 
which may limit the articulation of the critical Other. The 
"production" of meaning can be altered by a rearticulation of the 
master's discourse in one's own way, so to speak. In this sense, not 
only is ventriloquism better than dumb silence, but it is also a way to 
keep one's own VOIce while rearticulating the master's voice. 
82Zavarzadeh and Morton, Theory, (Post)Modenlity, Opposition, p.22l. 
83Zavarzadeh and Morton, · Theory (Post)Moderllity, Oppositioll, p.225. 
They have a very lucid critique of the so-called "Iudic hermeneut.ics" in the 
book. They critique philosophical hermeneutics and dcconstructlon as not 
radical enough to act as an oppositional discourse. Sce chapter 5, "Ludic 
Hermeneutics," pp.165-188. 
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Zavarzadeh and Morton also criticize Spivak's so-called "subtle 
populism" which "absorbs the Other" and that her emphasis on 
"discontinuity" as only reinforcing dominant ideologies since Spivak 
believes that the classroom is "a depoliticized 'neutral' space" and 
thus "renders the pedagogue's relation to the institution to which she 
IS attached quite safe and comfortably non-oppositional,"84 but this 
I 
IS an issue that needs further examination. Spivak's emphasis on 
self-reflexivity and cognitive vigilance, at this point, is perhaps more 
urgent than a complete "transformation" to us. Yes, I admit that 
Spivak's eclecticism (a mixture of Marxism, deconstruction, feminism 
and p~st-colonial theories) is designed as a generic politics which is 
harmless In the academy_ However, I would say, as Spivak does 
admit, to be eclectic is not necessarily a limitation with regard to the 
participation in the dominant discourse. To (re- )voice a tradition in 
the voice of the . dominant has a pre-requisite to which one must 
conform: it has to conform to the rules laid down by the academy_ 
Being an inter-cultural critic, a comparatist has to cope with 
interpretation, textuality, the aggressiveness of paradox, and utilize 
the "complexity" to show the self-defeating nature of such 
"complexity" In Western theories of interpretation. 
Tatlow's words, 
To borrow 
An inter-cultural hermeneutics, which Brecht 
. practised in order to continue thinking, must 
constantly look for models that question 
domestic "normality" and draw attention to the 
dangerous limitations in our understanding of 
84Zavarzadeh and Morton, Theory, (Post)Moderllity, Opposition, pp .4-6. 
our own practices, In the hope we may 
eventually succeed In changing those which 
endanger us and in developing more adequate 
ones. 85 
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Perhaps what a marginal discourse can contribute to an inter-
cultural hermeneutics may be somewhat different from that 'of the 
dominant discourse. A critical Other should rather questioL 
"normality" in the dominant tradition in order to develop more 
adequate categories. Without an Other which can do so, it may not 
be possible to have a truly "inter-cuI tural" herlneneu tics. 8 6 In the 
meantime, we also have to bear in mind the point that if the Chinese 
tradition is an Other to the West, then it should also be an Other to a 
modern Chinese growing up in a westernized context. If history is 
continuous, our VIew of the tradition IS predetermined by the 
modern perspective and so it may be enmeshed in the westernized 
context. If history is discontinuous as claimed by many post-
structuralists, tradition is only a historical Other. Therefore, we 
should not aim at a direct re-presentation of the Chinese tradition as 
a "difference" from the dominant discourse. As Tatlow points out, 
"The power of the dominant paradigm automatically ensures that 
85Tatlow, Repressio1l alld Figuration, p.128. 
86For instance, refer to Zhang Longxi, "The Myth of the Other: China 
in the Eyes of the West," Critical Inquiry 15 (Autumn 1988), pp. I 08-1 09. Zhang 
points out an interesting case in which Foucault mistakes a quotation 
concerning China to be a correct representation 'of China, and Foucault uses it 
to demonstrate that there may well be other systems of thinking beside the 
closed Western one. Unfortunately, if the representation is itself inaccurate, 
there may be a risk that the Other cannot be an illumination to the 
inadequacies of the Western systenl since that particular representation is 
already inadequate by itself. Ironically an anti-totalizing critic as Foucault 
has misrepresented China and made it a marginal example to secure his own 
discourse. So a critical Other has to be vigilant towards the "normality" more 
than to aim at a simple turn to other cultures for the same reasons of Brecht. 
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what resists it will be repressed. "87 So what we need to achieve is an 
oppositional reading which uses the Chinese tradi tion as a means to 
. 
question the interpretive obviousness, and the production of 
meanings and values in the hegemonic system of interpretation In 
the West. 
Let me use a reading of a contemporary play, Secret Love for 
the Peach Blossom Spring ~ ~ i~t ~~ , as an example to illustrate 
such a reading stance and conclude this chapter. Secret Love for the 
Peach Blossom Spring is the work of Stan Lai Sheng-chuan's 
"Performance Workshop," and it is the sixth creative work of the 
collective improvisations of Lai's workshop. In the following reading 
of the play, I will focus on the presentation of the play in Hong Kong 
in order to highlight the production of meaning by a colonizing grand 
narrative. My reading will not place the emphasis on the analysis of 
! 
theatrical devices; instead, I will try to see the play in light of a 
colonial paradigm. 
In fact, when contemporary critical discourse becomes more 
and more sensitive towards the Other, it seems that minority 
discourse will gradually find its articulation. As noted above, the 
advent of minority/marginal critics, however, does not guarantee the 
success of decolonizatioIl. Although the play . receives accolades in 
Taiwan and Hong Kong, it does not mean that a Chinese discourse 
prevails, nor does it symbolize a Chinese articulation in "art." In the 
following paragraphs I will try to call into question a kind of 
juxtaposition in Secret Love for The Peach Blossoln Spring, trying to 
shed light on the danger of (re)producing the values of the dominant 
87Tatlow, Repression and Figuration, p.128. 
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system of interpretation if we do not radically challenge the 
legitimation of the production of meaning. 
First of all, I have to state that the play is a combination of 
two very different plays, Secret Love (a tragedy) and The Peach 
Blossom Spring (a comedy).88 (The "for" in the English title of the 
play IS not present In the Chinese one.) One of the , . major 
characteristics of the play presented at Hong Kong Cultural Centre is 
the performance by Briggite Lin Ching-hsia, one of the most popular 
movie stars in Hong Kong and Taiwan. Lin's perforInance in the play 
can well be seen as a "popularization" of an "artistic" performance. 
Lin's performance immediately foregrounds a kind of binary 
opposition almost Ubiquitous in the play. Although I do not intend to 
see Lin's performance as a mere commodification, I will treat it as a 
foregrounding of .t~e opposition between "art" and "popular culture." 
As the writer of the introduction to the play indicates, "Stan Lai's 
work successfully blends 'art' and , 'popular culture'. "89 Besides this 
opposition, the title of the play has already reminded us of other 
88 Let me ' have a brief synopsis of the two plays here. At the 
beginning of the play, it is Secret Love. The male leading character Jiang 
Bingliu and the female leading character Yun Zhifan (Lin Ching-hsia) meet in 
Shanghai. Later after Yun returns to her homeland, Yunnan, she loses 
contact with Jiang due to the chaos of the War of Resistance against Japan. 
Jiang spends the rest of his life in menlories of Yun, and he does not see Yun 
again until thirty-seven years later. But after a brief and awkward talk, Yun 
leaves Jiang again. On the other hand, in The Peach Blossom Spring, the 
leading male character Lao Tao leaves home angrily since his wife is carrying 
on with a fish dealer. Accidentally he comes upon the peach blossom spring. 
At first, LaoTao spends a wonderful time there, but later he cannot resist his 
longing for his wife, and he decides to go home. His wife and the fish dealer 
have since his departure got married, and Lao Tao invites them to the peach 
blossom spring. They think Lao Tao has gone crazy, and Lao Tao eventually 
leaves in despair. 
, 89Quoted from the brochure distributed during the performance of the 
play at Hong Kong Cultural Center, Dec. 1991. This is a bilingual edition, and 
this quotation appears only in Chinese. Translation nline. 
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oppositions: Secret Love versus The Peach Blossoln Spring, and thus 
"modern versus ancient," "tragedy versus comedy." Although the 
play is grounded on these pairs of binary oppositions, we are told 
that "a complete th t ea re experIence cannot be contained In a 
"tragedy" and a "comedy," but rather resides In their interaction. "90 
(my emphasis) In other words, theatre ex perlence has to be 
mediated between the two opposites although none of them can 
wholly represent the experience itself. 
The trust in "interaction," unfortunately, leads the audience to 
a "logical" comprehension of the play. In fact, i'n Chinese, the title 
should be Secret Love The Peach BlossQln Spring. However, due to 
the limitation of English gramlnar, the English translation of the title 
has to add the preposition "for," and this "for" has already strangely 
asserted the impo'rtance of "interaction" between the two plays, and 
it thus significantly limits the "meaning" of the play. In fact, there 
should be a caesura between the two plays. However, the belief In 
"interaction" of "opposites" erases the caesura by adding "for" to 
generate the "meaning" of the play. Secret Love (.)The Peach 
Blossom Spring becomes Secret Love for The Peach Blossonl Spring. 
So a simple . juxtaposition of the two plays is transformed into an 
interaction of the two sides, leading it to a monologic meaning of 
"everybody has a secret love for 'the peach blossom spring' (implying 
a dreamland)," as the writer of the introduction states. 91 
90Quoted from the introduction to the play, p.18. 
91 Quoted from the Chinese version of the introduction, p.6. 
Translation mine. I understand that to focus on the word "for" - a Saussurian 
analysis - is one-sided. Stan Lai is educated at Berkeley and his affiliation with 
Western discourse, his Taiwanese nativity, and his sense between cultures 
should also be coped with. The reason I choose lo focus on "for" here is that I 
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I have no intention of dealing with the "interaction" in details, 
and thus I will not examine the structure of the cross-presentation of 
the two plays. What I wish to focus on IS the seemingly 
homogeneous situation brought forth by a juxtaposition of the two 
plays. Heterogeneity gradually becomes homogeneous in the course 
of the play. Through the so-called "interaction," Secret Love and The 
Peach Blossom Spring gradually becomes Secret Love for The Peach 
Blossom Spring, bringing out the message of "everybody has a secret 
love for the peach blossom spring, but those who are already there 
take no notice of it." Through the dreamland "peach blossom spring," 
the heterogeneity of the two plays (comedy vs tragedy) becomes 
homogeneous. "Art" and "popular culture" becomes homogeneous 
too. We can no longer see the "caesura" between the juxtaposition of 
the two plays. The "polyphony" of a juxtaposition has been silenced 
by the transcendental "dreamland" - the meaning of the play - which 
everyone longs for: 
I would permit myself to diverge a bit to use Samuel 
Beckett's Waiting for Godot to illustrate the production of "meaning." 
As Raymond Williams points out, 
"Godot", that is to say, IS not to be translated 
or even interpreted; it is an indefiniteness 
that defines what the real experIence is: not 
the coming but the waiting.92 
want to foreground the way the colonizing grand narrati ve produces meaning 
according to its set of signification system. 
92Raymond Williams, Dranla from Ibsen to Brecht (London: Penguin, 
1973), p.348. 
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Anyhow, the "meaning" of "Godot" has been a very popular issue, and 
the critics seem to forget that any explanation of the term IS a mere 
supplement of "Godot" which, as I see it, radically challenges a 
unified and determined "meaning" In literature. Unfortunately, the 
"Godot" in Beckett's play, upon representation by other critics, 
becomes an orIgIn and a meaning which strangely makes the 
"i~logical" dialogue In the play, which originally alms at 
defamiliarizing literary "meaning," become a logical meaning. In the 
pursuit of "meaning" of "Godot," one tends to forget to question the 
pursuit itself, the complicity between the production of meaning and 
one's own interpretive strategy, and to ask . how "meaning" IS 
legitimated. 
In fact, "meaning" can be seen as an instrumental reason that 
tries to fill in the "absence" in the play. "Meaninglessness" seems to 
be intolerable. There are numerous interpretations · of this "Godot," 
such as death, titne, truth and even God ... We can even see "Godot" 
as a process of Derridean diff:rance - as Williams claims, it is simply 
a process of waiting. Unfortunately, the process of waiting is often 
terminated In the pursuit of meaning. Even if we consider the 
"meaning" of the play as "meaninglessness," the discursive centre IS 
still "meaning," and the politics of the legitimation of meaning, or 
even meaninglessness, has been silenced. 
When "meaninglessness" becomes a kind of "meaning," the 
"meaning" of Secret Love jor The Peach Blossoln Spring is indeed 
reasonable. In ,the interaction of the two plays, the caesura in 
between has been erased, and any ambiguity between the two has 
been rationalized. The erasure and rationalization can be seen as 
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legitimated by the dominant system of interpretation In which 
"meaning," "logic," "reason" and "homogeneity" are always at the 
centre. 
In fact, this situation IS very common In a comparative 
discourse. Throughout this thesis, I have been trying to demonstrate 
the appropriation of a juxtaposition by the dominant system of 
interpretation. . The dominant system of interpretation will have the 
power to make heterogeneity and difference become homogeneous 
and logical under the category of "meaning," and at the end 
appropriate them. 
In the play, "the peach blossom spring" transforms to a "full 
presence" in the pursuit of the "meaning" of the. play; no longer is it 
fictional or transcendental. It further strangely becomes the "origin" 
of the two plays, albeit a supplementary one. This problematic 
"supplementary" origin, in complicity with the pursuit of "meaning," 
has escaped questioning. In such a production of meaning, the 
message of "secret love for the peach blossom spring" has completely 
dominated the polyphonic nature between Secret Love and The 
Peach Blossoln Spring. The "caesura" which causes ambivalence 
between the colonizer and the colonized, as invoked by HOlni Bhabha, 
has been filled by "for" which produces the "meaning" of the play. 
Because of the trust in the transcendental "peach blossom spring," 
the nostalgia for the lost origin (in Chinese, the word yuan 5~ .... "spring" 
can also mean origin) paradoxically becomes the "meaning" of the 
, 
play. Similarly, the "ambivalence" between the colonizer and the 
colonized may be erased, ironically reasserting the difference 
between the colonizer and the colonized. 
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In a rationalized discourse, "the peach blossom spring" 
becomes the origin that everyone is searching for, becoming a kind of 
"instrumental reason" which silences the production of meaning by 
the grand colonizing narrative. One is merely complacent In the 
shadow of "meaning" and thus forgetting the so-called "being In the 
peach blossom spring" is only a small fantasy in a grand narrative 
secured by the hierarchy between the dominant and the marginal 
discourse. 93 
At this point I wish to reassert that the provisional term 
"Chinese hermeneutics" I design in the first chapter . of this thesis IS 
exactly a means of calling into question the production of meaning In 
such a juxtaposition. Strangely enough, a "hermeneutics" which 
implies theories of interpretation does not have to question the 
production of meaning in a formulation like "Chinese hermeneutics," 
and the term itself is simply conceived as a meaningful act by using 
"modern"/Western methodologies to treat the classical Chinese 
literary tradition. In fact, this thesis can be seen as being inscribed 
at the caesura between "Chinese" and "hermeneutics," as a 
problematization of the construction of the juxtaposition. 
In my rearticulation of Secret Love for The Peach BloSS0111 
Spring and above all, Chinese, critical discourse, I understand that I 
must conform to the dominant system of interpretation. In other 
words, there is no way we can find an Archimedean point on which 
we can find a fulcrum to overturn the hegemonic interpretation. For 
93For instance, in traditional Chinese poetry, juxtaposition can be 
seen as a means to hold the two sides together without specifying their 
relationship since such a specification may limit the self-presentation of the 
juxtaposition. I have already cited examples like these in Chapter Three when 
I discuss the criticism of Sikong Tu and Zhong Rang. 
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a discourse of the Other In face of this predicament, the point that 
matters is to question the legitimation of meaning from within. What 
one has to do is to free oneself from the shadow of the grand 
narrative which fascinates us by a seemingly "logical" meaning. 
Unless one can problematize gIven discursive categories like 
"meaning," "interpretation" and "logic" in one's rearticulation of them, 
one cannot hope to establish new spaces for one's own articulation. 
In sum, as a contemporary critic, one is obliged to engage 
oneself in Western discourse in which one has to weed off the 
extravagant wish that the East can become a self-sufficient subject. 
Gates's analysis of other critics' readings of Fanon has reminded us 
not to dream that Said's, Bhabha's, Spivak's, Fanon's or even Gates's 
, 
theories may illuminate a way out of the colonialism In 
interpretation, and in discussing these theories one has already been 
trapped in a colonial discourse in interpretation. Anyhow, these 
theories do expose different positions of contemporary discourse and 
these positions enable Chinese critical discourse to define its own 
con t ex tan d po sit ion, hen c e uti I i z i n g the In to ( re - ) v 0 ice an 
"unfiltered" radical hermeneutics of one's own. Theory, like poison, 
can be therapeutic if used properly. Without such a discourse of our 
own, we are no different from "otherness machines" with 
manufacturing alterity for the consumption of the West as our 
principal role. 
Let me borrow the last words from Trinh T. Minh-ha. When 
she talks about a story teller at the end of her W0J11an, Native, Other, 
there is a perfect illustration of our reading position: 
Even if the telling condemns her present life, 
what IS more important is to (re- )tell the 
story as she thinks it should· be told; in other 
words, to maintain the difference that allows 
(her) truth to live on. The difference. He 
, 
does not hear or see. He cannot give. Never 
the given, for there is no end in sight.94 
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94Trinh T. Minh-ha, 
University Press, 1990), p.150. 
story please refer to p .149. 
Wo In all, N at i v e, 0 { Iz e r (B loom i n g ton: In d i a n a 
For further details about the storyteller and the 
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Glossary* 
Ambivalence 'denotes the relationship between the colonizer and 
the colonized. Homi Bhabha holds that the colonizer does not 
exert his power unmetaphorically upon the colonized and their 
relationship is not as determinate as Edward Said would say. 
Anxiety of Influence IS the condition that affects a poet who tries 
to revise the works of his precursors. In this· thesis the writing of 
criticism is conceived to be showing a similar kind of anxiety. 
Chinese Hernleneutics is a provisional term used in Chapter One 
and Chapter Four, which is devised as a questioning of the 
construction of the term itself, the production of meaning in a 
comparative discourse and the gIven dominant discursive 
categories. It IS used to bring forth the problems faced by Chinese 
critical discourse wit1;1 respect to "reading." 
Critic-function IS a term coined from Michel Foucault's "author-
function." Foucault holds that "author" should no longer point only 
towards the individual who writes a certain work. "Author" has 
become a "function" that may be appropriated by others. 
* This glossary includes only the tcchnical terms which are closely 
related to the main argument of this thesis. For the sake of brevity, I have to 
choose to be concise rathcr than comprehensive. For further implications 
that these terms nlay have, please refer to the context ,in which they appear in 
' the thesis. 
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Critical Other refers to a group or system excluded by 
categorization, and thus having no voice of its own In a critical 
discourse. This kind of issues can be seen as central to the 
production of dominant ideologies in critical discourse. 
Decolonization IS an act of freeing the colonized discourse from the 
tyranny of the discourse of the colonizer. In this thesis the 
decolonization of interpretation is seen to be essential in finding a 
voice of one's own. 
De/Formation extends the "deformation" as implied by the Prague 
School who holds that deformation is a way to fore~round a 
certain elemen t. The foregrounding of the Chinese-Western 
comparative hermeneutical framework in this thesis can be seen 
as a way to paradoxically "form" an "other" way of initiating an 
"other" hermeneutics. 
Diff/ranee IS the famous term ' of Jacques Derrida, simultaneously 
implying difference and deferment. 
, / 
In the process of dijjer.ance, 
"meaning" is' permanently . deferred, and this kind of "deferring" 
and "differing" is also conceived in this thesis as a process In 
critical discourse, in which "meaning" is never self-present. It 
should be noted that it is a paradoxical act to define the term. 
Dissemination IS the state that meanIng grows and scatters 
endlessly. In this thesis the scattering of ideas and meaning 
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across cultures, In particular from dominant to marginal culture, is 
foregrounded. 
Dominant Discourse is the network of meanIng, sIgns, rhetoric and 
ideologies of the mainstream culture. In this thesis that focuses 
on Chinese-Western comparative discourse, Western culture is 
almost always seen as the dominant discourse. 
Epistemic Violence is developed from Michel Foucault's episteme 
' that indicates the totality and the transformation uniting all 
discursive practices. Gayatri Spivak extends the term to refer to 
the relationship between the Master and the subaltern, and in this 
thesis it is also used to refer to the (violent) legitimation of 
meanIngs and ideas of the dominant culture. 
Erasure, another Derridean ter,m, denotes the use of an inadequate 
term which one can find no alternative. The term is crossed out, 
but the term and th'e crossing are both printed out. 
Fusion of Horizons refers to the overcomIng of foreign elements in 
a text by the interpreter. In Hans-Georg Gadamer's sense, any act 
of understanding is a process of "fusion of horizons." 
Hermeneutics of Inde'terminacy, a term used by Geoffrey 
Hartman to highlight the uncertainty "of interpretation, proposes a 
type of analysis that renounces the ambition to demystify its 
subject (e.g., a text). 
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Hermeneutics of Suspicion IS a term used by Paul Ricoeur to refer 
to the hermeneutics which "cast into doubt the claims of direct 
form of self-knowledge." Gadamer adds that "every form of 
hermeneutics is a form of overcoming an awareness of suspicion." 
Interpretive Community IS a term used by Stanley Fish to show 
that a certain group of people may share similar conventions of 
in terpretati on. 
Intertextuality denotes a web formed by two or more texts. Julia 
Kristeva sees "text" as a permutation of texts, an intertextuality. 
In other words, several texts intersect and neutralize one another 
to form an intertext. 
Literary Hermeneutics, as used by Hans-Robert Jauss, is the task 
of interpreting the tension between texts, concretizing meaning In 
ever different ways, and the meaning of the text will thus become 
richer and richer. 
~arginality is conceived in this thesis as the situation that a certain 
system marginalizes another system by ' using a certain set of 
dominating . norms. The experience of the marginalized can be 
seen as dominated by the stronger system which always assumes 
a superior position. 
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M eani ng/S i gni ficance IS a paIr of terms used by Eric-Donald 
Hirsch to differentiate two different aspects in the interpretation 
of a text. "Meaning" can be determined in a text and the author's 
intention is responsible for that, whereas significance IS the 
interaction of this meaning with the reader, and is thus an 
extension of the meaning outside the text. 
Metacriticism, as apparent by the term itself, is "criticism of 
criticism." In this thesis it is used to highlight different levels of 
discourse. 
Metalanguage can be said to be "a language about a language." In 
other words, it refers to the typical situation that we can discuss 
our language in the same language. Furthermore, the metalingual 
function of language checks whether the same code is being used. 
Neocolonialism IS concerned with "the more awkward effects of 
colonialism in the present," as outlined by Robert Young. It. also 
implies a different situation In which colonialism has been 
transformed into a su btler strategy in discursive practices. 
Oppositional Discourse tries to VOIce against the domination of the 
hegemonic culture. It has to find its articulation by an opposition 
against dominant ideologies I which reproduce themselves in given 
discursive categories. 
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Paradox of Interpretation refers to the aporIa 111 which those who 
believe that interpretations may not guarantee certainty still have 
to use interpretation paradoxically to wish the readers to correctly 
interpret their interpretations. 
Paradox of Textuality IS used In this thesis as the textuality of 
I interpretations which exhibit paradox of interpretation · as 
mentioned above. The relationship among different levels of 
discourse which are originated from a paradox of interpretation 
will inevitably be paradoxical. The textuality of these discursive 
practices will thus generate paradoxes. 
Positional .: Superiority IS used by Edward Said to denote the 
flexible position of the West over the East, and this relation IS 
supported by a kind of strategy which predetermines a situation 
in which the West is always In relative upper hand in whatever 
relationship with the East. 
Violent Hier~rchy highlights the so-called "hierarchy" which IS 
violently imposed upon two or more systems according to · a 
certain set of standards which is always predetermined by the 
dominant system. In this thesis the ~ violent hierarchy of Western 
Theory over Chinese text is a signal Issue that is to be 
deconstructed. 
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